S. HRG. 98-174, PT. 2

UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
ARMS CONTROL RESOLUTIONS

S. Res. 57

A RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE SENATE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS SHOULD ADHERE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF A MUTUAL GUARANTEED BUILD-DOWN OF NUCLEAR FORCES

S.J. Res. 2

A JOINT RESOLUTION CALLING FOR A MUTUAL AND VERIFIABLE FREEZE AND REDUCTION IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS

S.J. Res. 29

A JOINT RESOLUTION TO PREVENT NUCLEAR TESTING

S. Res. 83

A RESOLUTION FOR STRATEGIC TALKS ON PREVENTION (S.T.O.P.)

S.J. Res. 74

A JOINT RESOLUTION TO EXPRESS THE SENSE OF THE CONGRESS THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD PROMOTE THE GOAL OF STRATEGIC STABILITY AND REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR THROUGH A BALANCED PROGRAM OF FORCE MODERNIZATION TOGETHER WITH NEGOTIATIONS TO ACHIEVE SUBSTANTIAL, VERIFIABLE, AND MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTIONS TO EQUAL LEVELS IN THE NUCLEAR ARSENALS OF BOTH SUPERPOWERS

S.J. Res. 12

A JOINT RESOLUTION RELATIVE TO ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

S. Res. 107

A RESOLUTION RELATING TO NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION NEGOTIATIONS

S. Res. 142

A RESOLUTION TO LIMIT MULTIPLE WARHEAD ICBM'S

S. Res. 159

A RESOLUTION RELATING TO IN-FLIGHT TESTING OF ICBM'S

S. Con. Res. 46

A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE REDUCTION AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR ARMS

JUNE 21, 22, AND 23, 1983

PART 2

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
23-619 O WASHINGTON : 1983

5381-43

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois, *Chairman*

HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr., Maryland
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas
RUDY BOSCHWITZ, Minnesota
LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska

CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, Jr., Delaware
JOHN GLENN, Ohio
PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska
PAUL E. TSONGAS, Massachusetts
ALAN CRANSTON, California
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

Edward G. Sanders, *Staff Director*
Geryld B. Christianson, *Minority Staff Director*

CONTENTS

Hearing days: Page
- June 21, 1983 1
- June 22, 1983 169
- June 23, 1983 289

JUNE 21, 1983

Statement of:
- Cohen, Hon. William S., a U.S. Senator from Maine 29
- Dole, Hon. Robert, a U.S. Senator from Kansas 114
- Garn, Hon. Jake, a U.S. Senator from Utah 103
- Hart, Hon. Gary, a U.S. Senator from Colorado 151
- Hatfield, Hon. Mark O., a U.S. Senator from Oregon 80
- Kennedy, Hon. Edward M., a U.S. Senator from Massachusetts 69
- Leach, Hon. James, a Representative in Congress from Iowa 163
- Levin, Hon. Carl, a U.S. Senator from Michigan 91
- Markey, Hon. Edward J., a Representative in Congress from Massachusetts 155
- Nunn, Hon. Sam, a U.S. Senator from Georgia 34

Insertions for the record:
- Text of S. Res. 57, S.J. Res. 2, S.J. Res. 29, S. Res. 83, S.J. Res. 74, S.J. Res. 12, S. Res. 107, S. Res. 142, S. Res. 159, and S. Con. Res. 46 3
- Prepared statement of Hon. Sam Nunn 38
- Letters to President Reagan and his answers thereto regarding the strategic modernization program 41
- Questions and answers on the guaranteed mutual builddown concept-submitted by Senator Cohen 45
- Letter to Senator Percy from Kenneth L. Adelman, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, dated June 16, 1983, concerning Senator Pell's question on whether under any circumstances the U.S. would be prepared to give up the MX program 51
- Prepared statement of Hon. Mark O. Hatfield 82
- Letters to Senator Percy from Senators Kennedy and Hatfield, dated June 30, 1983, in response to Senator Pressler's question on the nuclear freeze and builddown proposals 90
- Prepared statement of Hon. Carl Levin 95
- Prepared statement of Hon. Robert Dole 118
- Prepared statement of Hon. Edward J. Markey 158
- Prepared statement of Hon. James Leach 163

JUNE 22, 1983

Statement of:
- Catania, Susan Kmetty, Illinois State Representative, 1973–83; Chair, Illinois Commission the Status of Women, 1974–83, and Fellow, Institute of Politics, Harvard University, Chicago, Ill 244
- Colby, William E., former Director, Central Intelligence Agency, on behalf of the Committee for National Security, Washington, D.C 271
- Gayler, Adm. Noel, U.S. Navy (ret.), on behalf of the American Committee on East-West Accord, Washington, D.C 267
- Herndon, Terry, president, Citizens Against Nuclear War, Washington, D.C 246
- Kehler, Randall, national coordinator, Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, St. Louis, Mo 242

Statement of—Continued
  Page
  Redlener, Irwin, M.D., chairman, National Executive Committee, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Cambridge, Mass 275
  Rostow, Hon. Eugene V 187
  Seignious, Gen. George C 186
  Smith, Hon. Gerard C 171
  Warnke, Hon. Paul 182
  Willens, harold, California Nuclear Freeze Initiative, Los Angeles, Calif 242
Insertions for the record:
  Even development and testing of space-based ABM components is prohibited by the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 174
  Prepared statement of Hon. Gerard C. Smith 178
  Prepared statement of Hon. Eugene V. Rostow 197
  Prepared statement of Hon. Claiborne Pell 228
  Letter to Senator Pell from Kenneth L. Adelman, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, dated June 16, 1983, in response to the question of whether the United States would be prepared to give up the MX program 228
  Prepared statement of Harold Willens 243
  Prepared statement of Terry Herndon 246
  Prepared statement of Randall Kehler 258
  Prepared statement of Adm. Noel Gayler 269
  Prepared statement of William E. Colby 273

JUNE 23, 1983

Statement of:
  Dam, Hon. Kenneth W., Deputy Secretary of State 291
Insertions for the record:
  Prepared statement of Hon. Kenneth W. Dam 293
  Press briefing by Hon. George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, June 22, 1983 296
  State Department's responses to additional questions submitted by Senator Mathias 322
Appendix:
  Letter to Senator Percy from the Friends Committee on National Legislation, dated June 23, 1983, regarding the nuclear freeze 325

UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

TUESDAY, JUNE 21, 1983

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pressler, Pell, Biden, and Tsongas.

The Chairman. We want to welcome our guests this morning. I am sorry that I was slightly delayed in getting here from the airport.

The committee is convened today to receive testimony from the sponsors of a number of arms control resolutions presently before the Senate. Ten of these resolutions have been referred to the committee. Copies have been distributed to each member.

House Joint Resolution 13, the nuclear freeze resolution which passed the House on May 4, would have been referred to the committee, but an objection was lodged and it was read twice and placed on the Senate calendar.

This year it is my intention to follow the same procedure we did last year in marking up the various resolutions. I would hope a majority of members, ideally a two-thirds majority, the same majority as would be required to ratify a treaty on the Senator floor, would be able to reach agreement on a resolution combining the best elements of the 10 resolutions in markup.

We accomplished this last year when the committee approved House Joint Resolution 212 by a 12 to 5 vote, and I would hope the same spirit of bipartisanship and cooperation will again prevail.

Today we will hear from the authors of these resolutions, taken in order according to the number of cosponsors. Our first witnesses are Senators Bill Cohen and Sam Nunn, both highly respected members of the Armed Services Committee and originators of the mutual guaranteed builddown resolution, Senate Resolution 57.

Senators, we welcome you this morning. The meteoric rise of the builddown proposal, which now has 45 cosponsors in the Senate, is truly a tribute to your leadership in this area. The builddown has gone from an op-ed piece to the endorsement of the President 4 short months.

As Senator Nunn pointed out, when the builddown proposal is presented to the Soviets in Geneva it will be the first time a major arms control proposal has originated in the U.S. Congress. I am an early cosponsor to your resolution, and I joined you in writing the President in late April to urge him to adopt the builddown.

I am, therefore, strongly supportive of the remarkable initiative. At the same time, though, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge that the builddown concept has its detractors. I have heard from quite a few the last 4 days in Illinois.

There are those who fear the builddown would require draconian cuts in the U.S. strategic force. I have also heard criticism that the builddown was meant to camouflage a major buildup.

I believe the builddown comes out somewhere in the middle. It provides for a prudent balance between the clear need for selective and stabilizing modernization programs and our overriding objective of achieving significant reductions in current inventory.

We look forward to hearing your testimony. I am sure it will answer many of the questions that have been raised about this very innovative and highly creative proposal.

[The text of S. Res. 57, S.J. Res. 2, S.J. Res. 29, S. Res. 83, S.J. Res. 74, S.J. Res. 12, S. Res. 107, S. Res. 142, S. Res. 159, and S. Con. Res. 46 follows:]

98TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 57

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should adhere to the principle of a mutual guaranteed build-down of nuclear forces.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

FEBRUARY 3 (legislative day, JANUARY 25), 1983

Mr. COHEN (for himself and Mr. NUNN) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should adhere to the principle of a mutual guaranteed build-down of nuclear forces.

Whereas strategic stability is essential to the security and well-being of the United States and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Whereas force survivability is indispensable to stability at the strategic nuclear level;

Whereas strategic stability requires the periodic replacement of vulnerable strategic nuclear weapons with more survivable weapon systems;

Whereas both the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have pledged themselves to seek major reductions in strategic nuclear forces;

Whereas the goal of strategic stability thus requires a balanced blend of force modernization and force reduction by both the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Whereas that goal could be served by a mutual guaranteed build-down of nuclear forces, under which the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would each eliminate from its operational forces two nuclear warheads for each newly deployed nuclear warhead;

Whereas the principle of a guaranteed build-down is compatible with other proposals to reduce nuclear forces already advanced by the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; and

Whereas the principle of a guaranteed build-down could be inaugurated immediately and remain in effect as a step toward achievement of such equal and lower levels of forces as may be agreed to by the two Governments: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should propose to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in the context of the relevant negotiations, immediate adherence by the Government of the United States and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the principle of a guaranteed strategic build-down of nuclear forces, subject to agreed procedures of verification and compliance.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this resolution to the President.

○

X

98TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. J. RES. 2

Calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze and reduction in nuclear weapons.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 26 (legislative day, JANUARY 25), 1983

Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. HATFIELD, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. BINGAMAN, Mr. BRADLEY, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. BYRD, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. DODD, Mr. EAGLETON, Mr. GLENN, Mr. HART, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. LEAHY, Mr. LAUTENBERG, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. MATSUNAGA, Mr. MELCHER, Mr. METZENBAUM, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. PELL, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. STAFFORD, Mr. TSONGAS, Mr. WEICKER, Mr. CHAFEE, and Mr. PROXMIRE) introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

JOINT RESOLUTION

Calling for a mutual and verifiable freeze and reduction in nuclear weapons.

Whereas the greatest challenge facing the Earth is to prevent the occurrence of nuclear war by accident or design;

Whereas the nuclear arms race is dangerously increasing the risk of a holocaust that would be humanity's final war; and

Whereas a mutual and verifiable freeze followed by reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems is needed to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce the risk of nuclear war: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (1) as an immediate arms control objective, the United States and the Soviet Union should—

(a) pursue an immediate and complete halt to the nuclear arms race;

(b) decide when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze on the testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems; and

(c) give special attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve.

(2) Proceeding from the freeze, the United States and the Soviet Union should pursue major, mutual, and verifiable reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems, through annual percentages or equally effective means, in a manner that enhances stability.

○

II

98th CONGRESS
1st Session

S. J. RES. 29

To prevent nuclear testing.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

February 3 (legislative day, January 25), 1983

Mr. Kennedy (for himself, Mr. Mathias, Mr. Baucus, Mr. Biden, Mr. Bradley, Mr. Bumpers, Mr. Burdick, Mr. Chafee, Mr. Cranston, Mr. Danforth, Mr. Dixon, Mr. Dodd, Mr. Durenberger, Mr. Eagleton, Mr. Ford, Mr. Glenn, Mr. Hart, Mr. Hatfield, Mr. Heinz, Mr. Huddleston, Mr. Inouye, Mrs. Kassebaum, Mr. Leahy, Mr. Levin, Mr. Matsunaga, Mr. Metzenbaum, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Moynihan, Mr. Pell, Mr. Proxmire, Mr. Pryor, Mr. Riegle, Mr. Sarbanes, Mr. Stafford, Mr. Tsongas, and Mr. Melcher) introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

JOINT RESOLUTION

To prevent nuclear testing.

Whereas the United States is committed in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time;

Whereas a comprehensive test ban treaty would promote the security of the United States by constraining the United States-Soviet nuclear arms competition and by strengthening efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

Whereas the Threshold Test Ban Treaty was signed in 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty was signed in

1976, and both have yet to be considered for ratification by the full Senate;

Whereas the ratification of the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty and the Threshold Test Ban Treaty will ensure the effectiveness and full implementation of significant new verification procedures and so make completion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and further progress in strategic arms control more probable;

Whereas a comprehensive test ban treaty must be adequately verifiable, and significant progress has been made in detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions by seismological and other means;

Whereas a comprehensive test ban treaty, to be effective, must ban nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as well as nuclear weapons tests;

Whereas presently negotiations are not being pursued by the United States toward completion of a comprehensive test ban agreement;

Whereas substantial progress has been made in past negotiations on important elements of the comprehensive test ban treaty, including prohibition of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, as well as effective and unprecedented verification measures in the areas of seismic monitoring and onsite inspection; and

Whereas the past five administrations have supported the achievement of a comprehensive test ban treaty: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That at the earliest possible date the President of the United States should—

(1) request Senate consent to ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties, signed in 1974 and 1976 respectively; and

(2) resume trilateral negotiations toward conclusion of a verifiable comprehensive test ban treaty.

○

III

98TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 83

For Strategic Talks on Prevention (S.T.O.P.).

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 8 (legislative day, MARCH 7), 1983

Mr. HART submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

RESOLUTION

For Strategic Talks on Prevention (S.T.O.P.).

Whereas a nuclear war would kill or injure millions of Americans, destroy most of our population centers, devastate our industrial and technological base, and threaten the survival of the Republic; and

Whereas there can be no assurance that a nuclear war, once initiated, would remain limited in scope; and

Whereas negotiations are currently underway in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union; and

Whereas there exists the ever-present risk that nuclear weapons might be employed through accident or miscalculation; and

Whereas the unregulated spread of nuclear technology increases the number of countries or terrorist groups which can detonate a nuclear bomb: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the United States and the Soviet Union expand the negotiations in Geneva to consider ways to prevent the use of nuclear weapons; to reduce the danger of nuclear war through accident or miscalculation; to agree on steps to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by third parties, including terrorists; to reduce the vulnerability of the two sides' nuclear retaliatory forces to preemptive attack; and to achieve sizable, mutual, and verifiable reductions in the number of strategic nuclear warheads and their delivery vehicles, consistent with the requirements for national security and international stability.

○

II

98TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. J. RES. 74

To express the sense of the Congress that the United States should promote the goal of strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war through a balanced program of force modernization together with negotiations to achieve substantial, verifiable, and militarily significant reductions to equal levels in the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MARCH 24 (legislative day, MARCH 21), 1983

Mr. GARN introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

JOINT RESOLUTION

To express the sense of the Congress that the United States should promote the goal of strategic stability and reduce the risk of nuclear war through a balanced program of force modernization together with negotiations to achieve substantial, verifiable, and militarily significant reductions to equal levels in the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers.

Whereas force survivability is indispensable to stability at the strategic and theater nuclear level;

Whereas strategic stability requires the periodic modernization of vulnerable and aging strategic and theater nuclear weapons with more survivable weapon systems;

Whereas the Soviet nuclear arms buildup, undertaken largely during the time frame of the SALT I and SALT II agreements, threatens the survivability of the United States land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force;

Whereas the current strategic bomber force of the United States will grow increasingly less capable of executing its penetration mission through the decade of the 1980's;

Whereas the unilateral deployment of SS–20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles threatens the security of America's European and Asian allies;

Whereas a nuclear freeze under current conditions would lock into place the vulnerability of key elements of the United States strategic forces, as well as an overall nuclear-force imbalance which would be destabilizing and could increase the likelihood of nuclear war;

Whereas a balanced program of strategic and theater nuclear-force modernization together with sizable and verifiable mutual reductions of Soviet and United States nuclear forces to an equal and substantially reduced level, in keeping with the mandate of the Congress as expressed in Public Law 92–448, would enhance stability and ensure the preservation of peace with liberty; and

Whereas President Reagan has proposed such a balanced program of force modernization and the United States is currently engaged in negotiations with the Soviet Union at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) talks: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That in order to promote the goal of strategic stability and reduce the threat of nuclear war, the United States should—

(1) pursue a balanced program of strategic and theater nuclear-force modernization with specific emphasis on increased survivability of nuclear weapon systems;

(2) seek to preserve through force modernization and arms-reduction negotiations the balanced and flexible force capabilities which have historically characterized the United States nuclear deterrent;

(3) continue to pursue negotiated mutual reductions to equal and verifiable levels in the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers, with particular emphasis given to effective measures of verification, including provisions for onsite inspections; and

(4) agree to such reductions only within the bilateral framework of the ongoing START and INF negotiations.

○

II

98TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. J. RES. 12

Relative to arms control negotiations.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 26 (legislative day, JANUARY 25), 1983

Mrs. KASSEBAUM (for herself and Mr. GLENN) introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

JOINT RESOLUTION

Relative to arms control negotiations.

Whereas the United States is committed in the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and in the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all explosions of nuclear weapons for all time;

Whereas intervening arms control agreements have failed to halt the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and their testing;

Whereas the United States conducted more tests of nuclear explosive devices in 1982 than in any year since 1970, and Soviet testing has not appreciably declined;

Whereas no United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics arms control treaty has entered into force for ten years;

Whereas negotiations for a comprehensive test ban treaty have been suspended;

Whereas the deteriorating state of United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics relations complicates the achievement of an arms control treaty while, at the same time, increases the need for such an agreement; and

Whereas the gradual mutual elimination, by stages, of the testing of nuclear explosive devices and of land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles would reestablish momentum toward the reduction of nuclear arms, would serve as a meaningful, reciprocal, confidence-building gesture, and would enhance the evolution of more reliable verification: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States should propose that negotiations begin on a priority basis, with the Soviet Union on an advance notification and test reduction treaty that would—

(1) require long-term advance notification to the other party of all tests of nuclear explosive devices and all flight tests of land-based intercontinental missiles;

(2) limit each party to an agreed upon number of all such tests each year; and

(3) seek to provide that the allowed number of all such tests be reduced, each year, to a zero level by the end of an agreed upon period of time.

○

III

98TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 107

Relating to nuclear arms reduction negotiations.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

APRIL 12, 1983

Mr. SPECTER submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

RESOLUTION

Relating to nuclear arms reduction negotiations.

Whereas nuclear arms reduction negotiations that have been conducted between representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union in Geneva for sixteen and ten months, respectively, and have been known as I.N.F. (Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces) and START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks), appear at an impasse;

Whereas leaders of both countries have publicly and categorically rejected all proposals of the other side;

Whereas rhetoric employed publicly by both sides has recently become harsh, personal and unconstructive to an unprecedented degree with the President of the United States referring to the Soviet Union as the "evil empire" and the Premier of the Soviet Union calling the President a "liar" and "insane";

Whereas, with Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles scheduled to be deployed in Great Britain and West Germany in December 1983, considerable concern has been expressed by citizens of those and other NATO countries, including demonstrators, over the lack of progress in the above negotiations;

Whereas such unrest has not been calmed by the "interim agreement" recently proposed by President Reagan, which was promptly rejected by Deputy Premier Andrei Gromyko;

Whereas the NATO nations approved deployment of the missiles as part of a "two-track plan" which included all-out efforts to conclude a missile reduction agreement that would make any deployment unnecessary;

Whereas, without a new agreement to reduce missiles, the United States and the Soviet Union may discontinue compliance with earlier agreements, including the SALT II treaty, which both countries have informally undertaken to observe even though not obligated to since it was never ratified by the United States;

Whereas, accordingly, there appears to have recently arisen a substantial risk of a new, dangerous, unlimited and expensive arms race;

Whereas such an arms race could be highly destabilizing and could increase the risk of nuclear war;

Whereas such an arms race might well extend to space and include positioning nuclear and other weapons in space for the first time;

Whereas, nearly one year ago, the Senate passed a sense of the Senate resolution urging a nuclear summit by near unanimous vote of ninety-two to six, but the President, who had initially opposed the resolution, chose to defer any summit meeting in order to give ambassadorial negotiators opportunity to complete necessary preliminary work and perhaps reach tentative agreement;

Whereas ten and sixteen months of intensive negotiation have produced no result and little if any progress in Geneva but has enabled each side to fully explain its positions and obtain compelte clarifications of those of the other side;

Whereas the time of maximum opportunity to achieve agreement is after final decisions by the host NATO nations to deploy but before actual deployment in December 1983;

Whereas once the American Presidential Campaign has begun in 1984 when numerous primary elections occur, the risk of delay to await the outcome of the General Election in November increases drastically, and the capability of the President to conclude an agreement and obtain Senate ratification decreases;

Whereas President Reagan is widely known for his unusual skills as a communicator and negotiator;

Whereas Premier Andropov and his predecessor publicly have offered to attend a summit on nuclear arms reductions;

Whereas the sincerity of the President to reduce nuclear arms and the efficacy of his strategy to negotiate such reductions have been questioned by some observers, including many citizens of NATO nations;

Whereas the most convincing demonstration of the President's serious and realistic intentions would be his proposing and participating in a nuclear summit;

Whereas it is believed that some officials appointed by the administration advocate relying almost exclusively on arms construction rather than a combination of arms construction and arms control and their influence may appear greater than it may be, in part by reason of the absence of observable participation by the President in the negotiating process;

Whereas it is difficult to conceive of any way in which proposing and holding a summit could harm the prospects of nuclear arms reductions even if such summit did not result ultimately in an agreement being concluded; and

Whereas, at the very least, agreement to hold a summit, coming at a time when the United States and the Soviet Union seem unable to agree on anything and at a time of high and growing tension, would offer hope to all and lessen tensions, thereby reducing the risk of nuclear war: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President of the United States and the Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should meet as soon as practicable and not later than November 1983, when intermediate range ballistic and cruise missiles are scheduled to be deployed in several Western European countries. This meeting, at a mutually agreed upon location, would be for the purpose of negotiating significant, mutual, equal and verifiable reductions at least in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear missiles and related warheads and, if possible, also in other nuclear weapons and delivery systems. It should result in agreement on fundamental terms that could then be incorporated into a draft treaty, with further details to be negotiated as soon as possible thereafter between Soviet and American representatives in Geneva as a continuation of the I.N.F. and START talks.

○

III

98TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 142

To limit multiple warhead ICBM's.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 12 (legislative day, MAY 9), 1983

Mr. HUDDLESTON submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

RESOLUTION

To limit multiple warhead ICBM's.

Resolved, That the President should call on the leadership of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to enter immediately into a bilateral moratorium on the testing and deployment of new types of ICBM's or new variants of existing types of ICBM's armed with more than one warhead as a supplement to existing formal and informal limitations on strategic offensive arms.

SEC. 2. No funds shall be expended under this or any other Act for the testing or production of the MX for six months or until such time as the President certifies to the Congress that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has tested or is deploying a new type of ICBM or a new variant of an existing type ICBM with more than one warhead after the date the bilateral moratorium comes into force.

SEC. 3. The President is urged to propose to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the following arms limitations:

(a) the two parties be allowed to test, deploy and produce one new type of ICBM of a very small size armed with a single warhead;

(b) all future variants of existing types of ICBM's be tested with single warheads; and

(c) a schedule be established for the phased reduction to an agreed ceiling of currently deployed MIRV'd ICBM's.

SEC. 4. The terms new and existing types of ICBM's are used herein as defined in article IV.9 of the SALT II Treaty. An exisitng type is an ICBM flight-tested as of May 1, 1979; a new type is a system tested after that date.

○

III

98TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 159

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should propose a mutual pause in flight tests of new MIRV'd ICBM's and seek an arms control agreement in the START talks incorporating the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 16 (legislative day, JUNE 13), 1983

Mr. LEVIN (for himself, Mrs. KASSEBAUM, Mr. INOUYE, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. PRESSLER, Mr. ANDREWS, Mr. DURENBERGER, Mr. SPECTER, Mr. BOREN, and Mr. MATHIAS) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should propose a mutual pause in flight tests of new MIRV'd ICBM's and seek an arms control agreement in the START talks incorporating the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission.

Whereas the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics should expeditiously conclude an arms control agreement designed not only to reduce the number of existing and planned nuclear weapons, but also to move toward more stable and less vulnerable systems which will decrease the likelihood of nuclear war; and

Whereas the President has agreed to the principle of mutual build-down as a means to achieve these objectives: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate of the United States of America that—

(1) the United States should announce its willingness to pause in the testing of new ICBM's with more than one warhead while strategic arms negotiations proceed if the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics agrees to such a pause; and

(2) the United States should propose to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the START talks an arms control agreement which implements the President's Commission on Strategic Forces' recommendations to reduce the number of ICBM's with more than one warhead on both sides and encourage the development of small, single warhead ICBM's, with limitations and reductions on overall strategic nuclear forces formulated in terms of warheads rather than launchers.

SEC. 2. The President shall report to the appropriate committees of the Congress on the text and presentation of such proposal.

SEC. 3. As used in this resolution, the term "new ICBM" means either an ICBM flight-tested after May 1, 1979, or a variant of an ICBM flight-tested as of that date.

○

III

98TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. CON. RES. 46

Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding negotiations for the reduction and control of nuclear arms.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 16 (legislative day, JUNE 13), 1983

Mr. DOLE (for himself, Mr. STEVENS, Mr. ABDNOR, Mr. ARMSTRONG, Mr. KASTEN, Mr. MURKOWSKI, Mr. TRIBLE, and Mr. GRASSLEY) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

---

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Expressing the sense of the Congress regarding negotiations for the reduction and control of nuclear arms.

Whereas, the most effective deterrent to aggression remains a strong defense on the part of the United States and its allies;

Whereas, the United States must, therefore, prudently rely upon nuclear weaponry as long as such weaponry is essential to deter any potential aggressor that is similarly armed;

Whereas, the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear weapons by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics aimed toward Europe must evoke effective counter deployment unless substantial or full reductions of such weapons are effected;

Whereas, however, all humanity stands to gain from reduced nuclear force levels that are mutual and verifiable;

Whereas, furthermore, the dangers of miscalculation or accident increase as nuclear weapons increase and proliferate;

Whereas, in consideration of the above and in consultation with allies of the United States, President Reagan has put forth innovative proposals for nuclear arms reduction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) negotiations, as well as proposals for substantial reductions in the strategic arms reduction talks (START); and

Whereas, such proposals, if adopted, would eliminate the need for certain planned deployments of nuclear weapons and could lead to further agreements on lower nuclear force levels, thus furthering the cause of peace: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That (a) the Congress hereby expresses its support for the policy initiatives of the President in proposing to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics substantial reductions in the levels of nuclear forces of the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and urges that special attention should be given to making proposals for deep reductions in those nuclear weapons which are the most destabilizing.

(b) It is the sense of the Congress that the President should propose to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—

(1) a mutual and verifiable freeze of nuclear forces at such reduced levels and in such a manner that the United States is not limited to nuclear forces inferior to those provided for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

(2) in formulating the freeze and successor agreements, relevant developments in nonnuclear military technology should be borne in mind; and

(3) the freeze should be a long-term agreement with provisions for renewal and with provisions for periodic interim reviews looking to equal and even lower nuclear force levels.

(c) It is also the sense of the Congress that the President should propose to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics discussions on practical measures to reduce the danger of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation, including agreed measures of crisis management, and on practical measures to deter the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their use by third parties.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy of this concurrent resolution to the President.

○

The **Chairman**. Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I join you in welcoming our colleagues today and believe that their testimony will be very valuable to us. I was particularly struck by the importance of the role of the Senate during the hearing last week on our relations with the Soviet Union. At that hearing the Secretary of State was reminded by the Senator from Massachusetts that this administration may be the first since the 1950's which did not have a significant arms control agreement with the Soviets nor meet them at the summit.

The Secretary's reply was "So be it." I know I was sorely disappointed our Secretary was not able to offer brighter prospects. The message should be clear: Chances are slim at best for any arms control agreement in the near future unless we in the Congress insist, if Congress waits for the chips to fall they will fall exactly where the administration has placed them, and that is very unlikely to be in the area of arms control achievement.

The American people are concerned that this administration is leading us closer to nuclear war. Millions have expressed their dismay and have gone into the streets, the polling booths, and the halls of Congress, pleading for a nuclear freeze to halt the arms race and reduce the threat of nuclear war.

I know I share these feelings. I feel we are closer to nuclear war now than we were on Janaury 20, 1981, when this administration took over.

I know our witnesses today do not all support the freeze. Some oppose it, some support it, some favor other approaches. But I believe the common desire among the witnesses is to achieve some measure of arms control, and I am encouraged by that and I am convinced that we in Congress have better sense than to face an arms control disaster and conclude "So be it."

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Pell.

Senator Pressler.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

During this week, the committee will conduct an extremely important series of hearings on U.S. strategic arms control policy and options. We have created the groundwork for this week's inquiry through a number of hearings, including with the Scowcroft Commission and with two former U.S. Ambassadors to the Soviet Union.

I wish to welcome the Members of Congress here today. I will closely follow your testimony on the arms control resolutions that you have offered to the Senate.

I believe that strategic arms control is vitally important. If we cannot rid the world of nuclear weapons through significant and verifiable arms control agreements, we will continue to risk disaster through a nuclear exchange. I compliment my colleagues who are here to testify today. Through the resolutions you have offered, each of you have helped to focus attention upon the nuclear dilemma. I believe that through our deliberations of this week we can begin to develop a solution to this most important problem.

At the same time, let me note that while we work toward significant and verifiable deep reductions in nuclear forces, we should not forget to pay equal attention to the modest steps that we and the Soviets can take to increase stability. Some of these modest steps could improve the atmosphere for the giant steps in the nuclear area. Also, in some areas, taking small steps today could help to avert major defense expenditures in the future.

It is for these reasons that I have offered a resolution on space arms control issues. I hope that we will soon be in the position to conclude a markup of Senate Resolution 43 on antisatellite weapons and other space weapons.

For the same reason, I have long supported ratification of the signed but unimplemented Threshold Test Ban [TTB] and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions [PNE] Treaties.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, Senator Cohen.

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM S. COHEN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE

Senator COHEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First I would like to thank you and commend you for holding these hearings, and also for your support for the builddown concept. You have worked closely with Senator Nunn and me, and your staff member, Bob Bell, has been working with our staff for the past several months, trying to refine the concept to answer some of the questions that have been raised about the builddown. I really want to commend you for your effort in trying to make this a constructive and indeed viable proposal.

I would also like to thank Senator Biden, who has been a long proponent of arms control, who is also a freeze supporter. Nonetheless, he has also seen fit to support the concept of a builddown in an effort to try to achieve a workable mechanism to produce a reduced level of nuclear weapons on both sides of the globe. And I want to thank him publicly for his support and efforts in trying to get this concept more refined and indeed workable.

I would like to take a few moments to read this statement. So many questions have been raised about the builddown concept, I would like to set the record as clear as I possible can from the beginning.

Early this year, Senator Nunn and I introduced a resolution in the Senate aimed at permitting some modernization of United States and Soviet forces while forcing significant overall reductions. By exacting a high price for the deployment of new warheads, the mutual guaranteed builddown concept encourages movement toward nuclear forces with characteristics, such as survivability, that will enhance stability while achieving meaningful arms reductions. This is consonant with President Reagan's stated objective.

Senator Nunn and I discussed the concept at length with our colleagues, and after careful study and over the course of several months, as you have indicated, Mr. Chairman, 43 additional Senators joined us in cosponsoring the builddown resolution. The list includes longstanding proponents of military force modernization and strong supporters of a nuclear freeze resolution. The Senators united around a common goal of enhancing strategic stability through reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the Soviet Union and the United States to equal and lower levels.

The builddown concept is not intended to defeat the freeze. I think all of us are working for the same goal, and that is the preservation of peace. I think indeed it is the freeze movement that has raised the Nation's consciousness to the point where proposals for significant arms reductions can have a real impact on U.S. policymakers. The builddown is an early but meaningful step toward the ultimate aim of eliminating the threat of nuclear war. While longer term objectives are pursued, we believe the builddown represents an interim measure which can have a real impact on international stability.

Today I would like to outline what the builddown is and, equally importantly, what it is not, and describe my views on how the concept is being addressed within the administration.

The builddown is intended to be a means of achieving meaningful and rapid reductions in United States and Soviet forces and allowing some modernization to proceed while seeking the broader objectives of arms control. The builddown concept is characterized by what I would call "bounded flexibility." Senator Nunn and I did not seek to define all the parameters of the builddown. We believe the administration must have sufficient flexibility in formulating and negotiating the builddown to facilitate positive movement. Any builddown proposal, however, must contain certain essential elements and meet certain requirements in order to achieve its objectives.

The builddown concept calls for the United States and the Soviet Union to agree that each will eliminate from its operational forces two nuclear warheads for each newly deployed nuclear warhead. This formula, as I indicated in an article back in January of this year, is not chiseled in stone. Variable ratios could enhance achievement of a more stable nuclear environment. But they must be applied carefully. For example, one might consider establishing a 3 for 1 ratio for newly deployed warheads on MIRV'd ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic missiles] to discourage their deployment, and a 1½ to 1 ratio for newly deployed warheads on single warhead ICBM's to encourage their deployment. But I would caution, any exception to the 2 for 1 ratio would have to be consistent with the objectives of the builddown concept, which requires negotiability to be successful. I would consider unacceptable, for example, a formula which was crafted to require a radical restructuring of Soviet forces but which had little real impact on U.S. forces, because to achieve true stability each side must be satisfied its forces are and will remain secure.

To be workable and negotiable, the builddown concept must be applied comprehensively. In personal discussions with administration officials, I have been assured that the builddown proposal would be proposed in this comprehensive form.

Freedom to mix must be permitted in applying the builddown principle. To assure negotiability of the principle, each side should be free to deploy its new warheads on launchers of its own choosing and to retire older warheads on launchers of its own choosing, subject to previously negotiated strategic arms restraints.

Each side would build down under agreed ratios until it reached a negotiated floor or "plateau," at which time it would hold. And when the other side reached the same plateau, the builddown formula would again take effect. Because the United States begins the process with substantially more strategic warheads, at no time will its forces have to drop below the Soviet levels.

The verification procedures required for SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] would apply to reductions under the builddown concept, with primary reliance on national technical means. The sides would utilize counting rules previously negotiated for missiles, supplemented by appropriate rules for bombers, which associate a set number of warheads with each strategic delivery vehicle. The builddown proposal would include associated measures to facilitate verification, such as the prohibition on interference with national technical means. The builddown would proceed from an agreed data base, which would be an updated version of the one agreed upon in SALT II.

Applied in the manner in which it was intended, the builddown would place a cap on the strategic nuclear forces of the two sides. Under present trends, and in the absence of a strategic arms control agreement, the strategic arsenals of the two sides could well reach over 15,000 nuclear warheads by the early 1990's. The builddown mechanism would halt and reverse the present buildup in nuclear warheads, resulting in forces with thousands fewer warheads than the sides might otherwise deploy. So by reversing the trends, the builddown would demonstrate that both sides are genuinely prepared to reduce their forces and would create a context conducive to further negotiations to insure stability at lower levels. Military planners would gain the advantage of being able to scale their own forces against a declining rather than expanding threat.

The builddown is not intended to be a substitute for START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks]. While framed in the context of present arms control talks, the builddown would be negotiated and implemented before the final agreement is reached on a broader and more complex START accord. The builddown would complement the START negotiations by requiring immediate reductions and enhancing the incentives to move toward more stable systems. It is not, however, I repeat, intended to force the restructuring of a side's forces by requiring a prior agreement to reduce heavy ICBM's. It must not be weighted with sublimits aimed at achieving the broader objectives of ongoing negotiations.

The builddown would not undermine the U.S. START position. Indeed, I think it is wholly consistent with the reduction ceilings presently in that position. President Reagan has already proposed a cut in ICBM and SLBM warheads to 5,000 on each side. The builddown floor might include that number, plus a suitable allowance for warheads ascribed to other strategic launchers, remembering that within the overall total, and subject to the counting rules and ratios, each side would be free to allocate its warheads to ballistic missiles or air-breathing systems as it deemed best.

The builddown would not offer the Soviets a plausible opportunity to gain an advantage by foregoing modernization. If the Soviets chose to stand still, they would then not add the thousands of new warheads which unclassified estimates project in their forces over the next decade. They would remain in a posture increasingly vulnerable to U.S. force improvements.

It is most improbable, in my judgment, that the Soviet leaders would direct their military to suspend development and deployment of the Typhoon submarines and the SLBM's [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] it carries, the new Blackjack bomber, and the two new ICBM's reportedly already being tested, because to do so would be to accept a unilateral freeze on their part while the United States continues to modernize.

Nevertheless, to hedge against this unlikely scenario, we have incorporated in the builddown proposal the suggestion of a series of progressively lower "plateaus" at which either side's builddown could hold until reached by the other side.

Because the Soviets have a greater number of single warhead SLBM's and a relatively small bomber force, their ongoing modernization programs would have to induce substantial reductions in existing ICBM forces. To give you an example, each Typhoon submarine added to their fleet would require the elimination of 360 warheads—roughly the total number of warheads on all existing Yankee I-class submarines. After the first 1,000 or so new warheads added by the Soviets, each additional warhead would require reductions in their existing MIRV'd ICBM's, the forces that are of the greatest concern for stability.

One of the earliest supporters of the builddown concept was the President of the United States. After reading a description of the concept in a newspaper article I wrote last January, President Reagan called me to express his sincere and serious interest in pursuing the builddown idea, because I think he recognized it was compatible with his own START position.

He reaffirmed this view in a letter to Senator Percy, Senator Nunn, and myself on May 12. Two weeks ago, in a meeting with a number of Senators at the White House, President Reagan again expressed his commitment to implementing the builddown concept.

But I must say in all candor that a number of people the President has charged with developing a builddown proposal do not appear to share his positive commitment to that concept. One notable exception, I think, is Bud McFarlane, whom I think you, Mr. Chairman, are well acquainted with. The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs has been most helpful in working with Senator Nunn, myself, you, and others.

Senator Nunn and I have consistently made it clear we welcome any serious study of all aspects of the builddown, that we are prepared to work toward resolving any difficulties that might arise. During the past few months, there have been some administration officials who have raised a number of concerns regarding the application of the builddown. Senator Nunn and I carefully studied the point and have adjusted the elements of the builddown accordingly. For example, we suggested the variable ratios which could promote achievement of stabilizing reductions and deployments, and we devised the idea of plateaus to insure continued equality as the sides build down. And we have also suggested counting rules for bombers and bomber weapons to insure comprehensiveness in application of the builddown concept.

Nevertheless, we continue to hear the same matters raised in a manner which indicates either a lack of understanding or a lack of desire to support the President's commitment to the builddown concept.

Frankly, I find this situation somewhat puzzling and at the same time disappointing; puzzling because of what appears to be an insufficient understanding of the requirements to help President Reagan honor his pledge and commitment; and disappointing because I fear that an opportunity to achieve a real consensus on critical matters may be slipping away.

Senator Nunn and I, as well as experts such as Lt. Gen. Kelly Burke, Gen. David Jones, Dr. Richard DeLauer, and Dr. William Perry, believe that the builddown concept offers a real means of enhancing stability through arms reductions and weapons modernization. What is needed now is will. We have to move beyond simply raising problems and seeking limited solutions to a positive approach aimed at overcoming difficulties and achieving the idea's objectives. There are quite straightforward solutions to every problem that has been raised. I am troubled that within the administration there may be those who do not in fact support the President's commitment to reducing nuclear forces. And indeed, efforts to shelter large numbers of weapons from an equitable application of the builddown rule would not only undermine the integrity and negotiability of the concept, but would directly contravene the President's repeated personal pledge to seek stability at equal and lower levels of strategic forces.

If I might recapitulate, the mutual guaranteed builddown principle is an equitable, negotiable, and verifiable approach to reducing nuclear weapons on both sides. It is intended to apply comprehensively to warheads and strategic missiles and bombers, allowing freedom to mix and using counting rules largely already worked out in SALT.

It should employ ratios aimed at encouraging stabilizing deployments such as small, single-warhead ICBM's and discouraging destabilizing modernization such as MIRV'd ICBM's. It should aim at reductions to a level based on the present U.S. START proposal of 5,000 warheads for strategic ballistic missiles and an allowance for necessary warhead deployments on strategic bombers. The precise figure should, of course, be consistent with the President's commitment to mutual reductions to equal and lower levels. Defining a builddown proposal in these terms would, I am convinced, hold great promise for moving the two sides toward important reductions sooner than the more complex and far-reaching negotiations required for START.

Because it is my conviction there is a desperate need for a framework combining arms reductions and weapons modernization, I linked my prospective votes on the MX missile to a number of measures, including the implementation of the builddown concept. Recently, in a thoughtful and constructive statement on the Senate floor, my colleague Senator Leahy said: "It would be unfortunate if the builddown became inextricably linked with a strategy intended merely to gain support for President Reagan's plan to deploy 100 MX's in vulnerable Minuteman silos." Senator Leahy correctly noted this was not the intent of the sponsors.

I do no intend to permit the builddown to become a meaningless link in the process of procuring the MX missile. In this regard, without a clear and constructive formulation of the builddown proposal by the administration, I do not intend to continue supporting the MX program. I will continue insisting that the builddown retain its intended effect of moving us toward a more stable nuclear environment, and I hope to have the support of the Foreign Relations Committee in this endeavor.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Cohen, very much indeed. Senator Nunn.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM NUNN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM GEORGIA

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, first let me thank you for holding these hearings on a crucial subject at a crucial time. I also want to thank you for your leadership in this respect, not just in the last 6 or 8 months as one of the cosponsors of the builddown proposal, but for your consistent advocacy of arms control and your effective leadership.

I also want to commend Senator Pell, Senator Biden, Senator Tsongas, and all of the members who are patiently going through a lot of testimony on a lot of different ideas, testimony I think of great importance.

Senator Cohen, of course, was the originator of the concept of the builddown. His vigorous expression in this respect and his leadership are unique in terms of congressional leadership in arms control.

So, Senator Cohen, I say to you as I begin my testimony, I am grateful to be a cosponsor and I am thankful for your innovative ideas and bold leadership.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of Senate Resolution 57, which calls for a guaranteed mutual builddown of the nuclear forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

This committee faces a challenging and critical task. The freeze resolution, the guaranteed builddown proposal, the MX debate, the Scowcroft report, and the revised START proposal have generated more awareness of and involvement with nuclear force policies in arms control matters than ever before.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, these hearings come at a rare point in our history where the public, the Congress and the Reagan administration are all involved in this search and struggle for arms control measures which will reduce the dangers facing the world. For the first time since I came to the Senate in 1972, there is enough interest and focus today by the media, by the public, by the Congress, and the executive branch, to give me hope that we can develop long-term goals in arms control and that we can develop a bipartisan consensus on these goals that has a chance of lasting beyond one administation.

In its simplest form, the builddown envisions the elimination of existing warheads from operational inventories for each newly deployed modernized warhead. Most importantly, it would provide strategic planners on both sides with incentives to minimize deployments of multiple warhead systems since these would require large reductions. This is of course the direction and focus recommended by the Scowcroft Commission.

Mr. Chairman, rather than repeat what Senator Cohen has already said, I will take the approach of raising a few questions that we have heard over and over again and attempt to give my own answers to those questions.

The first question we hear, of course, is a very legitimate question, and that is what is the fundamental difference between the freeze and the builddown. The freeze movement reflects the great concern of many Americans that the nuclear arms competition has gotten out of control. By conveying this concern to elected officials in the Congress and the executive branch, the freeze movement has helped to bring about a gradual reorientation of U.S. policy toward the more vigorous pursuit of arms control.

The specific vehicle proposed by the freeze movement, however, is not in my view the best way to attain those objectives. Questions of negotiability and verifiability aside, a bilateral freeze on the development, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons would not in my view be in the best interest of the United States because it would prevent us from acquiring the more survivable nuclear forces we must have to continue to deter nuclear war.

The builddown permits modernization by allowing the addition of more survivable forces. The freeze does not. This is the fundamental difference. The former Secretary of State and chairman of this committee's Arms Control Subcommittee at one time, our former colleague Ed Muskie, has termed the builddown concept "the kind of constructive initiative for which those of us who support a nuclear freeze have been waiting."

Question 2: Why does the builddown permit new weapons if we are trying to reduce nuclear arsenals?

My answer to that, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, is for over 30 years we have succeeded in avoiding nuclear war. We have provided incentives for the U.S.S.R. to seek more stable political relations by making it clear that no matter how large an attack the Soviets mounted against this country, such substantial U.S. forces would survive that attack as to guarantee the devastation of their country in retaliation.

There is no near-term alternative to this dependence on deterrence through the threat of retaliation. The credibility of our deterrent hinges upon our ability to maintain forces which are clearly capable of surviving an attack and penetrating Soviet defenses. Most important are our strategic submarines and the missiles deployed on them. We are replacing our existing 20-year-old submarines with newer, quieter submarines. We are adding new missiles with greater range. This extends the area in which the submarines can patrol and greatly enhances survivability, which is absolutely essential to preserving a credible sea-based deterrent force. These improvements would be precluded by a nuclear freeze.

Our bomber forces also require improvements due to their age and the continued improvements in Soviet air defenses. Key improvements, such as the air-launched cruise missile and Stealth programs, would not be possible under a comprehensive freeze.

Over time, as the credibility of the bomber component of the deterrant erodes, we would face increasingly dangerous situations. We already have one vulnerable nuclear component. We cannot afford any doubts about the survivability of the other two legs of the nuclear deterrent. These facts of life require modernization.

Question 3: What would be the impact of the buildown agreement on the overall size and structure of the two sides' nuclear arsenals?

My answer to that, Mr. Chairman, is both the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in ambitious programs to modernize and expand their nuclear arsenals. In the absence of significant arms control agreements, both nations will substantially augment the number of strategic and intermediate range nuclear warheads over the next 5 to 10 years.

The Soviet Union is deploying a new generation of submarine-based missiles with multiple warheads, a bomber with cruise missiles, and they continue to develop new types of land-based ballistic missiles for the United States. For the U.S. part, our modernization programs cover all three components of the nuclear deterrent, with our cruise missile programs causing the largest portion of a prospective increase in the nuclear arsenal.

The great advantage of a builddown agreement is it would harness the momentum of the two sides' modernization programs to bring about reductions in force levels. Although the extent of any reduction would vary with the specifics of the agreement, any builddown arrangement would bring immediate and substantial cuts in the number of operational weapons on the two sides.

Moreover, since the two nations would be building down together, they would be in a better position to negotiate a more substantial agreement which enforced a stable force posture on both sides. Each side can do with fewer weapons, there is no doubt about it, but only if it is confident its opponent is also restraining the prospective growth of its inventory.

Question 4: How would the builddown enhance stability?

My answer is, the basic answer is that the builddown permits modernization to improve survivability while driving down force levels on both sides. Stability in the nuclear balance is achieved primarily through a complex web of survivability of the forces as well as survivability of command and control. The more survivable the force and the ability to use that force, the less gain and less incentive to a potential attack.

Detailed calculations have shown clearly the great premium on survivability which a shrinking force intrinsically would require. This premium could be enhanced through the use of variable replacement ratios, as Senator Cohen has already mentioned, structured to encourage the deployment of survivable systems. The builddown would essentially be biased against destabilizing systems in favor of more survivable systems.

Deployment of large MIRV'd systems such as the Soviet SS-18 and, for that matter, the U.S. MX would require large reductions. In my judgment, the builddown, by permitting the modernization, by requiring simultaneous reductions, and by extracting penalties on de-destablilizing systems, would combine to produce a more stable nuclear balance with reduced numbers on both sides.

Question 5: Does the builddown exclude other types of qualitative restraints on each side's strategic modernization options?

My answer to that is no. The builddown proposal is intended to complement, not supplant, other arms control initiatives. I would expect both the START and the INF negotiations to continue while builddown arrangements are being put in place and certainly as it is being implemented. The builddown proposal is intended to bring about rapid and immediate reductions in the two sides' forces while the necessarily more difficult negotiations for qualitative restrictions continue to take place.

The builddown envisions continued observance of such SALT II provisions as the ban on deployment of new heavy ICBM's, the ban on increasing ICBM and SLBM warhead fractionation beyond those levels specified in SALT II, as well as the sublimit on total numbers of MIRV'd ballistic missiles.

In other words, the builddown does not repeal the accomplishments of previous arms control agreements. In addition, the builddown does not preclude other types of constraints that the sides might agree to.

Mr. Chairman, the question has recently come up and you and I have discussed this. What would happen if the Soviets claimed a particular missile was not a "new type" but rather a variant of an existing type that fell within the modification limits spelled out in SALT II? Specifically, how would the builddown handle the Soviets PL-5 when some analysts consider this a "new type," although the Soviets insist it is a permissible variant of the SS-13?

In answer, the problem alluded to here is not unique for the builddown, but is occuring primarily under the SALT II "new type" rules which permit each side only one such new missile.

It is primarily a question of definition and verification. If the United States decided that the PL-5 was a "new type," it would be covered under the builddown as well as SALT II. If the Soviets did not agree to this, we have the option of abrogating an agreement.

If we are undecided how to categorize the PL-5 due to definitional problems, then we have the ability under the builddown as well as START to negoitate more precise guidelines.

Essentially, irrespective of the builddown, the United States has to decide whether or not the PL-5 is a "new type" or whether we need a better definition of a "new type."

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying that I am convinced in the next 6 or 8 months the Reagan administration has an excellent chance of reaching meaningful arms control agreements with the Soviets. President Reagan has been dealt high cards to take with him to the negotiating table, including, but not limited to, a bipartisan commission report on strategic programs and arms control, a vigorous American strategic program, including the MX missile, and a NATO alliance firmly committed to the deployment of Pershing II's and ground-launched cruise missiles [GLCM] absent an arms control agreement.

This opportunity that has been presented will require wisdom and sound judgment on the part of the President, his administration and the Congress. In summary, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, as I view it we now have a window of opportunity in arms control.

We must face reality, however, as a nation in our approach to arms control in our own strategic and conventional programs. We must have clear goals, we must have the ability to explain them to our citizens in a democratic society and we must have the patience to pursue them over the long term.

The question facing this committee and indeed, the Nation, is whether we as a democracy can form the consensus behind a rational, persistent, and patient approach to arms control. This is our national challenge.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would ask that my complete statement be put in the record.

The **Chairman**. The full statement will be incorporated in the record, Senator Nunn, and I thank both of you for exceptionally fine testimony.

[Senator Nunn's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Sam Nunn

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify in support of Senate Resolution 57 which calls for a guaranteed mutual builddown of the nuclear forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

This prestigious committee faces a challenging and critical task. The freeze resolution, the guaranteed builddown proposal, the MX debate, the Scowcroft report, and the revised START proposal have generated more awareness of and involvement with nuclear force policies and arms control matters than ever before.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, these hearings come at a rare point in our history when the public, the Congress and the Reagan administration are all involved in this search and struggle for arms control measures that will reduce the dangers facing the world.

For the first time since I came to the Senate in 1972, there is enough interest and focus by the media, the public, the Congress and the executive branch to develop long-term goals in arms control and to develop a bipartisan consensus on these goals that has a chance of lasting beyond one administration.

THE BUILDDOWN

In its simplest form, the builddown envisions the elimination of existing warheads from operational inventories for each newly deployed modernized warhead. Most importantly, it would provide strategic planners on both sides with incentives to minimize deployments of multiple warhead systems since these would require large reductions. This is, of course, the direction and focus recommended by the Scowcroft Commission.

Mr. Chairman, I felt I might be more helpful to the committee by responding to a few pertinent questions that have been raised about the builddown concept

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN FREEZE AND BUILDDOWN

Question 1. What is the fundamental difference between the freeze and the builddown?

Answer. The freeze movement reflects the great concern of many Americans that the nuclear arms competition has gotten out of control. By conveying this concern to elected officials in the Congress and the executive branch, the freeze movement has helped to bring about a gradual reorientation of U.S. policy toward the more vigorous pursuit of arms control.

The specific vehicle proposed by the freeze movement, however, is not in my view the best way to attain those objectives. Questions of negotiability and verifiability aside, a bilateral freeze on the development, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons would not be in the U.S. interest because it would prevent us from acquiring the more survivable nuclear forces we need to deter nuclear war. The builddown permits modernization by allowing the addition of more survivable forces; the freeze does not. This is the fundamental difference. Former Secretary of State and chairman of this committee's Arms Control Subcommittee, Ed Muskie, has termed the builddown concept "the kind of constructive initiative for which those of us who support a nuclear freeze have been waiting."

Question 2. Why does the builddown permit new weapons if we are trying to reduce nuclear arsenals?

Answer. For over 30 years, we have avoided nuclear war. We have provided incentives for the U.S.S.R. to seek more stable political relations by making it clear that no matter how large an attack the Soviets mounted against this country, such substantial U.S. forces would survive as to guarantee the devastation of their country in retaliation. There is no near-term alternative to this dependence on deterrence through the threat of retaliation.

The credibility of our deterrent hinges on our ability to maintain forces which clearly are capable of surviving an attack and penetrating Soviet defenses. Most important are our strategic submarines and the missiles deployed on them. We are replacing our existing 20-year-old submarines with newer, quieter ones. We are adding new missiles with greater range. This extends the area in which the submarines can patrol and greatly enhances survivability which is essential to preserving a credible sea-based deterrent force. These improvements would be precluded by a nuclear freeze.

Our bomber forces also require improvements due to their age and the continuing improvements in Soviet air defenses. Key improvements such as the air-launched cruise missile and STEALTH programs would not be possible under a comprehensive freeze. Over time, as the credibility of the bomber component of the deterrent erodes, we would face an increasingly dangerous situation. We already have one vulnerable nuclear component; we cannot afford any doubts about the survivability of the other two legs of the nuclear deterrent. These facts of life require modernization.

FORCE LEVELS

Question 3. What would be the impact of a builddown agreement on the overall size and structure of the two sides' nuclear arsenals?

Answer. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in ambitious programs to modernize and expand their nuclear arsenals. In the absence of significant arms control agreements, both nations will substantially augment the number of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear warheads over the next 5 to 10 years.

The Soviet Union is deploying a new generation of submarines based missiles with multiple warheads, a new bomber with cruise missiles, and they continue to develop new types of land-based ballistic missiles. For the United States part, our modernization program cover all three components of the nuclear deterrent, with our cruise missile programs causing the largest of a prospective increase in the nuclear arsenal.

The great advantage of a builddown agreement is that it would harness the momentum of the two sides' modernization program to bring about reductions in force levels. Although the extent and rate of reductions would vary with the specifics of the agreement, any builddown arrangement would bring immediate and substantial cuts in the number of operational weapons on the two sides. Moreover, since the two nations would be building down together, they would be in a better position to negotiate a more substantial agreement which enforced a stable force posture on both sides. Each side can do with fewer weapons, but only if it is confident that its opponent is also restraining the prospective growth of its inventory.

STABILITY

Question 4. How would the builddown enhance stability?

Answer. The basic answer is that the builddown permits modernization to improve survivability while driving down force levels on both sides. Stability in the nuclear balance is achieved primarily through a complex web of survivability of the forces and their command and control. The more survivable the force and the ability to use that force, the less gain and less incentive to a potential attacker.

Detailed calculations have shown clearly the great premium on survivability which a shrinking force intrinsically would require. This premium could be enhanced through the use of variable replacement ratios structured to encourage the deployment of survivable systems. The builddown would essentially be biased against destabilizing systems in favor of more survivable systems. Deployment of large MIRVed systems such as the Soviet SS-18 and the U.S. MX would require large reductions. In my judgment, the builddown by permitting modernization, by requiring simultaneous reductions, and by extracting penalties on destabilizing systems, would combine to produce a more stable nuclear balance with reduced numbers on both sides

QUALITATIVE RESTRAINTS

Question 5. Does the builddown exclude other types of qualitative restraints on each side's strategic modernization options?

Answer. The answer is no. The builddown proposal is intended to complement, not supplant, other arms control initiatives. I would expect both the START and INF negotiations to continue while builddown arrangements are being put in place and certainly as it is being implemented. The builddown proposal is intended to bring about rapid and immediate reductions in the two sides' forces while the necessarily more difficult negotiations for qualitative restrictions are taking place.

The builddown concept invisions continued observance of such SALT II provisions as (a) the ban on deployment of new heavy ICBMs; (b) a ban on increasing ICBM and SLBM warhead fractionation beyond those levels specified in SALT II, and (c) the sub-limit on total numbers of MIRVed ballistic missiles.

In other words, the builddown does not repeal the accomplishments of previous arms control agreements. In addition, the builddown does not preclude other types of constraints that the sides might agree to.

"NEW TYPE" PROBLEM

Question 6. What would happen if the Soviets claimed that a particular missile was not a "new type" but rather a variant of an existing type that fell within the modification limits spelled out in SALT II? Specifically, how would the builddown handle the Soviet's PL-5, which some analysts consider a "new type" though the Soviets insist it it a permissible variant of the SS-13?

Answer. The problem alluded to here is not unique to the builddown but is occurring primarily under the SALT II "new types" rules which permits each side only one such new missile.

It is primarily a question of definition and verification. If the United States decided that the PL-5 was a new type, then it would be covered under the builddown as well as SALT II. If the Soviets did not agree to this, then we have the option of abrogating any agreement.

If we are decided about how to categorize the PL-5 due to definitional problems, then we have the ability under the builddown and START to negotiate more precise guidelines.

Essentially, irrespective of the builddown, the United States has to decide whether or not PL-5 is a "new type" or whether we need a better definition of new types.

WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by saying that I am convinced that in the next 6 to 8 months the Reagan administration has an excellent chance of reaching a meaningful arms control agreement with the Soviets. President Reagan has been dealt high cards to take with him to the negotiating table including, but not limited to, a bipartisan commission report on strategic programs and arms control, a vigorous American strategic program including the MX missile, and a NATO Alliance firmly committed to the deployment of PII's and GLCM's absent an arms control agreement.

This opportunity will require wisdom and sound judgment on the part of the administration and the Congress. In summary, Mr. Chairman, we now have a window of opportunity in arms control.

ARMS CONTROL IN THE LONG TERM

We must recognize, however, that arms control negotiations with the Soviets represent a continuous long-term process and that the millennium is not likely to be the result of any such negotiations.

If this arms control window of opportunity is realized with a START agreement, we must realize that there will probably be a START II, a START III, IV, and V. We must realize that our children and grandchildren will also have to face the reality of a nuclear war.

We must recognize that limiting numbers of nuclear weapons under arms control puts a premium on survivable systems if both sides are to being to move away from a hair trigger.

We must recognize that the United States and the Soviet Union have a mutual stake in preventing nuclear proliferation and in promoting confidence-building measures to guard against war by accident or war by miscalculation. Mr. Chairman, I would submit that confidence-building measures, such as the joint nuclear risk reduction concept as well as the exchange of visits by high level United States and

U.S.S.R. military officials I have proposed are perhaps even more important in preventing war over the long run than arms reduction agreements.

We must also recognize that while a nuclear war between the superpowers would be catastrophic, nuclear weapons are not the only weapons that can bring about worldwide catastrophe. We in the Western World have for many years relied on nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional weaknesses and to deter both nuclear and conventional war. As we strive to reduce nuclear weapons and struggle to assure that these weapons of mass destruction will not be used by either side, we must recognize that freedom of the Western World can be lost with conventional as well as nuclear weapons.

We must face reality as a nation in our approach to arms control and our own strategic and conventional programs. We must have clear goals, we must have the ability to explain them to our citizens in a democratic society, and we must have the patience to pursue them over the long term.

The question facing this committee is whether we as a democracy can form a consensus behind a rational, persistent, and patient approach to arms control. This is our national challenge.

The CHAIRMAN. My colleagues on the committee have a very full day with our colleagues appearing before us. We will try to stay on schedule and limit ourselves to 10 minutes on the first round. We will try to make it shorter if we can, but we will keep the record open for further questions. Do you have some record inserts?

Senator COHEN. I have several, Mr. Chairman. We prepared a question-and-answer format which is preliminary in nature, trying to deal with some of the issues Senator Nunn has raised and we have tried to address. There may be other questions following your several days of hearings which will be raised and which will have to be addressed.

So I would hope the committee would look at these questions and proposed answers in the light in which they are offered, simply as trying to construct the response to the issues that have been raised since January about the applicaiton of the builddown.

In addition, I would, for the record, request an insert of letters written to the President and his responses to us so they can become a part of the record, as well, to show his commitment to the concept.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you. As I say, your testimony will be incorporated in the record. It was very complete.

[The information referred to follows:]

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, D.C., April 29, 1983.

The PRESIDENT,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: We have carefully studied the report of your Commission on Strategic Forces and find it to be a valuable contribution to the national debate on U.S. strategic force posture and arms control policy. You establishment of this bipartisan Commission and your decision to endorse its recommendation reflect your sincere and continuing commitment to a strong national defense.

We believe the Commission's report contains the elements necessary to move the United States toward a posture in which force modernization and arms control can produce a more stable world. In particular, we see much merit in the Commission's recommendations to work vigorously toward development and deployment of systems which are collectively more survivable and individually less valuable as targets for a would-be attacker. We fully agree with the Commission's emphasis on a new direction in arms control as an essential component in its recommended program.

We are however, concerned, that the Administration has not responded more fully to the arms control recommendations put forward by the Commission. General Scowcroft has testified that the current U.S. START proposal is "not fully compatible" with the Commission's recommendations. Noting that the U.S. proposal would, if accepted, increase rather than decrease the existing warhead-to-launcher ratio, General Snowcroft has called on the Administration to eliminate its proposed ceiling on ICBM and SLBM launchers, as well as the associated sub-limits on specific ICBM types. However, the Administration has yet to indicate what, if any, modifications will be made in our START proposal.

The present debate in the United States provides an opportunity to develop a widely supported, long-term framework for arms control and weapons modernization—a policy that would put the United States in a position to move forward resolutely on strategic force improvements, while giving the Soviet Union strong incentives to bargain earnestly in ongoing arms reduction negotiations.

Toward this end, we recommend that you announce a firm commitment to the following:

A reformulation of the U.S. START position to incorporate the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission.

A proposal in the appropriate arms control context that the Soviet Union and the United States should adhere to the principle of a guaranteed mutual build-down of nuclear forces in which each country would eliminate from its operational inventory two nuclear warheads for each one newly deployed. This agreement would ultimately be linked to warhead ceilings established in the relevant negotiations, and would be subject to mutually agreed procedures and verification.

An immediate start on research and development of a new, small, single-warhead ICBM, with an assurance that the program will retain a high priority despite probable constraints in the overall defense budget.

In accordance with your request in your April 19, 1983, statement that General Scowcroft have a continuing role in shaping arms control policy, we also urge you to consider establishing a new, bi-partisan arms control panel to advise you on implementing the Commission's arms control recommendations. Establishing such a body would confirm your commitment to the formulation and maintenance of a durable framework for U.S. policy in this area. It would also underscore to our allies and adversaries the continuity of U.S. arms control policy beyond any one Administration.

These proposals would meet the essential concerns and recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission. Revising the U.S. START position and proposing the build-down concept as a mechanism for early arms reductions could give impetus to U.S. arms control efforts and would constitute evidence of U.S. resolve to encourage stability in weapons modernization decisions. The Commission indicates in its report that the build-down concept is consistent with its recommendations. The build-down concept has attracted support from such experts as: Lt. General Kelly Burke, who headed the MX development program as Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Research and Development in your Administration; General David Jones, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the present and previous Under Secretaries of Defense for Research and Engineering, Dr. Richard DeLauer and Dr. William Perry. In addition, a resolution supporting the build-down concept has already attracted 45 co-sponsors in the Senate.

Mr. President, the Scowcroft Commission Report and testimony before the Armed Services Committee make clear that, without effective arms control to restrain the threat, there is no satisfactory solution to the problem of land-based missile vulnerability. Unless we achieve steady progress toward reducing the number of ballistic missile warheads on both sides, the survivability of MX and the single-warhead missile will remain in doubt. For that reason, we believe that explorations should begin at once to determine whether there is any reasonable prospect of agreement with the Soviets to move toward the kind of long-term posture outlined in your Commission's report.

Soviet reaction to the build-down proposal would provide a crucial indication of their willingness to scale down total warhead inventories to levels compatible with ICBM survivability. At the same time, continuing research and development on an upgraded Minuteman III force would provide useful flexibility should developments in these talks make it unnecessary or unwise to field the full MX component.

In sum, Mr. President, our proposed approach would provide a means of immediately implementing the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission. We believe it would attract wide bi-partisan Congressional and public support for a strong national defense and a viable arms reduction policy.

Before we reach a decision on the critical question of opening the production line for the MX missile, we would like an expression of your opinion on the approach we have outlined. If Congress decides to proceed with MX production, it is our opinion that the eventual number of MX missiles to be deployed should be contingent on arms control developments.

After you have had an opportunity to review our recommendations, we would like to meet with you personally to discuss these suggestions.

Sincerely,

William S. Cohen,
U.S. Senator.
Sam Nunn,
U.S. Senator.
Charles H. Percy,
U.S. Senator.

The White House,
Washington, D.C., May 12, 1983.

Hon. William S. Cohen,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Bill: Thank you for your recent letter on our strategic modernization program and its relationship to our arms control proposals. Your letter represents the bi-partisan spirit which I believe will help achieve our common goals of ensuring effective deterrent forces and equitable and verifiable arms reductions.

The fundamental U.S. goal in negotiations concerning arms reduction, and especially in our approach to the START negotiations, is to seek agreements that would enhance security and stability by reducing overall force levels while permitting modernization of U.S. forces necessary for a credible deterrent. As you know, the Scowcroft Commission noted that elements of our START proposal are consistent with and supportive of the Commission's findings. I agree wholeheartedly with the essential theme of the Scowcroft Commission's approach to arms control: the attainment of stability at the lowest possible level of forces.

The Scowcroft Commission's recommendations on modernization and arms control are integrally related. Our action with respect to these recommendations must be equally comprehensive. That is why I am now reviewing our START proposal in order to develop such modifications as are necessary to reflect the Commission's approach, which I share. To cite just one example, the Commission report recommended that the proposed limit on deployed ballistic missiles currently contained in the U.S. START position be reassessed since it is not compatible with a desirable evolution toward small, single-warhead ICBMs. There are a number of alternative approaches available to integrate this and the other Commission recommendations into our approach to arms reductions. As modifications are made to our START proposal, I will continue to seek stability at the lowest possible level of forces.

The planned deployment of the Peacekeeper missile as proposed by my Administration is compatible with the long-term objective of the Scowcroft Commission Report. The Peacekeeper missile, deployed in a mix with small single-warhead ICBMs, would permit us to maintain the effectiveness of our deterrent and enhance stability.

At the same time, let me emphasize that we do not seek a first strike capability. To this end, we will constrain the number of Peacekeeper missiles to the minimum number needed to assure the effectiveness of our deterrent and no more. Our task, of course, would be much easier if the Soviets would agree to work with us to reduce the ratio of accurate warheads to missile silos. Clearly, consistent with our national security requirements, the overall level of Peacekeeper deployment will be influenced by Soviet strategic programs and arms reductions agreements.

In addition, I fully recognize the central role that the small, single-warhead ICBM plays in the overall modernization program recommended by the Scowcroft Commission Report. We will promptly undertake a major effort to bring the proposal of a small, single-warhead ICBM to fruition on a high priority basis.

In considering the implementation of the essential ICBM modernization program, the Scowcroft Commission also recognized that a series of decisions involving both the Executive Branch and the Congress would be necessary in the months ahead in order to determine the future shape of our ICBM force. Further, it noted that not all of these decisions can or should be made in 1983. The deliberate approach to decision making proposed by a number of members of Congress is fully in keeping with the intent of the Scowcroft Commission Report. I fully recognize that a lasting consensus on such an important issue must be built up carefully and I intend to take the time necessary to forge that lasting consensus.

I urge all concerned, however, to keep in mind that if we draw out critical elements of the decision-making process unnecessarily, we encourage the Soviets to delay in negotiations while continuing apace in their own weapons modernization programs.

To avoid this, I am seeking a clear show of support from Congress to signal U.S. resolve. A case in point is the clear necessity of approving funds promptly to procure Peacekeeper missiles. Working together, this should be achievable while simultaneously meeting our mutual desire to deal with deployment issues, whenever possible, in a careful, deliberate manner.

You have suggested that certain additional initiatives could be helpful in moving us toward our goals of security and stability at reduced levels of forces. One of the most prominent of these initiatives is the idea of a "guaranteed build-down."

The principle of a mutual builddown, if formulated and implemented flexibly, and negotiated within the context of our modified START proposal, would be a useful means to achieve the reductions that we all seek.

It would, if properly applied, reinforce our intent to cap the number of strategic ballistic missile warheads on both sides and to cause each side to reduce those levels steadily and substantially over time.

It could be implemented flexibly and with reasonable latitude for each side to balance the forces it deploys and reduces. Variable ratios as appropriate, would encourage more stabilizing rather than less stabilizing systems.

It could be implemented in conjunction with an agreed floor which, when reached, would trigger the suspensions of the builddown rule, subject to renegotiation.

As you have acknowledged, any builddown concept must recognize the importance of strategic modernization and the necessity of maintaining a balance during the reduction process to deal with asymmetries in U.S. and Soviet forces. It would, of course, require agreement on effective verification measures, including counting rules for all systems.

My Administration is currently examining the structure of a builddown proposal which would meet these criteria and would facilitate a START agreement embodying substantial reductions in nuclear forces. I will work with you and your colleagues to develop such a proposal.

Finally, I want to stress the extraordinary contribution made by the Scowcroft Commission. It provided an opportunity for non-partisan analysis of an exceptionally difficult issue as a prelude to obtaining necessary bi-partisan support for critically needed modernization of our strategic forces. While not prescribing the details or the timing, the Commission report suggested certain directions that the continued evolution of our complementary strategy for arms reduction could take. Over the short term, follow-on arrangements involving members of the Commission, as well as close coordination with the Congress, will be extremely helpful both technically and politically in thinking through this evolution. However, we are giving careful consideration to determining which follow-on arrangements best meet our common objectives.

In this regard, I do see merit in a panel with bi-partisan composition and with staggered terms of membership to provide advice and continuity in this area. I will work with the Congress, building upon the experience of the Scowcroft Commission, to strengthen and supplement our consultative and advisory processes to assure a lasting, national, bi-partisan consensus concerning arms control initiatives—a consensus which will deserve to be sustained from one Administration to the next.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN.

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C., May 26, 1983.

Hon. RONALD REAGAN,
President of the United States,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Following the Senate's MX vote yesterday, we were gratified by your statement reconfirming your administration's commitment to serious arms reduction efforts.

We wish to emphasize that our support for releasing fiscal year 1983 funds does not represent a consensus on the need to deploy 100 MX missiles in Minuteman silo launchers. Rather, yesterday we effected our part of an agreement with your Administration to proceed with military controversial program in exhange for a strong commitment to proceed seriously and immediately with a reformulation of the U.S. START proposal, a meaningful guaranteed builddown proposal, development of a more survivable, small single-warhead ICBM, and creation of a bi-partisan, durable arms control panel.

In the next several weeks, we hope to see development by the administration of a meaningful builddown proposal for nucelar arms reductions. Several key points should be borne in mind in framing such a proposal.

The builddown proposal developed for presentation to the Soviet Union must be simple enough to be understood and fair enough to be negotiable.

The builddown concept should be looked upon as a complement to, but not a substitute for, START. The builddown aims solely at achieving meaningful and rapid reductions in United States and Soviet forces while permitting those types of weapons modernization programs which enhance stability. It should not be structured to attempt to achieve the more complicated, longer-term objectives of START.

To be workable and negotiable, the builddown concept must be applied comprehensively to all strategic nuclear warheads.

If applied in the spirit in which the builddown concept was developed, variable ratios could enhance achievement of a more stable nuclear environment. To achieve true stability, each side must be satisfied that its forces are, and will remain, secure.

Yesterday's vote did not constitute approval of the full MX program. In the near future, the Senate will address additional and equally important milestones, which will determine the fate of the MX program. Most immediate will be the authorization and appropriation of funds for opening the MX production line. Two factors will bear heavily on our position on these and any subsequent steps in the MX program: The administration's continued sincerity in developing and implementing a framework for weapons modernization and arms control—in particular, its attitude and actions on the builddown proposal—and developments in arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Mr. President, we believe the present debate over the MX missile offers an opportunity to forge a broad and effective consensus around an arms policy which combines arms reductions and modernization programs in a manner which promises to enhance stability. With good faith and hard work by all, we can create a framework for real progress.

We look forward to working with you in this critical endeavor.

Sincerely,

William S. Cohen, Charles H. Percy, Mack Mattingly, Warren Rudman, Slade Gorton, Rudy Boschwitz, Alan K. Simpson, Arlen Specter, Alfonse D'Amato, Frank H. Murkowski, Dan Quayle, Nancy Landon Kassebaum, Ted Stevens, Richard G. Lugar, Bob Kasten, Pete V. Domenici, John Heinz, Larry Pressler, and John C. Danforth.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE GUARANTEED MUTUAL BUILDDOWN CONCEPT

IMPACT OF BUILDDOWN

Potential inequities

Question 1. What if the Soviets decide not to modernize under a builddown, knowing that the United States will have to reduce forces as it modernizes?

Answer. If so, the Soviets would then not add the thousands of new warheads which unclassified estimates project in their forces over the next decade. They would remain in a posture increasingly vulnerable to U.S. force improvements.

It is implausible that the Soviet leaders would direct their military to suspend development and deployment of: The new Blackjack bomber; the Typhoon submarines and SLBMs it carries; and the two new ICBMs already being tested.

To do so would be to accept a unilateral Soviet deployment freeze, while the United States continues to modernize.

Nevertheless, to hedge against this unlikely scenario, we have incorporated in the builddown proposal the suggestion of a series of progressively lower "plateaus" at which either side's builddown could hold until reached by the other side.

Question 2. Would the builddown in fact have signifiant impact on Soviet forces?

Answer. Yes. Because the Soviets have fewer than 2,000 warheads on single warhead missiles and only a small bomber force, their ongoing modernization programs would have to induce substantial reductions in their existing ICBM forces. For example, each Typhoon submarine added to their fleet would require elimination of 360 warheads—more than the total number of warheads on all existing Yankee-I class submarines. After the first 1,000 or so new warheads are added to the Soviet forces, they would have to begin trading off new weapons against their existing MIRVed ICBM forces.

Question 3. Does the builddown permit the Soviets to retain a disproportionate counter force capability?

Answer. By permitting modernization, a builddown would enable the United States to diminish the Soviet counter-force advantage by moving the United States toward more dispersed, lower value targets—e.g. single-warhead ICBMs. Such deployments could change force exchange ratios drastically, causing the Soviets to expend two warheads for every one they attacked. Furthermore, as noted above, after the Soviets add the first 1,000 or so new warheads to their forces, they would have to begin trading off new weapons against their existing MIRVed ICBM forces.

Question 4. Wouldn't the builddown have a major, disproportionate impact on U.S. strategic bomber programs?

Answer. Exactly how to deal with bomber weapons requires careful consideration. A modernization effort of the magnitude now planned for the U.S. air-launched cruise missile program could require major reductions, depending on how the builddown was applied. Reductions, however, could be accommodated under a builddown—and the Soviets would face difficult decisions as well as they deploy the ALCM-capable Blackjack bomber.

For example, assuming the Blackjack carries 20 ALCMs, under a 2 for 1 builddown ratio, deployment of only 10 Blackjacks would require retirement of the entire existing Bear and Bison force, if they chose to take the required reductions from their present bomber force. To build a significant bomber force the Soviets would have to reduce ICBM warheads by a considerable number. The United States, by contrast, has credit for 500 bombers under SALT counting rules and plans to build only about 100 new bombers in the next decade.

Question 5. The builddown would lead to substantial reductions in U.S. SLBM and bomber levels, but it would not constrain Soviet air defenses and ASW capabilities. Isn't this destabilizing?

Answer. Our builddown proposal envisions a "floor" below which reductions would not continue. This floor can be set low enough to achieve significant reductions but high enough to ensure that each leg of the Triad remains viable vis-a-vis Soviet defenses. We would also note that the U.S. START proposal includes no constraints on Soviet air defenses or ASW capabilities—and that it contemplates cuts in ICBM and SLBM warheads by one-third to 5,000 on each side. Since the United States would begin the process with many more strategic weapons than the Soviet Union, at no time would the United States be obliged to reduce its inventory below the level of the Soviets.

Question 6. Couldn't inequities occur from utilization of SALT counting rules?

Answer. Each side presently has the capability to deploy greater numbers of warheads that are actually carried on its missiles. conceivably, in the near-term, a side could get credit for destroying warheads which do not, in fact, exist. Real missiles, however, would have to be destroyed, regardless of the number of warheads they carry. And in the long run, the dynamic nature of the builddown formula would exact its full toll on the nuclear arsenals of the sides.

Overall force levels

Question 7. What difference would a builddown make in strategic force levels?

Answer. Under SALT II, each side could exceed 15,000 warheads by the early 1990's. That massive expansion in permitted warhead levels was a major flaw in SALT II.

The builddown directly cures that flaw. With both the Soviet and American modernization programs expected to add several thousand warheads in the next few years, reductions required under a builddown rule would reverse that growth trend. Depending on which floor is agreed upon, the builddown could cut total warheads on both sides significantly below the levels currently anticipated or permitted under SALT II. By constraining the scale for the threat in this manner, the builddown would facilitate the task of planning a more stable military relationship. Each side can get by with fewer weapons if it is faced with fewer weapons on the other side. Only by containing the growth of forces in the near-term will it be possible to achieve the President's long-term goal of major reductions to achieve stability at equal and lower levels of forces.

Question 8. What would be the overall impact of the builddown on the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two sides?

Answer. Applied in the manner in which it was intended, the builddown would place a cap on the strategic nuclear forces of the two sides. Under present trends, and in the absence of a strategic arms control agreement, the strategic arsenals of the two sides could reach well over 15,000 nuclear warheads by the early 1990's. The builddown mechanism would halt and reverse the present buildup in nuclear warheads, resulting in forces with thousands fewer warheads than the sides might otherwise deploy.

Stability

Question 9. Doesn't the builddown permit each side to deploy modern destabilizing systems while only giving up obsolete and less effective systems?

Answer. It is correct that the builddown permits modernization, but only at a heavy price. If a side decides not to modernize because the toll is too high, it will, in effect, have accepted a freeze.

If a side decides to modernize, it seems evident that, with declining force levels enforced by a builddown rule, it would act in its own self interest to deploy more survivable forces and to phase out vulnerable ones. A shrinking force intrinsically enhances the premium on survivability.

For example, under a builddown agreement, the Soviets might choose to reduce the potential vulnerability of their ICBM force by deploying a new mobile ICBM. Say each mobile system had 5 warheads, thus requiring the dismantling of 10 existing warheads. Wouldn't the Soviets almost certainly choose to meet this requirement by phasing out one SS-18 rather than two SS-19's? Similarly, for the U.S. part, a builddown agreement would advance the argument for a new ICBM with one warhead in place of the MX. In short, on both sides, a builddown defined in terms of warheads would encourage the proliferation of potential aimpoints, causing each nation in its own interest to prefer deploying larger numbers of missiles with fewer warheads each.

Question 10. What is to say that the sides would opt for more stabilizing systems under builddown?

Answer. The builddown is a mechanism for reaching lowered ceilings on nuclear warheads. As newer, more survivable systems are deployed, older more vulnerable systems would be destroyed.

Ultimately, the older weapons force would be eliminated. The result would be a smaller, more survivable force, which would enhance international stability.

If a side decides not to modernize because the toll is too high, it will, in effect, have accepted a freeze.

If a side decides to pay the price for modernization, it will have to accept an imperative to optimize its smaller force by deploying weapons in a survivable mode.

In either case, a lowered agreed ceiling resulting from ongoing arms control negotiations would tend to force both sides to opt for fewer numbers of warheads on more survivable weapon systems.

Question 11. The builddown seems to be based on an assumption that new weapons are more stabilizing than old ones and that fewer weapons are always more stabilizing. How would the builddown ensure the enhancement of stability?

Answer. With a requirement to eliminate two warheads for each one added, military planners will be forced to emphasize elements which enhance stability.

Threats to survivability will encourage decision-makers to opt for more survivable systems.

Requiring a 2-for-1 reduction in warheads would ultimately discourage deployment of systems with large numbers of reentry vehicles. It would require, at the same time, elimination of older, more vulnerable systems.

We believe that the requirements of the builddown concept would lead the sides to modernize in ways that would enhance stability.

The builddown concept does not assume that "fewer weapons are always more stabilizing." It assumes that fewer systems with characteristics that enhance stability are better.

We would emphasize that the builddown concept deals with warheads. Focusing on warheads ensures real reductions while encouraging deployment of survivable systems.

Qualitative impact

Question 12. Does the builddown exclude other types of qualitative restraints on each sides's strategic modernization options?

Answer. Not at all: The builddown concept should include continued observance of such SALT II provisions as (a) the ban on deployment of new heavy ICBMs; (b) a ban on increasing ICBM and SLBM warhead fractionation beyond those levels specified in the treaty, and (c) the sub-limits on total numbers of MIRVed ballistic missiles.

BUILDDOWN AND START

Question 13. What is the relationship between builddown and START?

Answer. The builddown concept should be looked upon as a complement to, but not a substitute for START. The builddown aims solely at achieving meaningful and rapid reductions in United States and Soviet forces while permitting those types of weapons modernization programs which enhance stability. It should not be structured to attempt to achieve the more complicated, longer-term objectives of START.

Builddown is compatible with—and, indeed complementary to—the START objectives of achieving reductions and enhancing incentives to move toward stabilizing systems. However, it is not intended to achieve the broader and more complex objectives of START and should not be woven into the START negotiations.

The builddown could be negotiated in much the way the Administration is handling confidence building measures. Discussion of builddown could be conducted by a U.S.-Soviet working group in Geneva, reporting to START delegations and governments. These would not interfere with START deliberations.

When work is completed, the builddown agreement would be reviewed and passed on to governments for ratification. It would then serve as an interim measure while negotiations proceeded on the broader, more complex START agreement.

Question 14. Wouldn't the builddown be inconsistent with U.S. efforts to get limits on the most destabilizing systems first?

Answer. While not legislating a restructuring of either side's forces, the builddown would encourage force structure decisions which would enhance stability. For example, improved U.S. counter-force capabilities at lower warhead levels should encourage the Soviet Union to move away from its reliance on large MIRVed ICBMs.

Question 15. Is the builddown compatible with reduction ceilings presently in the U.S. START position?

Answer. President Reagan has already proposed a cut in ICBM and SLBM warheads to 5,000 on each side. The builddown floor might include that number plus a suitable allowance for warheads ascribed to other strategic launchers, remembering that within the overall total, and subject to counting rules and ratios, each side would be free to allocate its warheads to ballistic missiles or air-breathing systems, as it deemed best.

Question 16. Could a builddown agreement be implemented before a START accord was reached?

Answer. Yes. We believe that the United States and U.S.S.R. should establish a START working group to negotiate a builddown agreement. In effect, the two sides would be deciding rules to govern each side's modernization during the period in which START is negotiated. We have already proposed a similar approach in START with respect to Confidence Building Measures (CBM's). The United States has proposed that the two sides establish a CBM working group and indicated that any accord on CBM could be put into force as soon as it was agreed, even if no agreement had been reached on an overall START treaty.

Question 17. Why should the United States propose that modernization be subject to limitations while START is conducted? Aren't we in a stronger position if we can threaten the Soviets with an unrestricted buildup?

Answer. The United States and U.S.S.R. have already agreed, informally, to a modernization rule while START proceeds: each side has pledged not to take actions that would undercut SALT as long as the other shows the same restraint. The administration has testified repeatedly that this policy of "interim restraint" enhances the prospects for success in START. The builddown would carry the interim restraint understanding one step further and—unlike SALT II—provide for real reductions now, which may be essential if public support for U.S. modernization programs is to be sustained.

Question 18. Wouldn't the builddown take as long as START to negotiate and thus get in the way of START or set it back for years?

Answer. No. The builddown incorporates much of what was laboriously negotiated in SALT and could thus be negotiated much quicker than START. Moreover, the builddown does not presume to take on as ambitious an agenda as START. At the same time, though, the builddown would complement START by moving us in the direction that we already know we want to arrive at if START succeeds. The builddown and START are entirely complementary. Negotiating the builddown via a START working group would further ensure that the two discussions did not get at cross purposes.

Negotiability

Question 19. Why should the builddown be negotiable?

Answer. Both sides have a stake in curtailing growth in the other side's forces and in maintaining reasonable flexibility to shape their own force postures. The builddown serves both interests and also enables each side to plan its forces against a shrinking force level by the other side instead of anticipating a larger threat.

By contrast, with elaborate and comprehensive START negotiations to define most features of the two sides' strategic posture, the relative simplicity of the builddown concept is illustrated in President Reagan's letter to builddown sponsors in the Senate.

In order to negotiate a builddown, the two governments need only determine:

(1) What is the force base to which the rule applies? (The SALT II data base would need only slight updating.)

(2) What ratio(s) are acceptable in establishing the relationship between newly deployed warheads and those to be eliminated from operational inventories, e.g. 1 new warhead for 2 existing ones, perhaps varied to 1:1.5 for single-warhead ICBM's and 1:3 for new MIRVed ICBM's.

(3) What counting rules apply to specific delivery systems? (SALT II provides appropriate counting rules for ICBM's and SLBM's, and a suggested basis for a strategic bomber counting rule of perhaps 20 for new ALCM-capable heavy bombers.)

(4) To what equal and lower level of warheads should the builddown rule apply? (President Reagan has already proposed a cut in ICBM and SLBM warheads to 5,000 on each side. The builddown floor might include that number plus a suitable allowance for warheads ascribed to strategic launchers, remembering that within the overall total each side would be free to allocate its warheads to ballistic missiles or air-breathing systems, as it deemed best.)

VERIFICATION

Question 20. How would you verify a builddown?

Answer. Essentially in the same way as previous and prospective agreements:

(a) Primary reliance on national technical means;

(b) Counting rules previously negotiated for missiles, supplemented by appropriate rules for bombers, which associate a set number of warheads with each strategic launcher;

(c) Associated measures to facilitate verification e.g. prohibition on interference with national technical means; and

(d) An agreed data base.

Question 21. But how do you know that a warhead has been removed?

Answer. Each side will get credit for removing a specified number of warheads only when it has dismantled the launcher with which those warheads are associated. Detailed procedures which permit verification of dismantling have been negotiated in the SCC.

Question 22. Could warheads be stored covertly?

Answer. Yes. The agreement pertains only to operational warheads. But stored warheads are not any good without their launchers. And a builddown agreement, like the SALT and START agreements, could have provisions to protect against rapid reloads of existing launchers. Also, procedures have been proposed by Adm. Noel Gaylor and others which would make possible the verification of warhead destruction. Such procedures could be negotiated along with a builddown agreement, or as a follow-up accord to strengthen confidence in the process.

Question 23. What kinds of warhead deployment would "trigger" the builddown rule? In other words, what is a "new" warhead?

Answer. Under the builddown, existing types of ICBM's and SLBM's are assumed to have the number of warheads assigned them in the SALT II Treaty. For example a Soviet SS-18 has 10 warheads, a U.S. Poseidon SLBM has 14. If either side replaces an existing type of missile which has been configured with fewer warheads than that assigned by the SALT II counting rule (e.g., an SS-18 with one RV) with the same type missile containing a higher number of warheads (e.g., an SS-18 with 10 RV's), then the builddown would not be triggered since both sides are already assuming that all missiles of that type have the maximum number of warheads permitted under SALT II. The builddown also assumes that the SALT II fractionation limits would continue to be observed. Thus, neither side could exceed the maximum RV loadings specified for each missile type in SALT II.

If either side deploys a "new type" ICBM (such as the MX or the SS-X-24), then it is assumed to carry the maximum number of warheads assigned it by SALT II and twice as many warheads must be dismantled from existing weapons under the builddown. For example, the MX and SS-X-24 are assumed under SALT II to carry 10 RV's and 20 RV's would have to be dismantled for each missile deployed.

If additional, permitted launchers of an existing type of missile are deployed, the builddown mechanism would be triggered.

Question 24. What would happen if the Soviets claimed that a particualr missile was not a "new type" but rather a variant of an existing type that fell within the modification limits spelled out in SALT II? Specifically, how would the builddown handle the Soviets' PL–5, which U.S. intelligence suspects is a "new type" though the Soviets insist it is a permissible variant of the SS–13?

Answer. The United States must decide whether the PL–5 is or is not a "new type" ICBM whether or not we have the builddown since both sides are committed to observing SALT II. If the PL–5 is, in our opinion, a "new type" then the Soviets have violated the SALT II provision permitting only one such missile (they have indicated that the SS–X–24 is their one "new type" ICBM). If the builddown were in place and the United States decided that the PL–5 was a "new type" ICBM, then the Soviets would have to dismantle two RV's for each PL–5 deployed. If they refused, then the builddown agreement could be abrogated by the United States.

CONSTRUCTING A BUILDDOWN PROPOSAL

Question 25. Would the builddown count deployed warheads or would it utilize a concept of accountable warheads?

Answer. The builddown would count warheads in much the same way as in the SALT II Treaty. SALT II provides appropriate counting rules for ICBM's and SLBM's which associate a set number of warheads with each strategic ballistic missile launcher. It also provides a suggested basis for a strategic bomber counting rule of perhaps 20 for new ALCM-capable heavy bombers.

Question 26. How would the sides establish the base from which the builddown would begin?

Answer. The builddown would proceed from an agreed data base. The SALT II data base would need only slight updating to be applicable to a builddown.

Question 27. Must a 2-for-1 formula be used?

Answer. If applied in the spirit in which the builddown concept was developed, variable ratios could enhance achievement of a more stable nuclear environment. For example, one might consider establishing a 3-for-1 ratio for newly deployed warheads on MIRVed ICBM's to discourage their deployment, and a 1½-for-1 ratio for newly deployed warheads on single-warhead ICBM's to encourage their deployment. We would caution that deviation from the 2-for-1 ratio would have to be formulated to be consistent with the objectives of the builddown concept, which requires negotiability to be successful and real reductions to be meaningful. We would consider inconsistent, for example, a formula which was crafted to require a radical restructuring of Soviet forces but which had little real effect on U.S. forces. To achieve true stability, each side must be satisfied that its forces are, and will remain secure.

Question 28. What systems would be covered under a builddown?

Answer. To be workable and negotiable, the builddown concept must be applied comprehensively. We have been assured by administration officials that the builddown would be proposed in this comprehensive form.

Question 29. Must the formula be applied only within categories of weapon systems?

Answer. No. Freedom to mix must be permitted in applying the builddown principle. To assure negotiability of the builddown principle, each side should be free to deploy its new warheads on launchers of its own choosing and to retire older warheads on launchers of its own choosing, subject to such previously negotiated strategic arms restraints as the overall ceiling on strategic delivery vehicles and relevant sub-limits on MIRVed missiles.

BUILDDOWN AND SALT II

Question 30. How does the builddown relate to SALT II?

Answer. The mutual builddown would preserve and extend the positive features of SALT II while correcting a number of its weaknesses. While many SALT II proponents have come to favor the more ambitious goals of a nuclear freeze, they should recognize that the builddown is a substantial improvement over the unratified treaty. It assumes retention of the SALT II launcher limits, verification provisions, fractionation and cruise missile limits, counting rules and relating provisions. Thus, the builddown is fairly compared not to the far-reaching, albeit differing proposals advanced by freeze advocates or the administration's START proposals, but to the more modest achievements of SALT II. In that comparison it is clear that the builddown would impose far more stringent constraints than SALT II:

(1) Regulating modernization by setting a high price for it in terms of reductions;

(2) Preventing the anticipated growth of warhead inventories under that accord; and

(3) Creating pressures to move ahead from continued reliance on MIRVed ICBM's.

Both those who favored SALT II and those who opposed it as inadequate should welcome these improvements.

The CHAIRMAN. I have already stricken four or five questions that I had intended to put to you that had been put to me in Illinois. I have given my own answers to those questions, but I wanted to be able to send out a record answer from you.

One question, however, I would like to put to you originated with questioning by Senator Pell, Senator Tsongas, and myself and others of Ambassador Adelman about whether or not under any conditions we would forgo deployment of the MX.

We have all raised serious questions about the MX. On Friday I received a letter from Ambassador Adelman and I believe Senators Pell and Tsongas have also received letters. I would like to insert the letter I received, without objection in the record at this point, and ask you this question, because the letter is an unclassified letter.

[The letter referred to follows:]

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY,
Washington, D.C., June 16, 1983.

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At yesterday's hearing Senator Pell asked whether under any circumstances the U.S. would be prepared to give up the MX program?

The following is my answer for the record: "The President has made clear that the scale of MX deployment will be influenced by Soviet strategic programs and arms reduction agreements. The MX is the U.S. response to a massive build-up of Soviet ICBMs over the last 10 years, and unless the Soviets are prepared to reverse this build-up and forego their heavy and medium ICBMs, the U.S. will go forward with MX."

I have sent letters to Senators Pell and Tsongas, who inquired extensively about this matter.

I want to tell you once again how pleased I was to appear again before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday and how I look forward to frequent appearances to implement both of our plans for the closest possible consultations. I will be back to you soon regarding the TTB and PNE treaties.

Sincerely,

KENNETH L. ADELMAN.

The CHAIRMAN. He stated in this letter that the United States would be willing to forego the MX if the Soviets halted their ICBM test programs and dismantled their existing force of some 650 SS-18's and SS-19's. This is the first time the administration has publicly indicated what they would consider a "fair trade" for the MX. In fact, Mr. Adelman is suggesting a zero option for START under which all medium and heavy ICBM's would be banned.

First, do you think this is a commendable objective and do you think it is a negotiable proposal?

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I would submit that that letter establishes that the MX, indeed, is a bargaining chip. The question is the price. I would say that the price is something that would be very hard to negotiate. We would all applaud it if the administration could negotiate it, but I think the principle is it will be very difficult to require the Soviets to completely change their force structure.

I remember a conversation I had with a certain Ambassador from Eastern Europe right after the President had proposed his zero option and I asked the Ambassador what he thought of zero option. He laughed and said we do not think much of it.

I was taken aback a little and I asked him why not. He said well, we will make you a counterproposal. He said what you are saying is we take down our SS–20's in exchange for you terminating your plans to build Pershing II's and ground-launched cruise missiles.

Now, we will make you a counterproposal. You have 15 aircraft carriers roaming around the world. We have plans for an aircraft carrier. We will tear up our plans if you'll sink your aircraft carriers. I think it's going to be a very difficult thing to negotiate, but I guess it displays some degree of flexibility in that indeed, the administration is implying there is some price for which they would forego the MX.

I, myself, think the administration will have to have more flexibility before we reach any agreement, particularly flexibility regarding the Soviet force structure. I think we are going to have to move the Soviets in the direction we think is more stabilizing over a long period of time in both arms control and our strategic program, but I do not think it is likely to happen overnight. If the administration is successful in making it happen overnight then, of course, I would welcome it.

The **Chairman**. Senator Cohen, would you care to comment on whether this is a commendable objective and whether you think it is a negotiable proposal and also, what would you consider a fair trade for the MX?

Senator **Cohen**. I think it is a commendable objective. If you could call for the elimination of the SS–18's and perhaps the SS–19's, that would be a noble goal and effort. I think, however, that it is impractical. I think the Soviets will reject it out of hand and frankly, I think they will have the same problem with START, because the way in which START is proposed, it calls for a rather dramatic reduction in their heavy ICBM's, which constitute the heart of their strategic force.

Therefore, I think they are very unlikely to accept START as originally formulated. One of the things we have tried to do with the builddown is to say to the Soviets we are not mandating that you reduce the ICBM's, your SS–18's or SS–19's. We are going to put into effect, hopefully, and offer for you to do the same a concept which will give you an incentive to move away from heavy ICBM's, much as we would have the same incentive to move away from MIRV'd systems.

I think that has to be accomplished over a period of time. But I believe the Soviets historically have rejected any sort of radical restructuring of their forces and, in all probability, they will reject this out of hand.

Second, I would like to say that the MX program should not be confused or merged in its entirety with this builddown concept. There are people who support the builddown concept who do not necessarily support the MX.

There are people who support the builddown concept who do not support the B–1.

There are people who support the freeze movement, I might say, who support the construction of the Trident submarine, and I have raised that issue.

Senator **Biden**. Are you describing me, Senator Cohen?

Senator **Cohen**. No, I am not. I am using hypotheticals. There are those who do support a freeze and yet say do not cancel the Trident. The Trident is very important to the future stability of our force structure, so we have to separate the two. The builddown can work together with weapons modernization programs, but should not be linked with any one program—to say, for example, that is you are against the MX, you are against the builddown.

The builddown simply says that to the extent we have modernization whether it come with a Stealth bomber or a B-1, whether it come with a Trident or not, we will have a commitment that we will reduce the forces on essentially a 2 for 1 level. But we ought not make this tied together with the MX program itself.

I have some doubts about MX frankly, putting it in static existing silos. Given an option, I would far prefer a mobile system. I would prefer, for example, to have 1,000 single warhead missiles in a mobile basing mode as opposed to 100 MX's. The simple reason is the Soviets could, theoretically take out those MX missiles with 200 warheads, whereas, it would take 2,000 warheads to take out the "Midgetman missiles." So, I think on a purely military basis there are better options.

But the MX involves in my judgment, more than simply military judgment. it involves foreign policy issues and our relationship with our allies as far as the connection between the Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missile. It involves something the Scowcroft Commission has called national will. Harold Brown has said that if you do not build the MX, you will never build the "Midgetmen." There is something to be said about that.

There are other elements involved in the MX. On a purely military basis, I think there is substantial data as to the wisdom of going forward, but nonetheless, I think we have to look at the builddown concept as something more comprehensive in application, not simply tied to the MX.

The **Chairman**. Perhaps each of you could give us a yea or nay answer on this one. Do you think the United States should incorporate a specific proposal in our START position which, if accepted by the Soviets, would enable us to cancel the MX?

Senator **Nunn**. Mr. Chairman, I cannot give you a yea or a nay on that. I think that gets into the tactics of negotiation. I, myself, in keeping with what I think is the spirit and duration in the long term, pointed out by the Scowcroft Commission, would hope that both sides could refrain from new deployment of MIRV warheads, MIRV missiles on land, and that includes the MX.

But, in exchange, I think we have to recognize reality. The Soviets have SS-18's and SS-19's that are their equivalent of what the MX will be in our arsenal, so this is a complicated negotiating scheme and I would hope we would be able to find some formula in arms control that would reduce the SS-18's and SS-19's in exchange for a restraint on the United States involving the MX, that would move both sides more toward single warheads. The question is whether you go to negotiations or whether you have to do it over a period of time.

As Senator Cohen has pointed out, I think it is important in the builddown concept that we do not require a change in the Soviet force structure, but we do give incentives for that force structure to change over time, because of the heavy penalties on MIRV missiles. So, I would say primarily it will have to be a matter of judgment at the negotiating table.

Senator COHEN. A yes and no answer, I would agree with Senator Nunn.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to read into the record one sentence of the reply of the administration to my question about what could be the quid pro quo for the MX program.

Mr. Adelman says: "The MX is the U.S. response to a massive build-up of Soviet ICBM's in the last 10 years and unless the Soviets are prepared to reverse this build-up and forego the heavy and medium ICBM's, the United States will go forward with MX."

In other words, I read this to say that the only price we would accept for halting the MX would be the elimination of their heavy and medium ICBM's. Do you see this as a possible objective of achievement, Senator Cohen and Senator Nunn?

Senator NUNN. I would welcome it if it could be achieved. I have great doubts of whether it could be achieved. It will involve a whole lot of negotiations and I think the administration hopefully would have fall-back positions.

I would say I would not expect the administration at this stage to give the fall-back position in a public forum. That would involve negotiating tactics.

Senator PELL. You mentioned earlier, Senator Nunn, how obviously absurd it would be for us to give up our 15 aircraft carriers for their blueprints of aircraft carriers.

And yet, turning it around a little bit, are we not doing exactly the same thing with the MX as we are in the INF area? There we are talking about the Soviet SS–20's, which are in place on their side, and while we have gone further than blueprints, we have not yet actually deployed our Pershings.

But there is a similarity here of their giving up something in exchange for our not doing something prospectively. I wonder if you see the analogy.

Senator NUNN. Mr. Chairman, I think that signifies the importance of maintaining a balance at all stages, because once one side has achieved a seeming advantage, as the Soviets certainly have with their intermediate nuclear forces, it makes it very difficult to negotiate away that seeming advantage in exchange for a plan or program that is not yet culminated.

I suggest that if we do keep a firm commitment to the two-track approach in NATO, and if our allies as they are so far, stick to the deployment plans for the Pershing II's and ground-launched cruise missiles, I do believe we will have an excellent arms control opportunity in that area in the next 4 or 5 months and I think that could indeed be a breakthrough that would lead to another breakthrough in the START area.

So, I remain reasonably and cautiously optimistic about achieving some form of agreement, either before deployment of the GLCM's and Pershing II's or shortly thereafter and I hope my cautious optimism proves to be accurate.

Senator COHEN. May I add to that? We should remind ourselves that as the NATO countries called upon the United States to help correct the growing imbalance, they became quite concerned, in fact, terrified about the rate at which the Soviets were deploying their SS–20's and the threat that posed, and therefore called upon the United States to build a Pershing II or ground-launched cruise missile. So, it was the Europeans who asked for the support.

Senator PELL. Thank you. On a somewhat different subject, what would prevent, under your proposal, the destruction on our side of two tactical nuclear weapons in return for building one MX warhead, for example?

Senator COHEN. Could I respond to that? I think tactical nuclear weapons have to be considered a separate item. We try to deal strictly with strategic systems and it would not be appropriate to deal with tactical weapons and include them in this application of the builddown concept.

Senator PELL. In other words, the basket you are talking about would only include strategic weapons. Would you separate out from that the submarine-launched weapons and put them in a separate basket, or would you have all strategic weapons systems in one basket?

Senator COHEN. The President has proposed in his START agreement to include submarine-launched ballistic missiles and ICBM's together to reduce that to a 5,000 level.

I would go further in the builddown concept applied on a comprehensive basis taking into account the unique characteristics of the bomber force and taking into account whatever air defenses the Soviets have which the United States do not have, and make adjustments accordingly to change perhaps the counting rules in terms of how many bomb loads each heavy bomber might be presumed to have.

But, I would apply it on a comprehensive basis. I think that is the only workable way to apply it.

Senator PELL. And you are applying the formula simply to warheads, not the sum total of destructive power versus the sum total of destructive power?

Senator COHEN. No, strictly on a warhead basis. We know the Soviets are building a Blackjack bomber and we are building a B–1. We know they are building at least one new ICBM, perhaps two. We know they are constructing a Typhoon submarine.

If, in fact, you have the builddown in place, what it would require would be a rather substantial reduction on both sides if each side modernizes consistent with those goals today.

Senator PELL. I think it is generally agreed the submarines are the least destabilizing weapons system. Could not this mean that we would eliminate some submarine-launched weapons for more destabilizing land-based weapons?

Senator COHEN. You see, that is the flexibility the military has to have. I am not in a position, nor do I think are any Members in

Congress in a position, to dictate to military planners what our force structure should be at any given time.

What we are saying to them is, if you want to build 100 MX's, you must pay a heavy price. That means 2,000 warheads will have to come out of inventory. You can take it out of Titans, you can take out of Minuteman II's, you can take it out of Minuteman III's, you can take it out of some of the old bombers counted under SALT II, some of which are rusting away being used for spare parts, but nonetheless counted. You can take those submarines that will be retired in the 1990's.

You make that choice. You may decide modernization is not worth the price. You may decide you only want to build 50 MX's, because what you have to give up is too dear. That is something the military planners will have to make their judgment on and I do not seek to preclude that. All I am saying is if you are going to modernize, you must do so under a penalty and the penalty is lower levels of weapons.

Senator **PELL**. Returning for a moment to the nuclear freeze concept, as I understand it, one could logically support both your proposal and the freeze. Would that be correct or would that be incorrect?

Senator **NUNN**. I am not sure I understood the question.

Senator **PELL**. Could you logically support both the freeze and your proposal?

Senator **NUNN**. Senator Pell, I do not support the freeze.

Senator **PELL**. I know you do not, but can one logically?

Senator **NUNN**. I think, in effect, the builddown is a freeze on warheads. The warheads are capped. The warheads on both sides can only come down if this concept is implemented in any respect.

So, as a part of our proposal, a key part, we do, in fact, cap warheads, but we do not preclude modernization. I think one could support the freeze and support the builddown, but one would have to conclude the freeze had to become more flexibile than it has been interpreted to preclude all new weapons systems, because there is a difference. The builddown permits modernization; the freeze does not.

In terms of the long-term goals, the spirit and concept behind the freeze, in terms of achieving stability and having a reduction on both sides, the concepts are the same. But that fundamental difference on modernization has to be dealt with intellectually.

Senator **PELL**. As I understand it, the freeze resolution says there can be no new deployment of new weapons while the freeze is in effect. Do you think the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty runs against the stream of your proposal?

Senator **NUNN**. I would prefer to think about that some. I do not know that I could give you a good answer without reflecting on it. I have not really contemplated that. I do not know why it would, but I would like to think about that.

Senator **PELL**. Thank you.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you. Senator Kassebaum.

Senator **KASSEBAUM**. My apologies for not hearing your opening statement. Perhaps you answered some of these questions, because I think it is a very intriguing concept. As you know, I have had questions as to exactly how it can be implemented, and I am sure you have too. We all have. I am still troubled by the question that seems to always hang us up, verification.

And second, perhaps more importantly, and I have listened to what you have said, exactly how we are going to determine what will be counted? I heard you say, Senator Cohen, of course this is left up to the Department of Defense.

Senator COHEN. In terms of what they would choose to reduce.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Right, but it would have to be comparable, I assume, to what the Soviets would do. We cannot say if we build one MX, we take down four Titan II's. That does not seem to me to be a good tradeoff.

Senator COHEN. I do not want to mandate for the military exactly what the tradeoff should be. One question was raised early as we discussed the builddown concept. Many planners in the Pentagon, for example, said that if we have the builddown and put into place 100 MX missiles it means we have to give up our entire ICBM force to add 100 MX missiles.

That might be correct if you have to give up only ICBM's. What we have suggested is you have the freedom to mix. You have the freedom to choose. You will decide whether or not to give up Titans, ICBM's, submarines or bombers. But you make that decision. The Soviets would have the same flexibility.

I pointed out in my testimony, for example, if they deploy an I Typhoon submarine, they will have to give up 360 warheads. That means they will have to eliminate, if they take it out of submarines, most of the Yankee I class submarines and as they continue to put more systems in, they will have to then turn to their heavy ICBM's.

But they will have the same sort of pressure, the pressure to decide whether or not the price of modernizing is worth it. That means they will have to reduce somewhere.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But it goes back, it seems to me, that you are leaving it up to both sides. And yet, when it comes together in some sort of negotiated form, both sides will want to try to have the same mix of reductions, right? They will take old obsolete systems that they are going to count against?

Senator COHEN. Let me say one thing we should not allow to take place with the builddown concept and that is to make it into another START agreement, a substitute for an arms control agreement. It is not an arms control agreement, per se. It is simply a mechanism that operates, as you said, up in the margins while we are still sitting down in Geneva negotiating the START agreement, which I believe will take a long time.

While that is going on, the two countries are saying to each other that we will put limitations on the levels of weapons. We will put reductions on the levels of warheads we are going to introduce into our arsenals. Because, without this restriction, it means we will each achieve something in the neighborhood of 15,000 warheads in the next decade.

So, what we have said is we will reduce, essentially, on a 2-for-1 basis and each side can determine whether it takes it out of the ICBM's, the SLBM's or the bomber forces.

But if we try to make it symmetrical, if we try to have a symmetrical reduction of every phase of the builddown, it will become so complicated and, I submit, nonnegotiable— that it is useless to go through the exercise. Some people in the administration want to take into account all asymmetries. We cannnot take into account those asymmetries without making it very, very complicated.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I would agree. But how do you answer verification? Is not this a major stumbling block?

Senator **Cohen**. I do not think so. I think the way in which we answer the verification problem is essentially what we do not.

We would rely upon national technical means, mainly satellite technology to monitor the dismantling. If they have to take out, for example, 20 warheads, then they could take out two SS–18's. They would have to dismantle two SS–18's, or an equivalent number of SS–19's or SLBM's, whatever it might be. They would have to dismantle those and the dismantling process would be subject to verification.

We have counting rules that have already been negotiated under SALT II. If we are talking SS–18, we assume 10 warheads. If we are talking MX, that is 10 warheads. If we are talking an SLBM, that could be 14. If you are talking bombers, well, we can ascribe a number anywhere from 20 to lower.

So, there are counting rules already in place. There are verification procedures already in place and we would have associated provisions such as for example, a ban on interference with national, technical means of verification. All of those items are already available, so I think it could be verified quite easily.

Senator **Kassebaum**. It is a worthy goal. I think it has the same frustrations, in may ways, the START negotiations do.

Senator **Cohen**. It is not cure-all. It is simply a first step, a small step, but at least a very positive one which will do something about reducing the levels in our inventories on both sides.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I certainly think it is worth a try and I applaud the effort.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum. Senator Biden.

Senator **Biden**. Gentleman, the thing I find most curious is we are having this full day of hearings. I, like you, Senator Nunn, have been here since 1972 and this is the first time since I have been here that so many initiatives have been generated from the Senate and the House, also. And although I do not want to evoke a requirement that Senator Cohen defend the administration, I suspect it should be pointed out the reason we are here is there is incredible skepticism about the desire for arms control at the administration's level.

For example, the letter from Ken Adelman, I think, is perfectly reflective of the attitude of this administration. We will give up something and they will give up everything. This is a good deal. That has been consistent, in my view, throughout this proceeding.

That is why, Senator Nunn, I think you have rendered a greater service to the arms control debate than anyone since 1969 and 1970 when Senator Brooke and Senator Case argued that maybe we should be thinking about MIRVing. Whether or not that was a good idea, we should have listened to them. None of us were here then and I am not sure I would have had the wisdom to listen then.

But I put your contribution, Senator Cohen, in the same category as I respectfully suggest that contribution should be placed as one of the most significant things occuring in the U.S. Congress with regard to the issue of arms control.

To answer my ranking member's question about can you support the freeze and can you support the builddown and be consistent, I would sincerely hope so, since I support both. I find nothing inconsistent about them. I think what they are both about is that we are in the process of doing—each of you used a phrase, each of you used one, Senator Cohen, you used the phrase "desperate need for a framework." I underline the word desperate. I think from our many discussions you and I have had on this issue that we share that same desperate concern for a need for a framework.

And your phrase, Senator Nunn, "to harness the momentum of the arms race," that is what these are all about, all of these that we have before us. I would suggest there is great consistency in supporting both the freeze and your builddown, because in essence they both put limits. One freezes warheads in place.

We can argue whether or not there is an asymmetry, whether the asymmetry as a consequence causes a vulnerability on the part of the United States. I would argue it does not. You would argue, Senator Nunn, that it would.

The builddown puts, in effect, a ceiling on warheads. The Scowcroft Commission, as you pointed out, Senator Nunn, in your statement, talks about warheads. Essentially, what the Scowcroft Commission says, is that they are not all that crazy about MIRVing. There is not a whole lot of security in MIRVing; not a whole lot of sense of security comes from that, as we have learned.

What I am a little concerned about is our continued preoccupation with the SS-18's and SS-19's. From my perspective, the reason I think your proposal, Senator Cohen, is so brilliant is it essentially says let them figure out what they want to do with their warheads. We will figure out what they want to do with their warheads. But, what we are going to be doing is reducing the number of warheads on both sides as a practical matter.

If I were running the negotiation, I would probably do something slightly different from the freeze and/or the builddown proposal and suggest to the Soviets that there be an absolute limit on the number of warheads any way you want them. Do you want to put them all in SS-18's? Wonderful. Put them all in SS-18's. We will do it our way, you do it your way, and that we would work over a regime of 10 to 15 years to gradually reduce those numbers.

That is why I think there is nothing inconsistent about what is essentially a crying out going on here in Congress and the public at large that, my God, we need a framework to deal with it.

The last point I will make before I ask two questions is, Senator Cohen, I really think that you and Senator Nunn have gotten the administration off dead center. I am less optimistic than Senator Nunn that they will continue to move off dead center, but I can think of nothing else that would have moved them.

The fact of the matter is we need at least half of the U.S. Senate to support a single point of view on arms control in order to make it clear to this administration that we are not going to go along with the remainder of their programs unless they at least move in the direction there is a general consensus on, and the fact that you have more cosponsors to your amendment than any other amendment before us or any other proposal, Senator Cohen, I think is the reason why the President is listening to you and Senator Nunn beyond the fact of your usual eloquent persuasion and I compliment you for that.

The first question is to Senator Nunn. Senator Nunn, why do we have to worry about the SS–18's? If in fact the builddown were adopted, would it matter to you whether or not the Soviets decide to leave all of their SS–18's in place, at the cost that that would entail under the builddown, and we jettison MX and move to Midgetman? Would that bother you at all?

Senator NUNN. Senator Biden, let me say, I would prefer the SS–18's not be there. I would prefer they had never been installed. I would prefer both sides have a regime in missile deployment that would emphasize single warheads, as the Scowcroft Commission report has said.

The administration is trying to negotiate away the SS–18's with sublimits in START. If they can achieve that, I will stand up and applaud. I would be surprised, but pleasantly surprised.

What we are trying to do is give an incentive for both sides to move away from the SS–18-type missiles, that is, large MIRV'd missiles with single aim points but with huge offensive power, very lucrative targets for anyone thinking about a first strike. I think we are trying to give the incentive for both sides to move away from that, and we are not doing it, though, with sublimits. We are doing it with incentives on reductions, and that is why Senator Cohen emphasized the variable rates you could apply.

For instance, you could apply a lot lower ratio, like 1.2, 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, to bomber weapons, as opposed to MIRV missiles like SS–18's and MX's and those kind of things. I would prefer both sides move away from those kind of systems. I am dubious about being able to negotiate it away with the Soviets directly.

I think indirectly the Soviets will have every incentive, if we adopt the builddown, to move away from those kind of systems and toward single-warhead systems. But it would be their choice. If they want to sit there with SS–18's and SS–19's, as we have MX's and Trident II missiles, I would say they are opening their own window of vulnerability. I do not think they are that foolish.

But one of the things we hear over and over again as a point that some people take against this proposal is, wait a minute, we will have to modernize first; therefore, we may have to reduce on a quicker timetable the number of warheads than the Soviets, and the Soviets could trick us by not modernizing, by sitting there and not building these terrible weapons we have seen in the intelligence briefings. They will trick us and be smarter. They will say, we will not build them, so we will get a slight warhead advantage.

But by doing that they would be sitting there with large MIRV'd systems that are increasingly vulnerable every day that goes by. I don't think the Soviets would subscribe to that kind of foolishness. We believe we are creating incentives here with the builddown proposal, coupled with the improvements in our own modernized forces, that would give maximum incentives for the Soviets to move away from those systems without putting firm fixed subceilings on them.

Senator **Biden**. Senator Cohen, what is your prognosis? Will you be able to continue to convince this administration to move forward? The only reason they have so far is you. You are known for your candor. How about a candid answer?

Senator **Cohen**. Senator Biden, first let me preface it by saying the central point during your remarks in my judgment was the word "consensus." You picked out a phrase of mine I used in my statement and I pick out one in yours. That is consensus.

Progress has been made only because we have generated a consensus to date in the Congress, in the U.S. Senate in particular, with people like Sam Nunn joining me as a Republican to promote this concept, Senator Joe Biden coming on—even though from a political point of view, with the popularity of the freeze movement as such, that support created a certain political risk to you—it is only because you have joined with a number of Republicans and put aside the party differences, put aside popularity for the moment, and said, let us look at the reality of what we can hope to achieve.

It is only because of your commitment to this concept that we are able to have a consensus. It is only because of that consensus we have any leverage in dealing with the administration. If the administration comes to the conclusion this is simply a concept being floated, that it can divide the Senate and divide the Congress, that the builddown has no chance of passing or receiving the kind of strong endorsement, that the proposal will be cut apart by opponents of the freeze and people who oppose restrictions, then the builddown concept has no chance.

But if it comes out of this committee and goes to the full Senate floor with an overwhelming affirmation of the concept itself, then I believe we have an opportunity to have a meaningful impact.

Senator **Biden**. I think the Senate should get to vote on both of these, and I for one, when the time comes, will be recommending that we report out the freeze to have a vote on that matter, and report this matter out also. I think they are, as I said, not inconsistent, and I think out of fairness we should have a vote on that freeze resolution.

I think the only practical thing that is going to pass this outfit is this proposal, and I think unless it does, I believe this administration will continue to drag its feet on serious arms control.

Senator **Nunn**. Senator Biden, two brief comments; One, when I said I was optimistic I preceded it with the adjective "cautiously optimistic." And I want to emphasize that word "cautious."

Second, Senator Pell raised the question about whether this indeed covered battlefield systems, and the answer is it does not. That is another basket. But I might say, I know you've taken a very strong leadership position in NATO. I joined you on a letter to the President asking for a review of the battlefield nuclear systems we have in Europe and a reduction of those systems and some form of arms control.

Even if not, I think we can improve our own security, as you said, by reducing some of those systems. So I would not preclude applying the builddown concept to that basket of weapons at some point also. But it is not part of this proposal and we would not be reducing battlefield weapons in exchange for strategic weapons.

But I applaud your leadership in this respect and I would encourage all of us to think about new initiatives in the battlefield systems also. I happen to believe those are the most destabilizing on both sides, more destabilizing, indeed, than strategic systems.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. For the benefit of our colleagues who are scheduled to follow, Senators Nunn and Cohen, the Chair would prefer not to go into a second round of questions, but submit my own questions and those of others for our distinguished guests, and then go directly into testimony by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield at the conclusion of Senators Pressler's and Tsongas' questions if that is satisfactory to the committee.

Senator Pressler, you will both take about 10 minutes. Fine, thank you.

Senator PRESSLER. I must thank my colleagues, Mr. Chairman.

I want to dig into some of the differences between the freeze resolution and the builddown. Let me say I was one of the early cosponsors of the nuclear builddown resolution.

We have already touched on the verification. As compared to the freeze proposal, would the builddown require a different standard for verification? As I understand, the freeze resolution that passed the House would require extensive onsite verification. I know there are freezes and different freezes, but what is the difference between the builddown resolution and the freeze resolution in terms of verification?

Senator COHEN. I think you have cited the principal difference. In my judgment there is no way you can verify whether any country, especially the Soviet Union, has ceased research, development and production of any weapon, nuclear or nonnuclear, without onsite inspection on a fairly substantial basis.

The Soviets to date have not been enthusiastic about having massive onsite inspections and it is unlikely they will in the future. But nonetheless, under this proposal the verification would rely principally on national technical means, the means by which we already verify SALT II.

Senator PRESSLER. Is this under the builddown or the freeze?

Senator COHEN. The builddown. We would use satellite technology and other forms of national technical means of verification. We would use the same counting rules. If they dismantle an SS–18 that would count for 10 warheads because under SALT II it is credited with having 10. If they dismantle other systems we would adopt the counting rules already set in place.

So essentially it is verified by national technical means.

Senator PRESSLER. Is that stringent enough in your view? Could they not cheat?

Senator COHEN. Could they cheat? Of course they could cheat. They could always cheat in terms of continuing to produce more weapons. The question is, once you dismantle the launcher what will they put it on? If the launcher was dismantled, it does not matter if they have warheads in their storage bins.

Once you have dismantled the launching vehicle, you may want to make some restrictions on a rapid reload program. But nonetheless they have been substantially inhibited from being able to load those warheads. If they were continuing to manufacture them to put them on a nonexisting vehicle, they would have to produce the vehicle. Theoretically, I suppose they could produce it under cover, but hopefully we would be able to detect that also as they came off the line.

Senator NUNN. Senator Pressler, let me add one point. The rapid reload problem was a problem in SALT, it is a problem in START, it will be a problem in the builddown. It is hard to cure that problem without pervasive onsite inspection. But what you try to do is get at the launchers, so even if they have that warhead capability, even if they cheat, they do not have the means to promptly launch those systems.

Hopefully, we can reach a point when the Soviets will agree to onsite inspection. We have not reached that yet. I think we should continue to pursue it.

I would like to add one addition to Senator Cohen's answer. One option is the SALT accounting rules to get rid of warheads. You can verify that because you check on the launchers presumed to carry those warheads.

Another possibility—and this is only for the purpose of exploration: I think it would have to be looked at carefully, but I think it deserves considerable study, whether it is the builddown or some other proposal—is one that Adm. Noel Gaylor has advocated, and that is setting up a mechanism between the two countries where you would turn in the warheads, actually physcially turn in the warheads and check on the fissionable material removed, so both sides would have onsite capability at the point the warheads were brought to or the fissionable material were brought to.

It is a complicated procedure. It could be incorporated in the bill and it could be incorporated in some other arms control forum. But nevertheless, I think it deserves very careful consideration.

Senator PRESSLER. I think our people have become almost numb with arms control expressions and concepts. That is, the man on the street. Indeed, it is a vocabulary unto itself.

Two questions: First of all, would you consider it inconsistent for this committee to report both the freeze resolution and the builddown resolution? And No. 2, if you had to, in the plainest of terms, state the difference between the builddown and the freeze, how would you do it? A previous speaker has said he feels it would be good to report both resolutions. Would that seem inconsistent to you?

Senator NUNN. I am accustomed to inconsistency, having been in the Senate for 10 years. [Laughter.]

If it would further the purpose of reaching a consensus, I would welcome that move. I would choose my own vehicle to vote for when it comes to the floor, and I think we would have a complicated procedure about which one would be voted on first, and I would hope it could be structured so, whatever the vote was, people who were supportive of the freeze, if it did not pass, would then be in a procedural position to vote for the builddown.

I think it is important in committee and on the floor, because there are a lot of different views here by a lot of sincere people.

Senator PRESSLER. So you would oppose the freeze resolution?

Senator NUNN. I would not support the freeze. I never have supported the freeze. The fundamental difference, as I see it, is the builddown permits a modernization, but the builddown, as I mentioned a few moments ago, is also a freeze. But it is a freeze on warheads. It puts a cap on warheads. It does not cap or freeze other things. It does not prohibit modernization.

The freeze would prohibit modernization, as I read it.

Senator PRESSLER. Can we combine the two resolutions?

Senator NUNN. I would prefer they be kept separate. There are certain fundamental differences and I think it would give supporters of both the builddown and the freeze the right to vote on them separately. But procedurally I would hope we would not set it up where we would alienate, putting it frankly, people who supported one concept or the other and turned it into a procedural question that precluded reaching a consensus.

I think reaching a consensus in this committee, reaching a concensus in the country that can last beyond this administration is absolutely essential if we are going to reach arms control agreements. I believe if that signal went out that we have reached a consensus in this body and the country and through the Congress and the administration, we would have a much better chance of reaching an agreement with the Soviets in the near term.

I think as long as the Soviets believe we are split, we are arguing, they may feel they can just wait for the next President. And I would hope they would not do that. I would hope we would send them signals we will be persistent and patient, because we have reached a degree of consensus.

Senator BIDEN. It is obvious to me why you win by 89 percent of the vote. [Laughter.]

Senator COHEN. Could I add a couple of words to that? No. 1, the freeze has been subject to many different interpretations. As I indicated during my opening statement, there are a number of Senators who have approached me who are strong proponents of the nuclear freeze, and I raised with them the question, as we are marking up our defense bill in the Armed Services Committee, would you like me to delete the funding for the Trident submarine?

Horror has risen to their throats. They say, for God's sake do not touch the Trident. We think that is important for our future security.

So on the one hand they support a freeze, but they nonetheless feel it is acceptable still to promote the systems they believe will enhance our security and make us more stable.

Second, I point out that Senator Muskie, who is a proponent of the freeze movement as such, nonetheless found this particular proposal to essentially bring us toward the goals we all share—a more stable balance between us and the Soviet Union at reduced levels. On the one hand he believes we should have a freeze, but nonetheless sees the builddown as a vehicle, one of the more constructive vehicles that have come to pass from the Congress, to achieve the same ultimate goal we all share, and that is a reduced level of nuclear weapons.

Senator PRESSLER. OK. When we pass this builddown, what will happen? How soon will it be implemented? Do you expect the

President to propose it in 2 months? What will happen if we vote it through?

Senator COHEN. It depends on the Congress. If it has overwhelming support in the Congress, I think the administration would be dutybound to propose this to the Soviet Union.

Senator PRESSLER. Within what period of time?

Senator COHEN. Within any period, as soon as we can refine the concept.

Senator PRESSLER. Within 2 months?

Senator COHEN. There should be no time limit. I am looking for a relatively early refinement of the concept.

Senator PRESSLER. How long will that take, roughly? Do you have some vision? A year?

Senator COHEN. Within the next several months.

Senator PRESSLER. Six months.

Senator COHEN. No, several months. I would say September, for example.

Senator PRESSLER. By September it will be adopted by the administration?

Senator COHEN. We should have an opportunity to refine the concept, address all of the questions that have been raised, and offer this to the Soviets for a proposal.

Senator PRESSLER. I voted for the MX with this understanding, but I was at the White House the other day. They said, we have all of these problems, we will have to refine it and study it. It sounded to me like it will take forever.

Could we somehow say we want some action, we want it proposed by September? Would that be fair? Because otherwise they are going to drag on and on and on.

Senator COHEN. The reason we are here today, the reason we are submitting questions and proposed answers to the builddown concept, is to see if we cannot move this along, because we have heard the same questions since January. There has been no shift. No one, other than perhaps Bud McFarlane, I mentioned before, has come forward to try to put a positive influence on this concept.

One administration member asked me, what happens if the Soviet Union declares that its Blackjack bomber is only carrying conventional weapons? And I said, there are two answers to that: We say our B-1 is only carrying conventional weapons; or, more realistically, we say SALT II deals with that. SALT II imposes a limitation or a counting rule for heavy bombers defining what the ALCM load is, and we assume it is carrying 20 or whatever figure we want to agree on.

So there are ways to overcome these objections if we approach them in a positive way. If we simply sit back and wait for the bureaucracy to move, I suspect we will be here long after next year still dealing with these eight or nine issues that have been raised periodically since January.

Senator PRESSLER. My time is up. In conclusion let me say, I am for this, but I sensed a terrible feeling of eternal delay at the White House the other day, and I think it will be at least a year before they get it implemented, unless we do something drastic here.

Senator **Cohen**. Senator Pressler, one of the things I indicated to the White House is that I supported the MX based upon the administration's commitment to four essential points Senator Percy, Senator Nunn, and others have joined in this:

No. 1, there was a commitment to the total Scowcroft Commission report, namely that we reformulate START to be consistent with the Scowcroft Commission report;

No. 2, that we have a vigorous R&D program on the Midgetman missile;

No. 3, that we adopt the builddown concept; and

No. 4, although this is not an actual requirement, that we recommend the creation of a bipartisan panel to advise this administration and subsequent administrations on arms control issues.

And without an honoring of the commitment to the builddown I do not intend to support the MX any further.

Senator **Pressler**. All right. I hope something happens soon.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Pressler, very much.

Senator Tsongas.

Senator **Tsongas**. Let me thank our colleagues for the initiative they have displayed, particularly in the discussion of consensus, because I think that is the issue. What we are trying to achieve here today is a consensus over mechanics, but I would submit that consensus can probably be reached, whether you talk about START or builddown or the freeze.

I happen to support the freeze. Where the consensus breaks down is the mindset. There are many of us who simply do not believe the administration is serious. Let me give you an example.

Secretary Shultz came here on Wednesday and said—he was talking about the President now. "He has indicated that our strategic weapons are 'on the table.'" That was Wednesday. We meet with Kenneth Adelman a day later and that is classified information, but in essence what he says in this letter is, it is on the table if the Soviets give up everything.

Fact 1. If the START talks fail, then all launchers of the MX missiles will be built and deployed. That is not surprising to anyone.

Fact No. 2. If the proposal of President Reagan is accepted by the Soviets in its entirety, all 100 missiles will be built and deployed. So the argument we have heard all these months of MX being a bargaining chip is simply not true. The MX is not, has never been, and will never be a bargaining chip.

And this letter, which is benign compared to what was said in closed session, makes it very clear that even if the Soviets gave in to everything in Geneva, all 100 MX missiles will be built and deployed.

How do you square that with Shultz' statement that everything is on the table? You cannot.

Senator Pressler and I and the chairman have had an agreement on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the Nixon-Ford treaty, but we were hung up on verification. The obvious question is again going to mindset. If it was all right for Nixon and Ford, who were hardly leftists; why is it not all right for this administration? Where are they coming from?

The President said we are behind the Soviets. I do not think any of us have quarreled with that statement. So I think the consensus on mechanics can be reached as long as there is a mindset and a consensus.

Now, Senator Cohen, you made some interesting comments about the President being committed to a builddown, with concern about some of the people he has assigned to work on it. If you look at all of our negotiating teams, it seems to me the President's basic position is he puts a fox in every arms control chicken coop to make sure that the nice public statements are not followed through, by the need for these detailed negotiating positions.

Look at Adelman, Perle, Nitze, Rowny. Where is the historic commitment to arms control? We do not see it, and that is where it breaks down.

I think if there was a very clear sense of a commitment to arms control, the mechanics could be resolved rather quickly. But that session with Adelman I found shocking, not so much because of what was said, because I think that is not a surprise to me, but they said it openly. And I would hope at some point that hearing could be negotiated with the administration and sent to the American public.

A very clear impression was given to us during the MX debate that is at variance, to put it mildly, with what was said to us by Mr. Adelman at that session, and I think there is a profound difference in the impression given by the administration and the reality expressed to us in that closed session.

My question goes to the consensus issue. You have approached the President with the builddown. He has been shown other responses to it. What was your reference to others who have been appointed and assigned to work on this proposal, Senator Cohen?

Senator Cohen. I do not understand. What do you mean by "reference"? To whom am I referring?

Let me address first your question of mindset. I totally agree. I do not think there is any question about the mindset or attitudinal problems encountered. I believe President Reagan himself is personally committed to achieving arms reduction.

I must say there are those people within the administration who are not committed to the same sort of program. I know there are people with whom I have been dealing who are not committed to the builddown, even though the President has expressed interest. There is a large bureaucracy across the river we are trying to move.

What is the hope I have? I am sure the President could take this builddown concept, take it to Geneva, table it, and tell his negotiators to forget about pushing it. I am sure that could be done. Mindset, attitude, has everything to do with the builddown, and there are no guarantees about this.

One of the reasons Senator Nunn and I and others have been working for the past several months, meeting with people time after time, is to say, what is your problem with this concept, how does it impact on us? Then we answer, all right, we will deal with that.

All we are asking for is a positive commitment to make it work. If you simply sit back and throw rocks at the concept, if you raise these questions as impediments over which we cannot climb, the concept is doomed and we are left where you suggested. START will not pass, MX will go on, no restraints, and we will have several thousand more warheads in our inventory.

What I hoped to be able to do if we can develop a consensus in this committee, and hopefully in the full Senate and ultimately the House, is that we take a corresponding measure of responsibility. We do so with whatever leverage we can.

I have tried to exercise leverage on the MX because I believe that is one of the first opportunities we have to exercise some control, saying to the administration, unless you agree to commit yourself in a good faith way to the builddown, to make it work, to overcome all of the questions about verification—which I think we can do—to overcome the questions about counting rules—which I think we can do—unless you are committed to making it work, I frankly cannot support the concept of putting this missile in that hole, because I do not think it makes sense.

It makes sense only in the context of the Scowcroft Commission report, it makes sense only in the context of arms control. It makes sense to me only in the context of the builddown, because if you have the builddown, it is my personal judgment that our military leaders will decide not to deploy 100 MX's because it does not make that much military sense when they could have many more aim points with a smaller, more mobile, less detectable, harder to destroy Midgetman missile.

Senator TSONGAS. Do you have any doubt, if we have 5,000 warheads, the proposal sought under START, that all 100 MX's will be built and deployed?

Senator COHEN. I would have some serious questions as to whether we would build all 100 MX's.

Senator TSONGAS. I would just refer you then to the——

Senator COHEN. Well, what is said and what is done may be two entirely different things. I would say, Senator Tsongas, I am as concerned about attitude as you are.

I have been concerned, for example, in a totally unrelated area about our relationship with the State of Israel, which I thought had been in a very poor state in the past year and a half at least, and suddenly we are seeing some change in attitude on the part of top people within our administration about a positive relationship as opposed to an antagonistic one.

The same kinds of force that can produce a change in that attitude and relationship can also be set in force to deal with this issue if the administration is satisfied that this Congress has finally got a consensus as to where it wants to go. Before we have been split apart. We have been polarized, politicized, Republicans versus Democrats.

What we have to do is develop a bipartisan approach to this, and if we have that I am satisfied we will be in a position to exert a considerable amount of influence over administration policies, be it this administration or succeeding ones.

Senator TSONGAS. I would feel more comfortable if, when the President goes in to his advisers and says, this builddown notion is very attractive—who is he surrounded by? Clark, Adelman, Rowny, Nitze, Perle. [Laughter.]

The **Chairman**. I would amend that by adding, he would also be very cognizant of Secretary Shultz and Deputy Secretary Ken Dam, and I think their voices will be heard.

Senator **Tsongas**. Well, time will tell.

I very much commend you on your initiative. The people in the Oval Office will be a lot more comfortable with you around. [Laughter.]

The **Chairman**. We want to thank you, Senator Tsongas.

Senators Cohen and Nunn, we thank you very much for a truly major accomplishment and a fine one. It is very much appreciated.

Senator **Cohen**. Thank you.

The **Chairman**. The Chair will call Senator Kennedy and, if he is back from the White House, Senator Hatfield.

We welcome you, Senator Kennedy. For the advice of our committee members as well as afternoon witnesses, it is the intention of the Chair to carry on here until about 12:50, at which time we will recess to attend the Republican and Democratic caucuses which will be important today, because the Budget Resolution will be voted out of the Budget Committee. That is the resolution which is also preventing Senator Hatfield from being here. He is still at the White House.

So, you will have to carry the load for both Senator Hatfield and yourself, Senator Kennedy. Senator Levin will be scheduled to begin at 2 p.m. and hopefully we will complete the committee's work on the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution by roughly an hour and one-quarter from now.

Senator Kennedy, we are happy to have you here. We welcome you. We commend both you and Senator Hatfield for the debate you have really accelerated in the country on the terror of nuclear warfare. We would be pleased to have your testimony.

Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. May I just join you in welcoming Senator Kennedy. We wish you well.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Senator **Kennedy**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. As the Chair has pointed out, I had hoped to have Senator Hatfield join me in this presentation this morning and there is still the possibility that he will be able to do so. He is being detained at the White House and we may seek a writ of habeas corpus if they do not let him out by sundown. [Laughter.]

In any event, I hope he will be able to join me during this presentation. First of all, I welcome the opportunity to testify in favor of the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution calling for an immediate bilateral freeze between the United States and the Soviet Union on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons.

As a starting point, I believe that the United States must learn to live in peace with the Soviet Union. We dare not misuse what is wrong in the Soviet system as an excuse for denying what is right in Soviet-American relations, which is the overriding imperative of nuclear arms control.

There is no morality in the mushroom cloud. The black rain will fall equally on the just and the unjust and the world that is left in the ashes of Armageddon will little note nor long remember which was the evil empire.

Earlier this month President Reagan announced changes in his START proposal, but the administration's new approach is, in fact, another false START, which requires the Soviets to dismantle 200 SS–18's and permits the United States to build 100 MX's; it requires the Soviets to cut their land-based missile force by almost two-thirds, while permitting the United States to go forward with every new technology which can put these forces at further risk.

What we have is not a disarmament policy, but public relations to quiet grassroots and congressional opposition to massive nuclear rearmament. To paraphrase the popular ad, the real administration policy seems to be: "Promise them anything—but give them MX."

The MX missile is a first strike threat against the Soviet Union, and the Russians are reaching for their own first strike capability against the United States. Once MX missiles are deployed in vulnerable Minuteman silos, the pressure will be even more intense to adopt a "use them or lose them" psychology. Indeed, some Pentagon officials admitted as much when they testified that in the brave new MX world, the United States might have to move to a "launch under attack" or a "launch or warning" strategy in order to prevent our MX missiles from being destroyed in their silos by a Soviet strike.

A nuclear weapons freeze offers the best chance to stop all this, to halt the nuclear arms race before it is too late. The fundamental question which we ask of this committee is the fundamental question that citizens in communities across the country are asking in ever-increasing numbers: Why not start with a freeze as the first step toward arms control?

A nuclear weapons freeze has the clear advantage of bypassing endless, unresolved arguments about which side is ahead. Too often we find that superiority is in the eye of the beholder. And now the Scowcroft Commission, by closing the window of vulnerability, has refuted the administration's argument that a freeze would lock us into a position of inferiority.

In fact, there is an overall nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. We are ahead by some measures and they are ahead by others. For every Caspar Weinberger in the Pentagon who says the Soviets are in the lead, there is a counterpart in the Kremlin who is persuaded that America is ahead. And so, as Einstein wrote, we drift toward unparalleled catastrophe.

Even in the extremely unlikely event that a Soviet first strike destroyed all our land-based missiles, we could still retaliate with a minimum of 3,500 warheads on our submarines and bombers. The United States has the capacity to make the Soviet rubble bounce all the way from Moscow to Vladivostok and the Soviets can make our rubble bounce all the way from the Potomac to the Pacific.

The Kennedy-Hatfield resolution accepts this condition of parity; it calls for a mutual freeze now, with mutual reductions to follow, in the interest of preventing mutual annihilation.

In fact, our resolution calls for across-the-board reductions, immediately following the freeze, through annual percentages or equally effective means. George Kennan, our former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and our foremost expert on that country, and Admiral Rickover, Director of Naval Nuclear Propulsion under seven Presidents, have proposed deep cuts of at least 50 percent in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. Such cuts could be achieved by the end of this decade, if both sides agree to reasonable reductions of 7 percent a year. This approach, proposed in the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution, is also the policy considered by this committee in 1979, when it sought sustained major reductions from the SALT II ceilings.

Finally, a freeze will enhance, not reduce, our overall national security. It will permit us to allocate resources to our conventional military forces, where we do need to do more. In my new role on the Armed Services Committee, I have been very disturbed to see conventional readiness and military pay being cut savagely in order to salvage billions for questionable new nuclear weapons. A freeze will halt the development of more powerful Soviet rockets and will prevent either side from perfecting the capacity for a first strike against the other.

We have always been superior in the air and the freeze would keep it that way. The strategic bomber force that the Soviets have today consists mainly of the slow-moving propeller-driven Bear; a freeze would stop their plan to build their more threatening intercontinental bomber, the Blackjack.

We also have superiority at sea. But the Soviet plans now include the more quiet and elusive Typhoon submarine, with more powerful and accurate missiles. A freeze will stop that development and deployment.

On land, the Soviets are developing a giant new missile equivalent to the MX, with a hard target kill capability. START will permit them to deploy hundreds of these new missiles. A freeze will stop those missiles on the drawing boards.

We have the advantage today in our cruise missiles, which are small, light and accurate. Soviet cruise missiles are large, heavy and inaccurate, more like World War II buzzbombs. START allows them to catch up and deploy as many modern cruise missiles as they wish. The freeze keeps them at zero, where they belong.

Some opponents of the freeze maintain that bigger missiles mean better bargaining chips in negotiations with the Kremlin. But history proves the fallacy of this claim. A decade ago, MIRV's were defended as a bargaining chip during the SALT I talks. The United States deployed them, and then we were told that they were too important to bargain away. Now, even Henry Kissinger wishes he had made that decision differently.

Opponents will claim that a freeze is not a practical idea, because it will be difficult to verify. Just the opposite is true. In fact, a freeze may well be easier to verify than a complex arms reduction treaty.

One critical aspect of the freeze, deployment, can be verified with high confidence through national technical means, that is, satellites and listening posts equipped with sensors, and through data exchange and restrictions on concealment.

A second critical aspect of the freeze, testing, can also be verified by such means, together with unmanned seismic stations and opportunities for onsite inspection. To presume the Russians will not permit any such inspection overlooks the record of Conprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations, now shelved by the Reagan administration, where the Soviets actually agreed to the principle of onsite verification.

The third aspect of the freeze, production, may be harder to verify, but our intelligence is so highly developed that, according to former Under Secretary of Defense William Perry, we have been able to monitor Soviet activity at the design bureaus and production plants well enough so that we have been able to predict every ICBM before it began its tests.

Herbert Scoville, the former Deputy Director of the CIA, states that a freeze is actually easier to verify than a treaty like SALT I or SALT II. Such treaties contain complicated limits on numbers and modifications of missiles and planes. To detect a violation requires continuing and exact measurements of a vast array of possible and prohibited activity. With a freeze, however, a violation would be known if the adversary did anything new at all.

This committee is now reviewing several arms control resolutions. Many of these contain constructive proposals for limiting nuclear tests, banning missile flight tests, reducing nuclear weapons, halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other nations, and prohibiting such weapons in outer space. I share these goals, and look forward to working with the committee to achieve them.

But on the critical issue of ending the nuclear arms race now and reducing the arsenals of nuclear annihilation, I believe the nuclear freeze resolution may be our last and best chance to stop the arms race before it is too late, and I urge the committee to approve it.

Mr. Chairman, if the committee would indulge me just a few moments, I would like to provide some charts to the committee on the relative strategic differences between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Generally considered, there are four general areas which we use in the Congress and which the administration uses. One is launchers; second is warheads; third is destructive power; and fourth, nuclear payload.



LAUNCHERS



WARHEADS



DESTRUCTIVE POWER
(EQUIVALENT MEGATONS)



PAYLOAD
(1000 LBS)

These charts, which are based upon information supplied by the Harvard nuclear policy study, from the International Institute of Strategic Studies, and U.S. Government sources, would, I think, be recognized as accurate.

Clearly, if we look at the launchers, we see some advantage to the Soviet Union over the United States: 1,969 for the United States, 2,468 for the Soviet Union.

If we look at warheads, which I believe are a critical factor, there are some 9,900 for the United States and 7,800 for the Soviet Union; warheads being the acutal weapons of destruction. There are two other elements—destructive power in equivalent megatons and nuclear payload. The Soviet Union is ahead in the area of destructive power, the United States is ahead in the area of payload.

These areas, or these columns, can be put in some proportion when you consider that if we were to evaluate, or at least add up, all of the tonnage that was used in World War II, it would amount to this black line at the bottom of the red and blue columns—even though the Soviet Union, if you were going to use the throw-weight rate argument, is ahead in terms of this particular column.

What we are talking about is vast overkill. We are talking about, in this case here, the destruction of the Soviet Union or the United States anywhere from 15 to 20 times. And obviously, the difference or distinction in these lines, then, rapidly disappears and becomes inconsequential.

Clearly, if we want to use payload, the United States is ahead. The worst case scenario that is used in terms of a first strike against the United States is that the Soviet Union could destroy all of our land-based systems, that they could catch about half of our Navy at port, and could also destroy half of our air. Even then we would end up with over 3,500 weapons warheads that we would be able to land on the Soviet Union which, as I mentioned, would be enough to make the rubble bounce all the way from Moscow to Vladivostock.

Under any fair consideration of whether it is destructive power, payload, launchers, or more specifically, warheads, which are really the most important factor, you would have to recognize that today we have substantial equivalence when you look at the total scene.

I think that the testimony, before both this committee and the Armed Services Committee, by both the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense have indicated they would not trade our Triad for the Soviet Triad. I think it is notable we have the advantage in the sea and air, which obviously the Soviet Union does not, being heavily skewed toward a land-based system.

This is basic information, which I think is familiar to the committee, but I dare challenge any of those who know this kind of information to suggest that the United States is in any way second to the Soviet Union in the area of strategic forces.

The other two charts that I have would show that we have to ask ourselves: Are we going to be better off under the administration's proposal of START or are we going to be better off under the proposal of a freeze? I would like to draw the attention of the committee to this particular chart first. Let us take, first, the Soviet air aspect of the Triad, the Backfire bomber and the Blackjack bomber. The freeze would freeze the Backfire bomber, with which the committee is familiar; it obviously has limited strategic value, although the letters of agreement were included in the SALT proposal. Our proposal would freeze them at 180.

NEWER SOVIET STRATEGIC WEAPONS

	UNDER FREEZE	UNDER START
BACKFIRE BOMBER	180	400?
BLACKJACK BOMBER	1	
TYPHOON MISSILE	20	1200?
NEW SOLID-FUEL ICBM	0	
ACCURATE CRUISE MISSILE	0	UNLIMITED

The Soviet Blackjack bomber, which is a prototype of our B-1, would be frozen at one. Under START, the Soviets could deploy somewhere in the range of 400. If you look at the sea aspect of it, where the United States is so clearly ahead, the Typhoon missile would be frozen at 20.

In the other Soviet land-based systems, the new solid fuel ICBM, we can see they are at zero. They would be able to move up under the START proposal to around 1,200.

In cruise missiles, where we have such a dramatic lead over the Soviet Union, there is no proposal whatsoever under START and they would be able to build unlimited numbers. And I think anyone who understands the background of the arms race would believe it is completely naive to believe they would not move toward the smaller, more accurate weapons systems. They clearly will.

SOVIET HEAVY STRATEGIC BOMBERS

	UNDER **FREEZE**	UNDER **START**
		
POWER	**PROPELLER**	**JET**
MAX SPEED	**500 KTS**	**1,200 KTS**
VARIABLE SWEEP	**NO**	**YES**
LOW ALTITUDE PENETRATION	**NO**	**YES**

Let us now refer to this chart about Soviet heavy strategic bombers. We do not hear very much from this administration pointing out that the Soviet strategic bomber (the Bear) is still propeller-driven, left over from World War II. And at the present time, under START, they would be able to develop a Blackjack bomber similar to the B-1. The maximum speed of the Bear is 500 knots. The B-1 moves up to 1,200. The variable sweep and the low altitude penetration, they would have with the Blackjack bomber, not with the Bear. And the low altitude penetration clearly has the advantage in moving against radar and clearly is a vastly superior weapons system. Under the freeze, these advances are frozen. Under START, the Soviets would be able to move into the modernization of those particular weapons systems in the air. they would be able to move forward with regard to the sea. And there would be absolutely no limitation over Soviet cruise missiles.

So the previous charts would say we have substantial equivalence with the Soviet Union at the present time with regards to nuclear capability. In some areas, they have some advantages; in some areas, we have advantages; but the overkill is vast and dramatic under any terms. We recognize that even our own spokesmen within the administration would not exchange our nuclear forces for those of the Soviets.

Look to where we are moving under both START proposals and where we would be in the strategic area at air, sea, and land. I dare say that the security interests of the United States are vastly better served with a freeze than the START proposals.

So, I thank the Chair for the opportunity to make these presentations. I may take the charts down so we can refer to each of them as they come up during the question period and I would welcome the opportunity to respond to any questions you might have.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy. We appreciate that. I think the committee members would like very much to have copies of those charts in reduced form. [Laughter.]

Senator **Kennedy**. It so happens I have some available.

The **Chairman**. I would like to ask you first, because Senator Nunn did comment on the freeze and also because Senators Gary Hart and Daniel Moynihan are among the 45 Senate cosponsors of the builddown, as is former Secretary and former Senator Ed Muskee, for your comments on the builddown, how you react to it, whether you think it makes a contribution to arms control?

Senator **Kennedy**. Mr. Chairman, I think there are many constructive aspects to the builddown, but I do not believe it is an acceptable substitute for the freeze. The concern I have at the present time is that the builddown proposal has been used by the administration as an excuse for the acceptance of the MX missile. I am more interested in the building down than I am in building up.

If we should put in place a freeze, there can be aspects of the builddown that would make sense. Clearly, the problem I see in the builddown is the continued qualitative capability to improve and continue the arms race.

But should the freeze be put into place, then I think there are elements of the builddown which would be of value and would be helpful. In the House-passed resolution, there is reference to the builddown, which indicates the matter had to be considered further and there ought to be additional studies.

But I do not beleive it is an acceptable substitute for the freeze, because it still continues the capability for a qualitative buildup and that is, for the reasons I mentioned earlier, unacceptable and unnecessary and dangerous.

The **Chairman**. The charts that you have shown to us do not actually show the radical cuts in Soviet ICBM's that would be achieved under START if START were successful. Possibly, you would be able to comment either now or for the record on what that potential might be, because they are more stabilizing.

Senator **Kennedy**. The fact is, Mr. Chairman, it does permit, even under the START proposal, for reasons I mentioned here in the three aspects of the Triad, a very dramatic improvement in the qualitative aspects in the Soviet Union and proves we are moving in a similar direction. There are those, including the President of the United States, who believe that by adding more weapons, we have greater security and safety.

But I do not believe that is necessarily the case when you already have substantial equivalence at the present time. I think the record of the arms race historically, when we were going from bombers, which took hours to reach Soviet territory, and then to missiles, which reduced the time to 30 minutes or less for decisionmaking by leaders of a country, now to new kind of systems which reduces the time allowed for decisionmaking to maybe 6 or 7 minutes, then basically decisions will be being made by computers.

There is very eloquent testimony by my colleague, Senator Hatfield, which he has made in other committees about the number of malfunctions of computers over a period of 20 months. I do not want to see decisions made in terms of the future security of my children and the future security and life of this planet being decided by computers.

What we are effectively doing under the START proposal is moving into an entirely new range of different strategic systems, which I do not believe enhance stability. I think, quite frankly, they endanger and provide greater instability for the reasons that I have outlined earlier in my testimony and I would be glad to elaborate further on.

The **Chairman**. Sentors Cohen and Nunn discussed several objections that have been raised publicly to the builddown and further some that we proposed. There are two serious objections that have been raised about the freeze.

I would like to put both of them to you, the first being verification. You expressed deep concern about the future security of our children and grandchildren. Under the freeze, what provision is there for verification associated with the freezing of production as against deployment?

We have national technical means of detecting deployment. How do you then go about verifying adequately so that you insure that they are adhering to it? Production, particularly of small missiles, could be carried on clandestinely in many different ways that would be extraordinarily hard for us to detect in their kind of society.

Senator **Kennedy**. I think there are probably three points I would make. First of all, we do not offer this proposal because we like the Soviet Union or we trust the Soviet Union. We say, as supporters of this resolution, that what cannot be verified will not be frozen and that will have to be worked out through negotiations.

On the questions of verification, one element might perhaps be onsite inspection, although as I think I mentioned in my testimony that Mr. Perry indicated, just from national technical means, they were able to identify every Soviet missile prior to the time of testing. But there may be, because of the nature of the technology, some requirement for onsite inspection.

I had the opportunity, as I know a number of the members of this committee did, to go to Geneva during the consideration of both SALT and the Comprehensive Test Ban. I sat through a number of those meetings and, if this committee reviews the negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban, you will see the Soviet Union was willing to accept onsite inspection as a matter of principle, as they did under the earlier 1976 treaty under limited circumstances. But on the Comprehensive Test Ban, they agreed to onsite inspection as a matter of principle. Now, whether that would be true in the future, I would hope so. It might not be, but I think it is worthwhile challenging the Soviet Union to that approach and I would hope that it would be acceptable.

What cannot be verified will not be frozen. Verification is sometimes raised, Mr. Chairman, as a disingenuous argument, because the question would be, is it easier to verify the existing situation with a freeze, or will it be easier to verify when we move into a whole new range of weapons systems.

The administration's proposals appear to be, we build more, then we reduce, then we freeze. I dare say it is difficult to find many within the arms-control community who believe you can move to new sophistication in terms of weapons systems and then move toward reduction and achieve adequate verification.

I dare say there are not many who believe that, with the addition of new, more complicated, and more sophisticated weapons, it will be any easier to verify under the administration's proposal than with present weapons under the freeze. To the contrary.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Kennedy, I would like very much to get in the second objection, which is even more difficult, particularly for this committee to deal with. It is the politicial complications of trying to include intermediate nuclear forces at the risk of undermining our ongoing INF talks. All of your charts deal with strategic weapons. They all deal with the direct bilateral negotiations of the Soviet Union and the United States. When we get into the intermediate forces; we are dealing with 15 other NATO countries. We are dealing with an alliance of 15 governments adamantly opposed to a freeze.

If we try to impose on them, we could not have any more chance than we had on the gas pipeline embargo. They would be terrified at the thought of freezing, because, as one of the most prominent European leaders said, we would be freezing them at a 350-to-0 disadvantage with respect to the SS-20 deployment that has gone on, one every 5 days, for years now. You would be freezing NATO when the Warsaw Pact has conventional forces that are overwhelming. South Korea knows that North Korea will not invade as long as nuclear weapons are a deterrent there. Kim Ilsong would sweep through Korea were it not for those weapons.

How do we face up for a freeze for the Europeans? How do we impose it on them? And is it not a delusion? Would you not consider separating what we can control, the strategic, from what we cannot really control, or impose on our allies the INF forces?

Senator KENNEDY. We reject just a freeze on Europe, Mr. Chairman, but as the chairman of this committee and members of this committee must understand, the NATO alliance over the period of the last 30 years has been based upon the combined strength of the United States at air, land, and sea, and has not been only limited to what is in place in Europe at any given time, and our adversaries would understand that any movement in terms of Western Europe would bring the whole range of global strength of the United States to bear on any particular challenge.

We reject the idea of a European freeze, and we recognize what we are talking about is a global freeze. The wide range of American military power would be available in terms of Western Europe. That power, quite frankly, has been the basis for the NATO alliance over the period of the last 30 years.

The question is whether the President would be able to convince our allies that under those negotiations, American interests in their security would continue. I believe that he could, should we be able to get the Soviet Union to a position they would be willing to accept a global freeze, but I think it is unrealistic at this time to choose selectively what American forces would be available, and what would not be available, should there be some conflict in central Europe. Our adversaries would know that the total range of American capability—land, sea, and air—in all of its aspects would be brought to bear, and I think that would certainly be a responsibility of a President, certainly one, should that unfortunate circumstance take place, one that I would support.

The **CHAIRMAN**. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator Hatfield, we are delighted you were able to come. I understand you are able to join us just long enough to give your own testimony, and then will have to return to your meeting. We are pleased you could come over and present your testimony personally. Why do you not take the Senator's seat by the microphone?

Again, I want to commend you and Senator Kennedy for the tremendous contribution you have both made to the debate in this country on what I called 16 years ago, in my first round in the Senate, the paramount issue facing mankind.

During the Vietnam war, we were consumed with that war. Today, we now have a level of public interest very great indeed, and you have contributed immensely to that public interest and better understanding.

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK O. HATFIELD, A U.S. SENATOR FROM OREGON

Senator **HATFIELD**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I have been briefly paroled, and will have to return to incarceration shortly. [General laughter.]

But I would be happy to seek a second parole to come back and answer any questions the committee may have to offer.

Let me first commend you and the members of this distinguished committee for the ambitious agenda you are pursuing on the subject of arms control and United States-Soviet relations. I am especially honored to join once again with Senator Kennedy to convey our deeply held belief that the nuclear freeze represents the optimal and perhaps the only course this Nation should embark upon to reverse the forward rush to accumulate more nuclear weapons and reduce the threat of nuclear war.

I will only highlight, Mr. Chairman. I would like permission to have my entire statement placed in the record.

Mr. Chairman, the nuclear freeze has become a symbol of concern over the dangers of nuclear war, and as a symbol it has spurred greater attention to the process of arms control. But it is more, much more than a symbol. It is technically sound, it is diplomatically sound, and it is a sound response to the unique strategic situation we face as we sit here today.

We not only have a multiple overkill capability in nuclear arms. We are today in a position of essential equivalence with the Soviet Union, and perhaps even more importantly, both nations are poised to develop a new generation of weapons so accurate, so deadly, and so difficult to verify that we may possibly be moving beyond the threshold of opportunity for true arms control.

In other words, Mr. Chairman, we risk subjecting ourselves to a form of progress so advanced and yet so sinister that the very genius which brought us here may be incapable of taking us back.

Senator Kennedy has eloquently outlined the litany of new Soviet and American nuclear systems which will be given birth unless a dramatic action is taken. The paradox is this. The political response to the freeze has been to tune in to the symbolism while tuning out the overwhelming realism which is inherent in this proposal.

The unfortunate result is an essentially cosmetic response. It is currently fashionable to favor arms control. I am convinced, however, that arms control, based more on symbol than substance, is far more dangerous than no arms control at all. A multitude of proposals introduced in Congress after the nuclear freeze was introduced by Senator Kennedy and myself, rely heavily on such symbolism.

These proposals are not without merit. Some place quantitative limits on the number of weapons that can be built. Some force a reconfiguration of forces. Others may yield greater stability than an unbridled arms race, but taken as a whole, they do not, Mr. Chairman, represent arms control. The term has been mutilated. The term has been perverted. It has been twisted into Orwellian forms of doublespeak. The best we seem to get are technocratic variations on failed themes and new Madison Avenue pitches to exploit old fears.

Any way you look at it, upward arms management is not arms control. I am reluctant to criticize the President's recently announced willingness to impact greater flexibility into the START talks. However, I cannot help but ask, flexibility to achieve what end? To quote from the President's statement of June 8, one of the principal reasons we have abandoned the original START limit on ballistic missiles is to allow "the evolution we seek toward new, small, single warhead ICBM's."

Mr. Chairman, at the risk of oversimplification, we can illustrate the futility of the current approach to nuclear arms control by comparing it to a group of individuals who have decided they will go on a diet. Each individual knows that if they were to go it alone, the temptation to deviate would be too great. As a group, the incentive to go along is greater. The knowledge that each will verify the behavior of the other through daily readings on the weight scale is proof of compliance.

I would characterize a so-called injection of flexibility into START and the administration's supposed interest in congressional builddown proposals in this way: the U.S. delegation and the Soviet delegation decide they want a nuclear diet. They agree on an appetizer. They agree on a main course. They agree on a vegetable and a beverage, and they agree on a dessert. They have agreed, Mr. Chairman, but they have not dieted. They have gorged themselves on mutually agreeable terms, and called it a diet.

This is what we can expect so long as the Pentagon and its Soviet counterpart are placed in charge of the menu committee.

I think I understand the mentality of those who openly call for an unrestrained arms race. I do not agree with them, but I understand their rationale. Quite frankly, the voices which bewilder me are the ones which ring with commitment to the cause of arms control but somehow skip over the question of why the testing, deployment, and production of additional nuclear weapons should not cease immediately.

With all the talk these days about stability and reductions and putting the MIRV genie back in the bottle, can anyone honestly believe that this nightmare waiting to happen will end without first bringing the arms race to a halt? And if not now, when?

Mr. Chairman, I come before you as a politician, no stranger to the necessity for compromise or the temptation to march to the dictates of our President on important matters of national security. I am well aware of the difficult choices we all face in the political arena, but I implore you and the members of the committee, if you were at all persuaded by the logic of the freeze, now is the time to submerge political reflexes to the call for survival. We stand at an unparalleled juncture in time.

As a student of history, I am all too familiar with bloodshed spilled on the altar of naivete, of well-meaning but misguided pleas for peace, of Chamberlain at Munich, and the aborted hopes of men and women in ideas such as the League of Nations, but there has never been a call to courage and action like the one we face today. There has never been so much at stake.

For once, we cannot wait for the crisis to occur before we acknowledge that an emergency exists. The challenge requires that we resist the temptation to dash off in every conceivable direction in search of escape routes from reality.

Can it be true, Mr. Chairman, can it possibly be true that our refusal to pose this challenge to the Soviet Union is because they may so no? How such a miniscule risk for peace can be viewed as an unacceptable liability is incomprehensible to me. To assert that our willingness to stand unabashedly for survival of the human race indicates a weakness more dangerous than the threat of nuclear war itself is as mad as it is inaccurate. Or have we become so accustomed, so numb to this race for the high ground of destruction that our subconscious fear is that they may just say yes?

We have never been forced to loosen our grip on the trigger. Perhaps we simply do not know how. We must unlearn the dependency we have developed on nuclear weapons or we will surely reach the day when their use will not depend upon us. They embody a momentum that defies human control. The weapons we are about to build inject new logic into nuclear war. The nuclear freeze is the best hope we have to resist this deadly tide.

[Senator Hatfield's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARK O. HATFIELD

Mr. Chairman. Let me first commend you and the members of this distinguished committee for the ambitious agenda you are pursuing on the subject of arms control and United States-Soviet relations. I am honored to join once again with Senator Kennedy to convey our deeply held belief that the nuclear freeze represent the optimal—and perhaps the only—course this nation should embark upon to reverse the forward rush to accumulate more nuclear weapons and reduce the threat of nuclear war.

It has been roughly a year since we were first invited to testify before this committee on the nuclear freeze. Over that period of time we have witnessed a rather profound shift in the degree of concern and attention given to the question of arms control on the part of Congress and this Administration. The call for a nuclear freeze and the overwhelming support it enjoys in the hearts and minds of the American people are the principle factors behind this shift in attitude.

I have no doubt that this movement has staying power. I would also predict that with each passing year more and more Americans will make their decisions in the voting booth with overriding emphasis on this issue. For this reason we desire a vote on the freeze—up or down—so that the American people are able to clearly discern the positions held by their representatives in the Senate on this issue.

The nuclear freeze has become a symbol of concern over the dangers of nuclear war. And as a symbol—it has spurred greater attention to the process of arms control. But it is more—much more— than a symbol. It is technically sound. It is diplomatically sound. And it is a sound response to the unique strategic situation we face as we sit here today. We not only have a multiple overkill capability in nuclear arms, we are today in a position of essential equivalence with the Soviet Union. Perhaps even more importantly, both nations are poised to develop a new generation of weapons so accurate, so deadly, and so difficult to verify that we may possibly be moving beyond the threshold of opportunity for arms control. In other words Mr. Chairman, we risk subjecting ourselves to a form of progress so advanced and yet so sinister that the very genius which brought us here may be incapable of taking us back.

Senator Kennedy has eloquently outlined the litany of new Soviet and American nuclear systems which will be given birth unless a dramatic action is taken. The paradox is this: the political response to the freeze has been to tune in to the symbolism while tuning out the overwhelming realism which is inherent in this proposal. The unfortunate result is an essentially cosmetic response. It is currently fashionable to favor arms control. I am convinced, however, that arms control based more on symbol than substance is far more dangerous than no arms control at all. A multitude of proposals introduced in Congress after the nuclear freeze was introduced rely heavily on such symbolism. These proposals are not without some merit—some place quantitative limits on the number of weapons that can be built, some force a reconfiguration of forces, others may yield greater stability than an unbridled arms race—but taken as a whole they do not, Mr. Chairman, represent arms control. The term has been mutilated and perverted. It has been twisted into Orwellian forms of "double-speak." The best we seem to get are technocratic variations on failed themes and new Madison Avenue pitches to exploit old fears. Any way you look at it, upward arms management is not arms control.

I am reluctant to criticize the President's recently announced willingness to impart greater flexibility into the START talks. However, I cannot help but ask: flexibility to achieve what end? To quote from the President's statement of June 8, one of the principle reasons we have abandoned the original START limit on ballistic missiles is to allow "the evolution we seek toward new small, single warhead ICBMs." A shift toward single warhead ICBMs is, in relative terms—in terms of seeking lesser evils (which we sometimes must do) probably in the best interest of strategic stability. It may also, even though the Soviets have thus far denounced it—facilitate the attainment of a new strategic arms agreement. But history begs the question—what kind of agreement?

Builddown and START are dubious propositions at best because the Soviets must agree to our terms of force configuration. Considering the geographical and technological impediments they face in placing greater emphasis on submarine based missiles and less on land, I question whether they will accept the invitation. If we also accept the notion that the Soviets enjoy selectively imitating our technological prowess but resist voluntarily embracing our strategic doctrine, (a notion espoused by those who claim that the Soviets have pursued a war righting doctrine while we have held to MAD) there exists little historic precedent to suggest that this time it will be different.

Let us assume these doubts are not valid. Let us assume we get an agreement. In my view, the future portends not on arms control agreement, but rather on arms escalation agreement cloaked in false notions of stability.

Mr. Chairman, at the risk of over simplification, we can illustrate the futility of the current approach to nuclear arms control by comparing it to a group of individuals who have decided that they will go on a diet. Each individual knows that if they were to go it alone the temptation to deviate would be too great. As a group—the incentive to go along is greater. The knowledge that each will verify the behavior of the other through daily readings on the weight scale is proof of compliance. I would characterize the so-called injection of flexibility into START and the administration's supposed interest in Congressional "builddown" proposals in this way: the U.S. delegation and the Soviet delegation decide they want a nuclear diet. They agree on an appetizer. They agree on a main course. They agree on a vegetable and a beverage and they agree on a dessert. They have agreed, Mr. Chairman, but they have not dieted. They have gorged themselves on mutually agreeable terms and called it a diet. This is what we can expect so long as the Pentagon and its Soviet counterpart are placed in charge of the menu committee.

I think I understand the mentality of those who openly call for an unrestrained arms race. I do not agree with them, but I understand their rationale. Quite frankly the voices which bewilder me are the ones which ring with commitment to the cause of arms control but somehow skip over the question of why the testing, deployment and production of additional nuclear weapons should not cease immediately. With all the talk these days about stability and reductions and putting the

MIRV genie back in the bottle, can anyone honestly believe that this nightmare waiting to happen will end without first bringing the arms race to a halt? And if not now, when?

If there were ever a time to be bold—this is it. If there were ever a time to abandon political considerations—this is the moment. If there were ever a time to reject the misleading "strangelovian" terminology in which we all indulge for the sake of appearing serious—this is the time.

Mr. Chairman, I come before you as a politician—no stranger to the necessity for compromise or the temptation to march to the dictates of our President on important matters of national security. I am well aware of the difficult choices we all face in the political arena. But I implore you and the Members of the Committee: if you are at all persuaded by the logic of the freeze—now is the time to submerge political reflexes to the call for survival.

We stand at an unparalleled juncture in time. As a student of history, I am all too familiar with bloodshed spilt on the altar of naivete of well meaning but misguided pleas for peace—of Chamberlain at Munich and the aborted hopes of men and women in ideas such as the League of Nations. But there has never been a call to courage and action like the one we face today. There has never been so much at stake. For once, we cannot wait for the crises to occur before we acknowledge that an emergency exists. The challenge requires that we resist the temptation to dash off in every conceivable direction in search of escape routes from reality.

Can it be true Mr. Chairman? Can it possibly be true that our refusal to pose this challenge to the Soviets is because they may say "no"? How such a miniscule risk for peace can be viewed as an unacceptable liability is incomprehensible to me. To assert that our willingness to stand unabashedly for survival of the human race indicates a weakness more dangerous than the threat of nuclear war itself is as mad as it is inaccurate. Or have we become so accustomed—so numb—to this race for the high ground of destruction that our subconscious fear is that they may just say "yes"? We have never been forced to loosen our grip on the trigger. Perhaps we simply don't know how. We must unlearn the dependency we have developed on nuclear weapons or we will surely reach the day when their use will not depend on us. They embody a momentum that defies human control. The weapons we are about to build inject new logic into nuclear war. The Nuclear Freeze is the best hope we have to resist this deadly tide.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. We appreciate it.

Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think the situation we are in now is best described by Father Hesburgh when he compared it to a room about this size filled with gasoline up to one's thigh, and two men in it, each with a box of matches, and said, "Who is ahead?" I think that is where we are. And as you said, Senator Hatfield, we seem to be numb, or I guess one could say dumb, in whatever we are doing now, because we are not facing up to the risks and dangers there.

I am one who believes in the freeze resolution. I was an original cosponsor when it came out. In fact, I publicly supported this idea in November 1981, even before the freeze resolution was formulated. I strongly support the resolution. I realize while it passed in the House, it failed in this committee by a 7-to-10 vote last year. I intend to urge our friend, the chairman, to schedule a vote as quickly as possible on this to see if we can fare a little better this time.

I liked Senator Hatfield's analogy sometime back when he said that before a rising elevator can go down it must first stop. Thus, before the arms race can be reversed, it must first be stopped, and that is why the freeze proposal has been made.

There is one problem I see in connection with the INF. That is, we do want to get an agreement on INF in Geneva. That agreement may entail some new weapons. But, by the same token, a reduction on the Soviet side along the outline of the walk-in-the-woods tentative agreement, that Paul Nitze and the Soviet negotiator had, would be very beneficial. In that connection, I think an INF agreement is very important; it would be one brick on which other bricks can be built, and I do not think it necessarily runs counter to the freeze resolution. I was wondering if either of you had a reaction to this argument?

Senator **Hatfield**. As I said before, I would be happy to come back at a later time to answer your questions, but if you will excuse me at this point, I have people waiting, and I must return to the meeting. I want to thank the chairman and the members of the committee for the opportunity to come. I want to thank my colleague, Senator Kennedy, for lettting me come in at this point. I feel very comfortable with any answers he will give you.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Hatfield.

Senator Kennedy, do you wish to comment?

Senator **Kennedy**. Yes, I would just say, Mr. Chairman, that I would agree with the observation made by the Senator from Rhode Island. I would be hopeful that we would get an INF agreement and there would be every possible effort extended to do so. I must say, I have shared the frustrations many have here in this body, and the chairman was good enough to include me in the briefings when Mr. Rostow came last year, and other meetings on the progress or lack of progress that has been made at Geneva, but I would say that that is not an agreement. The INF agreement is not inconsistent with the freeze. I would certainly hope we would have a success and that we would move toward a freeze.

Senator **Pell**. I think it is very important that the point be made clear that, even if the INF agreement involved the placement of some weapons that are not there now, it would still to my mind not be inconsistent with the overall objective of the freeze and reduction resolution, because the things outlined which I see eventually materializing here would involve Soviet reductions.

Senator **Kennedy**. I agree. The proposal made by the negotiators at that particular time was unfortunately dismissed, and it did appear to me, and perhaps to others, as a very important opportunity which was lost, but I would say I would certainly hope there could be some agreement, but that we would also move ahead with this resolution.

Senator **Pell**. The danger that we face is, it seems to me, in the very near future. I wonder how you see the danger. Do you see it in the near term or the long term? I see danger and peril in the near term. How do you see it?

Senator **Kennedy**. As I mentioned very briefly, there is a very basic conceptual difference, I believe, with this President and the administration. They just think that, by adding more sophisticated and deadly weapons to our arsenal, we are increasing our security, at a time when we do have substantial equivalence, and where the lesson of the last 30 years is so clear, that for every weapons system we have built, we have been matched by the Soviet Union.

I think we fail to realize their determination to match us missile for missile on into the future. That will be the case. That is the lesson of the arms race, and as you know, Senator, it is interesting that actually the weapons systems they are developing almost parallel the ones we have. The Typhoon is very similar to the Trident, the Blackjack very similar to the B-1.

We have some obvious advantages in a number of different areas. They obviously have greater throw-weight. But anyone who does not believe those weapons systems will continue, and that we will find our futures eventually resolved by computers rather than decisions made by rational individuals, I think just does not understand where technology will bring us, and at a cost which I am sure we have really not gotten into today. Our estimate is that with the freeze in place, we could save approximately $100 billion over the period of the next 5 years in the expenditure for strategic systems.

Senator PELL. Another of the particularly beneficial things about the freeze, too, is that we are on the threshold of moving into space, and it woud have an impact on preventing the weaponization of space.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, could you yield at that point for just a clarification?

Senator PELL. Certainly.

The CHAIRMAN. And I will add some time to you. I want to be sure I understood what Senator Kennedy is saying. It relates to the last question I put to him just as Senator Hatfield came in.

Are you saying with a freeze in place, NATO could deploy some number of new missiles under an INF accord? Does this mean the freeze simply would not apply in Europe? Or would this be a specific exemption?

Senator KENNEDY. I would hope that the INF negotiations would be concluded successfully. I would hope that would be done in the very near future. But irrespective of whether that is going to be the case, I still think we should press forward with the freeze. There have been those who have had reservations about the freeze because they believed we would be accepting the conditions in Europe.

We have pointed out that we are talking about the global freeze, not a freeze in Europe, and that available to Europe would be the total range of American weaponry. If there would continue to be some imbalance in terms of the European situation, then I would hope under negotiations this would be an area that would be addressed at the earliest possible time. We are hopeful there will be negotiations, but we are saying we want to press ahead with an overall freeze, because we do accept the fact that the total range of American capability would be available in terms of Western Europe.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Pell, for yielding.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Touching upon another point, Senator Kennedy, and that is the question about responding automatically. One of the dangers of the Pershings, for example, is that within a few minutes they will be able to reach their target in the Soviet Union. Could this not necessitate really an automatic response on their side as well as by us?

Senator KENNEDY. I think I mentioned this earlier. I think the Senator is correct. Senator Hatfield has included in this part of the record his comments on this. Over a period of 20 months, I believe over 140 mechanical malfunctions have occurred in the United

States, and I think 6 or 8 of those have actually gone to active alerts. A number of those have been just a matter of simple computer chips, and there is just no question that the amount of time available to make those kinds of adjustments and changes will be dramatically reduced with this increased technology being produced by both the Soviets and the United States.

And I think that has to be a matter of enormous concern.

Senator **Pell**. It is also in our best interest that they should have the best computers possible, so as not to have those malfunctions.

Senator **Kennedy**. That is certainly logical and sensible.

Senator **Pell**. I strongly support the resolution, and will do all I can to help bring about congressional approval.

Senator **Kennedy**. I would perhaps add that whatever would be negotiated on the INF would be included in the freeze. That would be the objective. We are all hopeful that will be concluded by December. Whatever would be concluded would be included in the freeze by that time.

The **Chairman**. Senator Pressler.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you very much.

As I understand it, about one-fourth of the cosponsors of the nuclear freeze resolution in the Senate have also cosponsored the builddown proposal. Do you believe both the freeze and the builddown advance our common arms control objectives? How do you explain this?

Senator **Kennedy**. I do not think the builddown is an adequate substitute for the freeze. I do think there are elements in the builddown which are useful. If we were putting in place a freeze, then there are elements of the builddown which I find more attractive, but what the builddown does permit at the present time is an improvement in the qualitative aspects, such as the MX and such as the other weapons systems requested by the administration, and I find that troublesome.

So, I would say: One, freeze; two, builddown. And I am more concerned about the buildup aspect of the buildown proposal than I am about the builddown, but if we were to put in place a freeze, then I think there are elements in the builddown that could be particularly appealing, but not as a substitute.

Senator **Pressler**. What would you see as the timetable? Let us say that this freeze resolution passed the Congress. First of all, are you satisfied with the House-passed freeze resolution? It has, I think, onsite inspection and other provisions the Soviets would not or have not accepted, but what would you see as a plan of action? Let us say the same resolution passed the Senate and the President adopted it and proposed it at the START talks. What would happen then?

Senator **Kennedy**. No. 1, I support the House-passed proposal. Quite frankly, there are drafting aspects which I would have altered, but the substance of it I support.

Second, with regard to what I would see as the scenario, the arms control and defense personnel that I have talked to, including the former Secretary of Defense, Clark Clifford, and also Bill Colby of the CIA, Paul Warnke of ACDA, and others who have supported the freeze, believe that the freeze aspect could be negotiated in a few months.

Then the more difficult and complicated negotiations are going to be the actual reductions, and that will probably take a considerably longer period of time.

Senator **Pressler**. The reduction under the freeze proposal?

Senator **Kennedy**. Under the freeze proposal, we have freeze and reductions. In terms of verification, most of the individuals who have been involved in negotiations with the Soviets and involved in intelligence activities and defense activities believe the freeze aspects can be negotiated within a matter of a few months, which I think is enormously important. The more detailed negotiations of reductions will take a longer period of time.

One other aspect. I would ask the Senator to review those negotiations on the Comprehensive Test Ban. I was a sponsor with Senator Mathias for the test ban. I was for the resolution coming out of this committee 7 years ago. I have had a keen interest in that proposal, and have attended the negotiations. The Soviets accepted onsite inspection as a matter of principle in that negotiation. They may not in this one, but it does seem to me we ought to be willing at least to challenge them.

Senator **Pressler**. I asked the same questions of Senator Cohen and Senator Nunn. What would happen, what is the scenario you envisage, in terms of months or years, until the Soviets would accept onsite inspections? I do not think the Russians will—I know the Russians would not presently. The Soviets did say they would not accept the House-passed freeze resolution, or at least that has been their position. Some of the things in the House-passed freeze resolution have been unacceptable to them as I understand it. Is that not correct? The House-passed resolution would not be accepted by the Russians?

Senator **Kennedy**. The fact is, in any negotiation, until you are actually in the negotiation, as any poker player would understand and know, until the cards are dealt, you are not going to really have a hand played, and I would not expect the Soviets to be forthcoming with regards to this resolution or the House resolution until it is actually tabled.

I do not expect that they would. So that is not a surprise to me. But I would hope that, if the administration were to make a serious effort and challenge the Soviet Union to this particular proposal, there may be a positive response. I have seen, as someone who has followed the negotiations generally, whether it is the ABM Treaty or going back to the partial test ban of President Kennedy, the Soviets act out of their national self-interest. They are not going to accept this because they are doing the United States a favor. They will act out of their own national interest.

And if they perceive their own national interest is served, I think they will accept it, and I believe we are at one of those rare points in terms of the arms race where you do have substantial equivalence. It would be madness for the United States to start a nuclear war with the Soviet Union because of the nuclear destruction that would rain on the United States, and I think there certainly can be that appreciation by the Soviets.

I would think a good negotiating effort could persuade them they are in a similar position as the United States is, and that we could get acceptance.

Senator PRESSLER. A final question. There seems to be, in the public mind at least, a bit of confusion about the differences between the freeze and the builddown. Indeed, there must be some confusion in Congressmen's eyes, because a fourth of the freeze supporters voted for the builddown thing. Is there any chance that—and you mentioned in your statement that your resolution would not only require a freeze, but reductions.

We are going through the exercise of counting the number of angels on a pinhead. Too often, that is what the debate in the arms control world is about. We seem to go in circles on semantics. But is there a way you could propose to combine the two, or do you see them as inconsistent?

Senator KENNEDY. The first would be a freeze, obviously, and then I think there have been a variety of different reduction proposals that have been mentioned that could then be considered, including George Kennan's percentage approach. A builddown proposal then, I think, could be considered, because then you have eliminated the qualitative changes which are now permitted under builddown.

Now, under the current builddown proposal, you can go to MX, you can go the Stealth, you can increase what would be considered to be the qualitative aspects of the strategic arms race, including the danger and the first-strike capability.

If you go to the freeze, where you have the prohibition of production, testing, and deployment, and you are reducing nuclear weapons, so you do not have qualitative increases then moving toward some aspect of builddown, such as the trading of two weapons for one, some agreement along those lines is not then inconsistent with the efforts for reduction, because you are not increasing the qualitative dangers of the weapons. And obviously the objective after you go to freeze and are moving toward reductions is to go to less dangerous weapons, stable weapons that can be verified and maintain our deterrent.

Senator PRESSLER. My basic question, though, is, Are you prepared to join in a legislative effort to combine the two?

Senator KENNEDY. I want to make it very clear. you cannot have a builddown alone. You can only consider a builddown proposal after you have a freeze.

Senator PRESSLER. You could say that in the legislation. What I am asking is, Are you prepared to join in a legislative effort?

Senator KENNEDY. Sure, I am wide open as far as the methods for reductions and certainly the builddown has aspects of it which are appealing and attractive. And I more than welcome the opportunity to see how those elements could be worked out.

I think, quite frankly, that will have to be the subject of negotiations in this area. But let me give a more complete response to the Senator as part of the testimony to the Senator's question, because I think it is a fair one, and I am sure that there are other people who would be interested.

Senator PRESSLER. I would also like to submit that question to Senator Hatfield.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want to submit them for the record?

Senator PRESSLER. Yes. If Senator Hatfield would answer for the record.

Senator KENNEDY. I am sure he would.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, he has indicated a willingness to handle these, and we will submit the questions to be put in the record at this point.

[The material referred to follows:]

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C., June 30, 1983.

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHUCK: As stated on page 2, paragraph 2 of the Kennedy-Hatfield Resolution (S.J. Res. 2), "Proceeding from the freeze, the United States and the Soviet Union should pursue major, mutual, and verifiable reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems through annual percentages or equally effective means, in a manner that enhances stability." Therefore, the nuclear build-down proposal could possibly be pursued as an "equally effective means" to accomplish the stabilizing reductions following the freeze, in a manner completely consistent with the purposes of the Resolution.

Sincerely,

EDWARD M. KENNEDY,
U.S. Senator.

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, D.C., June 30, 1983.

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHUCK: During last week's Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Arms Control Resolutions, Senator Pressler asked if there was a way to combine the nuclear freeze and build-down proposals, or if I believed them to be inconsistent.

This question gets to the heart of what I believe could be a meaningful arms control policy; and I emphasize the words could be. If we freeze both arsenals at current levels, and mutually forego the proliferation of new, more dangerous weapons systems, then, and only then, could we move toward reducing the destructive capability of the existing nuclear arsenals.

Any attempt to combine the freeze and the build-down concepts must be approached with great care if we are to avoid certain dangerous, potentially fatal pitfalls. It would be imperative, for example, that the arms build-down portion accomplish what its title suggests: a real reduction in destructive capability. Many of the build-down proposals simply replace a larger number of older, less potent weapons, with a smaller number of more sophisticated and more dangerous systems. The net effect would be a smaller number of weapons, but, in many cases, the destructive capability under a build-down scenario would be altered significantly upward.

In response to the immediate question; no, I do not see the freeze and build-down as being necessarily incompatible. At the same time, I have not seen a proposal which marries the two principles in such a way that the Free World and the Soviet Bloc would move closer to our goal of reducing both the number of nuclear weapons and the exponential growth of the destructive capability of existing nuclear arsenals.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to comment on this matter.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

MARK O. HATFIELD,
U.S. Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I have one last question, relating to the Sunday television appearance by Walter Mondale, who said that virtually all freeze supporters also favor the Midgetman, the new small single warhead ICBM, because it represents a stabilizing development.

Now, adopting your resolution would seem to prohibit this development. How do you react to former Vice President Mondale's comments? Do you favor exempting from the freeze those systems that could lead to a more stabilizing nuclear balance until such time, of course, as we develop a means of achieving the ultimate goal which this committee reported out in its resolution last year, which is the destruction of every single nuclear weapon on Earth? That is the ultimate goal and objective we established.

Senator KENNEDY. Rather than commenting on my good friend Walter Mondale's statement, which I do not have in front of me, I would refer the committee to page 2 of our resolution, to the final paragraph, paragraph 2, which says:

> Proceeding from the freeze, the United States and the Soviet Union should pursue major mutual and verifiable reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems, through annual percentages or equally effective means, in a manner that enhances stability.

And I think there would be maximum opportunity available to negotiators to breathe life into those words, understanding that the test is whether we are adding to stability or whether we are talking about additional new dangerous weapons systems. But the language in the final words in that second paragraph addresses that particular issue.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Kennedy.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. I just want to make the point here that the freeze resolution is very well crafted, very well written, and has a little leeway for the problems we talked about, the INF negotiations and Midgetman. It is really a well-done resolution, which leaves a little leeway for instances of that sort.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The hearing is recessed until 2 p.m., when we will start with Senator Levin.

[Whereupon, the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Levin, we welcome you. We are very sorry that we could not get to you this morning, but we simply were not able to complete the agenda. So we are happy to have you as our leadoff witness this afternoon. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF HON. CARL LEVIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM MICHIGAN

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly can understand that.

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon about an arms control proposal which Senator Kassebaum and I have introduced with nine other Senators as cosponsors. Our resolution, Senate Resolution 159, was introduced on June 16 and it calls on the United States to announce its willingness to pause in the testing of new ICBM's with multiple warheads while strategic arms negotiations proceed, if—and this is a critical "if"—the Soviet Union agrees to such a pause.

It also states the sense of the Senate that the United States should propose an arms control agreement which implements the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission for reductions in MIRV'd ICBM's, the development of small single warhead ICBM's, and limitations on strategic nuclear forces formulated in terms of warheads rather than launchers.

This proposal has been sponsored by Senators from both parties and by Senators who recently supported development and testing of the MX, as will as MX opponents. While the sponsors of this resolution have different views about the advisability of proceeding with the MX, at this point we all agree that a mutual pause in the flight testing of new MIRV'd ICBM's would clearly be in our national interest. It would be a positive step the United States could take to link the MX decision to arms control and create a more positive climate for the START talks, while at the same time challenging the Soviets to reciprocate.

It would also allow congressional endorsement of the full thrust of the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations, rather than just the proposal to put MX missiles in Minuteman silos. The Scowcroft Commission's report deflated the sense of urgency of testing and deployment of the MX by pronouncing the window of vulnerability closed.

It was that supposedly open window which impelled the development of a new MIRV'd ICBM which could survive a Soviet first strike and also threaten Soviets with the same kind of time-urgent hard-target kill capability which their large ICBM's are said to pose against us. The Commission urged moving away from new MIRV'd missiles and instead proposed the development of a new single warhead lightweight missile, with deployment of MX in nonsurvivable Minuteman silos as only an interim first step to demonstrate our national will and determination to match the Soviets in every leg of the strategic arms race.

Congress has now approved the latter recommendation, despite its apparent inconsistency with the rest of the Commission's recommendations, and fiscal year 1983 funds for the development and testing of the MX have been released. I believe the "national will" argument and the hope that the MX would strengthen the President's hand at Geneva are what won the Congress support for the MX.

The first flight test of the MX was conducted last week. If our resolution were adopted by this committee, the Congress, and then implemented by the President, we could in a sense have our cake and eat it too. The President would have the funds to proceed with the MX, demonstrating our resolve to make continuous improvements in our strategic deterrent, while this resolution would demonstrate our willingness to negotiate an end to the develoment of the most destabilizing weapons in both sides' nuclear arsenals.

This approach would allow us to pin the responsibility for continuing this most threatening part of the arms race squarely on the Soviet Union. We would continue testing the MX only if the Soviets were unwilling to match our offer of a testing moratorium by halting work on their own MX, the SS-X-24 ICBM, as well as their so-called fifth generation modifications to the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM's, which are expected to be tested later this year.

The Soviet Union continually outmaneuvers us in the propaganda wars over strategic arms by announcing their willingness to negotiate various types of freezes and reductions in nuclear weapons. The United States could neatly turn the tables on them with this proposal for a mutual pause. If the Soviets did not agree, MX testing and deployment would proceed and we could then point out that we tried to avoid opening this new chapter in the arms race.

Mr. Chairman, the advantages of a mutual pause in MIRV'd ICBM testing are not merely propaganda points. Halting Soviet improvements to their MIRV'd ICBM's would yield real military benefits to the United States. The Soviets' current ICBM arsenal is made up of 550 SS-11's, 60 SS-13's, 150 SS-17's, 308 SS-18's, and 330 SS-19's. All but the SS-13's are fueled by liquids that are highly toxic and volatile. Preparing them for launching is hazardous and time-consuming, and the rockets require an extremely intricate set of pumps and circuits in order to regulate fuel flow in the combustion chambers in correct proportions.

Of course, the Soviets have learned to handle this liquid fuel with few problems. But this may have been of necessity, given their limited success in developing solid propellant ICBM's. The United States concluded more than 30 years ago that liquid fuels were too dangerous and unreliable and developed solid propellants exclusively. With the exception of the 52 Titan II missiles, all our ICBM's are now solid fueled.

The Soviets are anxious to make the shift to solid fuels. As Dr. John Kincaid, who helped design most of the basic rocket motors now used by the U.S. Navy, has said:

> Whoever thinks the Soviets have stuck with liquids because they chose to do things that way does not know what they are talking about. No one would mess around with liquids if they did not have to.

The Soviets have been able thus far to develop successfully only two solid-fuel land-based missiles—the single warhead SS-13 ICBM and the SS-20, a three-warhead intermediate, not intercontinental, range missile. The SS-X-24 is the first solid-fueled Soviet ICBM likely to be deployed in significant numbers.

Moreover, the SS-X-24 is likely to have significantly increased system reliability and effectiveness compared to current Soviet ICBM's. The SS-X-24 could also be turned into a mobile ICBM, which is not feasible for a liquid-fueled missile. It could carry up to 10 reentry vehicles and replace missiles with only 1 or 4 RV's, thus adding many more RV's to the Soviet arsenal.

Its more modern warhead and guidance technology is likely to provide militarily significant improvements in system lethality over the fifties and sixties era technology in the missiles it would replace. Halting the new generation of SS-18's and SS-19's would also prevent the Soviets from further improving the accuracy, yields, yield-to-weight ratios and reliability of these multiple-warhead missiles.

All of these developments, if allowed to continue, would clearly not be in our own strategic security interest. Halting Soviet programs to improve reliability, accuracy, and hard target kill potential of their missiles and to develop solid fueled ICBM's would certainly be in our strategic security interests. In April, I asked the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at an Armed Services Committee hearing if the United States has a military interest in getting the Soviet Union to stop deploying new ICBM's, and he replied emphatically, "Yes, we do."

This proposal for a mutual flight-test pause is both timely and verifiable. Even though flight-test programs for the new Soviet missiles and our own MX have already begun, it will still be some time before any of these missiles have been fully tested and ready for deployment. A new ICBM must be flight tested more than one dozen times to have high confidence that all of its systems will operate according to design, and the Soviets have historically been quite conservative and tested their new missiles even more exhaustively before deployment.

The MX flight-test program has only just begun and is scheduled to continue well into 1986. The SS–X–24 has only had four tests, three of them reportedly unsuccessful, and the fifth generations of the SS–18's and SS–19's have not yet been tested. National technical means of verification through land- and space-based systems are fully capable of detecting ICBM flight tests and of distinguishing between training tests of operational missiles and experimental flight tests of new designs.

I would also emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that the mutual test pause is intended to be an interim first step toward negotiated reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides, and not the end result of such negotiations. Halting the development of new MIRV'd ICBM's would help set the stage for those negotiations and is not inconsistent with the President's START proposals, the programs for a builddown, or the nuclear freeze approach.

A pause would have to be followed by negotiations for further limits and reductions, which might well include reductions in the Soviet arsenal of MIRV'd ICBM's. The pause would also maintain whatever value the MX might have as a bargaining chip to the START talks, because a bargaining chip is useful only before the missile is deployed and not after.

Let me now recount some fascinating and chillingly relevant Senate history from 1970 which shows that a mutual pause in the further flight testing of MIRV'd ICBM's is an idea whose time came over a decade ago, and has stayed. It came in the late sixties, Mr. Chairman, and in 1970 in the U.S. Senate.

Senators Brooke, Case, Fulbright, Muskie, Percy, Javits, Phil Hart, and others saw that the development of fixed MIRV'd ICBM's increased the risk of nuclear holocaust.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Levin, in the interest of time, because of the number of witnesses we have, the section going from here through page 9 covers pretty much the history. Would you possibly care to summarize and then go on to your conclusion? The entire text will be incorporated in the record.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will do that. I will simply refer to one quote in the pages and then move on as the chairman suggests.

Many of the Senators I named—Brooke, Case, yourself, Hart, and a number of other Senators—became very deeply determined that they are going to adopt a resolution in the Senate urging President Nixon to propose a mutual pause of MIRV'd ICBM's to the Soviet

Union, and I quote many of the Senators I indicated. I would like to just read one quote from Senator Mansfield, who summed up as follows:

> What we are trying to do is break the deadlock which exists, to try to give encouragement to the President and his delegates at Vienna, and to try to do something constructive in helping to bring about an end to the mad momentum which seems to have gripped the two major powers in the world, the Soviet Union and ourselves, to the end that perhaps there will be salvation at the end of the road, rather than destruction.

Senator Brooke used the terms "fragile moment" back in 1970.

Mr. Chairman, this is almost like deja vu, except this all really happened, and the quotes in my testimony, which will be made a part of the record, could have been made now instead of 13 years ago.

What Henry Kissinger said perhaps sums it all up: "There is no effective or intellectually adequate solution to this problem except to seek to eliminate multiple warheads within a fixed time."

And as you know, Mr. Chairman, the Scowcroft Commission itself has strongly recommended that we move away from reliance on MIRV'd ICBM's because they are so destabilizing. Then the question comes, how can the Senate express its hopes for mutual and verifiable arms control and its continuing deep concern about MIRV'd ICBM's? The pause resolution of Senator Kassebaum, myself, and nine other cosponsors fits those needs, Mr. Chairman. It is supported by Senators who voted for and against MX and by Senators on both sides of the aisle.

It is not unilateral; it is mutual. It does not tie the President's hands; it is simply advice to the President. It does not pretend to suggest the outcome of negotiations relative to MIRV'd ICBM's or anything else. It seeks only to create an atmosphere in which those negotiations might succeed.

It is aimed at the most dangerous of the dangers and at the most destabilizing weapons in our inventories. It would challenge the Soviets. It would put the onus on them if both sides continue during the negotiations to stumble into the quicksand that MIRV'd ICBM's represent.

For those who opposed the MX because it was so destabilizing, this resolution offers a breather in the arms race toward more and more destabilizing systems on both sides.

It is to our advantage militarily that the Soviets be slowed up in the deployment of the new solid fuel missile and the newly modified and more accurate SS-18's and SS-19's. The resolution would also appeal to those who voted for MX principally because of the national will and desire to support the President's arguments.

This resolution expresses our view. It does not bind the President. It expresses our concern. It does not presume to dictate the outcome of negotiation. It might help achieve some clear arms control value out of the decision to proceed with MX, and it would give us some hope of a shift away from the final holocaust.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Senator Levin's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CARL LEVIN

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful for this opportunity to testify before this distinguished committee about an arms control proposal which Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kans.) and I have introduced with nine other Senators as cosponsors. Our resolution, Senate Resolution 159 introduced on June 16, 1983, calls on the United States to announce its willingness to pause in the testing of new ICBM's with multiple warheads while strategic arms negotiations proceed if the U.S.S.R. agrees to such a pause. It also states the sense of the Senate that the United States should propose an arms control agreement which implements the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces for reductions in MIRVed ICBM's, development of small, single warhead ICBM's, and limitations on strategic nuclear forces formulated in terms of warheads rather than launchers.

This proposal has been sponsored by Senators from both parties and by Senators who have recently supported development and testing of the MX as well as MX opponents. While the sponsors of this resolution have different views about the advisability of proceeding with the MX at this point, we all agree that a mutual pause in the flight testing of new MIRVed ICBM's would clearly be in the national interest. It would be a positive step the United States could take to link the MX decision to arms control and create a more positive climate for the START talks, while at the same time challenging the Soviets to reciprocate. It would also allow Congressional endorsement of the full thrust of the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations, rather than just the proposal to put MX missiles into Minuteman silos.

The Scowcroft Commission's report deflated the sense of urgency about testing and deploying the MX by pronouncing the window of vulnerability closed. It was that supposedly opening window which impelled the development of a new MIRVd ICBM which could survive a Soviet first strike and also threaten the Soviets with the same kind of time-urgent, hard target kill capability which their large ICBM's are said to pose against us. The Commission urged moving away from new MIRVed missiles and instead proposed the development of a new single warhead light-weight missile, with deployment of MX in non-survivable Minuteman silos as only an interim first step to demonstrate our national will and determination to match the Soviets in every leg of the strategic arms race.

Congress has now approved the latter recommendation, despite its apparent inconsistency with the rest of the Commission's recommendations, and fiscal year 1983 funds for the development and testing of the MX have been released. I believe the "national will" argument and the hope that the MX would strengthen the President's hand at Geneva are what won the Congress' support for the MX. The first flight test of the MX was conducted last week. If our resolution were adopted by this committee, the Congress, and then implemented by the President, we could in a sense have our cake and eat it too. The President would have the funds to proceed with the MX, demonstrating our resolve to make continuous improvements in our strategic deterrent, while this resolution would demonstrate our willingness to negotiate an end to the development of the most destabilizing weapons in both sides' nuclear arsenals. This approach would allow us to pin the responsibility for continuing this most threatening part of the arms race squarely on the Soviet Union. We would continue testing the MX only if the Soviets were unwilling to match our offer of a testing moratorium by halting work on their own MX, the SS-X-24 ICBM, as well as their so-called "fifth generation" modifications to the SS-18 and SS-19 ICBM's, which are expected to be tested later this year. The Soviet Union continually outmaneuvers us in the propaganda wars over strategic arms by announcing their willingness to negotiate various types of freezes and reductions in nuclear weapons. The United States could neatly turn the tables on them with this proposal for a mutual pause. If the Soviets didn't agree, MX testing and deployment would proceed and we could then point out that we tried to avoid opening this new chapter in the arms race.

But the advantages of a mutual pause in MIRVed ICBM testing are not merely propaganda points. Halting Soviet improvements to their MIRVed ICBM's would yield real military benefits to the United States. The Soviets' current ICBM arsenal is made up of 550 SS-11's, 60 SS-13's, 150 SS-17's, 308 SS-18's and 330 SS-19's. All but the SS-13's are fueled by liquids that are highly toxic and volatile. Preparing them for launching is hazardous and time consuming, and the rockets require an extremely intricate set of pumps and circuits in order to regulate fuel flow into combustion chambers in the correct proportions. Of course, the Soviets have learned to handle this liquid fuel with few problems, but this may have been of necessity given their limited success in developing solid propellant ICBM's. The United States concluded more than 30 years ago that liquid fuels were too dangerous and unreliable and developed solid propellants exclusively. With the exception of 52 Titan II missiles, all our ICBM's are now solid fueled. The Soviets are anxious to make the shift to solid fuels. As Dr. John Kincaid, who helped design most of the basic rocket motors now used by the U.S. Navy has said, "Whoever thinks the Soviets have stuck with liquids because they chose to do things that way doesn't know what they are talking about. No one would mess around with liquids if they didn't have to. The reason the Russians do it is because they are so goddam backward." The Soviets have been able thus far to develop successfully only two solid fuel land based missiles—the single warhead SS-13 ICBM and the SS-20, a three warhead intermediate, not intercontinental, range missile. The SS-X-24 is the first solid-fueled Soviet ICBM likely to be deployed in significant numbers. Moreover, the SS-X-24 is likely to have significantly increased system reliability and effectiveness compared to current Soviet ICBM's. The SS-X-24 could also be turned into a mobile ICBM, which is not feasible for a liquid-fueled missile. It could carry up to 10 reentry vehicles (RVs) and replace missiles with only one or four RVs, thus adding more RVs to the Soviet arsenal. Its more modern warhead and guidance technology is likely to provide militarily significant improvements in system lethality over the 1950's and 1960's-era technology in the missiles it would replace. Halting the new generations of the SS-18 and SS-19 would also prevent the Soviets from further improving the accuracies, yields, yield to weight ratios and reliability of these multiple warhead missiles. All of these developments if allowed to continue would clearly not be in our own strategic security interests. Halting Soviet programs to improve reliability, accuracy, and hard target kill potential of their missiles and to develop solid-fueled ICBM's would certainly be in our strategic security interests. In April, I asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at an Armed Services Committee hearing if the United States has a military interest in getting the Soviet Union to stop deploying new ICBM's, and he replied emphatically, "Yes, we do."

I would also like to emphasize that this proposal for a mutual flight test pause is both timely and verifiable. Even though flight test programs for the new Soviet missiles and our own MX have already begun, it will still be some time before any of these missiles have been fully tested and ready for deployment. A new ICBM must be flight tested more than a dozen times to have high confidence that all its systems will operate according to design, and the Soviets have historically been quite conservative and tested their new missiles even more exhaustively before deployment. The MX flight test program has only just begun and is scheduled to continue well into 1986. The SS-X-24 has only had four tests, three of them reportedly unsuccessful, and the fifth generations of the SS-18 and SS-19 have not yet been tested. National technical means of verification through land and space based systems are fully capable of detecting ICBM flight tests and of distinguishing between training tests of operational missiles and experimental flight tests of new designs.

I should also emphasize that the mutual test pause is intended to be an interim first step toward negotiated reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides, and not the end result of such negotiations. Halting the development of new MIRVed ICBM's would help set the stage for those negotiations and is not inconsistent with the President's START proposals, the proposal for a builddown, or the nuclear freeze approach. A pause would have to be followed by negotiations for further limits and reductions, which might well include reductions in the Soviet arsenal of MIRVed ICBM's. The pause would also maintain whatever value the MX might have as a bargaining chip in the START talks, because a bargaining chip is useful only before the missile is deployed and not after. As Paul Warnke, our chief SALT II negotiator has stated, referring to and concurring with the experiences of chief SALT I negotiator Gerard Smith, "It is really the potential, rather than the actualization of that potential, that gives you the major bargaining position. . . . Once you have gone ahead and done that which you were threatening to do, the threat is no longer of any particular use to a negotiator."

Let me now recount some fascinating and chillingly relevant Senate history from 1970 which shows that a mutual pause on the further flight-testing of MIRVed ICBM's is an idea whose time came over a decade ago—and has stayed.

It came in the late 1960's and in 1970 in the United States Senate. Senators Brooke, Case, Fulbright, Muskie, Percy, Javits, Phil Hart and others saw that the deployment of fixed MIRVed ICBM's increased the risk of a nuclear holocaust. They saw that stability required each side to be confident in its ability to deter the other side by being able to retaliate following a nuclear attack. They saw that threatening the survivability of the other side's nuclear forces is destabilizing. They saw that making one's own forces more survivable was stabilizing and reduced the risk of nuclear war. As Alton Frye wrote in his book, A Responsible Congress, "So far as fixed land-based missiles are concerned, MIRVing threatens to give a distinct advantage to the side which launches its weapons first in a counterforce strike against the adversary ICBM's . . . to the extent that such capabilities enter either or both side's arsenals, they will undermine a cardinal principle of stability, namely the requirement that, in order to deter rather than invite attack, strategic weapons should be invulnerable."

Senator Brooke, with 42 cosponsors, introduced a sense of the Senate Resolution in early 1970 which urged President Nixon to bring a halt to the MIRV race before it was too late by offering the U.S.S.R. a mutual pause on the further testing of MIRVed ICBM's. Senator Brooke told the Senate on April 9, 1970, that we must decide "what to do about land-based ICBM's which are becoming vulnerable as missile accuracy on both sides improves and which invite attack on our own territory."

A long debate over the Brooke resolution occurred. Opponents said that we would be giving up military advantage and that the Senate would be interfering with the President's prerogatives by adopting even a non-binding sense of the Senate Resolution.

But the Senators persisted.

Senator Brooke argued that, if the moratorium took place and "there is no further testing and no further deployment during this time, both will have performed a great service; and they will be more apt, in that climate, to be able to enter into a mutual arms limitation agreement than if they sat down in June and began to talk—but at the same time both parties were increasing their arsenal, both parties were continuing to test, and both parties were moving ahead with far more devastating technology."

Senator Fulbright said that the mutual moratorium was not necessarily the ultimate goal. "The point is to suspend all deployment now in order to enhance the probability of getting some agreement, some permanent agreement, at the talks in Vienna. This is not proposed as the ultimate goal of the talks at Vienna, but as a first measure that would insure, insofar as we can, the success of those talks." He continued that "the President should take the initiative" so that we would not have a "shifting base on which to try to negotiate a final agreement."

Senator Fulbright referred to a statement of Marshall Shulman, Director of the Columbia University Russian Institute, which said in part, "The third rationale has been the need for MIRVs as hard-target killers, and here it is most evident that the development of MIRVs capable of destroying adversary missiles would be destabilizing and, therefore, undesirable since it would create understandable apprehensions on the Soviet side about out intentions. . . ." Director Shulman went on to say that the "argument that we should proceed with MIRV . . . in order to have a bargaining counter in our hand is shortsighted. To enter upon these programs in order to have something to bargain with or in order to apply pressure upon the Russians is likely to have an effect opposite to what is intended. The logical Soviet reaction to such actions would be to question our real intentions and to redouble their own military efforts. If SALT proceeds over a long period, as it may do, and if both sides argue the need for continuing their buildup to improve their bargaining advantage, the effect of the SALT negotiations will be to leave us both worse off than if they had never been begun. Negotiating about strategic weapons is not entirely like a poker game—both sides can lose."

Senator Cooper urged the Senate as follows, and remember this is April 1970: "There are those who claim we have fallen behind the Soviet Union in nuclear destructive ability. It is true that in some categories the Soviets are ahead in numbers. But in no category do we have less than the assured ability to destroy the Soviet Union many times over and kill hundreds of millions of their people . . . While our ability to destroy is assured, our ability to prevent catastrophic war is in grave doubt." Senator Cooper urged the President to offer a mutual suspension to the Soviets because such a proposal "will test Soviet intentions and, just as important, make clear to the Soviet Union our own purposes. It is the course of reason, it is the course of security."

Senator Phil Hart argued that "absent a moratorium, such as we call for in this resolution, each side will continually feel compelled to take 'one last step' to place itself in a 'superior' position by some new weapon deployment. It is, therefore, imperative that we now take the initiative and say 'Let's stop now. What do you say?' Until that step is taken, there appears to be no way of blocking the continued arms spiral."

Senator Hart said the effort on each side to take one last step was a tragic example of the "fallacy of the last move."

Senator Percy expressed the indebtedness of the Senate to Senator Brooke "for his initiative and leadership in seeking a mutual suspension of testing of MIRVs by both the Soviet Union and the United States."

Senator Mansfield summed up: "What we are trying to do is to break the deadlock which exists, to try to give encouragement to the President and his delegates at Vienna, and to try to do something constructive in helping to bring about an end to the mad momentum which seems to have gripped the two major powers in the world—the Soviet Union and ourselves—to the end that perhaps there will be salvation at the end of the road rather than destruction."

Senator Brooke concluded: "We have arrived at a fragile moment which we must either grasp by bold initiative or see it fall victim to our own hesitation."

The resolution was amended by this Committee to include a moratorium on deployments of all strategic weapons, including particularly MIRV and ABM, and was subsequently adopted by the Senate by a vote of 72 to 6.

The Nixon administration opposed the resolution but, after its passage, proceeded to offer the Soviets some half-hearted MIRV deployment limitations at Vienna. The limitations were conditioned by an agreement to onsite inspection and the United States was to be allowed to continue producing MIRV warheads. The proposal was rejected by the Soviets. Two excellent books explain the history of this effort more fully—Gerard Smith's "Doubletalk, The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks," and Alton Frye's "A Responsible Congress," Chapters 3 and 4.

Henry Kissinger is quoted in the Gerard Smith book as stating in December 1974, that "I wish I had thought through the implications of a MIRVed world more thoughtfully in 1969 and 1970 than I did." He has written more recently, "The challenge . . . is to resolve, finally, the intellectual problem of how to insure strategic stability amid the revolution wrought by thousands of warheads on only hundreds of launchers". . . and that "the principal cause of instability with current weapons systems is the disproportion between warheads and launchers. All the remedies that have been tried are vulnerable to technology. . . . There is no effective or intellectually adequate solution to this problem except to seek to eliminate multiple warheads within a fixed time . . ." (Time Magazine March 21, 1983)

We are not at another "fragile moment", to use Senator Brooke's term.

The Soviets are flight-testing modifications of their SS-18 and SS-19, thereby improving their accuracy. The Soviets are flight-testing their new SS-X-24, a solid-fuel missile with greater reliability and effectiveness.

And we, of course, have started the flight testing of the MX.

We are heading toward the precipice predicted in 1970. It is all deja vu—except that this all really happened before.

The Scowcroft Commission itself repeatedly expressed fears about MIRVed ICBM's.

The Commission wrote, ". . . whether the Soviets prove willing or not, stability should be the primary objective both of the modernization of our strategic forces and of our arms control proposals . . ."

The Commission continued, ". . . from the point of view of enhancing such stability, the Commission believes that there is considerable merit in moving toward an ICBM force structure in which potential targets are of comparatively low value—missiles containing only one warhead."

And further, ". . . for those silos or shelters holding a missile with only one warhead, each would present a far less attractive target than would be the case for a silo containing a large missile with many MIRVs."

How can the Senate express its hopes for mutual and verifiable arms control and its continuing deep concern about MIRVed ICBM's? I believe our mutual pause resolution fits those needs. It is supported by Senators who voted for and against MX and by Senators on both sides of the aisle.

It isn't unilateral—it is mutual.

It doesn't tie the President's hands. It is simply advice to the President.

It doesn't pretend to suggest the outcome of negotiations relative to MIRVed ICBM's or anything else—it only seeks to create an atmosphere in which those negotiations might succeed.

It is aimed at the most dangerous of the dangers and at the most destabilizing weapons in our inventories.

It would challenge the Soviets. It would put the onus on them if both sides continue during the negotiations to stumble into the quicksand that MIRVed ICBM's represent.

It is to our advantage militarily that the Soviets be slowed up in the deployment of their new solid-fuel missile and the newly modified and more accurate SS-18 and SS-19.

For those who opposed MX because it was so destabilizing, this resolution offers a breather in the race toward more and more destabilizing systems on both sides.

This resolution should also appeal to those who voted for MX principally because of the "national will" and "desire to support the President" arguments.

This resolution expresses our views—it doesn't bind the President.

It expresses our concerns—it doesn't presume to dictate the outcome of negotiations.

It might help achieve some clear arms control value out of the decision to proceed with MX.

It would give some hope of a shift away from the final holocaust.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.

I have thought many times about Senator Brooke, and particularly Senator Cooper, Senator Javits, and others who really had this great fear a decade ago that we were moving in a direction that was wrong. And I am reminded, when you quote my own words, of indebtedness to Senator Brooke for the leadership in seeking a mutual suspension of testing of MIRV's by both the Soviet Union and the United States. We would have been a lot safer in the world today had we followed the admonitions of Senator Brooke and those you mentioned.

Thank you very much for your very strong and helpful testimony.

I would like first to ask you, how long a pause would you recommend on flight testing of each side's new MIRV'd ICBM's?

Senator LEVIN. The pause would last as long as the negotiations which are now going on. There is no time limit on that pause in this resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. What if, after 6 or 12 months, START remained stalemated? Would you favor keeping the moratorium in place, even though we appeared to be on dead center?

Senator LEVIN. I think both parties could decide whether to do it at such a point. This is a mutual pause that both parties would have to pursue, and at the end of 12 months if they are still stalemated and START is still talking they would decide whether to continue such a pause on flight testing of MIRV'd ICBM's.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you think of any precedent in arms control where a mutual moratorium on certain systems proved to be a catalyst for prompting agreement on a broader range of weapons?

Senator LEVIN. I cannot offhand, but I would like to get back to the committee on that issue. I would not want to say yes or no offhand on that.

The CHAIRMAN. We will keep the record open.

Senator LEVIN. I do know this particular resolution I referred to in 1970 did lead President Nixon to make a proposal at Vienna. Whether one could say that, even though it was rejected for various reasons by the Soviets, that it helped lead the way to the conclusion of the SALT talks. I would have to go back into the record.

The CHAIRMAN. We will leave the record open so you may comment further if you would like.

Just as I did with our two panels this morning, I will be a devil's advocate and raise objections that have been raised to your own proposal, just to give you an opportunity to answer those objections.

Critics of your resolution believe that halting the Soviets' SS–X–24 test program is not really a fair trade for halting the MX. They point out that your proposal leaves in place some 650 Soviet medium and heavy ICBM's. How would you respond to this criticism?

Senator LEVIN. We would gain significant military value by a pause in the SS-X-24 and a pause in the further modifications of the SS-18's and SS-19's. They are gaining significant accuracy on the SS-18's and SS-19's. They are gaining considerable reliability in moving to a solid fuel rocket in the SS-X-24. Those are very important military advantages.

When you add to that the arms control advantage for us and for the world, when you add to that the fact that we are seeking in our own interest to find a way to move away from the most destabilizing weapons, then it becomes indeed a very desirable goal.

If you are one who adopted or voted for MX based upon its military, alleged military advantages, rather than, let us support the President and give him a bargaining chip, let us show national will, let us move toward arms control arguments, then I would say this resolution would not be your cup of tea.

But if one voted for MX based primarily on the hope that it would move us toward some arms control and the need to support the President, to give him a bargaining chip, to show national will, then this resolution is very consistent indeed with those particular goals.

The CHAIRMAN. There are those who say the successful flight test of the MX Friday makes your resolution moot. How would you respond to that?

Senator LEVIN. The Soviets are in the middle of their flight testing of their SS-X-24 and their SS-18 and SS-19 mods. It is not moot as to them. It is not moot as to our MX.

It is still relevant to the issue which you, Mr. Chairman, were right in the middle of in 1970, and that is the future of this world with these fixed MIRV'd ICBM's. It is not a moot point until we are over the pressers 0.3. As long as we are still walking in that direction, these efforts must continue, providing they are mutual and verifiable.

The CHAIRMAN. My final question, and I quote you because you have done a tremendous amount of thinking about this subject and have been devoted to arms control: Absent a dramatic initiative such as this, do you believe there is much chance that START will succeed?

Senator LEVIN. I think there is less chance. I think this kind of initiative would show our intentions and would be a challenge to the Soviets. This is a real challenge to them. It is clearly in our interest that they accept, but it is a challenge to them. It would show them we are not trying to destabilize. It is their fixed land-based missile, duplicated by us, that would be so destabilizing, and we are deeply concerned about the future.

So I think it would help push the START talks in the right direction. It would set the right atmosphere. Senator Kassebaum and I spent a good deal of time talking about just this question when we decided to introduce this resolution. And without speaking for her, I think we can say we do believe it would push the START talks in the correct direction. It would not guarantee their success.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I can only reiterate a few things I think Senator Levin said that I believe are very important. I certainly respect the time and thought and initiative he has given to this effort, which I believe is a very important one.

Secretary Shultz presented last week his outline on United States-Soviet relationships, it was a very forthright, thoughtful analysis, in which he said there was the opportunity for flexibility. I think President Reagan has stated this and I think this is the kind of approach that can be used with some flexibility and with some initiative in the hopes of constructing something even better as it goes along.

But as you have stated, our initiative would create a better atmosphere for START or whatever other negotiations might evolve from START, and would challenge the Soviets to respond. It would implement certainly the intention of the Scowcroft Commission by encouraging the movement away from MIRV'd ICBM's.

In that effort, it does not halt any testing of single warhead ICBM's. It is totally to MIRV'd ICBM's. One of the beauties of this, it seems to me, is the simplicity in that verification is very easy. It does not take long months or years of negotiation. It is a very clearcut and simple proposal.

I would certainly support Senator Levin in his comments, Mr. Chairman, on the fact of whether, when the first flight test has been made, our resolution is not moot. In fact, I think it was important a flight test be made. It does not halt those tests and it shows that, indeed, we intend to carry forward with those tests unless the Soviets would agree to respond.

I think that for those who say, well, we are just beginning the MX program, they already have one in place, are we not giving up more, you very clearly delineated what I think is the important consideration. There is not a solid fuel missile, and this would halt those tests, as well as any modified SS-18 or SS-19 tests.

I do think that one question certainly to be raised and that we would have to consider if indeed this came to pass is the time that this moratorium would go into place. If indeed it was talked about for a certain length of time or the Soviet Union saw it is a benefit to them to stall negotiations while they continued testing to a point where it would not be of any real significance to call the moratorium, then certainly that is something we must take into consideration.

But if, indeed, we saw it as the opportunity right now to offer a little breathing space, a constructive challenge that will take us even further in the positive direction in managing arms control issues, then I think it has enormous importance.

I certainly am hopeful there can be some constructive comments made by the administration on this, some thoughtful efforts given to the importance of it, and I stand willing to do whatever I can to assist in the implementation and support of the U.S. Senate in this resolution in giving what efforts we can to see it being carried out.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Levin, we thank you very much.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman and Senator Kassebaum.

The **Chairman**. Senator Jake Garn.

Senator Garn, the committee welcomes you. You have devoted a great deal of thought and attention to arms control. I always marvel at the way you go after these problems and try to find the right answer. We are very pleased to have you with the committee today.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAKE GARN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM UTAH

Senator **Garn**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I had intended to summarize my statement, but a year ago Chairman Volcker came before my committee, the Banking Committee, and I asked the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board if he would summarize his statement, and he did, in about 1 hour and 10 minutes. So the next time he appeared before me, I asked him if he would please read his statement in full, because it would take less time than the summary.

Because of what you have mentioned, of having been more involved in the arms control debate probably more than in any other single issue since I came to the Senate in 1974, I feel if I just started talking, as the chairman has heard me so many times over the years, it might take a lot longer than if I just read my statement. So I think the committee will be ahead if I read my statement rather than attempting to summarize it.

Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, I appreciate this opportunity to testify on the subject of nuclear arms control and my proposal, Senate Joint Resolution 74. I also want to thank my colleagues, Senators Armstrong, Denton, Hatch, Helms, Laxalt, McClure, and Symms, who joined with me in sponsoring this resolution. Finally, I would like to make note of the support I have received in this endeavor by such groups as the Veterans of Foreign Wars and the U.S. Defense Committee.

Since coming to the Senate in 1974, I have spent many hours studying the subject of nuclear arms control. I am convinced that the United States can best promote the goal of strategic stability and reduce the threat of nuclear war through a balanced program of arms reduction, negotiation, and nuclear force modernization. This is the principal theme of Senate Joint Resolution 74, which draws on many of the ideas expressed in various arms control proposals introduced last year by my colleagues in both the House and Senate.

It is essential that both elements of negotiations and modernization be integrated into a single coherent policy. One without the other will not do the job that is necessary.

Without a program of force modernization, the United States cannot hope to negotiate meaningful and verifiable arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, in the absence of a serious arms control agenda, the United States cannot hope to sustain public support to move ahead with needed modernization initiatives.

Senate Joint Resolution 74 incorporates both of these elements necessary to reduce the threat of nuclear war. It does so without eliminating the flexibility the Congress should have in judging specific aspects of the defense budget or curbing the flexibility the

President should have in designing the specific terms of his administration's arms reduction position at the negotiating table.

Senate Joint Resolution 74 preseves the spirits of the Cohen-Nunn builddown proposal, with its focus on force survivability and periodic modernization, joined with the effort to achieve substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers. A number of concerns I have had with the Cohen-Nunn proposal, however, have kept me from endorsing it as an alternative to the nuclear freeze, and prompted me to introduce Senate Joint Resolution 74. Let me highlight those concerns that I have with the builddown proposal.

First, the language of the resolution calls for adherence "to the principle of a mutual guaranteed builddown of nuclear forces." Our colleague, Senator Cohen, reemphasized this point in his statement introducing the builddown resolution by calling for "immediate" adherence to the builddown principle. In my view, agreement in principle is simply not good enough when it comes to nuclear arms control with the Soviet Union. And the call for "immediate" adherence is an invitation to disaster. Many questions, particularly dealing with verification procedures, remain unresolved and give pause for concern with respect to any agreement to be adhered to in principle. This is why Senate Joint Resolution 74 emphasizes that reductions be agreed to only within the bilateral framework of the ongoing START and INF negotiations, subject to review and ratification by the Senate.

Second, whereas——

The **CHAIRMAN**. Senator Garn, I might just say at that point parenthetically, on March 1, I spoke on the subject, and took exactly the same position you have. I agree with you completely. I said then the builddown must be negotiated in the START talks and submitted to Congress for approval.

Senator **GARN**. I thank the chairman.

Second, whereas Senate Joint Resolution 74 endorses negotiated reductions, the builddown proposal stipulates a 2-for-1 reduction ratio. I am not convinced that this ratio is desirable from the viewpoint of stability, and I believe it is undesirable from the viewpoint of unnecessarily restricting the President's flexibility in designing the specific terms of his negotiating proposals.

In my view, the 2-for-1 builddown ratio should be eliminated, and the Senate should go on record endorsing the modified START proposal recently announced by the President.

Third, the builddown proposal, as do other arms reduction proposals, poses a very serious verification challenge. In my opinion, a builddown agreement could not be effectively verified solely through national technical means. The verification provisions of SALT II, including warhead counting rules, are inadequate to verify Soviet compliance with a builddown. In fact, certain SALT II loopholes, such as the one related to telemetry encryption, would actually make more difficult the task of verifying the builddown agreement.

For these reasons, Senate Joint Resolution 74 states that negotiations on mutual reduction of forces should place particular emphasis on effective measures of verification, including provisions for some kind of onsite inspections.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Senators Cohen and Nunn have indicated they do not rule out the possibility of onsite inspections. I agree with you, it is highly desirable.

Senator GARN. Finally, I am concerned the builddown proposal goes too far in linking our force modernization programs with arms reduction. Certainly, these two elements must be viewed together in the context of a single, integrated national security policy.

This is what the Scowcroft Commission achieved in its report on strategic forces. The Commission's report provides us with a coherent, coordinated view of arms control and force modernization as they relate to strategic stability. It is, in my judgment, a sound view—a view which is fully compatible with the provisions of Senate Joint Resolution 74. Yet the Commission judiciously refrained from linking modernization with specific force reduction requirements.

Although it is not stated, I believe the reasoning for this is that it would be unwise to link something we can control, that is, needed U.S. force modernization programs, with something we cannot control, that is, our ability to conclude an arms reduction agreement with the Soviet Union.

Furthermore, if our objective is to achieve negotiated reductions at equal levels, then a builddown agreement could conceivably prevent us from achieving this goal. There is no way to predict that a 2-for-1 builddown would result in equitable force levels. In fact, following a decade of relative inactivity, U.S. force modernization requirements are such that a builddown could lead to a destabilizing imbalance in forces in which the United States would be unable to maintin force levels necessary to deter Soviet aggression. Again, in response to this concern, Senate Joint Resolution 74 calls for "militarily significant reductions to equal levels in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers."

In correspondence with the sponsors of the builddown proposal, President Reagan has exercised a substantial degree of caution in endorsing this concept, and has stressed the need for flexibility in incorporating it into his START proposal. The President's caution is well-founded, and I believe it would be counterproductive for the Congress to insist on further alterations based upon the builddown proposal to what is essentially a sound U.S. START position.

Given the importance of the freeze issue to the national debate on nuclear weapons and in light of the recent action taken by the House on this matter, I would like to highlight my basic objections to the Kennedy-Hatfield freeze proposal. It should be noted that Senate Joint Resolution 74 is the only resolution which specifically rejects a nuclear freeze as being destabilizing and potentially increasing the danger of nuclear war.

Let me first say that I raise these objections without any sense of personal animosity toward those who sincerely support the freeze. I certainly do not question their motivation or sincerity. It is too easy to impugn the motives of those with whom we disagree as a way to avoid rational discussion and debate. I think one of my constituents put it best when she wrote in a letter to me that "There is a danger of badmouthing the other side * * * Freeze advocates have been accused of being Communist dupes, and Peace Through Strength advocates accused of wanting war."

First, a number of editorial and national defense spokesmen not generally allied with the security programs of the Reagan administration have expressed their concerns with the freeze proposal. For example, the Washington Post has said that a nuclear freeze "would block new programs designed to take Soviet and American nuclear forces off a hair trigger, to create more stability." Moreover, "the letter of the movement honors mutual negotiated cuts, but its spirit is patently unilateralist."

The New York Times also added its misgivings about the freeze. When the New York Times and I agreed, I had to reexamine my position for several weeks to see if I still thought the same way. To quote the New York Times: "The freeze remains a simplistic, sloganeering response to a complex issue. The political effect is to put relatively greater pressure on the United States than on the Soviet Union, which suppresses its own freeze movements, and a halt in weapons production would not be verifiable."

Finally, former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown commented in a like manner about the effects of a freeze: "A Congressional endorsement of the nuclear freeze would carry some major risks. Its effect is to put pressure on the United States, but not on the Soviet Union * * * It would displace or draw attention away from more specific and effective arms control proposals, and from actions needed to stabilize the strategic balance."

Second, a freeze at existing force levels would lock the United States and our allies into a position of military disadvantage and vulnerability. Efforts by the United States to deploy a modernized ICBM, be it the MX or a small ICBM, in a survivable basing mode would be blocked under the terms of a freeze. Thus, the destabilizing condition of a land-based missile vulnerability which currently prevails would be perpetuated.

A freeze would block the deployment of the B-1B and the Stealth bombers needed to replace our aging B-52 force. A freeze would reward the Soviets for unilaterally deploying approximately 350 SS-20 launchers with 1,050 warheads, not counting the refire missile our intelligence agencies credit to each launcher. These mobile missiles threaten our allies in Europe and Asia. A permanent Soviet advantage in long-range theater nuclear systems would, therefore, be assured.

Third, a nuclear freeze would undermine the negotiating position of the United States at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Talks currently under way in Geneva. Under the terms of a freeze, the Soviet Union would have no meaningful incentive to negotiate seriously to reduce its nuclear arsenal.

As the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, observed, "If you want nuclear weapons reduced in the world, you have to take the firm approach."

Fourth, the adoption of a nuclear freeze policy would be a step backward from the progress that has already been made in the START and INF negotiations. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are currently discussing their own versions of proposals which would result in reductions in their nuclear arsenals. While the Soviet proposals to date are clearly unacceptable, we should not discourage this discussion of reduction proposals by adopting a nuclear freeze.

Fifth, a freeze on all testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons would include important elements that cannot be effectively verified by national technical means. Our experience with mounting evidence of Soviet use of outlawed chemical/toxin weapons should give us pause before we entrust our security to any agreement that lacks effective verification procedures and the means for enforcing treaty compliance. The difficulties of verifying a freeze agreement, even with intrusive onsite inspection provisions which the Soviets are likely to find unacceptable, were recognized in the New York Times editorial I referred to earlier.

Sixth, a nuclear freeze would do nothing to hamper Soviet antisubmarine warfare or air defense efforts. While neither SALT nor START curb Soviet defensive efforts, their effect on nuclear stability is much less than contemplated under the terms of a freeze, since these proposals do not ban all modernization programs.

Three-quarters of our strategic nuclear warheads are on missiles, submarines, and bombers that are more than 15 years old. Three-quarters of the Soviets' are on launchers less than 5 years old. Commonsense will tell you that the combination of age and Soviet defensive measures would seriously weaken the deterrent capability of our forces under a freeze.

Finally, the practical effect of a freeze would be to impose unilateral pressure on the United States and our NATO allies to abandon necessary modernization programs. The Soviets heartily applaud nuclear freeze rallies when they are held in New York City. It is an entirely different matter, however, when Soviet citizens attempt to express their own views in Moscow.

I understand this criticism of unilateralism offends the advocates of a nuclear freeze. Time and again we are told that the freeze will be mutual, but reality seems to throw some doubts on this assertion. A mutual verifiable freeze would not be agreed to overnight, and one wonders what would come of our modernization programs in the interim. Would we hedge our bets and support modernization until it is clear that a mutual freeze could be achieved? The record is not promising on this score.

As the Washington Post noted:

> To the extent that they have addressed it, freeze advocates tend to say that each new system should be judged on its own merits, but it is not easy to find new systems in which they see merit. The letter of the movement honors mutual negotiated cuts but its spirit is patently unilateralist.

To conclude my statement, I would offer just a few general observations concerning the arms control challenge facing our country today. Let us be frank in recognizing that the principal problem we face is not the exact specifics of our negotiating proposal. After all, the Soviets have already rejected our initial START proposal and our zero option and interim agreement INF proposals.

One day after President Reagan again demonstrated his ability to be flexible at the bargaining table by modifying his START proposal, the Soviets, remaining true to form, repeated their standard line of rejection. Why should we have expected anything differently? That is the whole pattern of all the negotiations I have been involved in for the last 9 years.

What is the true nature of our arms control problem? Is it that our negotiating positions are patently unfair, or if agreed to, would fail to enhance stability while reducing the nuclear arsenals of both superpowers? Of course not. We should rid ourselves of the illusion that if only we were a little more flexible, a little more creative, a little more innovative, we would achieve a breakthrough at the negotiating table.

Since we have misread the problem, we have also tended to misread the answer. Our positions are fair and negotiable. They would also reduce nuclear weapons and the threat of nuclear war. The problem is, the Soviets have no incentive to negotiate meaningfully when they believe that public and political pressures in the West such as we see in the nuclear freeze movement and efforts to further encumber modernization programs such as the MX, will force use to continually back down from our stated positions, and in the process make unilateral concessions in the face of persistent Soviet demands.

The answer, then, is to demonstrate our resolve in pursuing needed modernization programs while continuing to negotiate fair and verifiable reductions in our nuclear arsenals. That is why I introduced Senate Joint Resolution 74, in order to provide the Congress with a legislative vehicle to express its support, not for a new arms control formula, but for a balanced program of arms reduction and force modernization.

It is my personal view that in dealing with the Soviets, an ounce of resolve will bring us closer to our goal of arms reduction than a pound of new negotiating positions, no matter how creative they might appear.

The difficulty we face in negotiating reductions in nuclear weapons is compounded by the central role these forces play in securing the position of the Soviet Union as a global superpower. Stephen S. Kaplan made this point clearly in his book, "Diplomacy of Power":

> The Soviet nuclear arsenal, which affords the U.S.S.R. superpower status, is the principal foundation of the Soviet Union's international position. Without nuclear armaments, Moscow would not be able to orchestrate conventional armed forces with confidence, and Moscow's diplomacy would not be taken as seriously as it is by the United States, China, Western Europe, Japan, and other nations.

Prof. Seweryn Bailer's article, "The Soviets Really Need Their Nukes," in the Washington Post, articulates the arms control implications of Kaplan's statements. Professor Bailer notes that,

> If nuclear weapons were ever abolished or decisively reduced in number, it is the Soviet Union that would really suffer—militarily, politically, and psychologically. This is an important reason why the total elimination of nuclear weapons is an unattainable goal, and why even their substantial reduction would be very difficult to achieve, though we must strive to achieve it.

And strive to achieve it we will and should. Secretary of State Shultz stated in his testimony before this committee last week, "No previous administration has put so many elements of the East-West military question on the negotiating table." It is not up to us alone to decide whether we will succeed in this endeavor. The Soviets must be prepared to play their part.

A balanced program of negotiated arms reduction and force modernization will bring us closer to the goal of a more stable nuclear environment. Senate Joint Resolution 74 provides the Senate with a responsible vehicle to express its support for such a program. It does not bind the hands of Congress in making decisions on specific weapon systems. Rather, it recognizes the merit of prudent modernization programs. This resolution also preserves the President's negotiating flexibility while clearly reaffirming the Senate's support for negotiated reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the two superpowers.

I strongly encourage my colleagues to consider the proposal I have made and join me in sending this urgent message to the American people that we are serious about reducing the threat of nuclear war. I thank the committee for the time, and I do believe that it is rare for me to read a statement, but I believe it saved us a great deal of time, rather than doing it extemporaneously.

The CHAIRMAN. It is a very comprehensive statement, and certainly one of the most detailed from the standpoint of the research that was done in pulling out some of the quotations, a few of which I had missed, on the freeze movement. You might want to have, Senator Garn, a member of your staff go over the testimony given by Senators Nunn and Cohen this morning, and mark for you some of the questions that were raised, some of the very questions you have raised here, and at least read their answers to some of those.

The first question I would like to put to you is with respect to the administration's strategic modernization program, and START, and INF negotiating positions, whether they are fully consistent with the objectives identified in your resolution.

Senator GARN. I certainly believe they are. As you look at the administration's initial position, particularly in the INF, where they proposed the "zero option," I would have expected everyone would have thought that was a worthwhile proposal. What could be better than having no Pershings and no SS-20's, although we must also be realistic and recognize that the Soviets would never agree to that. So, I think the question on that initial proposal was not if you back off zero zero, but when.

I think we backed off too soon, and there was entirely too much pressure on our side to compromise. If you look at the record of the ABM treaties, SALT I and SALT II, what you find, going back and reading all the records of those negotiations procedures, our offers and theirs, is that the Soviets are very good at holding firm to their position.

They hold firm, and we move. They hold firm, and we continue to move, and finally, after the United States has compromised, they say, OK, now we will split the difference. That is exactly the process we are going through again. The Soviets have offered no substantive compromises from their initial bargaining position.

I believe the President has backed off considerably, has shown great flexibility in both INF and START. He has endorsed the Scowcroft Commission report, and I think his response to the builddown is consistent with what I have said. I want modernization and builddown. My only real objection to Nunn-Cohen, and the three of us have worked on a lot of defense issues together for many years, is simply picking an exact ratio. I think that takes away flexibility, and I think the President has not agreed to that, but he has agreed we need reductions to equal levels on both sides, and that is my goal, so I think we are consistent.

The **Chairman**. Are there aspects of either negotiating positions in START and INF with which you disagree?

Senator **Garn**. I have disagreed through the entire process of arms control negotiations of counting launchers. A launcher is a hole in the ground, a silo. It never kills anyone. Warheads do. So I disagree with the approach of this administration and others in continuing to count launchers, which I felt were rather meaningless in SALT II, but I am now in concert with them because of the recommendation of the Scowcroft Commission and the modification of their proposals where they also now feel that the most important thing for us to count and to negotiate reductions is in warheads. That is all that kills you. Unless you fall in a Soviet silo or Minuteman III silo, it will not hurt you.

The **Chairman**. Your resolution stresses the need for a balance between selective modernization and arms reduction, and you sent out a dear colleague letter in which you stated, the resolution preserves the spirit of the Cohen-Nunn builddown, which also endeavors to strike a balance between needed modernization and arms control. Could you point out the differences, how you differ in your own resolution from the builddown resolution and also whether you support the President's decision to incorporate the builddown concept into our START posture?

Senator **Garn**. I do support the President's decision to incorporate the builddown concept into our START proposal. Again, I would just say that picking an exact number, 2 to 1 or 3 to 1, I think takes the flexibility out of it. So that is a major difference. And also, as we both agreed earlier, in my testimony, the builddown should not be separate. It should be incorporated as part of the START and also the INF talks, incorporated within those talks and not done separately.

The **Chairman**. When we look at the SALT II Treaty, which you rather vigorously opposed, that was one difference that we had, and we are observing it, and of course if we ratified the thing, we would have been required to destroy by now 250 nuclear warheads, but the advocates of the unratified SALT II Treaty would say that agreement also endeavored to strike a balance between needed modernization and arms control.

SALT II specifically would have permitted the B-1, MX, Trident, and air-launched cruise missile, while lowering each side's strategic inventory to 2,250 systems. Do you support the President's decision to continue to observe the treaty as long as the Soviets do the same?

Senator **Garn**. No, I do not, but I do not feel that it makes any difference. If you look at the numbers in SALT II, I do not believe that either side had the capability to build the number of warheads or possibly not even have the nuclear material available during the time of the treaty, the limits were so high. The chairman made one small technical error when he said it eliminated 250 warheads. There were no limitations on warheads in SALT II. The major reason I opposed SALT II, despite a lot of people making the usual warmonger comments, was I did not feel it even began to represent true arms control. The chairman is correct in that it reduced the total number of launchers by 250. The Soviets had approximately 2,500, and it did require them to reduce by 250.

The catch, that a lot of people never did realize, was that while it eliminated 250 single warhead launchers, it did not directly eliminate warheads, although it had the limited practical effect of doing so. The sublimits were 1,320 on total MIRV'd systems, 820 on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. In those land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles alone, the Soviets had approximately 500 launchers at that time. Allowing both sides to go to 820, and the Soviets to have the SS-18 with 10 warheads allowed them an increase of 320 launchers with 10 warheads on each one. So that was a legalized increase of 3,200 warheads with a reduction of 250 single warhead launchers.

So, I opposed it almost exclusively on the basis that it was defrauding the American people in indicating it was arms control, when in effect in warheads it actually dramatically allowed a massive increase to the biggest nuclear arsenals either side could contemplate. I offered a substitute that still would have allowed increases, but to show how blind SALT II was, that would have allowed much smaller increases in the number of warheads than SALT II did.

What I am really aiming at, Mr. Chairman, is, I want reductions. I would like to see actual reductions in the number of nuclear warheads on both sides. The treaties we have looked at in the past have allowed increases. To me, that is not effective arms control.

The CHAIRMAN. We all want those goals. We may differ in the way we choose to get there, but that is what we all want.

I know Senator Jesse Helms and I disagree on some things, but he will agree on major reductions, and that is where I think the genius of the administration's program is. They really are going for heavier reductions.

My final question relates to the Soviet's half of the bargain. Do you think they actually are observing their half of the bargain, and if not, what would you recommend we do?

Senator GARN. I do not think they have. I think there have been many violations of both SALT I and SALT II. And every time they have been confronted with these violations, they have said that was not their understanding of the treaty. Treaties are vague enough, I suppose, that as you get attorneys on either side, you can find different interpretations, and that is what they have always used as an excuse; we do not understand the treaty.

For example, I think in the area of using SAM 5 radars in a battle management mode, regardless of what the Soviets say, is a violation. I think some of the encryption of their telemetry data, at least from my viewpoint, are definite violations of the SALT II Treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Thank you very much indeed.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Just briefly, I gather from what you said, Senator Garn, that you are supportive of moving toward a single warhead, a Midgetman-type missile.

Senator GARN. Yes. I support the Scowcroft Commission. I think it was an excellent report. I wish people would look at the totality of that report rather than just the MX recommendation. You can have some disagreement with the isolated parts of the report, but the totality, particularly the fact that it recommends counting warheads, is a positive achievement.

I would also say the reason I support a single warhead missile and the reason we went to multiple warhead launchers was primarily pushed on us by the SALT process because we counted launchers. And therefore, if you are going to limit launchers, scientists figure out how to put more warheads in each launcher. So the very arms control process, I believe, is what drove both sides toward MIRV's, and I think single warheads on both sides would be much more stabilizing.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I certainly agree very much with you on that. I do not know whether you arrived in time to catch any of the debate on the Levin-Kassebaum resolution on the moratorium on testing of MIRV ICBM's. Are you familiar with that?

Senator **Garn**. I just got the tailend, your statement and question at the end.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Because it in no way, for instance, if we had that in place, would it preclude efforts to continue with the modified START or your proposal which in many ways fits in with that. I wondered what your thoughts are on such an effort.

Senator **Garn**. I would have two major concerns, Senator. The first is verification.

Senator **Kassebaum**. But is it not very easy to verify test flights of MIRV ICBM's? That is all we would be doing, test flights.

Senator **Garn**. It is easy to determine that a test flight has taken place and I will not get into classified material dealing with our ability to monitor testing, and the losses we suffered with our sites in Iran. Certainly you can track them. Certainly you can see a dispersal of MIRV's in the Kamchatka Peninsula area and all of that. But there is a lot of data we are not able to achieve at this time in the initial stages of launching due to the limitating of national technical methods.

That is why I stress in any of these arms control proposals, even those I proposed, how important adequate verification is. And although we can say yes, you have conducted a test, often in the past they have said OK, we will not do it any more, and they have already obtained the information they wanted.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Would you not say, then, it was not so much a problem of verification as that we have not followed through on saying you did test, however? It seems to me it perhaps is not so much a question of knowing whether it was done or not but what action is taken through as a followup.

Senator **Garn**. It is not a question of knowing whether it was done or not. It was a question of what they did and what kind of throw-weights and all of that sort of thing we were able to determine, because often we can say yes, you conducted a test flight, but we do not know what they learned on that test flight, and it may be in direct violation of the SALT II. They encrypted it, so we did not know what they learned and it was a violation of the terms of SALT II.

The other thing I would worry about is what has happened in INF. A lot of people are not aware that the Soviets have deployed possibly more SS-20's since the negotiating process started about 2 years ago. That does not give me much feeling of confidence in the

Soviets' sincerity. That is one of the troubles of the freeze that I did not mention: How many more do they build before they agree to a freeze?

We go 2 years. We have not built an MX. We have not deployed a Pershing. We keep unilaterally stopping, but they continue to build until they are satisfied. That has also been one of the general points I have learned from studying arms control negotiations. The Soviets build until they are satisfied with what they have, and that is when they agree to negotiate limits.

So I would worry about what they do in the meantime before they agree to your proposal. And I was happy to hear you say you would have to reassess that.

Senator **Kassebaum**. And in the meantime we are testing, of course.

Senator **Garn**. I would hope so, but that is one of the problems. In 1970 we made a unilateral decision not to deploy more than 1,054 land-based ICBM's—54 Titans, now 52, 550 Minuteman III's and 450 Minuteman II's. That is still exactly what we have in the ground.

The Soviet Union had approximately 500 launchers at the time. Now they have approximately 1,400. There are a number of unilateral decisions we have made over the years that were supposed to encourage the Soviet Union to follow suit, and they have simply not done that. As a matter of fact, in the Armed Services Committee hearings on Paul Warnke's nomination to be the Director of ACDA, I challenged him, after he had talked a great deal about his book about each side aping the other, to show me one example in which the Soviet Union stopped building a weapons systems because we did. He could not. I asked him if he could supply it later, and to this date several years later, none of those who support SALT II can show me a single example of a major weapons system stopped by the Soviet Union because of a unilateral stoppage of a similar system on our side.

Senator **Kassebaum**. I guess we are all trying to explore means by which we can find some answer to this. It cannot be a unilateral decision. I certainly agree with you there. But I do hope in our efforts to try to find something we can be responsible on the verification question, and I would share some of your concerns about that on the builddown theory, but I am open to initiatives by which we can explore some of these avenues. The Levin-Kassebaum proposal puts the responsibility back on the Soviet side to see if they are indeed willing to show flexibility, which up to this point they have not been. You can only go just so far unless you get some response back.

I hope as we sort through all of these different resolutions we can keep some of those questions in mind.

Senator **Garn**. I do not disagree with what you have said in general, but again, when you review the negotiating process, it is terribly frustrating looking at what the Soviets do during the negotiating process. You look back at SALT II when President Carter made what I felt was a reasonable offer on SS–18's, that they should not deploy more than 150. The Soviet Union said no, they wanted 308, and we compromised at 308.

Now, normally you should expect some give. I would have felt much better about SALT II had there been just some token give on the part of the Soviet Union. If they had said 275, 280, just a little bit of give. In all of the hard points in SALT II they remained firm while we had pressure to get an agreement, and we gave on all of the major points.

So I wish there was some way to get some response on the part of the Soviet Union. That is why, as I look back at the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union agreed to an ABM Treaty when we started putting in the Safeguard ABM system. That is why I feel so strongly that there is very little likelihood of them agreeing to reduce any SS-20's if they can prohibit the Pershings from going into Western Europe. I see no incentive.

I wish we did not even have to consider an MX, but I see no incentive for them to reduce any of their SS-17's, SS-18's or SS-19's if they think they can get the MX through political pressure. There has been no evidence the Soviets agree on anything unless they are concerned about something and want to prevent us from doing something. And, as long as we do it unilaterally, I think they will continue to play hardball, as we would if we could in some way exert public pressure in the Soviet Union and could get them to reduce SS-20's or SS-18's or any of them without having to give up anything in return. We would do so, too. Our Government would take any freebie we could get from them. I think that is normal.

You and I and Chuck go to the House all the time. How many times have we kept provisions in the bill—I have been on the Banking Committee when you were a member—knowing I will have to trade it to Freddy St Germain, the House Banking Committee chairman, for something I do not like in his bill. That is true of all of our negotiating. If we do not have any chips, anything the Soviet Union wants, I do not know why they should give up anything.

Senator Kassebaum. Thank you.

The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Garn, we appreciate very much your being with us. We will give thoughtful and careful consideration to your resolution.

Senator Garn. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and Senator Kassebaum.

The Chairman. Senator Dole, we are delighted to have you with us.

You have made a proposal in your resolution that we freeze at substantially reduced levels, not the present levels, but reduced levels. We will be delighted to have you expand on any comments you wish to make at this time. The full text of your statement will be incorporated in the record.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT DOLE, A U.S. SENATOR FROM KANSAS

Senator Dole. It is not a very long statement. It might be just as easy to read the statement. In fact, I can summarize as I read it.

I have had the experience in my committee, when I ask people to summarize, it takes twice as long as when I ask them to read the statement. I would also indicate there are eight cosponsors of the resolution: Senator Stevens, Senator Abdnor, Senator Armstrong, Senator Kasten, Senator Murkowski, Senator Trible, and Senator Grassley. And we are making efforts now to at least familiarize our colleagues with the resolution.

I would also like to recognize that Bill Shepard on my right, who is a Congressional Fellow, has been with me a number of months. He is a U.S. Foreign Service political officer specializing in negotiations and political analysis. He is with us from the State Department. I have been very thankful for his input and almost full-time work on this issue. He brings a great deal of expertise which I did not have. So I want to thank Mr. Shepard at this point. He will be with us another month and a half.

Let me say first of all, Mr. Chairman, I will ask that my statement be made a part of the record.

I have been sitting here listening to Senator Garn, who is acknowledged as one of the experts in the Senate in this area. I appear before this committee, much as some appear before my committee, knowing that the expertise is up there. Hopefully they feel that when they come to my committee.

I know that many in this committee have spent a long time studying a number of different proposals. I know of no other matter that more directly affects the American people and no matter of any greater interest, whether it is a deficit, taxes or whatever it might be, than trying to address this very important problem.

So I commend you, Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee for trying to sift through the various proposals and I would guess come up with some committee resolution that might express a fair and objective proposal to later come to the floor.

But I would also suggest the fact that we, who are not Foreign Relations Committee members, and are not as expert as others, is no excuse for inaction. It seems to me we all have a duty to express ourselves on this issue. We have attempted, as others have, to try to do that. And I would say at the outset that my own basic inclination is not to look to some numbers formula for the solution of our arms control problems. Instead, I suspect the key to arms reductions might be found in the comprehensive review of the staggering array of nuclear forces on both sides.

So let us take a long look at these weapons the same way the arms negotiators must. Let us see how they compare and in what specific areas we can make progress, what weapons are most destabilizing and what are the most logical areas for reductions, what source of systems would be most stable for future deployment, and while we are at it, let us take a look at all of the warheads and weapons systems in both the theater and strategic ranges.

Mr. Chairman, no one knows better than the members of this committee that our nuclear deterrent rests on a Triad of land-based ICBM's, manned bombers, and submarine-launched nuclear forces. The dispersal and flexibility this Triad provides has helped make our defenses credible, so no potential agressor could ever be under the conclusion that a first strike would demolish that Triad.

Also, Mr. Chairman, who among us could really doubt that for 38 years our nuclear defenses have in fact helped prevent another major conflict? We all wish it was not so, nobody more than everyone on this committee. But a strong defense still remains the best way I know to make certain that our defenses will never be tested.

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, I believe there are simply too many of these nuclear weapons and warheads. We hear there are some 9,500 on our side and at least 8,500 on the Russian's side. Whatever number advantages we might possess, however, on the strategic weapons count has to be offset by the decided Soviet advantage in throw-weight. These numbers do not even include the thousands of shorter range theater or intermediate-range weapons such as cruise missiles that we are developing, and the SS-4's, SS-5's, and SS-20's that the Soviets have already deployed.

Mr. Chairman, the danger is that instead of continuing to be the safeguard against a new holocaust, the nuclear weapons may themselves become a threat to our peace and well-being. That is why we must guard against and to make certain that any weapons remain our servants and do not become our masters.

As you are all well aware, we are seeking at the INF talks to have the Russians remove their SS-4's, SS-5's, and SS-20's that now threaten Europe and the Far East and parts of the Middle East. To the extent we cannot negotiate these drawdowns, we will have to deploy Pershing II's and ground-launched cruise missiles.

The recent elections in Great Britain and West Germany give us all further reason to be confident that those deployments, if necessary, will proceed. At START we are attempting to negotiate some limits to strategic weapons with emphasis on reducing the Soviet performance in land-based ICBM's. And I think Senator Garn just again touched on how they have surged ahead in that area. In my judgment that is a proper emphasis given the 3-to-1 warhead discrepancy that now favors the Soviet Union in these dangerous and destabilizing ballistic missiles.

The Senator from Kansas has been disappointed, as I am certain you have, Mr. Chairman, that the President's attempts to introduce flexibility at both the INF and START talks have met with stony refusals to negotiate seriously from the other side. We moved away from the zero-zero option in the INF talks, and the Soviets did not take that opportunity to negotiate seriously on theater nuclear force reductions.

The President's June 8 remarks set forth new flexibility in our START position, and again, the Soviets failed to seize the occasion for real reductions in the strategic missile talks.

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to briefly try to describe my proposal, our proposal. What I would like to do is build on the flexibility that the President has shown. Perhaps a new approach might be productive.

As you are aware, there are many delivery systems and thousands of warheads on both sides which have not been specifically addressed in detail at the INF and START talks, and I would like to include them all and then get down to the basic issues of force comparability at both INF and START. For reasons of assuring our NATO allies of the essential value we attach to our common defense, I would keep the INF and START talks separate, although they would, of course, become closely linked, perhaps through a negotiating memorandum of understanding. Further, I would pursue a nuclear freeze of force levels, aiming for initial reductions below our current deployment totals.

To summarize, here is my six-point program that addresses these points in further detail. First, I believe that the President should propose to the Soviet Union a mutual and verifiable freeze of nuclear force levels substantially reduced from those that currently exist.

Second, the precise proposal must not limit the United States to nuclear forces inferior to those provided the Soviet Union. I might suggest language taken from a resolution proposed by Senator Jackson of Washington in the SALT I hearings.

Third, the freeze will be of all types, strategic and theater nuclear weapons and warheads, along the lines of the nuclear Triad itself.

Fourth, if agreed to, the freeze would be a long-term agreement with provision for reviews from time to time looking to even lower nuclear force levels.

Fifth, special attention must be paid to weapons that are the most destabilizing and to technological breakthroughs of all sorts.

Finally, we should also explore with the Russians nuclear nonproliferation and the best ways to reduce the dangers of nuclear war by accident.

To be realistic, arms control efforts must reflect the security that our nuclear Triad is designed to achieve. We have heard of the freeze and the builddown and both are good-faith attempts to get control over the nuclear genie.

I am well aware that the members of this committee have given considerable thought and in several cases their support to these concepts, and yet a freeze of current weapons would reward the Soviet buildup in ICBM's and leave us with an unacceptable situation in Europe given the Soviet focus on theater nuclear weapons there.

As usually proposed, it would also not allow for force modernization while driving down the overall nuclear weapons total.

The builddown is also a useful notion and one that has received some support in principle from the White House. Strictly applied—and I understand there have been some indications that would not be a strict 2-to-1 or 3-to-1, but some variable ratio—but strictly applied, since a number of our systems represent yesterday's technology, we would have to build on two weapons for every one newly deployed for the privilege of catching up to the Russians.

In the area of air-launched cruise missiles alone, our present Triad defense would have to be virtually dismantled in order to deploy these missiles, and there would be no obligation on the Russians' part to build down any weapons until they wanted to deploy new ones.

It is more productive, in my view, to preserve our nuclear defense while offering the Soviets something both sides can agree to. With an eye to what these weapons are supposed to do rather than a rigid formula, we can best see how to limit them. Let us put arms control in the real world of nuclear defenses, and let us make it work.

To summarize, Mr. Chairman, I believe that the President should propose that all strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces should be reduced below today's deployment figures for both the United States and the Soviet Union. The proposal should parallel our present nuclear Triad force structure. The nuclear force level should be frozen at the lower reduced level which would then become the ceiling for a new round of negotiations. Special attention should be paid to weapons that are the most destabilizing, to verification procedures, and to nonnuclear technological breakthroughs that could affect the nuclear defense. The negotiations would be hard and long, but I know of no subject that deserves more our full commitment and attention.

I would like to send to you—in fact, we are working on it now; the CRS has been working on it for a number of days—for inclusion with these committee reports an arms control proposal that illustrates these proposals with specific numbers. I am trying to set forth the general principles, and we hope to supply to the committee before you go in to markup an illustration of how it might work in principle.

The Senator from Kansas believes that we can hammer out an overall approach that would mutually lower our arsenals of theater and strategic nuclear weapons. I am not wedded to any single approach or set of numbers, Mr. Chairman, providing only that an overall approach will safeguard our national security while advancing a practical basis for arms control.

Building on our current INF and START positions and the flexibility the President has shown, I think there is some room for constructive debate here.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your consideration. And I might add that I understand, although I was not here this morning, that Senator Biden made an observation, and he indicated a desire to harness the momentum of the arms race by imposing warhead limits. "Why don't we let them figure out what they want to do with their warheads, and we will figure out when we want to do with our warheads, and then we can work an agreement out within these agreed limits," he observed.

And I would just suggest that I hope that is essentially what I have been trying to outline in our general proposal. As I have suggested, we will have more specific information which I will ask be made a part of the record when it is completed by the Congressional Research Service.[1]

[Senator Dole's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT DOLE

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for this opportunity to speak before this committee on the crucial subject of nuclear arms control. There is no more important subject facing us all today. It is important that we all harness our efforts to try to solve these issues.

I appear before your committee, Mr. Chairman, with some trepidation. I know that for many, many years you have taken a keen interest in this subject. Other committee members have closely followed these matters as part of their responsibilities as members of this committee. I am sure that the arcane knowledge of negotiations and treaties that your members possess could not be readily duplicated elsewhere. And so, the Senator from Kansas must state at the outset that I could not match those who have closely studied these issues for years.

---

[1] See page 122.

But that must not furnish an excuse for inaction, Mr. Chairman. I think that as Senators we all have some obligation to study and to speak out on the great issues of our day. I am sure that you will agree with me that the control of nuclear arms is such an issue.

My own basic inclination is not to look to some numbers formula for the solution to our arms control problems. Instead, I suspect that the key to arms reductions might be found in a comprehensive review of the staggering array of nuclear forces on both sides. Let's take a long look at these weapons, the same way that arms negotiators must. Let's see how they compare, and in what specific areas we can make progress. What weapons are most destabilizing, and what are the most logical areas for reductions? What sorts of systems would be most stable for future deployment? And while we're at it, let's look at all the warheads and weapons systems, at both the theater and strategic ranges.

THE NUCLEAR TRIAD

Mr. Chairman, nobody knows better than the members of your committee that our nuclear deterrent has rested on a Triad of land-based ICBM's, manned bombers, and submarine-launched nuclear forces. The dispersal and flexibility that this Triad provide have helped make our defenses credible—for no potential aggressor could ever be under the illusion that a first strike could demolish that Triad.

Also, Mr. Chairman, who among us could really doubt that for 38 years, our nuclear defenses have in fact helped prevent another major world conflict? We all wish that it was not so—and nobody more than a former soldier—but a strong defense remains the best way that I know to make sure that our defenses will never be tested.

At the same time, Mr. Chairman, I believe that there are just simply too many of these nuclear weapons and warheads. We hear that there are some 9,500 on our side, and at least 8,500 on the Russian side. Whatever numbers advantage we may possess, however, on the strategic weapons count has to be offset by the decided Soviet advantage in throw-weight. And these numbers do not even include the thousands of shorter range theater weapons such as the cruise missiles that we are developing, and the SS-4's, SS-5's and SS-20's that the Soviets have already deployed.

Mr. Chairman—the danger is that instead of continuing to be the safeguard against a new holocaust, that nuclear weapons may themselves become a threat to our peace and well-being. That is what we must guard against, to make sure that any weapons remain our servants and do not become our masters.

THE CURRENT ARMS CONTROL SETTING

As you are all well aware, we are seeking at the INF talks to have the Russians remove their SS-4's, SS-5's and SS-20's that now threaten Europe, the Far East, and parts of the Middle East. To the extent that we cannot negotiate these drawdowns, we will have to deploy Pershing II's and ground-launched cruise missiles. The recent elections in Great Britain and in West Germany give us all further reason to be confident that those deployments, if necessary, will proceed.

At START, we are attempting to negotiate some limits to strategic weapons, with emphasis on reducing the Soviet preponderance in land-based ICBM's. In my judgment that is a proper emphasis, given the three-to-one warhead discrepancy that now favors the Soviet Union in these dangerous and destabilizing ballistic missiles.

The Senator from Kansas has been disappointed, as I am sure you have been, Mr. Chairman, that the President's attempts to introduce flexibility at both the INF and START talks have met with stony refusals to negotiate seriously from the other side. We moved away from the zero-zero option in the INF talks—and the Soviets did not take that opportunity to negotiate seriously on theater nuclear force reduction. The President's June 8 remarks set forth new flexibility in our START position—and again, the Soviets failed to seize the occasion for real reductions on the strategic missile side.

THE DOLE PROPOSAL

Mr. Chairman, I would like to build on the flexibility that the President has shown. Perhaps a new approach might be productive. As you are aware, there are many delivery systems and thousands of warheads on both sides which have not been specifically addressed in detail in the INF and START talks. I would like to include them all. And then get down to the basic issues of force comparability at both INF and START. For reasons of assuring our NATO allies of the essential value that we attach to our common defense, I would keep the INF and START talks separate, although they would of course become closely linked, perhaps through a negotiating memorandum of understanding.

Further, I would pursue a nuclear freeze of force levels, aiming for initial reductions below our current deployment totals. To summarize, here is my six-point program that addresses these points in further detail:

I believe that the President should propose to the Soviet Union a mutual and verifiable freeze of nuclear force levels substantially reduced from those that currently exist;

The precise proposal must not limit the United States to nuclear forces inferior to those provided the Soviet Union;

The freeze will be of all types of strategic and theater nuclear weapons and warheads, along the lines of the nuclear Triad itself;

If agreed to, the freeze would be a long-term agreement with provisions for reviews from time to time, looking to even lower nuclear force levels;

Special attention must be paid to weapons that are the most destabilizing, and to technological breakthroughs of all sorts.

We should also explore with the Russians nuclear nonproliferation, and the best ways to reduce the dangers of nuclear war by accident.

FREEZE OR BUILDDOWN?

To be realistic, arms control efforts must reflect the security that our nuclear Triad is designed to achieve. We have heard of the freeze and the builddown, and both are good faith attempts to get control over the nuclear genie.

I am well aware that members of this committee have given considerable thought—and in several cases, their support—to these concepts. And yet, a freeze of current weapons would reward the Soviet buildup in ICBM's, and leave us with an unacceptable situation in Europe, given the Soviet focus on theater nuclear weapons there. As usually proposed, it would also not allow for force modernization. My freeze proposal would allow for needed modernization, while driving down overall nuclear weapons totals.

The builddown is also a useful notion, and one that has received some support, in principle, from the White House. Strictly applied, since a number of our systems represent yesterday's technology, we would have to builddown two weapons for every one newly deployed for the privilege of catching up to the Russians! In the area of air-launched cruise missiles alone, our present Triad defense would have to be virtually dismantled in order to deploy these missiles. And there would be no obligation on the Russian part to build-down any weapons until they wanted to deploy new ones!

ARMS CONTROL AND THE REAL WORLD

It is more productive in my view to preserve our nuclear defenses while offering the Soviets something that both sides can agree to. With an eye to what these weapons are supposed to do—rather than to a rigid formula—we can best see how to limit them. Let's put arms control in the real world of nuclear defenses, and let's make it work.

To summarize, I believe that the President should propose that all strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces should be reduced below today's deployment figures for both the United States and the Soviet Union. The proposal should parallel our present nuclear Triad force structure. Then nuclear force levels should be frozen at that lower, reduced level—which would then become the ceiling for a new round of negotiations. Special attention should be paid to weapons that are the most destabilizing, to verification procedures, and to nonnuclear technological breakthroughs that could affect the nuclear defense.

The negotiations would be hard and long—but I know of no subject that more deserves our full commitment and attention.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to send to you for inclusion with the committee report an arms control proposal that illustrates these principles. The Senator from Kansas believes that we can hammer out an overall approach that would mutually lower our arsenals of theater and strategic nuclear weapons.

I am not wedded to any single approach or set of numbers, Mr. Chairman, providing only that an overall approach will safeguard our national security while advancing a practical basis for arms control. Building on our current INF and START positions—and the flexibility that the President has shown—I think that there is room for constructive debate here.

Thank you for your consideration and attention, Mr. Chairman. I would welcome your interest and questions on my proposal.

U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C. June 24, 1983.

Hon. Charles Percy,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman: During my arms control testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee last Tuesday, June 21, I referred to a Congressional Research Study that would set forth one illustration of my approach to overall nuclear arms negotiations at the strategic and intermediate ranges. That study has now been completed according to my general guidelines, and is attached.

The study, I believe, illustrates a number of the serious questions which arms negotiators must begin to address, particularly in the new negotiation area of intermediate range weapons. As I replied to Senator Kassebaum during the hearings on Tuesday, for example, the smaller missiles which may be developed under the Midgetman concept will also introduce special issues of verification. Similarly, dual purpose aircraft, such as F-16s, would require some modification to see whether any nuclear role could become observable on a functional basis.

Similarly, the highly dangerous submarine-launched cruise missiles deserve special study, and if possible, specially negotiated sublimitations. Further, the problem of any inclusion of French and British forces becomes illustrated clearly if we see what that would do to allowable weapons allocations on both sides. The problem, as Dr. Eugene Rostow testified on Wednesday, is however a political one primarily, and I would not favor the inclusion of these weapons in the negotiations. Nevertheless, for the sake of force comparison, I did ask for the study to set forth one scenario of inclusion.

As I mentioned on Tuesday afternoon, the Foreign Relations Committee is to be commended for its attention to this critical area. I am glad to add this further contribution to the debate and ask that this letter and enclosed study be included in the full record of your hearings.

Sincerely yours,

Bob Dole,
U.S. Senate.

Enclosure.

Congressional Research Service
The Library of Congress

Washington, D.C. 20540

This material has been prepared in response to the requester's instructions with respect to conclusions, inclusions, or assumptions. It should not be understood or represented as presenting the views or findings of the Congressional Research Service or of the author.

A Comprehensive Arms Control Proposal

Prepared According to the Instructions of the Honorable Robert Dole

Louis C. Finch

Mark M. Lowenthal

A.A. Tinajero

Specialists in National Defense

Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division

June 23, 1983

DIRECTED WRITING

Arms Control Proposal

Conceptual Framework

My recent comments on the floor of the Senate, together with the ideas expressed by myself and several of my colleagues in Senate Concurrent Resolution 46, suggest a number of basic principles related to the U.S. position on nuclear arms control. These principles, while not inconsistent with the proposals made by the President and many of my colleagues in the Congress, I believe form a basis for a conceptual framework for American arms control policy which combines and extends these proposals in a way that better promotes and protects our security.

My purpose in this discussion is to begin to go beyond these principles with some more specific ideas which could form a conceptual framework for future U.S arms control negotiating positions. On the one hand, I believe such specific suggestions are essential if our policies are going to move in sensible directions. At the same time, I fully recognize the complexity and inherent difficulty of the problem we are trying to tackle. Therefore, I offer these suggestions not as sure fire prescriptions for success. Rather they are directed at channeling the public debate toward the tough problems which we in the United States need collectively to solve if our approach to arms control is to contribute measurably to our security.

In my remarks which follow, I will lay out the basic principles mentioned earlier together with some specific ways that they could be included in our arms control positions.

Balanced Force Structure

Traditionally the U.S. has relied on a balanced force structure based on a triad of manned bombers, submarine-based missiles and land-based missiles. This structure has effectively preserved deterrence. Any arms control approach we pursue should not preclude continuing with this balanced approach. At the same time, our experience should tell us that military power is a complex function of all three legs of the triad, and that any arms control agreement that will effectively check and reduce the military power of our adversaries must take this into account.

Relating this to the President's current proposal, it's worth noting that only two thirds of the triad -- submarine and land-based missiles -- are included. In the short term, this might seem to be a shrewd negotiating strategy since the U.S. has a big advantage in bombers -- the triad leg left out. Putting aside whether the Soviets would ever agree to such an approach, it is important to consider the consequences for American security of leaving Soviet bomber forces totally unchecked. We know from intelligence sources that the Soviets are aggressively pursuing development of a new bomber -- the Blackjack, which appears to be designed along the lines of our B-1. We also know that the Soviets have considerable experience in developing cruise missiles that can be launched from aircraft -- giving the potential for an even more lethal dimension to their bomber force. Finally, independent of whether one believes the Soviets violate arms control agreements, there is a widespread consensus that the Soviets will exploit loopholes in agreements to their best advantage.

With the stage set as it is, I believe we are not in a position where we can afford to allow the bomber forces to go unaccounted for in our arms control policy. Such a gaping void may skew the Soviet's force structure way out of kilter to the detriment of our security especially given the absence of U.S. continental air defenses. At the same time, reasonable, balanced limits which affect bombers on both sides can be designed in ways that accommodate necessary modernization of American forces while cutting back on the overall size of strategic nuclear arsenals.

Attention to Destabilizing Weapons

A major accomplishment of the Scowcroft Commission and the subsequent position adopted by the President is recognition that our arms control positions can and should pay particular attention to certain weapons that might unnecessarily lead to making nuclear warfare more likely. The President's proposal certainly heads in the right direction. It may be possible to take it further in certain areas.

One area concerns land-based ICBMs. An important lesson from the Scowcroft Commission is that for a given number of ICBM warheads on both sides, more ICBM launchers will improve stability in a crisis since it will be more difficult to disarm an opponent's ICBM force with a preemptive attack. Despite this lesson, press reports indicate that the U.S. negotiating position still includes a limit of 1200 ICBM launchers. While this 1200 limit is better than the earlier 850 proposal, there may be some circumstance where even 1200 launchers are too few to ensure stability. Since the limits on ICBM warheads already contained in the President's proposal are sufficient to limit effectively military capabilities from ICBMs, it would seem that limiting ICBM launchers would be at least superfluous, and as mentioned, actually contrary to improving stability in some cirucmstances.

Another area of substantial potential instability not dealt with in the President's proposal involves sea launched cruise missiles. While nuclear armed sea launched cruise missiles have been deployed in the past by both the U.S. and U.S.S.R., they have been relatively few in number and crude by performance standards. A new generation of sea launched cruise missiles promises a substantial jump in performance. Further, our plans to deploy hundreds of these systems, and apparent Soviet plans to invest in this type weapon in a big way (exemplified by their apparent plans to outfit their new Oscar submarine as a cruise missile carrier) seem to foretell a major jump in U.S./Soviet nuclear competition. From a standpoint of stability, such a circumstance will signal yet another turn in the arms race spiral and in a crisis, could tempt the Soviets to use these systems for essentially no warning attacks against the vast, undefended target complexes on American coasts and the shores of our allies. Because of this situation, I believe U.S. arms control policy should pay special attention substantially limiting this class of weapons which threatens to inject instability into the U.S./U.S.S.R nuclear relationship.

A third area where I believe more effort is needed to check destabilizing nuclear weapons involves intermediate range nuclear aircraft. (These are aircraft which have range not sufficient to attack the U.S. from the U.S.S.R. and vice versa, but do have range to attack Western Europe from the Soviet Union and vice versa.) To begin with, these aircraft are not included in any of the President's proposals for arms control. Yet they constitute a

DIRECTED WRITINGS

significant threat in the first instance to our friends and allies in Europe, Asia and elsewhere. In the case of at least one aircraft sometimes put in this category -- the Backfire -- there are many who argue that it constitutes a threat to the United States itself. In addition to posing threats to our interests, these aircraft are also destabilizing in a crisis or conventional confict. They are typically based in the theater of potential (or actual) conflict in very vulnerable postures at bases of fixed, known locations. As such, they provide easy targets which invite preemptive nuclear attack -- a situation clearly to be avoided in the interests of maintaining stability. Thus, because of the destabilizing character of these weapons, I believe they deserve explicit treatment in our arms control positions.

Comprehensive Coverage

As the preceding discussion indicates, while the President's proposals treat a range of nuclear weapons systems, they are by no means comprehensive. They leave out a number of weapons which are -- or at least should be -- of concern to ourselves and to the Soviets. Some of the weapons left out are particularly destabilizing, both in fueling an arms race and in making a nuclear conflict more likely in times of heightened international tension. In the interests of preserving our security and pursuing a permanent peace, our arms control positions need to be expanded to take on coverage of these additional weapons.

Realistic Negotiating Approach

To be realistic, our negotiating proposals must first recognize our legitimate security concerns. For example, some freeze proposals would effectively perpetuate Soviet advantages gained by their massive buildup in

ICBM forces -- advantages which have left our ICBMs potentially vulnerable to a preemptive attack. Such freeze proposals, however well intended, realistically do not help our security -- in fact they hurt it.

Another element of realism for our negotiating approach is to seek approaches that offer something to both sides so that there will be some chance that both parties will come to an agreement. It takes little skill to develop proposals which are clearly in the American interest but clearly unacceptable under any circumstances to our adversaries. My objective in outlining these proposals here is to develop a negotiating framework which is realistic first and foremost in protecting U.S. security interests, but also one which I think the Soviets should find in their best interest as well.

Verification

An absolute necessity for any arms control agreement to safeguard American security is that it be adequately verifiable — that any cheating on the part of our adversaries that would significantly affect the balance of military power be detected in time for the U.S. to take effective corrective action. There are some proposals actively supported today which unfortunately do not meet this test -- for example freezes on the production of nuclear warheads seem beyond any practical means of verification currently available. There are others where the question of verification is at best unclear -- for example limiting the number of mobile IRBMs or counting dual-capable aircraft. The arms control proposals offered here recognize these difficulties, and their enactment would be dependent on agreed adequate verification measures.

Unfortunately an informed public debate on verification is difficult to stage. Traditionally the intelligence community carefully guards the details of how good our intelligence resources are in gathering information on Soviet weapons. In order for Americans -- in the Congress and in the public -- to make intelligent choices, I call upon the Administration to make available to the greatest extent possible information on our capabilities and limitations for determining whether the Soviets will be living up to their part of any agreements that we may negotiate with them.

Mutual Freeze at Lower Levels

The spirit of a freeze -- calling a halt to an arms race -- is an important one to capture in any arms control agreement. Freezes which perpetuate armament levels which are already too high, freezes which sanction a state of nuclear instability, and freezes which confer to our enemy advantage that we are precluded from redressing cannot on balance be worth our while. What is worth our while is a freeze which gives deeps cuts in the nuclear arsenals for both sides, which deals directly and comprehensively with the most destabilizing weapons on both sides and which confers the rights to equal military power on both sides. This is the type of freeze which I propose.

In terms of specific ceilings and limitations, I believe a proposal along the following lines would capture these principles:

DIRECTED WRITING

Phase I: START

The basic premise of the Phase I strategic reductions would be to follow the lead offered in President Reagan's START proposal by limiting the warheads (or reentry vehicles -- RVs) on ballistic missiles on both sides. However, it may be necessary to move beyond the START proposal in two significant ways:

(1) by adding bombers and cruise missiles as part of an overall larger aggregate strategic ceiling;

(2) not setting specific limits for ballistic missile launchers, which may not be necessary with firm RV constraints. Indeed, force structure changes made by the United States along the lines recommended by the Scowcroft Commission could very well lead the Soviet Union to alter its force structure as US ICBMs de-MIRV.

The outline of the revised START proposal in Phase I would be:

(a) an aggregate ceiling of 6500 strategic RVs, nuclear bombs, and cruise missiles

(b) a sub-ceiling of no more than 5000 RVs on ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs)

(c) a sub-ceiling of no more than 2500 RVs on ICBMs within the 5000 ballistic missile RV sub-ceiling

(d) a ban on tests to increase the fractionation (i.e., the MIRV capacity) of ICBMs and SLBMs beyond those levels in SALT II

(e) force modernization of all legs of the strategic triad allowed on a 1:1 RV/weapon basis within the agreed ceilings.

DIRECTED WRITING

Such a proposal would have the following effects:

(1) it preserves the basic goal of the START proposal by emphasizing warheads and not launchers, and offers genuine reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides. The US arsenal would reduce from approximately 9500 weapons to 6500, and the Soviet inventory from approximately 8500 to 6500.

(2) it preserves the strategic triad.

(3) it would allow the US and the Soviet Union to modernize their strategic forces. For the US this would be especially important, and would allow us to carry out the proposals of the Scowcroft Commission.

(4) it moves strategic arms control away from launchers and firmly onto the weapons themselves.

(5) it requires the largest reductions in the most destabilizing weapons, the ICBMs.

(6) Verification could be carried out as follows:

  (a) RV capabilities for missiles currently in the arsenals are already established, providing a data base for both sides;

  (b) counting rules for bombers and cruise missiles have been established;

  (c) rules and procedures for dismantling and destroying excess systems are already in place;

DIRECTED WRITING

(d) National Technical Means (NTM) already in place can observe the RV capacity of new missiles during tests, or observe tests of current missiles to enforce the ban on increased fractionation.

Under this proposal the strategic force structure for the United States and the Soviet Union could look like the following illustrative examples, which presume that both nations decide to maintain their current asymmetrical forces, with the US emphasizing a greater overall balance, and the Soviets emphasizing ICBMs:

DIRECTED WRITING

United States

ICBM

100 MX x 10 MIRVs =	1000 RVs
500 Minuteman II/SICBM x 1 RV =	500 RVs
Total ICBM RVs	**1500 RVs**

SLBM

12 Ohio SSBNs x 24 tubes = 288 Trident II x 8 MIRVs =	2304 RVs
9* Lafayette SSBNs x 16 tubes = 144 Trident I x 8 MIRVs =	1152 RVs
Total SLBM RVs	**3456 RVs**
Sub-total, US ICBM + SLBM RVs =	**4956 RVs**

Manned Bombers

102* B-1Bs x 15 ALCMs/weapons =	1530
Manned Bomber Weapons	**1530**
Aggregate, US Strategic Weapons =	**6486**

(* Under one of the INF approaches outlined below the United States would subsume the 144 SLBM RVs currently deployed by Britain and France in US START totals. In that case the US ICBM force could remain as above, while the SLBM and Manned Bomber totals under START would change as follows:

SLBM

12 US Ohio SSBNs x 24 tubes = 288 Trident II x 8 MIRVs =	2304 RVs
8 US Lafayette SSBNs x 16 tubes = 128 Trident I x 8 MIRVs=	1024 RVs
4 British Polaris SSBNs x 16 tubes = 64 Polaris x 1 RV =	64 RVs
5 French SSBNs x 16 tubes = 80 MSBS x 1 RV =	80 RVs
Total, Allied SLBM RVs	**3472 RVs**
Sub-total, US ICBM RVs + Allied SLBM RVs =	**4972 RVs**

Manned Bomber

101 B-1Bs x 15 ALCMs/weapons =	1515
Aggregate, US and Allied Strategic Weapons =	**6487)**

Soviet Union

ICBMs

100 SS-18 x 10 MIRVs =	1000 RVs
100 SS-24 x 10 MIRVs =	1000 RVs
500 SS-11/SS-13/SICBM x 1 RV =	500 RVs
Total, ICBM RVs	**2500 RVs**

SLBMs

4 Typhoon SSBNs x 20 = 80 SS-N-X x 10 MIRVs =	800 RVs
15 Delta III SSBNs x 16 = 240 SS-N-18 x 7 MIRVs =	1680 RVs
Total, SLBM RVs	**2480 RVs**

Subtotal, Soviet ICBM + SLBM RVs = 4980 RVs

Manned Bombers

101 Blackjack x 12 weapons =	1212
77 Tu-95 Bear x 4 weapons =	308
Total, Manned Bomber Weapons	**1520**

Aggregate, Soviet Strategic Weapons = 6500

Phase II: INF

INF is a thornier problem than strategic systems for several reasons:

(a) there is less agreement as to which systems should be included, and what constitutes a balance in INF;

(b) unlike strategic arms, there are no precedents for INF arms control upon which to draw;

(c) verification issues become much more complex given systems that are more mobile, or that have dual (i.e., conventional and nuclear) capabilities, or in which the actual weapons themselves are much smaller.

To a large extent the outcome of the INF talks could depend on the resolution of the first issue, which systems should be included. The Soviet Union has insisted that British and French nuclear systems be included in this total, while the United States has said that this is not an issue for bilateral negotiations, and that the US has no control over those systems.

DIRECTED WRITING

Obviously, it might be possible for the US and its allies to work out some arrangement to include these systems. The Phase I INF proposal could take either track, including or excluding these systems.

In the first proposal outlined below the current British and French nuclear forces have been included; in the second they have not. The first proposal does not take into account British and French plans for force modernization. These plans would greatly increase Allied RV totals (from the current total of 162 RVs to some 934 RVs), which would have to be compensated for out of US SLBM totals under START, or by a major revision of INF to include SLBMs, which would then allow the Soviets to keep many of the SLBMs they otherwise would have to dismantle.

The INF proposal would take the following lines:

(a) a global ceiling of 1500 INF weapons, including IRBM/MRBM RVs, GLCMs, SLCMs, and dual capable aircraft weapons. British and French SLBMs would count as part of the US SLBM total under START;

(b) a sub-ceiling of 126 RVs on IRBMs and MRBMs;

(c) GLCMs and SLCMs are to be counted as part of the dual capable aircraft total;

(d) no SLCMs may be deployed on submarines; SLCMs may be deployed on surface vessels subject to agreed counting rules for the number of canisters per ship times the number of SLCMs carried on board.

DIRECTED WRITING

Such a proposal would have the following effects:

(1) the global ceiling would require a reduction of Soviet systems down from current totals of approximately 2880 to 1500.

(2) the sub-ceiling on IRBM/MRBM RVs would require a reduction of approximately 318 SS-20s globally, and 198 in the SS-20 force now threatening Western Europe. Limits on IRBMs would affect the most destabilizing weapons.

(3) this ceiling could accomodate current British and French systems, but planned British and French force modernizations could be allowed only by decreasing US SLBM forces in START or raising INF limits with the possibility of Soviet SLCM deployments under INF.

(4) the US could carry out most of the planned GLCM deployment.

(5) Verification would be more difficult, especially in terms of counting aircraft and SLCMs. Agreed weapon loads counting rules for each type of aircraft and for ship loadings of SLCMs would be necessary. It might also be necessary to agree to identify all sites at which IRBMs and MRBMs and/or their mobile launchers are manufactured.

DIRECTED WRITING

Allied and Soviet force structures might appear as follows under this proposal:

Allied INF

IRBM/MRBM

18 SSBS (French MRBM) x 1 RV =	18 RVs
108 US Pershing II x 1 RV =	108 RVs
Total, Allied IRBM/MRBM RVs	**126 RVs**

Aircraft/GLCM

48 Vulcan B-2 (Britain) x 2 weapons =	96
33 Mirage IV A (France) x 1 weapon =	33
165 F-111 (US) x 2 weapons =	330
60 FB-111A (US) x 4 weapons =	240
120 A-6E (US) (12 aircraft carriers x 10 aircraft = 120 aircraft) x 1 weapon =	120
150 F-16* (US) x 1 weapon =	150
404 GLCMs (US) x 1 weapon =	404
Total, Aircraft/GLCM Weapons	**1373**

(* The inclusion of F-16s assumes agreement on some kind of FROD -- functionally-related observable difference -- to allow verification of those aircraft commmitted to a nuclear mission, and the larger number planned for a conventional role.)

Total, Allied INF = 1499

Soviet INF

IRBM/MRBM

42 SS-20 x 3 MIRVs =	126 RVs

Aircraft/GLCMs

62 TU-16 Badger x 2 weapons =	124
150 Tu-22 Blinder x 2 weapons =	300
350 Su-19/Su-24 x 1 weapon =	350
300 Tu-26 Backfire x 2 weapons =	600
Total, Aircraft Weapons	**1374**

Total, Soviet INF = 1500

Finally, should the INF negotiations not include British and French systems, the US could deploy the INF forces shown below. In this case the overall INF ceiling could be dropped to 1482 and the IRBM/MRBM sub-ceiling dropped to 108 (the decrease of French MRBMs), or the US could deploy 18 additional Pershing IIs. Should the overall ceilings be lowered the Soviet total of SS-20s would have to decrease to 36, while their aircraft total could remain as above. In the US force structure shown below the INF ceiling remains at 1500, with the IRBM RV sub-ceiling dropping to 108. This would allow the full planned GLCM deployment of 464, leaving room for 88 additional aircraft to be determined in the future. In an INF agreement of 1500 weapons and 108 IRBM RVs, the Soviet could also add 18 weapons to their Aircraft/GLCM total. An INF limit of 1482 would keep their aircraft levels as above.

DIRECTED WRITINGS

United States INF

IRBM	
108 Pershing II x 1 RV =	108 RVs
Aircraft/GLCM	
165 FB-111 x 2 weapons =	330
60 FB-111A x 4 weapons =	240
120 A-6E (12 aircraft carriers x 10 aircraft = 120 A-6Es) x 1 weapon =	120
150 F-16 x 1 weapon =	150
464 GLCMs x 1 weapon =	464
88 other nuclear aircraft, to be decided x 1 weapon =	88
Total, Aircraft Weapons/GLCM	**1392**

Total, US INF = 1500

Beyond Phase I

With Phase I successfully in place, which would probably require several years to implement, it would then be possible to freeze the inventories of both sides at levels that would indeed be equal. With such a freeze in place we could then proceed to further phased reductions on strategic and intermediate forces. A number of different methods would be possible, including percentage reductions to maintain the triads in both areas, or a willingness to continue to emphasize the more destabilizing weapons first.

DIRECTED WRITING

The CHAIRMAN It will be made a part of the record.

I am going to suggest to my colleagues, because we have five witnesses this afternoon to finish, four of whom are in the room already waiting, that we limit ourselves to 5 minutes and insert additional questions in the record, if that is all right.

Senator Dole, your resolution calls for a freeze at substantially reduced levels. This concept was essential to last year's Jackson-Warner resolution. How does your resolution differ from the Jackson-Warner resolution?

Senator DOLE. I think there are a number of significant changes from the Jackson-Warner proposal. And I would say, first of all, we share the basic notion of reducing weapons first, then a freeze at force levels.

My resolution would back our negotiators at Geneva. It would also provide for a more realistic freeze proposal in two ways. First, by allowing for technological breakthroughs, and second, by providing automatic renegotiation at stated intervals. In other words, we are suggesting we reduce the levels and then continue after that level has been reduced to try to further reduce levels on both sides.

We have also specified that we want reductions based upon our Triad structure to be at both the theater and strategic levels, and I think that is a basic difference, and we want to make the ideas as realistic as we can.

The CHAIRMAN. You have expressed strong support of the President's approach to START and INF. Does your resolution in any way go behind the negotiating approach undertaken by the administration in these talks?

Senator DOLE. Yes, it would. I think we can fairly say it would be a basic premise of ours in the phase I strategic reductions to follow the lead of President Reagan's START proposal, limiting warheads or reentry vehicles on ballistic missiles on both sides. But it seems to me it may be necessary to move beyond the START proposal, and we would do that by adding bombers and cruise missiles as part of an overall larger aggregate ceiling, not setting specific limits for ballistic missile launchers which may not be necessary with firm RV constraints. Indeed, force structure changes made by the United States along the lines recommended by the Scowcroft Commission could very well lead the Soviet Union to alter its force structure as U.S. ICBM's de-MIRV.

I would just suggest that there is a basic difference. We think the President is on the right track. We want to go even further, including strategic and also theater nuclear weapons.

The CHAIRMAN. You have criticized the builddown concept because it would deplete the airborne leg of our Triad. In my March 1 speech on builddown I addressed this particular concern you expressed and suggested that we count bomber platforms, not bomber weapons. Under the builddown, thus, two bombers would have to be retired for each Soviet Blackjack. At the same time we could deal with air-launched cruise missiles by retaining the SALT II limits on ALCM's per bomber type.

Would your concern in this area be lessened any if this approach were adopted?

Senator DOLE. I think that approach would be very useful, and I do not suggest we could not combine a number of them. In fact, we have been asked if there is some way we could combine ours, which covers all areas, with the builddown proposal. I suppose you could use the builddown for overall limits. You could expand START and INF to include all systems and keep the notion of the Triad, as you suggest, and make certain that the builddown has variable ratios instead of a fixed ratio that might find us at a disadvantage.

But I think it is significant that there has been wide acceptance among Members of the Senate and also the President himself at least to the concept of the plan proposed by Senators Cohen and Nunn.

The CHAIRMAN. One last concern you have expressed will be my final question. You expressed concern the Soviets might simply halt their modernization while the U.S. totals were driven downward by the 2-for-1 rule. To address this scenario, which I think is extremely unlikely, the builddown recommends a series of progressively lower plateaus at which either side would hold until the other got down to this level.

Would this clarification ease your concern on this particular point?

Senator DOLE. I think it might. Of course, there would be no obligation to modernize, but there is no reason to believe they would not. I think that might be helpful, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Kassebaum.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Senator Dole, I would guess that thorny question of verification is still a problem with your proposal as it seems to be for most. I guess the only question I really have to ask is, Given the state of United States-Soviet negotiations and relationships at this point, do you see any more success for this effort than we have at present with the modified START or the INF talks? What is here that might lead us to move forward that we do not have already on the table?

Senator DOLE. I think that is one of the key questions with any system we might agree to. That will be the sticker. We have suggested, of course, that the START portion could be verified by the counting rules and existing national technical means set up in SALT II. When you move from that into the INF, it is much more difficult, I am advised by the experts. Then you have a real problem, and problems might lie particularly with such matters as dual purpose aircraft and the smaller missiles that the Scowcroft Commission recommends we work toward.

But I guess it is like anything else. You are going to have to meet the issue head on. I do not have an answer for it. That is one of the problems we are going to have to face up to if we are going to have a comprehensive arms control agreement. Verification has to be if not the centerpiece, very near the center.

Senator KASSENBAUM. I know when Senators Nunn and Cohen were testifying this morning on the builddown plan, they referred back to the SALT II verification outline; but at that time in the SALT II debate I remember that nearly everyone was criticizing the verification outline as it existed in the SALT II proposal. Now it seems to be sort of a framework we are working off of. As you indicated, it is an enormously troubling aspect of all of these and seems to be a major roadblock for us and the Soviet Union.

Senator DOLE. In fact, I might say I was one of those who felt we should have at least debated SALT II, and we might have been able to address some of these questions. I am not sure we would have ever ratified it, but it seemed to me to be a mistake not to even focus on SALT II. And I think there has been at least the hope that both sides are living up to that agreement, even though it has not been ratified.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Tsongas.

Senator TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I must leave after this because I have other appointments, and I wanted to listen to Congressman Markey. I regret I will be unable to.

Senator Dole, let me say it is a pleasure to have you before the committee. A lot of people work at proposals that hopefully will see some progress. But let me ask you what I think is probably the basic question that divides some of us. You stated that one of your concerns about the builddown is that we would have to build down two weapons for every one newly deployed for the privilege of catching up to the Russians.

Do you believe we are behind the Russians in overall strategic capability?

Senator DOLE. I think it is a close call, but certainly in some areas we are well behind the Soviet Union. Maybe in the bomber areas and others we are ahead. But I think that is an area that has to be addressed.

The builddown that has been discussed this morning, whether or not we are going to be wedded to 2-to-1 or 1½-to-1, I think we have to make certain we do not find ourselves in that position.

Senator TSONGAS. Most people would agree the United States has the advantage on the sea leg and the air leg of the Triad and the Soviets have an advantage when it comes to the SS–18. Would you share that view?

Senator DOLE. Generally, yes.

Senator TSONGAS. If we are ahead, then, in two of the three fields, how can we be behind?

Senator DOLE. I want to make certain we do not back ourselves into anything. As I have indicated in my resolution, we adopted a provision from the Jackson language on SALT II to make certain we do not end up in any position of inferiority.

As I indicated from the outset, I would hope that we are ahead or even. I am not certain of that and I am not certain who is certain of that.

Senator TSONGAS. Well, the President is certain.

Senator DOLE. Pardon me?

Senator TSONGAS. The President is certain of some things.

Senator DOLE. He is certain of some things and others are certain of others.

Senator TSONGAS. I could not have said it better myself. [Laughter.]

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Boschwitz.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Senator Dole, what advantages do you see by combining START and INF, which is apparently one of the basic parts of your proposal?

Senator **Dole**. Are you talking about the negotiations themselves? I think I make it clear we would not combine the two, but we would have maybe a memorandum of understanding that would indicate we are going beyond just START or INF.

What I am proposing we do is move beyond the START proposal by also looking at bombers and cruise missiles and the overall larger aggregate strategic ceiling. But I think they have to be very closely linked, and that is why I suggest perhaps through some memorandum of understanding.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Between INF and the START?

Senator **Dole**. Yes.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I got the impression that everything would be considered, and that seemed to say that it would be considered in one or perhaps tandem negotiations. Are they not now quite so closely linked? They are even held in the same building, I believe.

Senator **Dole**. They are in the same city, in the same building, and I suspect they are closely linked. But I would suggest the President propose this reduction across the board and we would, I assume not link the two, but through some memorandum of understanding we would make certain they are closely related.

Senator **Boschwitz**. You talk about a substantial reduction prior to a freeze. What percentage? Do you have a percentage in mind?

Senator **Dole**. Again, I am going to present to the committee—I want to avoid any numbers because you might be trapped, like others may have been trapped, in saying two to one or three to one. But I think you could do it in a number of ways we are going to provide for the committee to illustrate. We are not wedded to any numbers, but to the general notion of how it might work. And we will have that information available in the next day or two.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Freeze proponents maybe do not disagree with the idea of lowering the numbers, but any way they say freeze first and you can do that later. How do you respond to someone who comes and talks to you about a nuclear freeze?

Senator **Dole**. First of all, I respond, as I think we all should, that these are dedicated, concerned people who should be listened to, and they have a lot of good ideas. But it seems to me, without being an expert in the area, that you cannot just have a freeze without negotiations. You have to negotiate the freeze.

And I have to believe that if negotiations are called for in any case, then what should be done is to turn that order around. It is going to take just as long and be just as lengthy a negotiation, and should result in reductions. And so I do believe that we ought to reduce and then have the freeze and then hopefully further reduce.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The **Chairman**. Thank you, Senator Boschwitz, very much indeed.

Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. I was not here to hear Senator Dole's statement, but I am very glad indeed that he is here. I admire him and if he puts his ingenuity and intelligence to a problem it bodes well for that problem.

The only tiny point of disagreement here is this use of the word "inferior." I think it is a highly subjective phrase. I am reminded of a conversation I had many years back with Premier Kosygin of the Soviet Union when he used the word "sufficient." As long as each side has weaponry sufficient to destroy the other, that is really what we are after here.

Senator **Dole**. That is problably a good suggestion. We are not wedded to that word. It was a provision we picked from another resolution.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you very much.

The **Chairman**. Senator Dole, we all welcome your entry into this very complicated area, and we will look to you for strong positive support.

Senator **Dole**. We could always tax them. That would put them out of business right away. [Laughter.]

We tax anything that moves or stands still. [Laughter.]

The **Chairman**. Senator Specter, you have long felt this is a paramount issue, and I know you have also urged, as I have, a meeting of the principals involved, President Brezhnev and President Reagan. We are happy to have your testimony.

STATEMENT OF HON. ARLEN SPECTER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA

Senator **Specter**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee. I certainly commend the chairman of the committee for convening these hearings.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Do you have prepared remarks? May we have a copy of them?

Senator **Specter**. I do not have typed remarks. I do have prepared remarks which I am about to present.

Senator **Boschwitz**. We may not have a copy?

Senator **Specter**. No.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I will have to take notes.

Senator **Specter**. That is acceptable.

I find the presentation a good bit more spontaneous without typed remarks and think that is the most appropriate course.

I appear today in support of a resolution which I have filed calling for an immediate summit. This follows a resolution I filed April 1982 following a Presidential speech on a Saturday, where he talked about the need for parity, or really the need for superiority. And I thought at that time there ought to be an immediate summit.

In May 1982, I pressed for a floor vote on that subject, over the objection of the chairmen of the two key committees, Senator Percy of Foreign Relations and Senator Tower of Armed Services. And following the defeat of the motion to table, that particular resolution calling for an immediate summit, was passed by a vote of approximately 90 to 6. The summit has not been held.

In April I renewed this resolution calling for an immediate summit. I consider it imperative, Mr. Chairman and members of this committee, that the Senate take this stand forthwith in urging the President to convene an immediate summit. My reasons are simple and direct.

The most important issue facing the world at the present time is the issue of war and peace. Stated somewhat differently, perishing or surviving. That raises the issue, how do we solve this basic question, and the answer is we seek an agreement. And how do we obtain an agreement? We obtain an agreement by negotiation.

And my suggestion is, the most direct way to do that is have the negotiators function at the highest level of the government, and this is President Reagan and now Soviet President Andropov.

I believe that we have a unique asset in the personage of President Ronald Reagan because of his tremendous persuasive appeal, demonstrated in his meeting with European leaders in a group, demonstrated repeatedly in his meetings with other world leaders; and that if he were to meet with President Andropov the Soviet leader would see the sincerity, friendliness and warmth of President Reagan, and it would come across much better than President Reagan does in print, where others interpret what he says, and really much better than President Reagan does even on television, where he can be seen and there is a greater awareness of his real personality than is present when he appears merely in print.

I think it would be enormously helpful for President Reagan to assess President Andropov.

The reasons which have been given in opposition to such a summit in my judgment are unsubstantial. It is contended and has been by Secretary of State Shultz before this committee earlier this month that there would be a buildup of expectations. That in my opinion is a straw man. If the summit were projected to be what it is, an effort by world leaders to get together and seek a solution, without any real expectation of success—it is an effort. It may succeed, it may not succeed.

But certainly the chances of success are greater if an effort is made than if no effort is made. If that clearcut line of reduced expectation were announced at the outset, how could there be a disadvantage in having built up expectations if they were from the start specifically not built up?

The second reason characteristically advanced is the agenda has not been set and the summit should be the occasion for world leaders to get together and in effect sign a document heretofore agreed on. And I reject that notion because if there were to be a summit established and if a timetable were to be set at this moment, it probably would not be for several months at the earliest. If we project ahead from late June, which is where we are now, a summit could probably not be convened until October or November.

That would set the stage for very intense negotiations by the subordinates in the United States and the Soviet Union to really move as far as movement is possible before the leaders of the two countries came together.

There is a real role of the U.S. Senate in passing such a resolution because of our constitutional responsibility to advise as well as to consent, and certainly we all know that the SALT II Treaty was not ratified by the U.S. Senate and how much better it would have been had the Senate been in the position to give some advice to the executive branch as the process proceeded.

Of course, SALT II was not ratified because of the invasion by the Soviet Union of Afghanistan, but there is no reason why the Senate should not exercise its constitutional prerogatives and its constitutional role to advise as the matters are in process, to say candidly to the Chief Executive of the country, our President, we believe a summit should be convened.

There is a strong feeling in many quarters in this country that the administration is not sincere in its efforts on arms control and that the administration is not really interested in the summit meeting, and if the President were to take the initiative and move for a summit my sense is that that feeling, that reservation, could be and should be dispelled.

When the issue of funding came before the Senate recently, President Reagan called upon a number of us from the Appropriations Committee to meet with him to talk about the MX, and this was a subject of a floor statement which I made on the day of the MX in which I recounted in part my acquiescence in supporting the President because of the significant concessions he made on three important items:

First, on proposing a new administration proposal at Geneva in accordance with the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission; and his agreement to appoint a Presidential commission on disarmament which would span several Presidential administrations; and his agreement in principle on the builddown proposal.

We are watching closely to see the President's actions and the actions of the administration in following through on those commitments made to many of us in the Senate as preconditions for our agreeing to vote in favor of funding on the MX. Mr. Chairman, I believe that action by the President in moving toward a summit would be a strong showing of good faith on his part, consistent with the objectives many of us were looking for when we voted in support of the funding of the MX conditioned on realistic efforts and sincere efforts by the administration to take aggressive action in the pursuit of peace, and I suggest that the convening of a summit is a very important step on that path.

That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Boschwitz** [presiding]. I thank you, Senator, and I commend you for coming before us and so rigorously pushing the idea of the summit.

We spoke with the Secretary of State, as you indicated, when he was before our committee a few days ago. He says unless there is a reasonable chance of some type of success the expectation you spoke about would arise. These expectations might arise even in the event they were foresworn beforehand.

But is it realistic, Senator, to have such a summit without having those expectations arise? Then in the event there is no satisfaction of those expectations, will it then perhaps not be counterproductive in moving the prospects of peace forward?

Senator **Specter**. Senator Boschwitz, if the summit were to convene and there were pronouncements made that expectations would not be present, nonetheless people would have expectations. That is a natural consequence. But it would be plain that the people in the United States and the people of the world would not be expecting the Moon, they would not be expecting a magic solution from the problems present:

The people in this world succeed when they try. They do not succeed when they do not try. I think the people of the world would understand it was an effort, and I think the argument about expectations is a makeweight and it masquerades other reasons. It is not a substantial reason in my judgment, and I think the U.S. Senate should say to the President:

Mr. President, we do not think that is a substantial reason, and if that is the best you have to say, plus a completed agenda so we are ready for signature, we think that is not a substantial reason. We understand you are the President and Chief Executive Officer. We do understand our role in foreign policy, which is a substantial role, to advise as well as consent. And we think your reasons for not having a summit are not good reasons, and we will take that into account the next time you ask us for something, to support an appropriations bill or an authorization bill for the famous or infamous bargaining chips about which we hear so much.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I am not familiar with any kind of inclination of the other side, on the part of the Russians, to institute such an invitation or such a meeting as we would. Are you familiar with what their feelings are with respect to having a summit, whether they are desirous of doing so?

Senator **Specter**. Not in any detail. I obviously have not discussed the matter with Mr. Andropov. I did discuss the matter with Mr. Arbotov when I was in the Soviet Union in July 1982, and the response was a noncommittal response at that time. He said he would be pleased to see Senator Baker and Senator Laxalt come to the Soviet Union, and encouraged U.S. Senators to travel to the Soviet Union.

I mention that by way of inference in response to your question, Senator Boschwitz, that I believe there is a receptivity on the part of the Soviet Union. Soviet scholars and officials come to the United States. But in this game of Gaston and Alphonse or cat and mouse, each wants the other to go first and neither will show any sign of weakness.

But I would feel fairly confident in asserting that if President Reagan said to President Andropov, let us have a summit and talk the best we can, the invitation would be accepted. And if it were not, I would withdraw my resolution.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Would you perceive it as a sign of weakness? Do I gather that from your statement, that they would consider it a sign of weakness and therefore they are not asking us?

Senator **Specter**. I would consider it a sign of strength to show a sign of weakness in this climate.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Would you repeat that?

Senator **Specter**. I would consider it a sign of strength to show a sign of weakenes in this climate, Senator Boschwitz. I do not think there is any such thing as strength or weakness when it comes to two people talking about a common problem.

You have some experience in litigation matters and settlement matters. Who can say it is a sign of weakness when two tenacious lawyers are in a tough hard-fought lawsuit and one says to the other, let us talk settlement.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I am not sure that is entirely analogous, and I do not take issue with your resolution. I believe I voted for it on the floor of the Senate. I would welcome such a meeting.

In a way it almost reminds me of an old story, that it cannot hurt, unless it is a sign of weakness or unless it were to be totally unproductive. But it might well be that setting up such a meeting, perhaps a little beyond October, maybe early into next year, would perhaps spur some efforts and get some things accomplished.

Senator SPECTER. I am concerned about letting this summit pass the time for deployment of the Pershing II missiles. I think that will be a significant event in the history of the world.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. It is hard to tell. You know, some of our best negotiations with the Soviet Union have occurred after some of the deepest crises between our two countries. So it is hard to make that general statement.

I yield.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Let us presume there is no possibility of agreeing on an agenda. Would you share my thought that it would still be a good idea for the two men to get together to make sure that each would be informed that the other has neither horns nor tail, that we are all fellow passengers on the spaceship Earth?

And I think you should not expect too much out of the summit meeting. I think you know as well as I do that the President really has a deep-down feeling of intrinsic, I think evil about the Soviet leaders. I do not know if the Soviet leadership has the same feelings about us or not, but I think if the leaders of the two countries spent a couple of days together perhaps each could be more conscious of the problems of the other.

Senator SPECTER. I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. I have agreed in principle that there should be a meeting between the two chief executives of the Soviet Union and the United States, and I came to that conclusion in November 1980 when I met with Brezhnev. However, the purpose of my meeting was not as detailed as your own resolution called for. You actually call for the meeting to be convened for the purpose of negotiating and submitting a mutual and equal verifiable reduction, at least of strategic and intermediate-range nuclear missiles and related warheads, and if possible also other nuclear weapons and delivery systems.

It would result in agreement on fundamental terms which could then be incorporated into a draft treaty, with further details to be negotiated as soon as possible thereafter between the Soviet and American representatives.

The chances that this subject, that is the life work of a great many people who have devoted themselves to it—Paul Nitze, for example; how many years has he put into it? To put that kind of task on two heads of state and expect them to sit there and agree to basic principles, and then that that would lead to a treaty, might set us up for a possible disappointment.

My objective was somewhat more limited, that there should be a meeting, I had hoped between Brezhnev and President Reagan. There was an understandable delay early in the administration. Finally there was an agreement reached. Secretary Haig said he would recommend it to the President. The President then did make an offer to meet with Brezhnev in New York if he came to the United Nations, but he was too ill to come.

But it showed we were ready for a meeting, not specifically any agenda laid out, just a meeting between the two. Now we have said that we should not have a meeting as Secretary Shultz testified, unless it is carefully prepared and there is a real prospect of ensuing agreements.

Carefully prepared, I would certainly agree. The Soviets, speaking through Anatoly Dobrynin, with whom I have talked about this, feel that it would be better to have such a meeting at a time when they could do something significant, like sign SALT I, the way President Ford and Brezhnev did. Well, that would be desirable.

But do you, from your closeness to the ongoing arms control negotiations in progress now, perceive that any agreement is at all possible by say November of this year that might lead to a treaty?

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Chairman, I think it is entirely possible. I have formulated the resolution to call upon the two leaders to deal with the central question, that is nuclear disarmament. The President has made specific proposals. His speeches have dealt with the details of the issue. Mr. Andropov has as well, and I think they should meet and I think they should discuss the central questions.

The summit meeting, if planned today, as I have said, would have to be several months away.

The CHAIRMAN. My question pertains to, do you see, the way things are going now in Geneva. Is there any chance that there could be an agreement reached by November of this year in Geneva, so that there would be something specific to meet the standard set by the administration and the Soviets, I understand, would like to have as the basis for such a meeting, so that something could come out specifically from the meeting of the two chiefs of state?

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Chairman, my answer is yes, but that presupposes a will on the part of the United States, as one of the parties, to have an agreement, and that issue is not free from doubt. It also presupposes will on the part of the Soviet Union to have an agreement and that issue is less free from doubt.

Part of the issue on will in my judgment is an issue by the refusal of the administration, the Reagan administration, to have a summit without giving a better reason than Secretary of State Shultz has given. He advanced the same reason in testimony before the Appropriations Subcommittee on State, the committee on which I sit, and I asked the same questions.

I just do not think they are good reasons, and it is largely a question of will. If the will is present, my sense is agreements are possible. I believe that Ambassador Nitze took a long step forward in his famous walk in the woods, and it was withdrawn. I was about to use the word "sabotage," which is as good as any other, really on both sides.

But I think we know enough about their position and they know enough about our position, President Reagan is well enough prepared, so is President Andropov, that it is realistic for those men to sit down and talk turkey at the highest level on the most important central issues.

The CHAIRMAN. The administration is concerned that if a summit meeting is held and produces no agreements, there might be dashed hopes for peace and it would make the situation even worse than it is today. How would you respond to that?

Senator SPECTER. I do not think the situation could be any worse than it is today.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you can think of many ways it could be worse. It is bad, but it could be worse. I could name 10 ways it could be worse.

Senator SPECTER. Well, in what way could it be worse simply because the two men sat down and failed? Are they going to punch each other during the course of discussion? Are they going to press the button during the course of the discussion?

What is there about the discussion which is calculated or likely to produce worse relations? I think the situation is pretty bad now, when Andropov calls President Reagan a liar and President Reagan calls the Soviet Union the empire of evil. I pride myself in some imagination, but I cannot think of 10 ways it could be worse.

Senator PELL. I must say I agree with you. Usually I agree with my chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. No, there could be a lot worse conditions than we now have. We are, after all, sitting and talking. It would be worse if the negotiations broke off and they were not talking.

We are negotiating a grain agreement. Sure, you cannot compare the two, arms control and grain agreements, but you are at least negotiating, you are talking.

Talks are being held with them on withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, in the United Nations, and on the situation in Poland. They have not put troops into Poland, as was threatened and we were concerned about.

You see, there are a lot of ways the conditions could be worse than they are today. But I will admit, we are not moving in a direction that is bright with hope for the future, and some breakthrough is needed.

Senator SPECTER. But reason is there to think those worse conditions would be fomented by a meeting? If you can think of 10 reasons why things would be worse, I can think of 11 reasons how things could be better.

The CHAIRMAN. I agree with the meeting. I would like to see it, and I am sure from a practical standpoint the agenda would be broader. It would include and embrace arms control, but it would also include Afghanistan, Poland, and other issues as well.

I have no further questions. Senator Pell, do you have any?

Senator PELL. I just wanted to emphasize, my own view is the agenda should not be too broad or too specific. I think the two men should just take each other's measure and, as I said earlier, recognize that each one of them is doing what he thinks is right, and not have too many items on the agenda. Then the general public will not be let down.

Senator SPECTER. Mr. Chairman, on the markup, I would be amenable to have the subject matter more narrowly drawn. I think the important thing is to have a summit, so that if there is disagreement as to the scope of the agenda or the discussion of the matters, I would be amenable to having that modified.

I would leave you with just one thought, and that is on the subject of when. I would quote Senator Percy, who said, "I do not think we have the time" to wait.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. That is a strong statement.

Senator SPECTER. Mine or yours?

The CHAIRMAN. We thank you very much, Senator Specter, for being here. Without any question, you and I agree there ought to be such a meeting and it ought to be as soon as possible.

Senator Gary Hart. I do apologize to our distinguished colleagues from the House, who have made a long journey over here, and we will move along as rapidly as we possibly can to get to you.

If the House Members would like to come up and join Senator Pell and myself, we would be happy to have you join us at the podium.

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, I would be more than happy to have the House Members join me in a panel, if it is agreeable to the committee, however, you want to do it. I intend to be brief.

The CHAIRMAN. Why do you not go ahead, Senator Hart? This is a subject in which you have been deeply involved for a long time.

STATEMENT OF HON. GARY HART, A U.S. SENATOR FROM COLORADO

Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, I thank you and the ranking minority member of this committee for being here and allowing me to join many of our colleagues who have testified today. The history of arms control negotiations, it seems to me, as important and immediate as it is, has come to the point where it does not fundamentally address the problem of our time and the problem of the future.

The basis of arms control negotiations beginning even before SALT I, through SALT I and SALT II, has been to put an overall limit on the number of warhead systems or launchers, and that is extremely important for those of us who strongly support a freeze on the production and deployment of new systems. That freeze is in keeping with the overall goals of arms control throughout the past 20 years, but increasingly, as technology has become more sophisticated, as warning times have dropped, as the hair trigger on the weapons systems we are developing has become even finer, serious students and supporters of the arms control process and disarmament have become increasingly concerned about the possibility and the problem related to the accidental or miscalculated use of nuclear weapons.

This is to say, even if a freeze were to be adopted and a mutual verifiable balanced freeze realized today, we would still have enormous numbers of warheads and launchers on both sides. There is nothing, nothing whatsoever, that I am aware of outside of the fairly fragile hotline, that prevents either of the two major nuclear superpowers from starting World War III, a nuclear war, by accident or miscalculation.

I, as a 9-year member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, having served 4 years on the Senate Intelligence Committee, am increasingly concerned and have been for some time about the problem of accidental use of nuclear weapons. In that context, in February 1982, I introduced a resolution which would have expanded the scope of arms control negotiations between ourselves and the Soviets to include specific measures, that would reduce the possibility that nuclear weapons might be caused by accident or miscalculation and would have taken other steps, in addition to limitations on the number of warheads and launchers, that would have reduced the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons any time in the future.

That resolution was introduced before the freeze resolution. The name of the resolution was STOP, standing for Strategic Talks on Prevention. That resolution was No. 323 in the last Congress. It has been reintroduced in this Congress on March 8 as Senate Resolution 83.

Mr. Chairman, with your indulgence, I would like to briefly outline the provisions and arguments for this approach to arms control, and I hope this committee, if it gets to the point of reporting out a resolution, will take some of these items seriously, hopefully in conjunction with a freeze proposal.

This resolution—and I will quote from the statement accompanying it, because I think this quotation summarizes its intent—while endorsing the need for a mutually verifiable freeze and reductions, makes clear that we must do much more. Even with reduced numbers, there are no guarantees that nuclear weapons still will not be used.

Therefore, we must rethink fundamentally our approach to nuclear arms control. We must refocus our efforts to reduce the extraordinary dangers of nuclear war. This is the intent of the STOP resolution. It moves significantly beyond the question of force levels addressed in the freeze resolution, and directs our attention to even more fundamental problems of prevention and capabilities.

Without such a comprehensive approach, the dangers of nuclear war will still grow rather than diminish. This resolution addresses four major problems that should be the focus of negotiations in Geneva. First, the possibility of nuclear war by accident or miscalculation. Even though our own forces are maintained under relatively tight and continuous control, computer failures over the past few years in our strategic warning system are very troublesome. And may I say, Mr. Chairman, parenthetically, that 3 years ago, Senator Goldwater and I, on behalf of the Senate Armed Services Committee, investigated the adequacy of that strategic warning system. We found that in an 18-month period, in spite of the expenditures of tens of billions of dollars on the most sophisticated warning system in the world, one much more capable than that of the Soviet Union, that system failed 151 times. Several of those breakdowns were serious enough for this Nation to go to higher degrees of alert, even though the system was in error.

Of course, we know even less about how tightly Soviet forces and procedures are controlled, and we know their technologies are not as sophisticated as ours. Moreover, the SALT II Treaty contains a provision for the prior notification of missile flight testing in an effort to reduce uncertainty over intentions. We need to reaffirm and extend that proposal. We would go a long way toward reducing the risk by expanding the 1973 United States-Soviet agreement on the prevention of nuclear war, and those are steps that should be negotiated today.

Second, the procurement of hard target counter-silo capabilities by both superpowers undercuts confidence in the survivability of retaliatory forces, in effect placing weapons on a hair trigger. We must make concrete steps to reduce the vulnerability of the two sides' nuclear forces to preemptive attack. A secure capacity to respond to an adversary's nuclear strike force is the very foundation of mutual deterrence, and yet I must say again parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, this administration, and up to this point, at least, a majority of the Members of both Houses of Congress, have endorsed construction, production, and deployment of the MX missile, which goes exactly in the opposite direction.

It is a counter-silo, hard target, first strike weapon, and upsets the strategic balance rather than securing it, and since the President has taken the position that this is not a negotiable item or, if you will, a bargaining chip, presumably if that system is built it will represent the destabilization for as long as it sits in those silos well into the future until some future President removes it.

This is exactly the course we should not be following if we are serious, as the Scowcroft Commission said we should be, about achieving stability instead of undermining stability.

Third, we and the Soviets have a special responsibility to restrain the export of sensitive nuclear technologies to prevent the use of nuclear weapons by other countries and extranational groups, including terrorists. Right now the administration's policies in this regard are to the contrary.

Fourth, we must continue to seek meaningful reductions in the overall numbers of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems, strategic, theater, and tactical. While arms control analysts recognize a minimum force of reliable survivable weapons systems tightly controlled would constitute the best deterrent for both countries, at least until we achieve the ultimate goal of the elimination of nuclear weapons, we must achieve sizable mutual and verifiable reductions in the number of nuclear weapons, warheads, and delivery vehicles consistent with the requirements for national security and international stability.

Mr. Chairman, we are taking two steps, the production and deployment of the MX, and the possible deployment of the Pershing II. One invites, as General Vessey has already stated he intends to do, the pursuit of a radical alteration in our targeting and launching doctrine from one of acceptance of a first strike to one of launching under attack. General Vessey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, with the endorsement of the Secretary of Defense, said it is the present intention of this administration and its military advisers to fundamentally change this country's launch doctrine. I think that is the most serious suggestion I have heard since I came to the Congress.

Second, the Soviets have said that if we deploy the Pershing II, they will undertake the same change in their targeting and launching doctrine. Now, I cannot think of two steps more inclined to destabilize the nuclear balance and lead this world closer to nuclear confrontation than those two steps, and I think this committee ought to give extremely serious consideration as to how to prevent this radical alteration of the launch doctrine on both sides.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we are here today exploring this issue again, because there has been so little real progress made to date in arms control agreements, either in the START negotiations or the INF talks. I urge this committee to do everything it can, and I pledge to do all I can to keep the pressure on to get more than just promises on arms control.

Every day we delay, we move a step closer to nuclear war. A year ago this committee held similar hearings on similar proposals for expanding, accelerating, and strengthening our efforts to achieve an arms control agreement and reduce the arsenals on both sides. What has happened since then and what will have happened a year from today? We cannot let another year pass with so little real results.

The prevention of nuclear war, not just stopping the arms race, but the prevention of nuclear war is our most solemn obligation to ourselves, even more importantly, to our children and the human race. In the event we are unable to prevent this holocaust, we will have no second chance.

Thank you.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much I have a few questions. In addition to offering your STOP proposal, you have also cosponsored the nuclear freeze and the builddown resolutions. What do you see as the common thread in these resolutions?

Senator **Hart**. The common thread clearly is to stop the nuclear arms race and reverse it. The differences, or the correlative nature of these three initiatives that I have sponsored are that, one, the freeze, once negotiated, would stop production of new nuclear systems on a verifiable and balanced basis. In the interim, and my support for the builddown is an interim support, not in replacement for the freeze, we should have, in my judgment, a requirement that for every new system that is built, two are taken down, and I support that proposal very strongly, not as an alternative to the freeze, but an interim step to be taken while the freeze is being negotiated.

And third, the STOP proposal augments and supplements a freeze or START or whatever other steps, other bargaining position we take to limit overall numbers of systems and warheads by negotiating steps to prevent the use of whatever levels of arsenals we have. What concerns me about traditional arms control, whether SALT II, START, or even the freeze is, none of those, and I would add the builddown proposal into the bargain, none of them address the real and increasing problem that as nuclear technology proliferates, some day someone could start the first nuclear war by accident. That is why I am so insistent that whatever our bargaining position is, we begin to incorporate as quickly as possible steps between ourselves, the Soviets, and other nuclear nations fairly quickly to build confidence among ourselves that no one will launch the war by accident.

The Chairman. My last question would pertain to that particular point. You have expressed concern about starting a war by accident and miscalulation of the actions of third parties. President Reagan has recently proposed a series of confidence-building measures in the context of the START talks. Do these measures meet the concerns expressed in your resolution or approach them?

Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, some of them do, and I applaud them, and I am glad to hear the START talks are expanded to include these measures. When I was in Geneva in November 1982, in discussing our position and our policy with our negotiators, there was no indication at that time these items were on the bargaining agenda. I am glad to see that the agenda has been expanded since that time in the last few months to include notification of sea-launched ballistic missile launches, long-range INF ballistic missile launches, prior notification of major nuclear force exercises, and so on.

It seems to me we would enforce and strengthen the hand of the administration and perhaps expand that as well to some of the other items I mentioned in my remarks if this committee and the Senate were to pass a resolution which urged further effort in this area and strengthened the bargaining position of the administration. So I think—I guess what I am saying is, I think the fact that some of the items, confidence-building measures and notification measures that have been added to the agenda is good. We could frankly strengthen the administration's hand by passing a resolution urging stronger efforts in these areas.

The Chairman. Senator Hart, we thank you very much. I think your movement around the country serves a personal purpose, but it also serves the purpose of alerting and better informing the Nation as to the subject that you have spent so many years worrying about. You have expressed your sincere concern about this and a desire to find a way to solve this overall problem which terrorizes mankind today. It is highly desirable, and it is certainly noted by this committee. We appreciate everything you are doing in the field.

Senator Hart. I appreciate your indulgence in this, and I yield to my colleagues from the House, both of whom have equal leadership histories. Thank you.

The Chairman. We are pleased to call Representative Ed Markey, a Democrat from Massachusetts—we will have a bipartisan panel—and Representative James Leach, my neighbor, Republican from Iowa.

STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM MASSACHUSETTS

Representative Markey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There is no need to apologize for the lateness of the hour. Mr. Leach and I have fought this fight in a lot of tank towns, and it is a great honor for us to be in the big time before the Foreign Relations Committee for a change.

The Chairman. We are glad to have you here.

Representative Markey. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to speak before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Kennedy-Hatfield nuclear weapons freeze resolution. I would like to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these hearings, in which you will be considering not only the freeze, but a number of other arms control proposals. During the past 2 years, we have seen an unprecedented debate across this country about the dangers of nuclear war. Therefore, hearings such as this one are important for considering arms control proposals that deal with the fate of this Earth.

For the next few minutes, I will summarize my statement and ask that the complete text of my statement be entered into the record.

Mr. Chairman, on May 4 the House passed, by a margin of 278 to 149, House Joint Resolution 13, the nuclear weapons freeze and reduction resolution. The House conducted an extensive and detailed debate on this resolution which lasted more than 50 hours over a period of almost 2 months, and after numerous attempts to weaken the measure had failed, the House passed a resolution that clearly called on the President to negotiate an immediate, bilateral freeze on the nuclear arms race so that both sides could then begin major, mutual, and meaningful reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

I therefore urge this committee to favorably consider the Kennedy-Hatfield nuclear freeze resolution, as it contains the same freeze proposal the House passed on May 4. I also hope that the full Senate will join the House in calling for a freeze following reductions.

Mr. Chairman, the House debate on the freeze revolved around three major questions that must be answered by all arms control proposals. The first question for any arms control proposals is whether the freeze accurately assesses the current strategic balance between the two superpowers. The Reagan administration has begun with the belief we are militarily inferior to the Soviets. The administration believes that while we in effect froze during the seventies, the Soviet Union launched a massive military buildup, so that now their nuclear forces are superior to ours.

The freeze, however, begins with a more realistic assessment of the overall nuclear capabilities on both sides. Yes, the Soviets built up their nuclear forces during the 1970's, but it is inaccurate and unfair to accuse our military of sitting on its hands during this period. The fact is, we modernized every leg of our Triad during the 1970's, and in many areas we continue to outpace the Soviets.

Yes; there are asymmetries, with each side holding certain advantages over the other. While the Soviets lead us in launchers, we lead them in warheads. While the Soviets lead us in total number of ballistic missile submarines, we lead them in total number of warheads deployed at sea at all times. While three-fourths of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal is concentrated in vulnerable land-based missile silos, about one-half of our nuclear arsenal is based in invulnerable submarines. However, overall, a balance of imbalances exists between the superpowers. Both have the capacity to reduce the other to rubble, and that is what parity is all about.

The second important question for any arms control proposal is, Can it be implemented? Freeze opponents have claimed the freeze is a leap into the unknown, that it cannot be verified or implemented. That is not true. The fact is, the freeze has a distinguished pedigree in the history of arms control. The Limited Test Ban Treaty and the ABM treaties, for example, froze the testing of warheads above ground and the deployment of antiballistic missiles respectively.

Even SALT can be considered a freeze, albeit at higher levels on the development of strategic systems. Building on the counting and verification procedures established by SALT, a freeze today could be adequately verified, In fact, today, in many respects the freeze would be easier to verify than the administration's START proposal. The administration's proposal, for example, would allow both the United States and the Soviet Union to build additional ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles which are easy to hide and are extremely hard to count.

Deploying thousands of these weapons will certainly complicate negotiation and make future arms agreements more difficult to conclude. Neither side will ever know whether it is counting all of the other's cruise missiles or double counting some. A freeze, on the other hand, would alleviate this verification problem. It would halt the missiles from even being built in the first place. Thus, the detection of just one cruise missile would be enough to prove a violation.

Moreover, the freeze to which the Soviets appear even more amendable than START, would take a relatively short time to negotiate. On the other hand, the President's START proposal, because it is so stacked against the Soviets, will take years and years to negotiate, thus allowing more time for both sides to deploy more weapons that make reductions more difficult to negotiate.

The administration has recently come up with a second START proposal which was supposed to be more flexible than the first START proposal, but I question whether START II is in fact more flexible than START I. START II's emphasis on limiting warheads instead of launchers is a good idea. However, the proposal still allows the United States to build 1,000 MX warheads which will certainly not please the Soviets, since those warheads will further threaten their land-based nuclear force in combination with the Minuteman III and Trident II missiles.

START II will force the Soviets to cut by more than one-half the number of warheads they have on ICBM's, while the United States would be able to increase the number of such warheads. The Soviets would also be required to reduce their SS–18's and SS–19's by two-thirds, while the United States would be allowed to build the MX and the Trident II missile.

The third and final question an arms control proposal must face is, Does it stop the arms race and make the world a safe place in which to live? While the administration's proposal would reduce land- and submarine-based missiles, it would still allow the United States to build more first strike weapons like the MX and Trident II missiles, and the Reagan proposal would also allow the Soviet Union to improve the destabilizing aspects of their nuclear forces. That clearly is not stopping the arms race.

Further, the world would not be left a safer place in which to live. During House consideration of the nuclear freeze resolution, the nuclear weapons builddown proposal was also debated and considered. I realize that the builddown proposal enjoys considerable support in the Senate. However, I would note the House rejected a builddown amendment that was offered to the freeze resolution. The amendment was rejected because, one, the builddown proposal ran counter to the intent of the freeze, and two, because even though a builddown would result in reductions, and even though we might be able to implement a builddown, the world, I feel, would not be left a safer place as a result of builddown. The builddown proposal, according to its author, Senator Cohen, would require that for each new warhead deployed, a side would be required to eliminate two older warheads. The builddown would achieve reductions in nuclear weapons, a goal we all share, but the builddown, as I understand it, would achieve those reductions at the expense of further modernization of both sides' forces.

A builddown would allow both sides to trade in older nuclear warheads for newer, more destructive, more accurate, more destabilizing nuclear weapons. I have compared it in the past to trading in two crossbows for one artillery piece. The freeze not only halts the quantitative arms race, it halts, more importantly, much more importantly, the qualitative arms race. We must stop before we cross this technological threshold.

The freeze, in other words, brings everything to a grinding halt. Testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons on both sides would be halted. Then and only then would a freeze—after a freeze is implemented, would reductions make the world safer, and only then would the arms race be truly moving in reverse.

Mr. Chairman, the House voted for the freeze because the freeze makes more sense. Remember, the freeze does not ask us to trust the Soviets. It does not ask us to approve the Soviet form of government. It does not ask us to approve of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan or Soviet repression in Poland. The freeze is a realistic, pragmatic proposal that recognizes it is in the interest of both sides to halt the nuclear arms race.

Mr. Chairman, the opportunity for reaching a freeze agreement far outweighs any technical problems. Today, the public is protesting and demonstrating, demanding a freeze on the nuclear arms race. The only missing ingredient for achieving such an agreement now is the political will.

[Mr. Markey's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD J. MARKEY

During the past 2 years this country has seen a remarkable public debate over the threat of nuclear war. People by the millions have begun worrying about living with the bomb. All across the country people began to study the issue and they began to organize and mobilize. From this national reawakening has become the nationwide nuclear freeze movement. The freeze gained its strength, not on college campuses, but in grass-roots America, in community centers, town halls, church basements and living rooms all over the country. Business and community organizations, professional groups, labor leaders, educators, doctors, lawyers, ministers, and scientists began to grapple with the issue of nuclear war. We had Ground Zero Week when people all over the country gathered together to talk about life—or the lack of it—after nuclear war. Freeze groups have been organized in every state in the union. One million people gathered in New York to rally against nuclear war. More than 500 town meetings, city councils and county commissions across the country passed freeze resolutions. One hundred and thirty-five Catholic bishops endorsed the freeze.

On August 5, 1982, the House held its first vote on the freeze resolution. Unfortunately, the freeze lost by a very close 204-202 vote to a substitute resolution that backed the Reagan administration's nuclear arms buildup. The freeze movement in this country, however, was far from defeated. On November 2, 1982, in what was the closest this country has ever come to a national plebiscite on arms control, more than one-fourth of the nation's voters cast ballots in state and local freeze referendums. The result was a solid victory over 11.5 million people, or 60 percent of those voting in the referendum, voted for the freeze.

On March 16, 1983, the House took up the freeze resolution for the second time. In what turned out to be a marathon debate over this country's arms control policies, the House spent more than 50 hours over a period of about 2 months considering the nuclear freeze resolution. On May 4, 1983, the House passed the freeze resolution by a 278–149 margin. A number of amendments were attached to the resolution during the debate. The measure, however, still contained the clear call for an immediate bilateral halt to the nuclear arms race so both the United States and the Soviet Union can begin major, mutual reductions in their nuclear forces.

Senators Edward M. Kennedy and Mark Hatfield have introduced a similar nuclear freeze resolution in the Senate. I urge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to report favorably on this resolution. I would hope that the full Senate would then join the House in passing a strong nuclear freeze resolution which calls on both sides to stop this insane arms race before it is too late.

Much has been said and written about the freeze during the past year. A lot of charges and counter-charges have been made. I would like to take this opportunity to explain some facts about the freeze and tell why I think the freeze makes the most sense.

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE

Most military experts agree that the United States and the Soviet Union are presently at nuclear parity—that is, both have the capability to destroy the other under any nuclear war-fighting scenario. President Reagan claims that our nuclear forces are inferior to the Soviets'. However, none of his generals or admirals in the Pentagon would trade our forces for the Soviet forces. For example, when Gen. John Vessey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked at a congressional committee hearing in May 1982 whether he would swap our overall military capability for the Soviets', he answered, "I would not trade." When Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger was asked a month earlier whether he would rather have at his disposal the U.S. nuclear arsenal or the Soviet nuclear arsenal, he said, "I would not for a moment exchange anything because we have an immense edge in technology."

Mr. Reagan, nevertheless, continues to stick to his claim that we are inferior to the Soviets. This belief rests largely on what he has called the window of vulnerability, which supposes that the Soviets could launch a preemptive attack to destroy our land-based missiles and up to half our strategic bombers and submarines. An American President may then accept the initial losses and capitulate rather than retaliate and face devastation from a second Soviet strike.

Our freeze resolution recognizes that this theory stands on three shaky assumptions: (1) that the Soviets could launch a near-perfect attack, which most military experts believe isn't possible, (2) that a President would accept up to 20 million casualties and not fire the remaining 3,000 warheads tucked away in our submarines underwater, and (3) that the Soviets would gamble on a first strike, not knowing whether we would launch on warning.

The freeze resolution, on the other hand, recognizes that asymmetries exist in the nuclear balance with each side holding advantages over the other. For example, while the Soviets lead us in launchers (2,500 to 2,000) we lead them in warheads (9,500 to 7,700). While the Soviets lead us in total numbers of ballistic missile submarines (62 to 32), we lead them in the total number of nuclear warheads deployed at sea at all times (3,000 to 300). While three-fourths of the Soviet strategic nuclear arsenal is concentrated in vulnerable land-based missile silos, about one-half of our nuclear arsenal is based in invulnerable submarines.

Overall, however, a "balance of imbalances" exists between the superpowers, with the overkill both sides have accumulated rendering the imbalances meaningless. The superpowers have stockpiled a total of 50,000 nuclear weapons. No more than 600 would destroy every major city in the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Reagan Administration, however, insists that we must build more and has therefore committed this country to a major nuclear arms buildup. The Administration wants to spend $222 billion over the next 5 years for nuclear weapons. Its plans call for eventually building up to 100 MX missiles, 500 Trident II missiles, 100 B-1 bombers, 5,000 cruise missiles and 17,000 nuclear warheads.

Clearly the arms race is getting out of control. Both the United States and the Soviet Union are producing more accurate and more powerful first strike nuclear weapons, like the MX, which are designed to start nuclear wars, not deter them. Furthermore, technological developments in both sides' weapons systems are advancing so far and so quickly that it may become impossible in the future for diplomats to negotiate any type of verifiable treaty.

Clearly, enough is enough. The time to freeze is now.

CAN A FREEZE BE IMPLEMENTED?

Yes, it can. Utilizing the verification and accounting procedures we have established with the Soviets through previous nuclear weapons treaties, a freeze could take a relatively short time to negotiate.

The Reagan administration has claimed that the freeze is an unverifiable "leap into the unknown" that would preclude reductions because the Soviets would have no incentive to reduce after they freeze. This is not true.

A freeze could be more than adequately verified through current "national technical means," which presently include spy satellites, aircraft and ship- and shore-based listening posts and through on-site inspections, which the Soviets are not as adverse to as they once were. Presently, our verification capabilities are extensive. As former Under Secretary of Defense, William Perry, has testified, "We monitor the Soviet activity at the design bureaus and production plants well enough that we have been able to predict every ICBM before it even began its tests."

As for the administration's second claim, a freeze would be a disincentive for Soviet reductions if the Soviets were ahead. But, the Soviets are not ahead and there is no credible evidence that the Soviets would not reduce after a freeze.

It turns out that the freeze would be much easier to negotiate than the Reagan administration's START proposal. Because the administration mistakenly believes that the United States is inferior to the Soviet Union, the Reagan START proposal envisions a treaty that allows for more buildup on our part and more cutting on the Soviets' part. Because the Reagan START proposal is so stacked against the Soviets, it will take years and years to negotiate, thus allowing more time for both sides to deploy more weapons that make reductions more difficult to negotiate. For example, in order to verify a strategic arms control treaty, you have to be able to count the other side's weapons. The Reagan proposal allows both the United States and the Soviet Union to build the ground- and sea-launched cruise missile. Because these missiles are so small they are easy to hide. They would thus be difficult to verify because we would never know if we were counting all the Soviet cruise missiles or double counting others. A freeze, on the other hand, would stop these missiles from ever being built. We wouldn't have to worry whether we were counting all the missiles or double counting; the detection of just one Soviet cruise missile would clearly show a treaty violation.

WILL THE FREEZE MAKE THE WORLD SAFER?

This is the acid test. Would we sleep easier at night under the Reagan START proposal or with the freeze?

While the Reagan proposal would reduce land- and submarine-based ballistic missiles, it would still allow the United States to build more destabilizing first strike weapons like the MX and the Trident II missiles. It would also allow the Soviets to improve the destabilizing aspects of their nuclear forces. That, clearly, is not stopping the arms race. Furthermore, the world would not be left safer. While both sides would have fewer long-range missiles, the ones remaining would be the deadly first strike variety that are used to start nuclear wars.

The freeze, on the other hand, would bring the arms race to a grinding halt. Testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons would be halted. Think of the arms race as an elevator moving up a building. You have to stop the elevator first before you bring it down. This is what the freeze does—stops the arms race first, so both sides can begin major and mutual reductions. Only then, will the world be a safer place in which to live.

BEYOND THE FREEZE

A nuclear weapons freeze and reductions treaty should not be the only agreement we negotiate with the Soviets. Both sides have been energetically pursuing destabilizing nonnuclear weapons technologies, such as anitsubmarine and antisatellite warfare. The United States and the Soviet Union must begin negotiating agreements that put a lid on these dangerous weapons so that neither sides' deterrence from submarines underwater or its eyes and ears from satellites in outer space ever become vulnerable.

The threat of nuclear war also has another dimension. The superpowers' nuclear arms race has received the most publicity because of the unimaginable destruction that would result if the United States and the Soviet Union fired their missiles. But the more immediate danger might well be nuclear proliferation—that is, the spread of nuclear weapons to other nations, such as unstable Third World countries, which would not be so hesitant to use weapons of mass destruction in a regional conflict. Argentina, for example, could have the capability to build a nuclear device within five years and has stated that it is keeping its nuclear option open. If Argentina had the bomb during the Falkland Islands crisis, can anyone say for sure that it would not have used it?

Six nations are now members of the nuclear club—the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, China, and India. But about thirty more nations have the technical capability to build the bomb within a decade. Pakistan appears to be secretly building a bomb. Iraq was headed toward the bomb until the Israelis destroyed its research reactor near Baghdad. Libyan dictator, Colonel Muammar Quaddafi, has a bid on the world market to buy a Moslem bomb.

By the end of the decade, the question we may be asking ourselves is not who has the bomb, but who doesn't?

The United States must adopt a much stricter nonproliferation stand than the current Administration is willing to take. The Reagan Administration has been vigorously promoting dangerous nuclear technologies overseas that will enable countries to move closer to acquiring the bomb. The Administration, for example, has loosened up restrictions on the production of plutonium from the spent fuel of civilian nuclear reactors. Plutonium is the fuel of nuclear bombs.

The United States plainly must halt the spread of dangerous nuclear materials and technologies. In that context, a nuclear freeze would help in our efforts to stem nuclear proliferation. Why? Because the nuclear arms race the United States and the Soviet Union have engaged in has left both countries with little credibility to persuade other nations not to build nuclear weapons.

The superpowers, for example, were shocked when India exploded an underground nuclear device in 1974. So far, however, the weapons states have conducted about 1,300 nuclear test explosions. In 1968, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the Nonproliferation Treaty, which, among other things committed the nonweapons states to not acquiring nuclear weapons. The treaty also committed the United States and the U.S.S.R. to halt the nuclear arms race and to begin disarmament. A freeze would go a long way toward having both superpowers live up to their end of the bargain.

In summary, the freeze and reductions resolution is a sound proposal to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. A freeze doesn't ask us to trust the Soviets, it doesn't ask us to approve of their form of government, it doesn't ask us to condone their brutal invasion of Afghanistan. A freeze simply recognizes that it is in both sides' interest to stop building more nuclear weapons.

As novelist Carlos Fuentes once said, "We shall now live together or die together. This is the final option of time . . . we shall either know each other or exterminate each other."

[From The Philadelphia Inquirer Feb. 12, 1983]

NUCLEAR ARMS FREEZE: THE TIME IS NOW

(By Representative Edward J. Markey)

Can the freeze be for real?

The nuclear weapons freeze movement in this country certainly is for real. But can we move beyond this public statement and actually have a freeze on the nuclear arms race followed by major reductions?

With the nuclear weapons freeze resolution soon to come up in the U.S. House of Representatives for a second vote (it lost on Aug. 5, 1982, by just two votes) and with its chance of passage much better this time (the Nov. 2 election put more freeze supporters in the House), that's a fair question to ask.

The freeze, like any arms control proposal, poses two important questions: Do we want a freeze now? And, if we do, can we implement it?

The first question can be answered in short order. Of course we want a freeze. In fact, now is the best time to freeze.

For one, public enthusiasm for such an arms control agreement is at an all-time high and this is extremely important. If any arms control enthusiast doubts the value of having the public behind an agreement, remember the lonely days of SALT II.

For another, the superpowers have never been more at nuclear parity than they are now. Under any nuclear war-fighting scenario, both sides have the capacity to reduce the other to rubble and limited war-fighting strategies notwithstanding, military experts agree that *any* nuclear war scenario most likely will end with all the silos emptied and both sides in rubble. That's what parity is all about. That's why the superpowers can stop today, confident that their deterrence will be maintained.

Both sides are nevertheless improving the nuclear war-fighting capabilities of their nuclear arms, that has resulted in unthinkable weapons of mass destruction having a more thinkable military utility in times of crisis or confrontation.

What's more, miniaturization is producing smaller nuclear weapons, such as ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles, that are more easily hidden and thus more difficult to count. Deploying these weapons will complicate verification, making future arms control agreements even more difficult to conclude.

So not only is now the best time to freeze, it may be our last.

Can we implement a freeze? Of course we can. The question we should be asking now is not "Can we freeze?" but "What is the best way to freeze?"

The freeze resolution before Congress calls for a mutual and verifiable freeze on the production, testing and deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems, followed by major reductions in both sides' arsenals.

Verification is a major factor in implementing this resolution. Critics claim it's the major hangup.

But an examination of (1) the weapons to be covered by a freeze, (2) the verification capabilities the United States has in place or could easily put in place, and (3) the level of monitoring confidence needed to detect militarily significant violations of a treaty, reveals that verifying a freeze does not pose the technological hurdles critics claim.

Already the United States has the national technical means of verification (spy satellites, listening posts and radar) which have been established as a result of the SALT negotiations and which can verify the testing and deployment of strategic nuclear missiles and other delivery systems, such as bombers.

The United States can also verify Soviet deployment and testing of intermediate-range missiles and delivery systems. The Reagan administration demonstrated this capability—inadvertently, no doubt—by publicizing every time the Soviets put an SS-20 into place.

Tactical nuclear missiles and delivery vehicles, because they often can be used in conventional roles, are not as easy to verify as strategic and theater systems. But verification of tactical weapons is certainly feasible.

The United States, for example, monitors closely all Soviet land and sea forces; intelligence officials know which forces actually have nuclear missions because of the special training and equipment those forces require.

As for nuclear warheads, their deployment on strategic systems is being verified largely through SALT-established verification of the delivery vehicles that carry them. And through seismological monitoring systems already in place or agreed to by both sides in the nearly concluded Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty negotiations, the United States could confidently detect Soviet testing of nuclear warheads.

The production of strategic missiles, bombers and submarines is easy to monitor simply because the systems are too large to hide from our satellites.

That leaves production of nuclear warheads. While the warheads may be easy to hide, a significant quantity of the fissionable material put in them isn't.

Production of weapons-grade nuclear material is a complex process requiring a number of large and highly visible facilities, such as enrichment plants and plutonium production reactors.

The Soviets could probably get away with producing a few bombs undetected but that would add little to their current stockpile of about 25,000 warheads.

For the clandestine warhead production to pose any significant military threat to the United States, the Soviets would need to produce thousands more bombs—and that production would eventually stick out like a sore thumb.

Yes, there are other details to flesh out in implementing a freeze. For example, which of many worthy negotiating strategies should be pursued in achieving a freeze?

Should we, as some arms control analysts have suggested, look for a quick agreement on what can easily be frozen—such as testing and deployment of missiles and bombers—then use this as a confidence-building measure to negotiate a more comprehensive freeze and reductions?

Should we pursue a quick freeze by shrinking SALT limits we already have on strategic systems and by closing SALT's loopholes, then negotiate a more comprehensive agreement?

Or, should we attempt to reach immediately an informal, across-the-board freeze with the Soviet Union on deploying new nuclear weapons—a sort of negotiator's pause—so those aspects of the arms race that pose the most immediate danger can be held in check while a freeze and reductions treaty is hammered out?

There are a number of options.

My point is that in implementing a freeze, the opportunities for reaching an agreement far outweigh the technical problems.

Remember, there were those who once thought that freezing the testing of warheads above ground and freezing the deployment of anti-ballistic missiles were nice ideas but too difficult to achieve. The public, however, protested and demonstrated and demanded that we have those treaties, so the Limited Test Ban and ABM treaties were concluded.

Today the public is protesting and demonstrating and demanding a freeze on the nuclear arms race. Let's not squander this opportunity by getting hung up on technicalities that turn out to be merely excuses for not freezing.

The only missing ingredient for achieving a freeze now is political will.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Congressman Leach.

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES LEACH, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM IOWA

Representative LEACH. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that my prepared statement be put in the record, and I will briefly summarize it. In fact, I will make just three quick statements.

The CHAIRMAN. Your statement will go in the record.

Representative LEACH. Perhaps the most mischievous idea in politics is that the United States is in an inferior position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, and we face a "window of vulnerability." I think, as Dickens might have said, "this is humbug." When you have the capacity to destroy the other side many times over, there is no such notion as inferiority. A human being can die only once.

Second, I would like to stress as a Republican and a supporter of the freeze that arms control is not a partisan issue. In the House, 60 Republicans voted for the freeze, as did 218 Democrats. Those Republicans and those Democrats who opposed the freeze in general supported other approaches to arms control, or had concerns about the appropriateness of Congress intervening in a negotiating area historically and traditionally reserved to the Executive.

But I would stress that these are reasonable disagreements which people on all sides can respect, and whether one likes the freeze approach or not, it has certainly sparked a responsible national debate on issues of arms control and raised to the public level of concern these very awesome issues.

Finally, I would just like to note that there are enormous risks to any approach to arms control, but there is a far greater risk in doing nothing at all. The nuclear freeze has a very powerful strength—the fact that it is an extremely modest proposal. It is not an end, it is simply a beginning, and I am personally convinced it would spark a much more dramatic effort across the whole spectrum of arms control issues, and as such, I would urge that this committee and this body give it serious consideration.

[Mr. Leach's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES LEACH

Mr. Chairman, perhaps the most mischievous notion in modern politics is that the United States may be in a position of nuclear inferiority with the Soviet Union and that American security is somehow jeopardized by a "window of vulnerability."

As Dickens might have said: "this is humbug." When American forces have the capacity to destroy the Soviet Union many times over there is no such conceptualization as inferiority. Death is death. A human being cannot die twice.

The problem with the logic of those who would reject a freeze in favor of unrestrained weapons development until an idealized treaty is negotiated is that their position hinges on the assumption that more nuclear weapons really matter. This is nonsense. In a world of nuclear overkill and redundance, the United States and the Soviet Union are like two rivals locked in a small room in a duel to the death where one has 1,400 pistols and the other 1,200. The one with 1,400 has no advantage when one or both of the parties are likely to be killed or maimed with the first pistol used.

The nuclear arms freeze resolution is not intended to undercut this Administration's negotiating position vis-a-vis the Soviets'. Rather, it is intended to bolster administration resolve and make it clear to political leaders in both parties that speaking out for issues where survival of the species is at stake is not only a moral but a political imperative. Presidents need not fear political reprisal for pursuing responsible arms control.

That—rather than the subtleties of semantics—is the message that this nuclear freeze resolution is intended to record.

In this regard, let me stress as a Republican and a supporter of the freeze that arms control is not a partisan issue. Neither the Republican nor the Democratic Party is a "war party." Peace is a commonly shared goal. In the House 60 Republicans voted for the freeze, as did 218 Democrats. Those Republicans and those Democrats who opposed the freeze did so in largest measure because they favored other approaches to arms control or questioned the intrusiveness of Congress in stepping into a negotiating role identified with the Executive. These are healthy disagreements for which respect must be acknowledged on all sides.

Recognizing, however, that there are elements of the freeze issue which are highly emotive, it is imperative to look not at the constellations of political groupings supporting one approach or another, but at the precise words of the resolution before us and the ideas that underpin their crafting. In this regard, I challenge serious students of arms control to find objection to the nuclear freeze approach passed by the House.

Finally, it should be stressed that the nuclear freeze movement is not a fad. A fad in American politics might be defined as an idea without an institutional base. The monumental difference between the arms control movement today compared to a year ago or 26 years ago is that it has become quintessentially middle-class. It is not a liberal movement, nor a youth movement, nor a partisan undertaking.

Just as someone once observed that war is too important a business to be conducted exclusively by generals, the American people are saying today that arms control—that is, survival—is too vital a concern to be left exclusively to a few politicians.

Middle-class America is taking a stand. In no uncertain terms the American people are telling elected officials at all levels that issues of survival cannot be allowed to stultify in the demagoguery of Presidential campaign rhetoric.

Admittedly, there is some risk in any specific approach to arms control. But there is far greater risk in doing nothing at all. The nuclear freeze is a modest proposal; it is not an end but a beginning—a direct, dramatic and essential means of launching a new period of negotiations across the entire range of arms control issues. As such, I urge its serious consideration by this Committee and this body.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

You have both thought about this subject a great deal, and you both know a great deal about our relationships abroad. How would we deal with our allies in Europe if we passed a resolution in the House that called for a freeze involving intermediate and theater nuclear weapons? They point out that all 15 governments have taken a position opposed to a freeze.

They point out the Soviet Union is enthusiastic about a freeze, and for good reasons. They would love to have Europe frozen at present levels, which one European head described as a 350 to nothing disadvantage for Western Europe when it comes to SS-20 deployment, and in conventional forces they are outnumbered.

How do we answer our allies on that? And we cannot control them in any way. We tried to, and I felt wrongfully so, with the pipeline. This is a sovereign question. How can we control their activities over there? We can help work out an agreement, and we are trying to do that, but we would not pay any attention to their interests if we did pass a resolution adversely affecting them. Strategic weapons, involving us, that is a different question.

Representative **Leach**. I think there are several points that should be made. First, with respect to the attitude of our allies, a nuclear freeze proposal was brought before the United Nations and passed by a vote of 122 to 16, with a number of abstentions. Of the members of NATO, one NATO country voted in favor of the freeze; two others abstained. In addition, several others only voted against the freeze after extraordinary pressure was brought to bear. I would agree with former CIA Director William Colby, who has said that the basic European reaction to a nuclear freeze negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union would be, "Well, thank God."

In terms of this 350 to 0 disparity, I think two things should be said. One, our nuclear capacity in Western Europe is rather substantial. There are a number of American nuclear weapons, there are two European nuclear powers, and in addition, a large number of nuclear weapons are held at sea in the European theater. It is hardly as defined in that 350 to 0 picture.

As far as basic negotiating between the United States and the Soviet Union, there is nothing more important than that we consult seriously with our allies. By the same token, I think we should realize we are talking first and foremost about the United States' sovereignty. You do not give up that sovereignty to any other country, no matter how closely allied they are to the United States. But as a general point of reference, I would be very surprised if the vast majority of nations who have supported us in NATO and the United Nations are not also telling the President of the United States as forthcomingly as possible to get down to the serious business of serious arms control.

It is no accident, for example, that Helmut Kohl a week before the [West German] election made the point of announcing that he was convinced the President would become far more forthcoming, and that was what he was advising the President of the United States. I personally have been very convinced through my contacts with Western European leaders that they are very much in favor of responsible arms control at this time.

Representative **Markey**. In the resolution passed in the House, there is language that provides for consultation with our NATO allies on any element of an agreement that would be inconsistent with existing U.S. commitments to NATO. The resolution also states that in the absence of a bilateral agreement embodying the objectives of the joint resolution, nothing in this measure is intended to prevent the United States from carrying out its responsibilities under the December 1979 NATO decision regarding intermediate range nuclear forces.

I believe that our NATO allies, if given an option of ending a nuclear arms race or continuing to allow the tail to wag the dog by concentrating on a small number of nuclear weapons deployed in

Europe, would rush to halt the arms race. But because INF appears to be the only issue on the table, NATO will continue to support the present two-track position.

At the same time, I think it is very important for us to realize that even as late as 2 weeks ago, Richard Perle was quoted as saying that it was a mistake for us to have committed to the deployment of GLCM's and Pershing II's in Europe, that in fact it would have been a much more sound strategic position to have placed the missiles in submarines. We decided to deploy Pershing II's and GLCM's to give some visible, tangible proof of American support for our NATO allies. These missiles, however, are totally vulnerable, and add not one iota to our overall defense of Europe.

What we are doing right now in INF is this. We are separating out one imbalance in a balance of imbalances, and focusing upon it disproportionately.

If we merged INF and START, we would be able to get the kind of tradeoffs that I think would make it very possible that our European allies would support us and praise us.

I believe the same problem exists in Europe that exists in our country. European public opinion is much more in support of the nuclear freeze than are their leaders, as is the case in this country.

On the question of whether or not we would be in any way violating any of our trust with our allies, many people felt no problem at all with vitiating the SALT II Treaty. That was a treaty that had already been negotiated and had already been supported by all of our European allies. The United States essentially pulled the rug out from underneath our allies, who had given us their support for the SALT II Treaty.

Presently, we are dealing with two negotiations that do not even have the basis for any kind of settlement between the United States and the Soviet Union, and we are asking for a change in negotiating position before we reach the SALT II position. The very same people who say we cannot offend our allies' only 3 and 4 years ago were pulling the rug out from under them.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Congressman Leach, in the resolution that passed the House it provides both for a nuclear freeze and modernization. Are these compatible goals?

Representative LEACH. Basically, the freeze resolution is aimed at stopping qualitative changes. Some may well occur through the limited framework of replacement that the freeze would permit. You cannot always bring a complete halt to modest modernization but it is aimed at qualitative changes of a stark nature.

That is, again, a difference between the freeze and builddown approach.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Markey, the Soviets have offered to reduce their strategic force to 1,800 systems. Given the Soviets' willingness to make a reduction, how would we gain by freezing at present levels?

Representative MARKEY. It all depends upon whether there are restraints placed upon the modernization of the launchers or warheads. A lot of it has to do with a question, and this was a central question in the freeze debate. The question is, should it be freeze and then reductions or freeze and reductions?

If it is freeze and reductions and it gives the option of reducing the total number of warheads or launchers into more deadly first strike weapons and then freezing at those lower levels, we are opposed to it. But if it is a freezing of already existing deployed weapons systems and then reducing from that into a smaller number, we support it. So a lot depends upon what kind of agreement would be reached between both countries with regard to modernization.

As long as it involves no deployment of improved technologies on either side, we support the reductions. But it would have to be with the precondition that a freeze had already been placed on all of the systems that could potentially be deployed in the future.

The **CHAIRMAN.** My final question to both of you is: Do you believe that the Soviets are genuinely, seriously sincere and interested in wanting to reach an arms control agreement on a realistic basis? That is, certainly they would want it all their way. That would give them a distinct advantage. But taking into account that it cannot be that way, it cannot be all one way for either side, it must be balanced, do you think they are interested in achieving an agreement?

Representative **LEACH.** Two things must be said. We have one mutual vested interest with the Soviet Union and that is the issue of survival. Based upon that, I think realistic agreements can be made.

Second, with regard to their stated intent to support something in the general area of a freeze, all I can say is it is worthy of being tested. I do not personally put a lot behind Soviet rhetoric until it is put down on paper, and you have an agreement that can be looked at seriously and with adequate verification provisions.

I do think the Soviets will have to come a long way further, not only in the conceptualization of what they can agree to in terms of numbers but also in terms of verification. Just as this administration will have to make adjustments in thinking on the numerical issues, I think the Soviets will have to make some adjustments in thinking on the verification issue.

But we will not get anywhere until we talk about areas of potential agreement within the constraints of both countries' perceived vested interests, and in that regard I personally think a little flexibility is warranted. Then if no agreement is possible, we will know it.

But not to try seriously is to jeopardize the fate of us all.

Representative **MARKEY.** I agree for the most part with Congressman Leach's analysis. I cannot say that we trust the Soviet Union any more than any of the opponents of the nuclear freeze do. We both eye them suspiciously. We want both sides to keep both hands on the table in any treaty negotiation.

We do believe, however, that the challenge has to be made, that the atmosphere exists worldwide making it proper for our country to challenge the Soviet Union to a nuclear freeze. If they reject our offer, I think we will have gained the upper hand in our relationship with our allies and other countries who perceive this to be the overriding issue in the world.

As long as we continue to make unrealistic proposals to the Soviets and they back to us, then we subject ourselves to public relations wars rather than an effort to really try to sit down with the

Soviet Union and resolve the issue. I think the Soviets would be willing to do so. I think ultimately their own best interest would be achieved by stopping this arms race now. The Soviet Union and the United States would be put within a hair trigger of total destruction with the war by accident that Senator Hart talked about becoming more of a possibility if the Trident II, the Pershing II, the cruise and their counterpart Soviet weapons are developed.

I think neither side, if we really sit down in earnest and had a means of avoiding further buildup, would be able to avoid signing that final treaty.

The CHAIRMAN. I have no doubt that the people of the Soviet Union want an arms control agreement and I think the Kremlin does, too. I am not prepared and cannot analyze what it would have to be to satisfy them and how favorable to them as against us.

But the sincerity of their comments about losing 20 million with conventional weaponry in World War II comes through very strong when you talk to them. And when I left the Kremlin in November 1980 I had every feeling—when you walk through the Leningrad Cemetery, you cannot help but have the feeling that the people of the Soviet Union want to avoid, if they possibly can, a nuclear holocaust. And this is what we have in common with them.

I would strongly recommend, because there have been many concerns expressed about the builddown, that you review Senators Cohen and Nunn's brilliant testimony from this morning. I think the record they made in answering many objections, some of which I gave voice to, was good.

In fact, there are 45 Senators now cosponsoring it. Former Secretary and Senator Ed Muskie supports it, and Gary Hart supports it, Senator Hart, and Senator Moynihan. We have got to find a way to come together between the House and Senate on this in conference, and I hope we can sit down together so that some of the concerns you have expressed, Congressman Markey, about the builddown, which are valid concerns, some of them—some of them have been answered now. Modifications have been made and adjustments are being made in that.

When you look at, I hope we can all work toward a common solution. Our objective and goal is common, there is no question about that. How we get there is the subject of a lot of interpretation.

Both of you have done an outstanding service. Your testimony has been outstanding today and we deeply appreciate your coming over here to meet with us. You have helped us a great deal. Thank you very much.

The hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:50 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Wednesday, June 22, 1983.]

UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

WEDNESDAY, JUNE 22, 1983

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Larry Pressler presiding.

Present: Senators Pressler, Percy, Boschwitz, Pell, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Biden, Glenn, and Cranston.

Senator Pressler. I will call this meeting to order.

Other Senators will be coming, but we will keep it on schedule.

We are very honored this morning to have four former ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] Directors, which is an unusual and historic gathering. We thank you very much for being here. All of you have worked a great deal in the arms control area. We probably have as much experience at this table as could be assembled in one place.

Let me say that I have been concerned about a timetable for progress in arms control. Yesterday, I asked some questions on the builddown and on the freeze as to what a proposed timetable might be, and some said that, well, it would take us about a year to get the builddown, to get the specifications, what would be traded for what, and what would be considered equivalent. It would take us a couple of years to negotiate it and a year or so to get it ratified, so 4 or 5 years would be a timetable.

I hope that we can find a way to move things faster than that in terms of an arms control agreement; I am in my third year of chairing this subcommittee, and it seems as though very little is happening.

Today's hearing in this committee's series on arms control and Soviet-American relations is both extremely important and distinctly unique, important because there are few issues that are as vital in shaping the destiny of America as is arms control, unique because this is the first time that the Foreign Relations Committee has received testimony at the same moment from four men who have stood at the helm of this Nation's arms control process.

As I have repeatedly noted over the past several months, we are at a critical juncture in arms control. If we are to suceed in negotiations, and I believe that we must succeed if we are to survive as a nation, we would do well to profit from the knowledge and experience of our former ACDA Directors.

I therefore am pleased and privileged to welcome Ambassador Gerard Smith, Mr. Paul Warnke, Gen. George Seignious, and Prof.

Gene Rostow. These four outstanding Americans have been at the center of our negotiations for much of the past 15 years.

Let me welcome you all.

ACDA's first Director, William C. Foster, could not appear here today for health reasons. Still, I am pleased to note that he has presented his views in a letter to the chairman that will be read into the record later in this hearing.

As each of you know from your tenure as ACDA Directors, this committee has a special relationship and a special feeling for arms control and for the agency at the center of this process. We have repeatedly worked to assure that ACDA has sufficient capabilities and a strong voice in making arms control and security policy. This commitment to ACDA is especially strongly felt by the Subcommittee on Arms Control.

Let me assure each and every one of you that since I have assumed the Arms Control Subcommittee chairmanship, I have worked vigorously to advance the cause of arms control and significant and verifiable arms reductions. I feel that I have a particular debt to you in briefing covering the period of accomplishments of the subcommittee. Let me just highlight just a few of those most important events.

Over the past 2½ years, the subcommittee has become a unique forum for the debate and consideration of perhaps the paramount concern of our citizens, security and stability. In 1982, we held the first field hearings in arms control in over 26 years in various States. In May of 1981, we spoke of the dangers and high costs that would be associated with a space arms race.

At that time, I offered the first of three resolutions on the need to resume negotiations in this area. Since September of last year, the committee has held three public hearings and numerous private briefings on the issue of arms control in outer space. It is fair to say that the consideration of this issue began in the subcommittee long before the expression "Star Wars" became commonly discussed.

The Soviet Union has as much responsibility for success in negotiations as does the United States, but judging from the opinion of some people, it is only the United States that has a responsibility for a productive outcome. In viewing the prospects for arms control, we must consider the options in a realistic light, and realize that the Soviet Union does not share many of our values.

Despite this fact, our mutual interest in survival provides hope that in Washington and in Moscow reason will prevail. Significant and verifiable arms control agreements can and will follow, and they must follow soon. The subcommittee held hearings on the suspected Soviet use of chemical weapons, so-called yellow rain, in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia. Our first hearing on this subject, which had a major bearing on arms control agreements, was held in November 1981.

More recently in February of this year, the subcommittee convened to reassess the evidence on yellow rain, given further investigation by the United States and by the Canadian Government and the United Nations. We have held hearings regarding the Pentagon's statement on the consequences of nuclear war, and also on the Threshold Test Ban [TTB] and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion [PNE] Treaties.

It is my conviction that ratification of these accords, which were signed by two Republican Presidents, is in the best interest of the United States. At the forthcoming markup, I will offer an amendment urging ratification. These are a few of the more important activities the subcommittee has conducted in this past year.

I thought it useful to report to you as former ACDA directors and to bring these issues to your attention.

Again, let me welcome you all here today, and let me call on you in the order that you are listed here. If someone feels strongly about going first—Eugene Rostow is listed first as the most recent—or in any order. Would that be a fair way to do it?

Mr. Rostow. Any way you like, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Pressler. You are four equals here.

Mr. Rostow. I thought I was going to come last, being the most recent, but I will defer to your instructions, of course.

Senator Pressler. Does that please you? We can hear from the most senior, which is Mr. Smith. What order shall we go in? Shall we use the seniority system? That is what we use in the Senate.

Mr. Rostow. I am probably the oldest.

Senator Pressler. Mr. Smith is the most senior, so we should call on him. How is that for a change of pace?

STATEMENT OF HON. GERARD C. SMITH

Ambassador Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have been asked to speak about some arms control aspects of the relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R., including the effect of, and on, the ABM Treaty of the President's recent proposal for a major long-range effort to develop strategic defenses, sometimes called his Star Wars dream.

First, let me speak about the recent change in the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] position, which is said to reflect the findings of the Scowcroft Commission, and presumably is the administration's first move to keep its end of the bargain with Congress which led to the affirmative vote on the MX program last month.

If this new START position is merely considered as an opener for genuine negotiation, the administration's move to raise the permitted levels for ballistic missile launchers seems a positive step. If one can take literally the White House assurance that everything is on the table, some movement in START may be possible, but we have heard this assurance before. Our chief negotiator's recent statement that he now has authority to listen to Soviet proposals makes one wonder about the nature of the START negotiations over the past year, when we were assured that progress was being made.

A fair inference from the Scowcroft Commission's report is that the window of vulnerability never existed, and that claims that the United States was a second-class nuclear power based on alleged vulnerability of our ICBM's was unfounded.

The Scowcroft Commission, surprisingly to me, reported, "Reasonable survivability of fixed targets, such as ICBM silos, may not outlast this century." But the latest START proposal seems to disregard the Scowcroft conclusions, which clearly state that we have no immediate or near-term problem of vulnerability.

The START proposal still seems to me to be trying to close that window of vulnerability. The proposal continues past efforts to get the Soviets to shape their strategic forces after the U.S. model. If the Soviets accept it, it would require vast new expenditures on their part to reconstruct their forces.

It has been reported that the administration believes that Soviet economic difficulties will encourage them to bargain seriously. If our idea of a successful bargain is that the Soviets would have to invest large resources to alter their force posture, dependence on this economic motivation strikes me as illusory.

In the past strategic arms negotiations, progress has been made when they were kept private. The publicity surrounding the new proposal suggests that its main purpose is propaganda to appear to meet domestic and foreign pressures for change.

The one new element is to raise ballistic missile-launcher ceilings from 850 to a level reported to be in the range of 1,100 to 1,200. That alteration seems to be aimed as much to ease American force planning as to limit Soviet forces. If we are to have 100 MX's and Midgetmen, the 850 limit would be too tight.

Apparently, all the other provisions of the earlier START position are to be retained, the 2,500 ICBM warhead ceiling, the 210/100 Soviet MIRV'd missile limit. Ambiguity, if not silence, persists about our ideas on limiting cruise missiles, systems which are of special concern to the U.S.S.R. They apparently are willing to discuss any Soviet proposals. Proposed bomber limitations seem somewhat unequal; 400 for both sides is reported in your committee staff report, not including our FB-111's and 350 for the U.S.S.R., including Backfires and the new bomber we call Blackjack.

I have a list of other specific criticisms, but in the interest of time, I will pass over them. Let me say that this criticism of the new START position is based on news reports about its content, but it would not be surprising if in addition the Geneva delegation has been made aware of other possible areas where concessions might be made if the Soviets engage in serious negotiations.

The most likely candidates would be the proposed ceiling for ICBM warheads and the sublimits on Soviet MIRV'd warheads. If such fallbacks were foreshadowed, aspects for realistic negotiation would be somewhat brighter, but still it seems to me a bargain is unlikely if the United States remains equivocal about limitations on cruise missiles.

Until then, the new proposal's main purpose seems to be to get MX safely underway with public and congressional anxieties tranquilized for a while. I wonder how long such a palliative will work. With the deepening public commitment to arms control and election year bearing down upon us, more substantive moves seem called for.

I would say that the present status of the administration-Congress bargain is that the administration got what it wanted on MX, but so far the Congress has only obtained a change in tone in the arms control rhetoric. Criticism of the administration's arms control policy should be tempered by recognition that the U.S.S.R. bears a good part of the onus for lack of progress.

Even if we refrain from express linkage of arms control to other aspects of Soviet-American relations, the somber messages of Afghanistan and Poland cannot be forgotten. Unanswered charges of possible Soviet violations of SALT and other arms control arrangements do not help. Soviet treatment of dissenters continues to shock even the most ardent American proponents of agreements to control arms.

We would not be interested in negotiating with the Soviets at all except for the supreme urgency of controlling nuclear weapons. The new proposal in START seems to reflect an attitude about strategic arms control that might be characterized as, "Well, if we cannot get it, too bad, let the chips fall where they may." Contrast this with the conclusion of the Scowcroft Commission that effective arms control is essential to the Nation's security.

I think we tend to overlook what a sharp setback for arms control was the failure to ratify SALT II. Coming on the heels of our failure to ratify two earlier arms control agreements, this collapse of a 7-year effort is still having a prejudicial effect. Tacit honoring of SALT II, which the administration found fatally flawed, is no substitute for embedding that treaty in international law by its ratification.

START was supposedly an effort to correct the fatal flaws of SALT II. So far, it has not.

I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the Soviets' greater interest now is in the INF negotiation, where there is a year-end deadline. I doubt that they will work seriously on START until they have a better idea as to how the INF negotiation is going to come out. The arrangement which the INF delegation leaders reportedly worked out last year were Soviet reductions in SS-20's, and would be matched by cancellation of proposed Pershing deployments under which some U.S. cruise missiles could be deployed. It begins to look better as the day approaches for the Pershing deployment.

Although both governments disclaimed interest in this deal, the circumstances are as yet unclear as to which was the first to react. The administration's conviction that the Soviets will soon start negotiating in earnest will be put to a final test as winter approaches. If that belief proves wrong, we will face the likelihood of deployment of additional Soviet missiles targeted on the United States, Soviet withdrawal from the INF, and perhaps even from the START talks. That would promise a cold winter and the collapse of hopes that some control of nuclear arms might be accomplished by this administration.

Calls are being heard in responsible quarters in Europe for reconsideration of the Nitze/Kvitsinsky bargain. Clarification for the Congress of the reasons for and the timing of our rejection of this arrangement may be in order.

I was also asked to comment on the relation of the President's Star Wars proposal to the ABM Limitation Treaty of 1972. On this score, I would like to submit for the record an analysis prepared by John Rhinelander, who was legal adviser to the SALT I delegation and a participant in the ABM negotiation.

Senator **Pressler**. Without objection.

[The material referred to follows:]

Even Development and Testing of Space-Based ABM Components Is Prohibited by the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972

In order to clarify certain aspects of the ABM Treaty of 1972, the Federation of American Scientists released, today, the following analysis of that Treaty:

(1) *Nationwide and Regional Defenses are Prohibited.*—The central tenet of the ABM Treaty is that a nationwide, and even a regional, defense of the United States and U.S.S.R. is prohibited (Article I). The permitted ABM deployments are constrained geographically, quantiatively, and qualitatively (Articles III, V, VI). The 1974 ABM protocol reduced from two to a single deployment area an ABM system which meets the Article III criteria.

(2) *ABM Systems Defined Generically.*—The ABM Treaty defines anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems generically as being "a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory . . ." (Article II). Thus the terms of the Treaty include ABM systems, of any kind, whether based on new physical principles or not. Therefore, systems based on lasers, microwaves, particle beams or whatever are included. ABM systems are further described as "currently consisting of" ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars (Article II).

(3) *Fixed Land-Based Systems Incorporating New Physical Principles Cannot Be Deployed.*—The ABM Treaty prohibits the deployment of any land-based ABM system except one system with no more than 100 ABM launchers, 100 ABM interceptors, and specified ABM radars, located either around the national capital area or ICBM silos (Article III; 1974 protocol).

The Treaty therefore prohibits deployment of any land-based ABM system which, for instance, substitutes a land-based laser for ABM interceptors.

The purpose of *Agreed Statement D* calling for discussions of ABM systems based on new principles was not as a substitute for Article III of the Treaty—which an agreed statement cannot be—but as a supplement to that article. In particular, it reinforces the prohibition on the substitution of fixed land-based ABM systems or components, based on new principles, for the 100 fixed land-based launchers and interceptors or the land-based ABM radars permitted by the Treaty. This point was emphasized by Secretary of State Rogers in the Senate Foreign Relations hearings of June 1972 when he said that "future exotic types of ABM systems, i.e. systems depending on such devices as lasers, may not be deployed even in permitted areas."

Neither Article III nor Agreed Statement D prohibit the development or testing of fixed land-based ABM systems or components utilizing new principles. Flight-testing of any ABM system or component, which is not otherwise prohibited, must take place at agreed test ranges (Article IV).

(4) *Space-based Systems or Components Whether Based on Current Technology or New Physical Principles Cannot be Developed or Tested.*—Even the development and testing, as well as the deployment, of "space-based" systems or components—whether based on "current" technology or new physical principles—is prohibited by the Treaty. Thus Article V asserts: "Each party undertakes not to develop, test or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based."

Since the Treaty defines ABM generically (as shown in point 2), the development or testing of space-based systems based on lasers, microwaves or particle beams is precluded.

(5) *Purpose of Agreement.*—The Treaty was to prevent destabilization by precluding an effective defense (Article I). In this connection, it did not matter for the Treaty purpose whether or not the space-based ABM system or component was based on current principles or new principles. Indeed, the fundamental character of the decision of the two sides to preclude such defenses, based on whatever principles might occur in the future, is underscored by the decision of the two sides to make the Treaty one of indefinite duration (Article XV).

(6) *Obligation to Discuss.*—Under Article XIII, the two sides established a Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and asserted that they would use it to: "consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous."

The growing interest of the Administration, and possibly of the Soviets, in space-based exotic systems does raise certain issues that may be considered "ambiguous" and, if so, the two parties are obligated to discuss them.

For example, the negotiator of this Treaty, Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 28, 1972, discussed the definition of the "development" of space-based systems and "components" that were prohibited. He said such prohibitions "would start at that part of the development process where field testing is initiated on either a prototype or breadboard model." [1]

Since the Treaty prohibits development or testing of "components" of space-based systems as well as of the systems themselves, a clear understanding of what constitutes a component could become increasingly important. In 1972 the United States interpreted component as "new types of basic components to perform the current functions of ABM launchers, interceptors or radars" . . . (Letter of transmittal of Secretary of State William Rogers). This letter indicated that "Devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers or ABM radars could be used as adjuncts to an ABM system, provided that such devices were not capable of substituting for one or more of these components." The adjuncts then discussed were a telescope to be used in connection with an ABM radar. The components specified were the three items: launchers, interceptor and radar. As applied to a space-based laser system, for example, the interceptor component might be the laser beam, the launcher component might be the devices necessary to deploy and generate the laser and its beam, and the radar component might be the methods of tracking the upcoming missiles.

Another issue may turn on what is "space-based." Would a system relying on a mirror in space—to magnify and direct the beam from a system based on land—be "space-based" as part of an ABM laser system whose laser generator was located on land? It would clearly appear to be so and, therefore, could not be described as simply an adjunct to the land-based components. Its development and testing, as well as its deployment, would be proscribed under Article V as a space-based ABM component.

Any space-based system or component, particularly one which would intercept an ICBM at the initial boost phase, is inherently a system for the defense of a region—if not for the entire territory of a country—and therefore would be inconsistent with the basic provision of the Treaty not to deploy an ABM system for the defense of its entire territory or even an individual region (Article I).

The Federation has solicited the help and agreement of the undersigned specialists to these interpretations and they endorse the above.

Ambassador Raymond L. Garthoff, "chief of staff" of the negotiating delegation; Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for Science and Technology at the time; and John B. Rhinelander, legal adviser to the delegation.

Ambassador SMITH. Very briefly, my understanding of the ABM Treaty is that all ABM's were banned in 1972 except two fixed land-based systems having 100 launchers each to defend a nation's capital or one ICBM field. In 1974, it was agreed to reduce the limits to one system for each side. An ABM system was defined as then made up of launchers, radars, and missiles. Development, testing, and deployment of sea, air, space, or mobile land-based systems was banned.

If land-based systems were developed using so-called exotic components, lasers, particle accelerators, et cetera, they could not be deployed unless the treaty was amended. Any major program to implement the President's dream would very quickly run afoul of the ABM Treaty's constraints. Even engineering work to develop a space-based system is banned under the treaty.

---

[1] Statement of Ambassador Smith to Senate Armed Services Committee, June 28, 1972:

"Article V of the ABM Treaty and an Agreed Interpretive Statement (E) obligate the United States and U.S.S.R. 'not to develop, test, or deploy' mobile ABM systems, rapid reload devices, or ABM inteceptor missiles for delivery of more than one independently guided warhead.

"The SALT negotiating history clearly supports the following interpretation. The obligation not to develop such systems, devices or warheads would be applicable only to that stage of development which follows laboratory development and testing. The prohibitions on development contained in the ABM Treaty would start at that part of the development process where field testing is initiated on either a prototype or breadboard model. It was understood by both sides that the prohibition on 'development' applies to activities involved after a component moves from the laboratory development and testing stage to the field testing stage, wherever performed. The fact that early stages of the development process, such as laboratory testing, would pose problems for verification by national technical means is an important consideration in reaching this definition. Exchanges with the Soviet Delegation made clear that this definition is also the Soviet interpretation of the term 'development.'

"Consequently, there is adequate basis for the interpretation that development as used in Article V of the ABM Treaty and as applied to the budget categories in the DOD RDT&E program places no constraints on research and on those aspects of exploratory and advanced development which precede field testing. Enginnering development would clearly be prohibited."

Perhaps the machinery of the Standing Consultative Commission set up under the treaty should be resorted to in the first instance in an effort to clear up ambiguities as to just how far the signatories can go without violating this treaty. We hear much these days about the importance of the stability of the strategic balance. Arms control treaties have an important part to play in this respect. By foreshadowing a program which would inevitably violate the ABM Treaty, I believe that we are introducing uncertainty which cannot fail to have a prejudicial impact on the current strategic balance.

Mr. Gromyko's statement on June 16 contained language indicating Soviet concern on this score. What the President had in mind, apparently, were defensive systems to protect not only the United States but all of its allies by attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles as well as bombers. Many of us have had this dream that the nuclear threat could be laid to rest by effective defensive systems.

Mutual invulnerability would be a much better deterrent to war than the present mutual vulnerability, but I have been told by knowledgeable scientists that the technical prospects for developing such systems are minimal to nonexistent. If we seriously set out on a long-term quest for an impervious defense for our population, serious near-term threats to the national security will arise.

One prejudicial effect may already be in train. It seems likely that U.S. refusal to negotiate controls over antisatellite systems is motivated by an aim to avoid further restraints on exotic Star Wars components of defensive systems which would use similar technology. Not only would going for Star Wars systems signal our intent to annul the ABM Treaty, which for 11 years has staved off a superpower competition in defensive systems to match the present only informally and incompletely regulated race in offensive systems.

It would signal to the Soviets a likely United States aim to neutralize their retaliatory capability to respond to any American first strike. The President himself recognized this danger by saying that paired with offensive missiles, an effective defense could be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and he added that we do not want to give that signal.

But regardless of good intentions, could an effective defense of North America, Western Europe, and our Far Eastern allies send any other signal to the Soviets? There seems to be no prospect that the United States or the U.S.S.R. if they ever mounted such defenses would abandon offensive forces. Would the resultant strategic balance be more stable than the present?

Unmentioned in the talk of defenses, which presumably would for the most part be conveniently deployed out of sight in faraway space, is the question of the consequential clear need for massive civil defense programs for populations. Unless the unwarranted assumption is indulged, that an impermeable defense system could be mounted, it must be assumed that some attacking warheads would reach targets.

Pressures would mount for gigantic blast and fallout shelter programs to protect these unpredictable targets. It seems a sure thing to me that an American program to try to realize the President's dream would promptly be matched not only by a similar Soviet program but by the development of new offensive systems designed to penetrate defenses.

I am afraid, Mr. Chairman, that the President's dream would generate a more tense strategic relationship, while never attaining the defensive posture contemplated.

In 1969, a number of us tried in vain to persuade the Government that a ban on MIRV's would advantage the Nation's security. That was when we were beginning to test MIRV's and before the Soviets had tested theirs. Now, 14 years later, it is recognized that MIRV is a source of strategic instability that advantages the Soviets more than us because of their larger missiles. The Soviets in SALT II purported proposed that any new class of ICBM's have only one warhead. We did not accept, because we wanted the MX.

Now we are faced with somewhat similar situations. The Soviets have tested and we are soon to test systems to destroy satellites in space. It would seem to be all to America's advantage to ban such systems, since we are more dependent than the Soviets on satellites for peacetime intelligence and communications and for controlling wartime operations.

But the negotiation looking to contol this threat has been suspended by the United States. Such controls may be as important as those over strategic weapons. And I urge the Congress to press for resumption of this negotiation. Another decision we may well live to regret is to allow a free competition in long-range submarine-launched cruise missiles.

Simple geography suggests that the American homeland will be more vulnerable than the Soviets' to this system. Deploying them in attack submarines can only prejudice the effective fulfillment of the normal role of such vessels. Verification problems will become much more complex if such systems are not banned at an early date.

Now, if I can turn to a more parochial issue, as a former Director of the Arms Control Agency, may I make a plea on behalf of this orphan that the various purges since 1973 have left ACDA weak. Its staff has minimal influence, although in years past ACDA members played key roles in developing and implementing arms control policy. More than in any other field of national security, it seems to me that bureaucratic memory is indispensable to the management of arms control affairs. What has happened to ACDA in the last decade has been prejudicial to the Nation in this respect.

I do not think it is too much to say that we cannot expect to have sound, strong, and vigorous arms control policies until ACDA's position in the bureaucracy is restored to something approximating that of the past. It is too much to expect that arms contol programs engineered by Pentagon people whose main and, I would add, proper responsibilities are for weapons programs will be sufficient to meet the arms control needs of the country, which are now being recognized as essential, not just possibly useful.

Let us face it. Basic asymmetry in the Soviet-American relationship is the fact that they have a foreign minister who has conducted arms control negotiations for over 30 years, since before some of our people working on arms control matters were born. At least we should have the institutional substitute for such long-term experience, which was one of the reasons for the formation of ACDA.

We do not have it. What is needed is a strong staff, which means a larger budget and more positions. Restoration of ACDA's computer facilities and library, a greater ACDA role in the national security bureaucracy, perhaps with a director becoming a member of the National Security Council, and clarification of the relation between the Director and the Secretary of State.

I urge the Congress to take a fresh look at ACDA, to see if its legislative basis needs fortifying.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, let me say that the deeper we get into the valley of death of nuclear confrontation, the more obvious it should be that solutions do not lie in more or better weapons systems. We should accept as literally true the conclusion of the Scowcroft Commission that effective arms control arrangements are essential to the security of the United States.

I think that term covers more than just strategic arms limitation. The security of the country is also threatened by the prospective proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional nations, a threat which would be moderated if a comprehensive test ban were in place. I am persuaded that arms control arrangements of advantage to the United States are attainable given the necessary political will on both sides.

Thank you, sir.

[Ambassador Smith's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. GERARD C. SMITH

I have been asked to speak about some arms control aspects of the relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R., including the effect of and on the ABM Treaty of the President's recent proposal for a major long-range effort to develop strategic defenses sometimes called his "star wars" dream.

First let me speak about the recent change in the "START" position which is said to reflect the findings of the Scowcroft Commission and presumably is the administration's first move to keep its end of the bargain with Congress which led to the affirmative vote on the MX program last month.

If it is merely considered as an "opener" for a genuine negotiation, the administration's move to raise the permitted levels for ballistic missile launchers seems a positive step.

If one can take literally the White House assurance that "everything is on the table," some movement in START may be possible. But we have heard this assurance before. Our chief negotiator's recent statement that he now has authority to listen to Soviet proposals makes one wonder about the nature of the START negotiations over the past year, when we were assured that progress was being made.

A fair inference from the Scowcroft Commission report is that the "window of vulnerability" never existed and that claims that the United States was a second class nuclear power based on alleged vulnerability of our ICBM's were unfounded. The Scowcroft Commission surprisingly reported "reasonable survivability of fixed targets, such as ICBM silos, may not outlast this century." But the latest START proposal seems to disregard the Scowcroft conclusions, which clearly state that we have no immediate or near term problem of vulnerability. It still seems to be trying to close that "window of vulnerability."

The proposal continues past effort to get the Soviets to shape their strategic forces after the United States model. If the Soviets accept, it would require vast new expenditures to reconstruct their forces. it has been reported that the Administration believes that Soviet economic difficulties will encourage them to bargain seriously. If our idea of a successful bargain is that the Soviets would have to invest large resources to alter their force posture, dependence on this eocnomic motivation seems illusory.

In the past, progress in strategic arms negotiations was made when they were private. The publicity surrounding the new proposal suggests that its main purpose is propaganda—to appear to meet domestic and foreign pressures for change.

The one new element is to raise ballistic missile launcher ceilings from 850 to a level reported to be in the range of 1,100/1,200. That alteration seems aimed as much to ease American force planning as to limit Soviet forces. If we are to have 100 MX's and Midgetmen, the 850 limit would have been too tight.

Apparently all the other provisions of the earlier START position are retained—the 2,500 ICBM warhead ceiling, the 210/100 Soviet MIRVed missiles limit. Ambiquity, if not silence, persists about our ideas on limiting cruise missiles—systems of special concern to the U.S.S.R. We apparently are willing to discuss any Soviet proposals. Proposed bomber limitations seem somewhat unequal—400 for the United States not including FB-111's, and 350 for the U.S.S.R. including Backfires and the new bomber we call Blackjack.

The Soviets have to reduce ICBM warheads by about 3,500—the United States could increase by about 250.

The Soviets would have to reduce MIRVed ICBM's by about two-thirds, while the United States could build 100 MIRVed MX's and some MIRVed Trident II missiles with hard target kill capability.

It has been calculated that Soviet missile throw weight would have to be reduced from 8.8 million to 4.2 million pounds.

All of this would result in substantially increased vulnerability of Soviet ICBM's and substantially decreased vulnerability of U.S. ICBM's.

It would tend to result in parity in ICBM throw-weight while continuing U.S. superiority in bombers and cruise missiles. The proposal seems to add up to an offer that the Soviets can easily refuse. Have we not learned by past SALT experience that one-sided proposals cannot work and will only kill time, which is a wasting asset?

This criticism of the new START position is based on news reports about its content. But it would not be surprising if in addition the Geneva delegation had been made aware of possible other areas where concessions might be made if the Soviets engaged in serious negotiations. The most likely candidates would be the proposed ceiling for ICBM warheads and the sublimits on Soviet MIRVed warheads.

If such fallbacks were foreshadowed, prospects for realistic negotiation would be somewhat brighter. But a bargain seems unlikely if the United States remains equivocal about limitations on cruise missiles.

Until then the new proposal's main purpose seems to be to get MX safely underway, with public and Congressional anxieties tranquilized for a while. I wonder how long such a palliative will work. With the deepening public commitment to arms control and election year bearing down, more substantive moves seem called for.

I would say that the present status of the administration-Congress bargain is that the administration got what it wanted on MX. So far the Congress has only obtained a change of tone in the arms control rhetoric.

Criticism of the administration's arms control policies should be tempered by recognition that the U.S.S.R. bears a good part of the onus for lack of progress. Even if we refrain from express linkage of arms control to other aspects of Soviet-American relations, the somber messages of Afghanistan and Poland cannot be forgotten. Unanswered charges of possible Soviet violations of SALT and other arms control arrangements do not help. Soviet treatment of dissenters continues to shock even the most ardent American proponents of agreements to control arms. We would not be interested in negotiating with Soviet leaders but for the supreme urgency of controlling nuclear weapons.

The new proposal seems to reflect an attitude about strategic arms control that might be characterized as "well, if we can't get it, too bad—let the chips fall where they may." Contrast this with the conclusion of the Scowcroft Commission that effective arms control is essential to the Nation's security.

I think we tend to overlook what a sharp setback for arms control was the failure to ratify SALT II. Coming on the heels, of our failure to ratify two earlier arms control agreements, this collapse of a 7-year effort is still having prejudicial effects. Tacit honoring of SALT II, which the administration found fatally flawed, is no substitute for embedding the treaty in international law by ratification. START was supposedly an effort to correct the "fatal flaws" of SALT II. So far it has not.

I think it is not unfair to say that our present national security managers bear a good part of the responsibility for SALT II's failure. And it is perhaps understandable that the U.S.S.R. is now somewhat cautious about seriously negotiating for a fourth arms control agreement. In the face of our past failures, talk by high administration officials about the need to prod or encourage the Soviets to negotiate must sound somewhat ironic to Soviet ears. They must wonder what prods are available to them to get America to ratify past agreements. The situation is not improved by the Scowcroft Commission's findings that serious flaws existed in our first START proposals—flaws which President Reagan quickly admitted.

Are these flaws corrected by the revised START proposal? Aside from its tone, which is said to reflect greater flexibility, the only change is in one number. I agree with Secretary Shultz' statement before this committee last week that the prospect for early progress is not bright.

I believe that the Soviet greater interest now is in the INF negotiation where there is a year-end deadline. I doubt that they will work seriously on START until they have a better idea as to how the INF negotiation is going to come out.

The arrangement which the INF delegation leaders reportedly worked out last year where Soviet reductions in SS-20's would be matched by cancellation of proposed Pershing deployments but under which some U.S. cruise missiles could be deployed begins to look better as the date approaches for the Pershing deployment. Although both Governments disclaimed interest in this deal, the circumstances are as yet unclear as to which was first to react.

The administration's conviction that the Soviets will soon start negotiating in earnest will be put to a final test as winter approaches. If that belief proves wrong, we will face the likelihood of deployment of additional Soviet missiles targetted on the United States and Soviet withdrawal from the INF and perhaps even from the START talks. That would promise a cold winter and a collapse of hopes that some control of nuclear arms might be accomplished by this administration. Calls are being heard in responsible quarters in Europe for reconsideration of the Nitze/Kvitsinsky bargain. Clarification for the Congress of the reasons for and timing of our rejection of this arrangement may be in order.

I do not sense in Washington even the beginnings of any alarm about a possible crisis. We are sure it won't come to that—that the Soviets will concede to our views when the first Pershings appear in Germany. But are the Soviets bluffing in saying that they will counter-deploy some new system to put U.S. targets under similar time urgent duress? Their interest in negotiating any arms controls with this administration will be reduced if the Pershings are deployed. No wonder some informed people here and abroad believe that it was a mistake to start down the "double track." I was struck by the statement in the recent staff report of this committee that something along the lines of the Nitze-Kvitsinsky bargain may perhaps be the best chance of reaching agreement. Not since the Berlin crises of the 1950's and 1060's have the two sides faced similar challenges. I question whether a policy of "let the chips fall where they may" is either sufficient or appropriate for what may well develop into a major Soviet-American crisis.

I was also asked to comment on the relation of the President's "star wars" proposal to the ABM Limitation Treaty of 1972. On this score, I would like to submit for the record an analysis prepared by John Rhinelander who was legal advisor to the SALT I delegation and a participant in the ABM negotiation.

Very briefly, my understanding of the ABM Treaty is that (a) All ABM's were banned in 1972 except two fixed land-based systems having 100 launchers each to defend a nation's capital or one ICBM field; (b) In 1974 it was agreed to reduce the limits to one system for each side; (c) An ABM system was defined as then made up of launchers, radars, and missiles; (d) Development testing and deployment of sea, air, space, or mobile land-based systems was banned; (e) If land-based systems are developed using so-called "exotic" components—lasers, particle accelerators, etc.—they could not be deployed unless the treaty was amended.

Any major program to implement the President's "dream" would very quickly run afoul of the ABM Treaty's constraints. Even engineering work to develop a space-based system is banned under the treaty. Perhaps the machinery of the Standing Consultative Commission set up under the treaty should be resorted to in the first instance in an effort to clear up ambiquities as to just how far the signatories can go without violating the treaty.

We hear much these days about the importance of the stability of the strategic balance. Arms control treaties have an important part to play in this respect. By foreshadowing a program which would inevitably violate the ABM Treaty, I believe that we are introducing uncertainty which cannot fail to have a prejudicial impact on the current strategic balance. Gromyko's statement on June 16 contained language indicating Soviet concern on this score.

What the President had in mind, apparently, were defensive systems to protect not just the United States but all of its allies from attacks by ballistic and cruise missiles as well as bombers. Many have had the dream that the nuclear threat could be laid to rest by effective defensive systems. Mutual invulnerability would be a much better deterrent to war than then the present mutual vulnerability. But I am told by knowledgeable scientists that the technical prospects for developing such systems are minimal to nonexistent. If we seriously set out on a long-term quest for an impervious defense for our populations, serious near-term threats to the national security will arise. One prejudicial effect may already be in train. It seems likely that U.S. refusal to negotiate controls over anitsatellite systems is motivated by an aim to avoid further restraints on exotic "star wars" components of defensive systems which would use similar technology.

Not only would going for "star wars" systems signal our intent to annul the ABM Treaty, which for 11 years has staved off a superpower competition in defensive systems to match the present only informally and incompletely regulated race in offensive systems, it would signal to the Soviets a likely U.S. aim to neutralize their retaliatory capability to respond to any American first strike. The President himself recognized this danger by saying that, paried with offensive missiles, an effective defense could be viewed as fostering an aggressive policy, and he added that we do not want to give that signal.

But regardless of good intentions, could an effective defense of North America, Western Europe, and our Far Eastern allies send any other signal to the Soviets? There seems to be no prospect that the United States or the U.S.S.R., if they ever mounted such defenses, would abandon offensive forces. Would the resultant strategic balance be more stable than the present?

Unmentioned in the talk of defenses—which presumably would be conveniently deployed out of sight in far away space—is the question of the consequential clear need for massive civil defense programs for populations. Unless the unwarranted assumption is indulged that an impermeable defense system could be mounted, it must be assumed that some attacking warheads would reach targets. Pressures would mount for gigantic blast and fallout shelter programs to protect these unpredictable targets.

It seems a sure thing that an American program to try to realize the President's dream would promptly be matched, not only by a similar Soviet program, but by their development of new offensive systems designed to penetrate defenses. I am afraid that the President's dream would generate a more tense strategic relationship with the U.S.S.R. while never attaining the defensive posture contemplated.

In 1969, a numberr of us tried in vain to persuade the Government that a ban on MIRV's would advantage the Nation's security. That was when we were beginning to test MIRV's and before the Soviets had tested theirs. Now 14 years later it is recognized that MIRV is a source of strategic instability that advantages the Soviets more than us because of their larger missiles. The Soviets in SALT II reportedly proposed that any new class of ICBM's have only one warhead. We did not accept because we wanted MX.

Now we are faced with somewhat similar situations. The Soviets have tested and we are soon to test systems to destroy satellites in space. It would seem to be all to America's advantage to ban such systems since we are more dependent than the Soviets on satellites for peacetime intelligence and communications and for controlling wartime operations. But the negotiation looking to controlling this threat has been suspended by the United States. Such controls may be as important as those over strategic weapons. I urge the Commission to press for resumption of the negotiation.

Another decision we may well live to regret is to allow a free competition in long-range SLCM's. Simple geography suggests that the American homeland will be more vulnerable than the Soviets' to this system. Deploying them in attack submarines can only prejudice the effective fulfillment of the normal role of such vessels. Verification problems will become much more complex if such systems are not banned at an early date.

As a former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, may I make a plea on behalf of this orphan. The various purges since 1973 have left ACDA weak. Its staff has minimal influence, although in years past ACDA members played key roles in developing and implementing arms control policy. More than in any other field of national security policy, it seems to me that bureaucratic memory is indispensible to the management of arms control affairs.

What has happened to ACDA in the last decade has been prejudicial to the Nation in this respect. I don't think it is too much to say that we cannot expect to have sound, strong, and vigorous arms control policies until ACDA's position in the bureaucracy is restored to something approximating that of the past. It is too much to expect that arms control programs engineered by Pentagon people, whose main and proper responsibilities are for weapons programs, will be sufficient to meet the arms control needs of the country which are now being recognized as essential, not just possibly useful. Let's face it, a basic asymmetry in the Soviet-American relationship is the fact that they have a foreign minister who has conducted arms control negotiations for over 30 years, since before some of our people working on arms control matters were born. What an advantage! At least we should have the institutional substitute for such long-term experience which was one of the reasons for the formation of ACDA. We do not have it.

What is needed:

(A) A strong staff, which means a larger budget and more positions. Restoration of ACDA computer facilities and library.

(B) A greater ACDA role in the national security bureaucracy—perhaps with the Director becoming a member of NSC.

(C) Clarification of the relation between the Director and the Secretary of State.

I urge the Congress to take a fresh look at ACDA to see if its legislative basis needs fortifying.

The deeper we get into the valley of death of nuclear confrontation the more obvious it should be that solutions do not lie in more or better weapons systems. We should accept as literally true the conclusion of the Scowcroft Commission that effective arms control arrangements are essential to the security of the United States. And I think that term covers more than just strategic arms limitation. The security of the United States is also threatened by the prospective proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional nations—a threat which would be moderated if a comprehensive test ban were in place. And I am persuaded that such arms control arrangements are attainable, given the necessary political will—on both sides.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you very much.

Going in what I am told is the order of seniority, we will hear from Ambassador Warnke, then General Seignious, and then Mr. Rostow.

Ambassador Warnke.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WARNKE

Mr. **Warnke**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee.

I have been asked today to discuss my views on how future developments in nuclear weaponry may affect arms control needs. Let me say at the outset that I am convinced that developments already under way are inimical to our national security, and increase the risk of nuclear war. New weapons systems are being developed by both the United States and the Soviet Union that will pose a greater threat to the survivability of the nuclear arsenals of each side, and therefore erode the deterrent on which nuclear peace now rests.

Both nuclear superpowers seem bent on acquiring nuclear weapons with war-fighting capability, and at the same time leaders on both sides purport to recognize that neither country could fight, survive, and win a nuclear war.

Moreover, I see nothing in prospect, either in the form of more survivable and less threatening weapons or in the form of arms control proposals that shows any promise of relief from this grim prospect. Neither in the INF talks on intermediate range nuclear missiles in Europe nor in the START talks on ICBM's, submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBM] and strategic bombers is there any sign of progress.

And given the proposals, at least as they have been made public, this lack of movement is not surprising. I think experience indicates that dramatic proposals for drastic deep cuts may be good public relations, but they are a very poor arms control policy. The only way that progress can be made is on a step-by-step basis.

I, of course, recognize that the steps have been too few and too far between. It is now 4 years since SALT II was signed, and for 3 of those years there were no negotiations on ICBM's, SLBM's or strategic bomber limitations.

There are some who now express hope that, in exchange for the Congress' tentative blessing of the MX, greater flexibility is becoming apparent in the arms control stance of the Reagan administration. Some even profess to see movement toward the recommendations of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces, the so-called Scowcroft Commission.

But here again I must say that I see a greater flexibility in rhetoric only, and that I find in the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission nothing that will stop or even slow the slide toward nuclear confrontation. If the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission can be ignored, as I believe that they should be, the report makes a lot of sense on strategic policy. It gives a lot of good reasons why we do not need a new ICBM. It closes the window of vulnerability but then opens a door in its own logic big enough to drive two new ICBM's through.

But in terms of a lot of the literature in the report, its is good arms control literature. It recognizes that intercontinental ballistic missiles with mulitiple independently targetable reentry vehicles with great accuracy create the greatest risk and are inherently destabilizing.

The report not only calls for a new American MX, it virtually guarantees, in my opinion, that there will be more new Soviet MIRV'd ballistic missiles. It propounds the concept of a single warhead ICBM, the so-called Midgetman; but again, it virtually assures that Midgetman would not replace MIRV'd ICBM's but would merely augment the vulnerable land-based forces.

Now, as these opposing forces stand today, no minimally rational leader of either country would initiate a strategic nuclear exchange as a matter of deliberate, reasoned decision. But with the growing counterforce capability of missiles, each of which can launch up to 10 warheads against the missile silos of the other sides, along with other destabilizing developments in shorter range strategic weapons, the point can come, if the arms race continues unchecked, at which a nuclear war will start not because of rational decision but because of panic, because of desperation, for fear that adequate retaliatiory forces would not be able to survive a preemptive strike by the other side.

And, in fact, it is that concern with the Soviet MIRV'd SS-18's and SS-19's that forms the basis for our START proposals in asking that they be cut back by just about 75 percent. Now, a commendable objective but totally unreasonable.

I agree with Ambassador Smith that this provides no reasonable basis for negotiations. I hope that we are tabling in the closed discussions in Geneva some suggestions that would give the Soviets some constraints on American forces that might lead them seriously to consider this proposed massive and immensely expensive restructuring of their own strategic arsenal. But certainly no such quid pro quo has been made public. And to the extent that Soviet public reactions reflect what they are being told in private, it appears clear that no such inducements have been held out to them.

Instead, as I see it, the administration, while calling on the Soviets to make this massive reduction, this total restructuring, this abandonment of billions and billions of dollars of investment in their present strategic forces, is offering nothing but the prospect of our going ahead with a full modernization program.

Our experience indicates that that sort of a one-sided approach has no chance of success. The Soviets are not going to deplete their land-based ICBM force at the same time that we go ahead with the MX and we go ahead with thousands of air-, sea-, and ground-launched cruise missiles, that we develop and deploy the D-5, or Trident II, submarine-launched ballistic missile.

The Scowcroft Commission endorses both the MX and the Trident II on the grounds that they will enable us, "to put Soviet hard targets at risk." Now, under those circumstances the chances of the Soviets reducing the number of hard targets is just nonexistent. This is not a formula for restraint. It is not a formula for greater security.

The apparent theory is that we can scare the Soviet Union into making sensible moves toward stabilizing systems by deploying destabilizing systems of our own. The rationale is expressed in terms of bargaining chips, but the theory seems to be that we can make the Soviet Union cry uncle at the bargaining table by deploying MX's, D-5's and by threatening to build still more. This, I submit, is not bargaining. It is instead the arms race theory of arms control, a theory that somehow the Soviets, faced with our determination to go ahead with this massive buildup, are going to give us arms control by default.

I know of no serious observer of the Soviet Union or anyone who has dealt with the Soviet leadership who believes it is remotely possible that this would be their reaction. The fact is that neither one of us can be bluffed out of the arms race. We can only find our way out and the way to greater security by steps that we agree upon and take together.

Now, the fact is that there exists today rough strategic equality. We ought to take advantage of this opportunity to freeze any new destabilizing developments now and to cut back on the most vulnerable, most provocative systems that already exist.

This fact of strategic parity has been recognized by the Joint Chiefs and even in the posture statements of the present Secretary of Defense. This offsetting deterrence, this situation of nuclear parity is the best that can be achieved in the present stage of the atomic age. It is the situation most conducive to avoidance of nuclear war.

It is for this reason that efforts should be made to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze. As I have suggested, this freeze, like any other measure of arms control, could only be obtained on a step-by-step basis dealing first with the technological advances that constitute a setback for true security, and completing, of course, a comprehensive test ban treaty. An effort to stop everything at the same time would mean that nothing would be stopped for the foreseeable future.

The Committee for National Security, a group of which I am the chairman, proposed some weeks ago an approach to strategic arms that I believe does hold promise of improving rather than reducing our national security. The approach would involve building on the provisions that have already been agreed upon in the SALT I and SALT II negotiations and moving away from greater emphasis on MIRV'd counterforce missiles. Instead of the MX there would be a mutual ban on any new MIRV'd ICBM. That would stop not only the MX but further Soviet testing of the solid-fueled MIRV'd SS-X-24, their first modern MIRV'd ICBM.

The approach would also involve a 50 percent cut in the SALT II ceilings on MIRV'd missiles. This would mean that the overall total of 1,200 covering MIRV'd submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental ballistic missiles would be cut to 600. MIRV'd ICBM's would drop from 820 to 410, and the ceiling on heavy Soviet SS-18's would be reduced from 308 to 154.

We also recommend retention of the Reagan administration's proposal of a limit of 5,000 warheads on long-range ballistic missiles. This would mean a reduction of about one-third of the currently deployed Soviet warheads. But dropped from the START demand would be what I regard as the unnegotiable insistence that the Soviets limit their MIRV'd ICBM's to 210. As I have mentioned, this would require the Soviet Union to gut its strategic forces while we would remain free to enlarge our own measures of advantage.

Another one of the suggestions of the Committee on the National Security is that the total number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles be cut from the SALT II ceiling of 2,250 to 1,650. Again, it would begin to approach what the Reagan administration says is the objective of its proposals. but it would do it in a fashion which in my opinion would hold distinct promise of being negotiable. Since that total of 1,650 would include strategic bombers, the Soviet missile numbers would be significantly reduced.

Finally, new MIRV'd sea-launched missiles, both ballistic and cruise, would be subject to a moratorium which would retain their potential for bargaining leverage without stimulating a new era of nuclear arms competition.

Now, I do not suggest that this is the only way in which effective progress can be made. There are obviously other formulas that might be equally effective. But in contrast to START proposals, both as originally presented and as now mildly modified, this approach would result in equivalent restraints and greater security for both sides. As publicly presented, the START proposals do not achieve that objective and do not meet those criteria.

We ought to recognize that even if we could achieve this drastic reduction in Soviet hard target ICBM's, even if it were remotely negotiable, it would not be desirable. In the curious but inescapable logic of a nuclear age, the security of the United States is not advanced by putting the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union at risk. All this would mean is that at a time of international crisis the Soviet leaders would have to wonder whether and when they should launch, in order to avoid the destruction of their retaliatory deterrent. Equal security means national security for the United States, and greater security and lower risk of nuclear war require movement toward strategic forces that are the most survivable and the least threatening to the survivability of the deterrent of the other side.

Any new weapons programs and any arms control proposals should be designed to move nuclear dependence away from the MIRV'd land-based ballistic missiles. Obviously, the most survivable elements of our deterrent are our ballistic missile submarines and the missiles that they carry. Certainly something like the Trident I missile with its greatly increased range is a stabilizing factor.

We ought to review any of the existing programs with these basic criteria in mind. In my view, neither the report of the Scowcroft Commission nor the current START proposals meet those criteria and can have that desired effect.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee, may I join Ambassador Smith in urging congressional action to restore ACDA's funding, staffing, computer and library facilities. The budgetary savings that are being realized are insignificant. The costs to sound security policy are immense.

Thank you.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you.

General Seignious.

STATEMENT OF GEN. GEORGE C. SEIGNIOUS

General SEIGNIOUS. Mr. Chairman, I have been asked to comment on a preception for the future in arms control and the organization within the Government of the United States and how to go about doing it. I have no prepared statement, but I have prepared convictions.

In 1972 when this country and the Soviet Union both adopted a policy of mutual vulnerability by virtue of signing the ABM Treaty, it added an element of stability that has been the only significant addition to strategic stability since arms control negotiations have started, in my opinion.

It is time now if we as a nation would look toward a policy of mutual survivability and try to negotiate that with the Soviet Union but not on a government-to-government level. I think it is going to take a long, long process; and I believe that if we could find a bipartisan instrument, an instrument that included the Congress, the Defense Department, ACDA and the State Department, and get the Soviets through Arbatov or some other instrument of policymaking to begin to look at force structure, that will add to mutual survivability.

Because as long as we go about negotiating, bean counting and reducing only numbers of warheads and numbers of missiles or numbers of systems, we are not aimed toward an arms control objective that is going to be mutually beneficial to both nations, to the security of both nations.

I would much rather see the United States have 100 absolutely survivable missiles, and help the Soviet Union find means to have 100 equally survivable missiles. Then you have stability. You do not have stability while there are 15,000 strategic nuclear warheads on both sides.

But, unfortunately, arms control—and I go much further than Ambassador Smith went—arms control and the instrument of planning and integrating arms control into the national security pattern in this Nation has been outrageously bad. I have seen it from both sides as Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and as Director for the Arms Control Agency. There is inadequate integration of arms control in this government. It has become bureaucratic. It has become politicized to the point where it is ineffective. And certainly the gutting of ACDA in the past 10 years has been equally bad and has caused this weakness in national planning.

I would suggest that there is no remedy by improving libraries or by improving staffs or approving a beefup, a small beefup in ACDA. I think it is useless. I think the very law that created ACDA in 1961 was misdirected.

Arms control is an instrument of foreign policy and national security. Therefore, the elements that have to be planned for must be planned for, in my opinion, by the Secretary of State, and the Director of ACDA, in my humble opinion, should be an Under Secretary of State with a formidable staff that includes the necessary technicians and all the computers you want, but put it in the structure so that they will be integrated into the planning, and have people from the Defense Department assigned to the State Department as they are now. But put them in a position where the man that is the Under Secretary of State has control not only of arms control but of the political military security.

Now it is a separate entity that goes off on its own, and it did when I was the Director. We need to get this thing integrated, or we will never come up with any long-range plans that are not bureaucratic and are not politicized. To me, as a former soldier and as a former Director, this is an imperative of our times, to find a way to get genuine arms control integrated into our national security and not be an adjunct, and a politicized adjunct at that, an a bureaucratic adjunct at the same time.

Senator **Pressler**. Ambassador Rostow.

STATEMENT OF HON. EUGENE V. ROSTOW

Mr. **Rostow**. Mr. Chairman, it is a pleasure and privilege, as always, to appear before this distinguished committee.

In your behalf a member of your staff asked me to comment on the general theme of this session: The state of Soviet-American relations with special emphasis on arms control. He asked two further questions: How should the United States break what he called the deadlock in the INF and START talks, and in that connection he asked me to say a few words about the episode last summer which attracted so much attention and to which Ambassador Smith referred, the celebrated walk in the woods involving Ambassador Nitze and Ambassador Kvitsinsky. Second, the staff member asked if I would comment about the Scowcroft Commission report and the freeze and build-down proposals now before the Congress.

Before answering these questions, I should like to make two preliminary comments. First, I should offer a word of caution. I congratulate the committee on holding these hearings which should make a significant contribution to the clarification of our foreign policy in general and with reference to arms control in particular.

The nuclear arms negotiations, the other arms negotiations, are important. The nuclear arms negotiations are, of course, particularly important. The nuclear arms agreements cannot win the peace, but they could help to lose the peace by making effective deterrence on the part of the United States impossible.

Therefore, all who participate in the national debate on this subject bear a very special burden of responsibility. Democracy is being severely challenged. It can survive only if the dialog on which it rests is conducted with sobriety, with discipline, and with respect for the evidence. Public opinion is rightly agitated about the significance of nuclear weapons, the state of the nuclear balance, and the possibility of nuclear blackmail or nuclear war.

President Reagan is under increasing political pressure to settle for a poor nuclear arms agreement for the sake of next year's election. Every candidate for Congress and for President next year will be under similar pressure. Each of us, therefore, should consider carefully what he or she is doing in this regard. Public opinion can be whipped up into a tide of overwhelming force.

Let us make sure that what we say and do represents our best judgment and not a cynical concession to the political passions of the moment. The United States cannot afford another bad arms control agreement.

The second preliminary comment I should like to make before answering the questions that have been put to me is that I think the agenda for this session is too narrowly focused. The questions suggest a view close to that of President Carter who regarded arms control as the centerpiece of our foreign policy.

I know that there are some people who still believe that even a poor or a trivial arms control agreement or the process of negotiating such agreements have a favorable effect on Soviet behavior. After the events of the last decade, one can cling to such beliefs only by ignoring the evidence.

My view of the matter is that of the celebrated quip of Virginia Woolf, the novelist, who met a gushy lady who asked her if she did not just adore babies. She said she applied the same standard to babies that she did to adults: She liked nice babies. I like good arms control agreements, and I abominate the other kind.

When I was here and up for confirmation 2 years ago, Senator Mathias commended me for saying that the quest for disarmament treaties is meaningless except as part of the larger quest to bring international society under the control of an effective and universal system of international law. I thanked Senator Mathias then for his encouragement, and I thank him still.

The point is fundamental. By concentrating so narrowly an arms control as a kind of elixir, we distort our perspective. We expect too much of arms control agreements. They can be useful tools of a sound foreign policy, but they are not a substitute for it.

Success in our arms control and disarmament efforts is inconceivable unless the United States and its allies in different parts of the world devote at least as much effort to developing a modern system of collective security as they do to arms control negotiations.

In short, I should prefer these hearings to give equal time to the 1982 report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In that report he warned the nations of a growing slide toward anarchy in world politics, and he called for a recommittal of the nations, to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, especially those with respect to the international use of force.

His appeal will be a ritual exercise in hand wringing unless it is backed by a major political effort led by the United States. I hope you will hold hearings soon on the Secretary-General's important recommendations, and I hope in that context that you will carefully examine Secretary Shultz' thoughtful statement here on June 15.

I welcome that statement. It is a useful attempt to define our national interests in world politics and to sketch a strategy for protecting them.

The administration's foreign policy has thus far lacked a coherent framework, an explanation of what our increased armaments are meant to do. The Secretary's speech is important also for its stress on our respect for the legitimate security interest of the Soviet Union and our desire to induce the Soviet Government to adopt policies of restraint rather than of indefinite expansion and confrontation.

Secretary Shultz' speech does not answer all the questions raised by such an effort, and certain elements of the speech—its conception of world public order and its treatment of Third World problems, for example—should be further developed in public debate: but it is an indispensable beginning.

Now I shall try to answer your questions in the order in which they were given to me.

First, you invite comment on the state of Soviet-American relations in general. Unfortunately, Soviet-American relations are exactly what they have been since 1945 when Stalin decided to break off our wartime alliance and go his own way, as he told Ambassador Harriman at the time.

I am aware, of course, of the recent spate of articles and speeches bemoaning the sad state of Soviet-American relations and pointing to a decline of cultural exchanges, of disarmament negotiations and so on. The exchange visits of string quartets are perfectly useful activities, especially if the quartets are good, but they have little or nothing to do with peace.

Peace is a political condition which involves much more than the absence of violence. Both within states and among them peace is a pattern of behavior, a set of relations defined by law and sustained by a public opinion which animates the law. For the world community peace means a political environment in which all states generally respect the rules of world public order which have evolved historically, especially since 1815, and are now embodied in the U.N. Charter. Those rules reflect the nature of states and the necessities of their cooperation.

The root of the problem in Soviet-American relations is not the atmosphere and vocabulary of political discourse at any moment or the absence of trips by orchestras and ballet companies. It is the fact that the U.S.S.R. has always claimed it is not bound by the charter rules against aggression.

When this point is brought to the attention of Soviet diplomats and other spokesmen, even at a high level, their answer is that we are asking them to give up a foreign policy rooted in the nature of the Soviet Union as a society and a state. To this claim, the only answer an American can give is that the Soviet Union can preach the virtues of communism without interference so far as the West is concerned, but that what the state system cannot tolerate is the Soviet claim of a right to spread its faith with a sword.

The process of Soviet expansion has been gaining in momentum in recent years, despite some setbacks. I submit that it has gone too far. It has provoked a reluctant but determined response throughout the Western World as the people and their leaders have begun to realize that Soviet expansion threatens the balance of power on which everybody's safety depends.

The next question that was asked of me is how the United States can break the deadlock in Geneva. The formulation of the question is fascinating, assuming that it is up to the United States to do so, and certainly the question seems to assume that the differences in Geneva could easily be resolved if only our negotiators were energetic and ingenious enough.

Every day's newspapers carry reports of speeches, articles, editorials, or letters to the editor which propose formulas for the negotiations which the authors think would accomplish this miracle. In our hearing this morning, if I may say so, what was said by my friends, Ambassador Smith and Secretary Warnke, is a further extension of that habit. Many of the critics even profess, like my friends, to know just what the Soviet Union would and would not accept by way of an agreement, a manifestation, I must say, of the kind of pride which generally leads to a fall.

It is much better, in my judgment, to allow the Soviets to negotiate for themselves. They do it very well. And to refrain on our part from negotiating for them.

But the enthusiastic search for a formula through which the United States can break the deadlock in the Geneva talks rests on illusion. There is nothing we can call a real deadlock in Geneva. What is happening is quite obvious. The Soviets are probing and testing to find out whether they can induce or force us to accept their political goal for the talks, the Soviet version of détente. When they are convinced we will never do that, they should be ready to join us in nuclear arms agreements and many other agreements based on the conception of détente, they already profess to accept, that of universal respect for the equality and independence and sovereignty of states.

The differences between the Soviet Union and the United States in the nuclear arms negotiations are clear and simple. They are differences of policy, not of language or of tactics, and they cannot be resolved by cosmetic changes of language, however skillful and athletic.

The Soviet Union has spent years of effort and billions of rubles to achieve nuclear superiority over the United States in ground-based intermediate range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union has approximately the same number of warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles. In this critically important category of weapons, the Soviet Union now has a 3-to-1 advantage in warheads and a 4-to-1 advantage in throw-weight. In addition, it has a growing monopoly in ground-based intermediate range nuclear missiles formidable in destructive capacity and in number.

The Soviet lead in the most destructive and destablilizing categories of weapons was not achieved in a fit of absence of mind. These weapons play a vital role in the Soviet strategy of trying to separate the United States from its allies throughout the world. For years we were told on high authority that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is defensive, and that all the Soviet Union was seeking through its arms buildup was parity, a place in the Sun, and recognition as a superpower.

When the Soviet Union achieved parity, many of our experts said, it would give up its program of expansion and settle back to enjoy the fruits of peace. This argument, too, has disappeared, save as an article of faith among the true believers. The Soviet Union has exceeded parity by any significant measure, but it continues its extraordinary buildup, and its campaigns of expansion go on and on.

You will recall Henry Kissinger's famous question, what in the name of God is strategic superiority, and what on Earth can you do with it? The answer to that question is now obvious. The nuclear superiority of the Soviet Union in ground-based ballistic missiles carries with it a capability we do not now have, a capability to destroy a range of hardened military targets at minimal risk of effective retaliation.

To adopt the language of the Scowcroft Commission report, the Soviet capability casts a shadow over the calculus of American risk taking at any level of confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Soviet capacity to improve its military position through a pre-emptive first strike does not in my judgment imply that nuclear war is around the corner, or that the Soviet Union intends to make a nuclear attack. There is no need for the Soviet Union to contemplate such a course.

The present state of the nuclear balance is a pervasive and insidious political force deeply affecting political attitudes throughout the West. With Soviet SS-20's creating an intense political reaction in Europe and elsewhere, at a time when many are skeptical about the possible use of American strategic forces, our alliance systems are under severe pressure.

Heightened nuclear anxiety in the West is manifest not only in protests and demonstrations and in one or another of the recipes for a nuclear freeze at current levels, but in the far more dangerous revival of the American isolationist impulse, and of corresponding attitudes of ultranationalism, militarism, and xenophobia abroad.

Support for a retreat to a policy of fortress America has increased across the spectrum of American politics. It is serious precisely because it is irrational. The American policy of defending Western Europe, Canada, Japan, Israel, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and a number of other countries is not a matter of philanthropy, an option of policy we can abandon when the going gets rough.

That policy developed not only because these countries share a common civilization with us, but because if they are controlled by the Soviet Union it would gravely affect the balance of power. We did not support Stalin against Hitler because we thought he was a

Democrat, nor did President Nixon deter a Soviet attack on China because he had any illusions about the Chinese political system.

The Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles is destabilizing in itself, and its political impact is multiplied by the way in which it is perceived. Thus, the political reaction to the changing nuclear balance is undermining the credibility of our security treaties and threatening our foreign policy as a whole.

To quote the Scowcroft Commission report again, the serious imbalance between the Soviets' massive ability to destroy hardened land-based military targets with their ballistic missile force and our lack of such capability must be addressed promptly. We cannot safely permit the present situation to continue. This imbalance can be corrected by modernizing our nuclear arsenal, through arms control agreements, or through a combination of the two.

During my period of service in ACDA, it was the major premise of President Reagan's arms control policy that this goal should be achieved if possible through arms control agreements rather than through force modernization. I hope and believe that this view of the problem will remain inviolate.

In the perspective of this hearing, I should comment that the Soviet position in both negotiations is one of determined defense of their growing advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles and determined rejection of the principle of Soviet-American parity.

I have put several speeches before you, Mr. Chairman, as well as the full version of my prepared statement and I hope they will all go into the record. I gave them to you to simplify and shorten the summary presentation at this point.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Did you include the speeches that you mention in your testimony?

Mr. ROSTOW. Yes.

To translate the controversy in Geneva to the political level, what is happening there, what has been happening there since the beginning is that the Soviet Union is asking us formally and permanently to accept Soviet military dominance and Western neutrality, that is, a military relation which could permit them to establish a Pax Sovietica in world politics.

What we have been seeking, in contrast, is to achieve agreements that would reduce the arsenals on both sides to equal levels necessary for deterrence and defense. Such agreements could eliminate the nightmare threat of Soviet nuclear blackmail, and they would, of course, be compatible with the rules against agression of the system of world public order posited by the U.N. Charter, a system based on the equality and unassailable integrity of states.

This is the course the United States has supported through thick and thin since 1945. It is, in my view, the only course that could protect our national security in world politics, and the only course consistent with our character as a people and civilization.

You have asked how the United States should break the so-called deadlock in the Geneva arms negotiation. As I have said, the differences between the United States and the Soviet Union in these talks all stem from the fact that we are insisting on an agreement which permits deterrence and defense while the Soviet Union is still trying to protect and enhance its capacity for blackmail based on the plausible threat of aggression.

I would say first that the Soviet Union has no right to seek such a capacity. Under international law, conventional forces become an act of force and an armed attack only when they are mobilized for war. It is a peculiar characteristic of certain nuclear weapons, if they exist in sufficient number, to constitute an act of force by reason of their very existence. This is the view of the problem, you will recall, which the United States took, and in my judgment took properly, during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962.

It follows that the deadlock in the Geneva talks will be broken only when the Soviet Union realizes that it cannot obtain an arms control agreement on the cheap, and that the United States will never accept a permanent and agreed position of nuclear inferiority. For the Soviet Union to agree to the principle and fact of Soviet-American nuclear parity would be a long step toward Soviet compliance with the charter provision against aggression. For the Soviet Union to take such a position would not be a concession to the United States, but an act of solidarity with the whole world community. To my mind, this is the lesson of our experience in the Geneva negotiations so far, and expecially in the INF talks, which are further advanced than the START talks.

As you know, we made a strenuous effort last summer and fall in the INF talks to find a compromise compatible with the legitimate interests of both countries. I commented on that episode in a speech called "Arms Control Fever" delivered in New York on April 17.[1] That speech is before you. I do not propose to read the relevant pages there, since they are before you, but I might clarify one point about that episode which has been raised by Ambassador Smith, I think, this morning. It is often said in the press and elsewhere that the Soviet Union did not reject the suggestion put forward by Ambassadors Nitze and Kvitsinsky until after the United States had done so. This is not correct.

We should know before long whether the Soviet Union is interested in a period of stability in its relationship with the West. If it concludes that its troubles in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and above all, in Poland, require such a period of true détente, it will be easy to reach nuclear arms agreements based on the principles of equality and deterrence.

I was asked to comment on the Scowcroft Commission report, and I am glad to respond. I congratulate the chairman and members of the body for a distinguished state paper. There are a number of points at which I would qualify what appears in that report, but I welcome and strongly support the main lines of what it said. Indeed, it would be churlish of me to do otherwise, since I have been preaching very much the same version of the gospel for a number of years.

Specifically, I am gratified by the position taken in the report that the first principle of American foreign policy and the essential dual task of American statecraft must be to avoid the threat of mass destruction and to contain the threat of aggressive totalitarianism.

My only amendment for these passages of the report would be that such a course on our part is required not only by our loyalty to the ideal of human liberty, but by the deepest and most fundamental requirements of our national security; namely, the need to preserve the balance of power and to oppose all hegemonial power.

---

[1] See p. 208.

Second, I welcome the report's statement that in dealing with the Soviet Union, we should make it clear with calm persistence that we offer the Soviet Union not only defense but true détente in accordance with NATO's Harmel resolution of 1967, both cooperation and a firm defense of our interests, recognizing that moral neutrality and indifference or acquiescence in Soviet aggression could only increase the risk of war.

Third, I fully support the important emphasis in the report that in order to eliminate the risk of nuclear war, we must join with others in seeking to enforce the rules against conventional war. The report points out that conventional war between the world's major power blocks is the most likely way for nuclear war to develop. Simply put, it is war that must concern us, not nuclear war alone.

Fourth, I find equally useful the thesis of the report that deterrence of war against our vital interests is the key task of our Armed Forces and diplomacy working together, and that our diplomacy, our Armed Forces, and our arms control proposals should be integrated and mutually reinforcing in the interest of improving stability.

The first and most urgent goal of that effort should be to encourage the Soviet Union to move in directions which reduce or eliminate the Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic warheads, an important source of the menacing instability of world politics today. I am at a loss to understand how some commentators, including Gerard Smith and Paul Warnke, can conclude that the report destroys the "myth" that we have allowed a window of vulnerability to develop in the nuclear balance.

On the contrary, it seems to me clear that the central argument of the report is the necessity for us to eliminate the Soviet Union's one-sided strategic advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles as quickly as possible. The report tells why.

The Soviets now probably possess the necessary combination of ICBM numbers, reliability, accuracy, and warhead yield to destroy almost all of the 1,047 U.S. ICBM silos using only a portion of their own ICBM force. If that is not the window of vulnerability that many of us have pointed to in recent years, I do not for the life of me know what it is.

I have no fundamental disagreement with the Commission's application of its precepts to the specific problems of our arms and arms control policies. I strongly support the Commission's view that any arms control agreement should encourage both sides to shift to smaller retaliatory weapons in the interest of stability.

In the debate over the new unit of account proposed in the INF and START talks, for example, I was much tempted in 1981 and 1982 to recommend exclusive reliance on throw-weight, but finally concluded for reasons of prudence that the new unit of account should be based both on the number of warheads and on throw-weight as an appropriate measure of their destructive capacity.

I thought then, back in 1981, and I still think, that the number of launchers should have no place in the unit of account for the new treaty or treaties, and I opposed the last-minute attempt by some participants in the debate to subordinate throw-weight somewhat and to adopt a launcher sublimit as a secondary element of the proposal.

The possible harm of that approach is qualified by the important provision in our START proposals that for each side no more than half its ballistic warheads can be on ICBM's. That feature of our position, in my judgment, despite what Paul Warnke, says should be considered indispensable. It is the only way so far in which we can hope to obtain a sharp reduction in the Soviet throw-weight advantage. The launcher limit drives planners to propose larger and larger MIRV'd weapons, while the throw-weight limit creates an incentive to build smaller weapons which could be confined to the function of retaliation.

It serves the cause of stabiity to make targets less lucrative. I am not convinced, however, that it is necessary or desirable to try to abolish MIRVing altogether, as the Scowcroft Commission recommends. The Commission had no practical alternative to relying on MX for the period of transition to smaller ground-based weapons. MX is the only new system of this type in the pipeline. It would have taken almost as long to revive production of Minuteman III as to produce MX.

As for the deployment of MX in Minuteman silos, all we can say at this point is that the solution proposed by the Commission was designed to balance some military risks against political acceptability. I should have preferred a solution which left our Minuteman force intact. So, apparently, would many members of the Commission. But on this critical issue, the Commission's hands were tied by the fact that both we and the Soviet Union have agreed not to undercut the SALT II limits for the time being.

Here, as in other areas, the negative effects of SALT II become manifest. Given the confused and controversial history of the issue, one can only sympathize with General Scowcroft and thank him for the unanimous agreement he achieved on the part of the Commission, but Congress is not bound by the Scowcroft Commission report. I hope it will accelerate the development of the Midgetman program. I was disappointed by the projection in the Commission report that it will take 10 years to develop the new small Midgetman missile. Experts in whom I have confidence tell me that they can see no reason why it should take more than 4 or 5 years, or at most 6 or 7. It would be useful, I believe, to go beyond the Scowcroft Commission report somewhat in improving the survivability of our ICBM force.

In my view, we should redeploy Minuteman III and then later MX in a multiple protective shelter mode, and undertake to defend them with antiballistic missiles even if that course would require amendment of the ABM Treaty. Such a step would fall well within the basic principles on which the ABM Treaty and the two SALT agreements together rest. That principle was that we were not interested in ABM unless there were effective controls on offensive weapons. Most students agree that such a solution would be militarily preferable. It would also be preferable from the point of view of arms control.

The last question you put to me for comment, Mr. Chairman, was to ask what I think of the various freeze and build-down proposals before you. The analysis I have presented here and in the package of speeches I have submitted for the record makes my response to your question obvious. The basic premise of the administration's negotiating position and of the Scowcroft Commission report is that the most serious problem we face is the Soviet lead in ground-based ballistic missiles, a lead we have allowed to develop in the last 10 years.

It follows as a matter of arithmetic that a freeze at current levels or a scheme involving equal reductions on each side cannot solve the problem. Such an approach would confirm and legitimize a position of strategic inferiority for the United States, and make real arms control impossible. Stability can be restored only by agreeing to parity for each side, that is, to equal levels, especially in the area of the most destabilizing classes of weapons.

Of course, an agreement should take all parts of the nuclear arsenal into account on a weighted basis which reflects the destructive capacity of each category of weapons. The freeze proposals fall into two groups. Some, like the draft offered by Senators Jackson and Warner last year, and by Senator Dole this year, propose freezes at equal and lower levels of deterrent nuclear power. They would support the administration's approach and give it additional weight.

When Congress and the President are together on a policy, then there is a full national commitment and a much stronger negotiating position. Other freeze proposals, despite a good deal of ambiguity among them, seem to favor a freeze at current levels. Such proposals would eliminate any incentive the Soviets might have to negotiate at all. Soviet negotiators are practical and experienced bargainers. They cannot be expected to give up their advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles unless the alternatives are unattractive.

So, while votes for freeze agreements of this kind may be seen politically attractive at home, they would greatly harm the possibility of reaching fair, balanced, and equitable nuclear arms agreements. Soviet spokesmen argue vehemently that in proposing a standard of equality between the Soviet Union and the United States, we are asking them to make unequal concessions, indeed, to disarm unilaterally. They offer instead the criterion of equality and equal security which would require us to accept their right to a force equal to the sum of the United States, British, French, and ultimately Chinese forces. This is not a claim for equality, but for dominion.

In the context of this analysis, the objection to build-down proposals is equally apparent. Equal reductions in the ballistic missile forces of the two sides could make the critical Soviet advantages even more significant than it now is. Build-down proposals could make a contribution to a balanced and effective agreement as part of it. Of themselves, however, build-down proposals are in my view of dubious merit.

The Soviets claim that our proposals would require them to disarm unilaterally. By that phrase, they seem to mean that they might have to give up more warheads and throw-weight than we in certain categories in order to reach equal ceilings. There is nothing inequitable about such a result. During the 1920's, the United States sank more naval tonnage than the other naval powers to reach the limits set in the Washington Treaty of 1922.

In any event, our START proposal in ballistic missiles, which Ambassador Warnke criticized so severely, does not require unequal reductions. It requires that we reduce our SLBM force somewhat more than they, and they reduce their ICBM force somewhat more than we do, but that the total reductions would be from 7,500 to 5,000, and since they tell us frequently and at length that the SLBM's are just as destabilizing as the ICBM's, it would seem that the principle of estoppel would deny them the right to claim that that proposal at least is a requirement for unilateral disarmament.

The United States should, of course, be alert to every possibility for a fair agreement and flexible agreement in its negoiating tactics, but never agree, in my judgment, to the Soviet version of equal security.

Our guiding principle in these talks must be that of parity. Soviet-American nuclear parity would in itself be a major contribution to world political stability. Once that is achieved, multilateral agreement among all the nuclear powers should become more feasible.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Mr. Rostow's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EUGENE V. ROSTOW [1]

I am glad to accept your invitation to testify this morning. It is a pleasure as well as a privilege for me to appear before this distinguished Committee.

As I understand it, the general theme of the session is the state of Soviet-American relations, with special emphasis on arms control. In your behalf, a member of your staff asked me to comment on two questions which clarify that theme and make it more concrete: (1) How should the United States break what he called "the deadlock" in the two Geneva negotiations about the level of Soviet and American nuclear weapons? In that connection he asked me to say a few words on the probe for a possible compromise in the INF talks which took place last summer and fall, and (2) he asked for my opinion of the Scowcroft Commission Report and the various freeze and "build-down" proposals now before Congress.

For your convenience, I am submitting for the record three of my recent speeches which explain some of the assertions I shall make in summary form this morning.

Before answering the questions put to me, I should make a preliminary comment.

In my view, the agenda set for this hearing is too narrowly focussed on the nuclear arms talks. The assumptions which lie behind the questions are fascinating and important. But I cannot accept them. The pattern suggested by those questions doesn't go quite so far as President Carter's view that the arms control talks are the "centerpiece" of our foreign policy, but it does not seem to be far from that position.

My own view recalls a remark attributed to Virginia Woolf. A gushy lady asked the novelist whether she didn't "adore babies." Mrs. Woolf replied, "I apply the same standards to babies I do to adults. I like nice babies." So for arms control agreements, I like good ones and abominate the other kind.

I know that some people still believe that even poor or trivial arms control agreements, and the process of negotiating them, have a favorable effect on Soviet international behavior. After the events of the last decade, one can cling to such beliefs only by ignoring the evidence. Despite the two agreements of SALT I and the process of negotiating SALT II, the "Seventies were the worst decade of the Cold War." The Soviet Union expanded its empire on a massive scale, in each case by illegal acts of aggression. The Soviets helped to make and to guarantee the Indo-Chinese peace agreements of 1973, which they then treated with contempt as scraps of paper. And they fully supported the final phases of that tragic war. Similarly, they armed President Sadat and helped him to fight the Middle East War of October 1973, although they had promised President Nixon full cooperation in joint efforts to achieve peace in the region by seeing to it that Security Council Resolution 242 was implemented. When they sensed the weakness and the indecision of American policy after the debacle in Indo-China, they rushed forward in Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, and Afghanistan.

---

[1] Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs at Yale University, and formerly Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1981–83).

When I appeared before you 2 years ago at my confirmation hearings, Senator Mathias commended me for saying that "the quest for disarmament treaties is meaningless except as part of the larger quest to bring international society under the control of an effective and universal system of international law." I thanked Senator Mathias then for his encouragement, and I thank him still. The point is fundamental. By concentrating so narrowly on arms control as a kind of elixir, we distort our perspective. We expect too much of arms control agreements. They can be useful tools of a sound foreign policy, but they are not a substitute for it. Success in our arms control and disarmament efforts is inconceivable unless the United States and its allies in different parts of the world devote at least as much effort to developing a modern system of collective security as they do to nuclear arms negotiations. Until a considerable degree of stability is restored in world politics, arms control and disarmament efforts will be nugatory. When the world system of public order is crumbling, nations do not disarm. They arm. It is no accident that the manufacture and sale of arms is the leading growth industry in the world today.

In short, I should have preferred it if this set of hearings had devoted equal time to the 1982 Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations. As you will recall, Ambassador Perez de Cuellar warned the world that the state system is slipping into a state of anarchy, and called for a recommittal of the nations to the principles of the Charter, especially those which purport to govern the international use of force. The Secretary General's appeal followed proposals made by an American representative to the United Nations in 1981 and reiterated in President Reagan's speech to the General Assembly of July 1982. The Secretary General's appeal will be a ritual exercise in handwringing unless it is backed by a major political effort led by the United States.

I hope you will hold extended hearings soon on the Secretary General's important recommendations. In that perspective, I urge that you review Secretary Schultz' thoughtful reformulation of our foreign policy presented here on June 15. I, for one, welcome the Secretary's statement. It is a useful attempt to define our national interests in world politics, and to sketch a strategy for protecting them. The Administration's foreign policy has thus far lacked a coherent framework—an explanation of what our increased armaments are for. The Secretary's speech is important also for its stress on the centrality of our respect for the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union, and of our desire to induce the Soviet Government to adopt policies of restraint rather than of indefinite expansion and confrontation. Secretary Schultz' speech does not answer all the questions raised by such an effort, and certain elements of the speech—its conception of world public order and its treatment of third world problems, for example—should be further developed in public debate. But it is an indispensable beginning. If it precipitates serious discussion, it could be immensely useful in helping to develop a new state of public opinion here and abroad—a state of public opinion which could support a foreign policy capable of inspiring our friends and deterring our adversaries.

Now I shall try to address your questions in order.

Your first question invites comment on the state of Soviet-American relations. Unfortunately, Soviet-American relations are today exactly what they have been since 1945, when Stalin decided to break off the Soviet Union's rather ambiguous wartime association with the United States, and go his own way, as he told Ambassador Harriman at the time. The major landmarks of that period were the Soviet Union's rejection of the Marshall Plan and the Baruch Plan; its breach of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements promising free elections in Eastern Europe; and its attempts to take over Iran, Greece, Turkey, Berlin, Czechoslovakia, and South Korea. Soviet foreign policy has shown remarkable continuity. There have been variations in the tone and style of Soviet diplomacy and propaganda during this period, but no changes in substance.

I am aware, of course, of the recent spate of articles and speeches bemoaning the sad state of Soviet-American relations, and pointing to the decline in cultural exchanges, the visits of hockey teams, and like subjects, and I have read the statements of Mr. Andropov and other Soviet spokesmen on the subject. All this naysaying is premature. Exchange visits by Soviet and American string quarters are perfectly useful activities, especially if the quartets are good. But they have little or nothing to do with peace.

Peace is a political condition which implies much more than the absence of violence. It is a set of relations defined by law and sustained by a public opinion which animates the law. To adapt Montesquieu's definition of domestic peace, international peace is a political environment in which no state need fear another, and all states generally respect the rules of world public order which have evolved since the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Those rules, embodied now in the Charter of the United Nations, reflect the nature of states and the necessities of their cooperation within the state system. The root of our problem is not the atmosphere and vocabulary of Soviet-American relations, or the fact that orchestras and ballet companies are not travelling much between the two countries these days, but the fact that the Soviet Union has always claimed that it is under no obligation to obey the rules of the United Nations Charter against aggression. The Soviet Union does more than claim this privilege. It uses it.

Competition in arms, including nuclear arms, is not the cause but the symptom of the breakdown in world public order brought about by Soviet programs of expansion. The deepening anxiety of world opinion about the likelihood of war is a natural response to the process of Soviet expansion, and the growing menace of the Soviet armaments, especially nuclear armaments, on which it is based.

When this point is brought to the attention of Soviet diplomats and other spokesmen, even at a high level, their answer is that we are asking them "to give up a foreign policy rooted in the nature of the Soviet Union as a society and a state." To this claim, the only answer an American can give is that the Soviet Union can preach the virtues of Communism without interference, so far as the West is concerned. What the state system cannot tolerate, however, is the Soviet claim of a right to spread this faith with a sword.

The process of Soviet expansions has been gaining in momentum in recent years, despite some setbacks. I submit that it has gone too far. It has provoked a reasoned and determined response throughout the Western world, as the people and their leaders have begun to realize that Soviet expansion threatens the balance of power on which everyone's safety depends.—%100.0—A619B.021

Your question has a corollary. You ask me to put special emphasis on the arms control element in Soviet-American relations. And you ask for suggestions about how the United States might break the deadlock in the nuclear arms negotiations, as if the differences between the parties in Geneva could be reconciled easily if only our negotiators were sufficiently ingenious. Every day's newspapers carry reports of speeches, articles, editorials, or letters-to-the-editor which propose formulae for the negotiations which the authors think would accomplish this miracle. Many of the critics even profess to know just what the Soviet Union would not accept by way of an agreement—a manifestation of the kind of pride which generally leads to a fall. It is better in my judgment to allow the Soviets to negotiate for themselves. They do it very well.

The enthusiastic search for a formula through which the United States could break the deadlock in the Geneva talks rests on illusion. There is no "deadlock" in Geneva. What is happening is quite obvious. The Soviets are probing and testing to find out whether they can induce or force us to accept their political goal for the talks—the Soviet version of "detente." When they are convinced we will never do that, they should be ready to join us in nuclear arms agreements and many other agreements based on the conception of detente they already profess to accept, that of universal respect for the equality, independence, and sovereignty of states.

The differences between the Soviet Union and the United States in the nuclear arms negotiations are clear and simple. They are differences of policy, not of language or tactics. And they cannot be resolved by cosmetic changes of language, however skillful and athletic.

The Soviet Union has spent years of effort and billions of roubles to achieve nuclear superiority over the United States in ground-based intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles. In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union had approximately the same number of warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles. In this critically important category of weapons, the Soviet Union now has a 3 to 1 advantage in warheads, and a 4 to 1 advantage in throw-weight. In addition, it has a growing monopoly in ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles, formidable in destructive capacity and in number. The Soviet lead in the most destructive and destabilizing categories of weapons was not achieved in a fit of absence of mind. These weapons play a vital role in the Soviet strategy of trying to separate the United States from its allies throughout the world.

For years we were told on high authority that the foreign policy of the Soviet Union is defensive, and that all the Soviet Union was seeking through its arms buildup was "parity," a place in the sun, and recognition as a super-power. When the Soviet Union achieved parity, many of our experts said, it would give up its program of expansion and settle back to enjoy the fruits of peace.

This argument, too, has disappeared save as an article of faith among the True Believers. The Soviet Union has exceeded parity by any significant measure. Yet it continues its extraordinary military buildup and its campaigns of expansion go on and on.

You will all recall Henry Kissinger's famous question: "What in the name of God is strategic superiority? What is the significance of it. . . at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?" The answer to Dr. Kissinger's question is now obvious. The nuclear superiority of the Soviet Union in ground-based ballistic missiles carries with it a capability we do not now have—the capability to destroy a range of hardened military targets at minimal risk of effective retaliation. To adapt the language of the Scowcroft Commission Report, this Soviet capability casts a shadow over the calculus of American risk taking at any level of confrontation with the Soviet Union. The Soviet capacity to improve its military position through a preemptive first-strike does not in my judgment imply that nuclear war is around the corner, or that the Soviet Union intends to make a nuclear attack. There is no need for the Soviet Union to contemplate such a course. The present state of the nuclear balance is a pervasive and insidious political force, deeply affecting political attitudes throughout the West. With Soviet SS-20s creating an intense political reaction in Europe and elsewhere at a time when many are skeptical about the possible use of the American strategic forces, our alliance systems are under severe pressure.

Heightened nuclear anxiety in the West is manifest not only in protests and demonstrations, and in one or another of the recipes for a nuclear freeze at current levels, but in the far more dangerous revival of the American isolationist impulse and of corresponding attitudes of ultra-nationalism, militarism, and xenophobia abroad. Support for retreat to a policy of Fortress America has increased across the spectrum of American politics. It is serious precisely because it is irrational. The American policy of defending Western Europe, Canada, Japan, Israel, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and a number of other countries is not a matter of philanthropy—an optional policy we can abandon when the going gets rough. That policy developed not only because these countries share a common civilization with us, but because their control by the Soviet Union would gravely affect the balance of power. We did not support Stalin against Hitler because we thought he was a democrat, nor did President Nixon deter a Soviet attack on China because he had any illusions about the Chinese political system.

The Soviet advantage in ground-based missiles is destabilizing in itself, and its political impact is multiplied by the way it is perceived. Thus the political reaction to the changing nuclear balance is undermining the credibility of our security treaties, and threatening our foreign policy as a whole. To quote the Scowcroft Commission Report again, "the serious imbalance between the Soviets' massive ability to destroy hardened land-based military targets with their ballistic missile force and our lack of such capability must be redressed promplty. . . We cannot safely permit (the present) situation to continue."

This imbalance can be corrected by modernizing our nuclear arsenal, through arms control agreements, or through a combination of the two. During my period of service in ACDA, it was the major premise of President Reagan's arms control policy that this goal should be achieved if possible through arms control agreements rather than through force modernization. I hope and believe that this view of the problem will remain inviolate.

I set out the Administration's position on the nuclear arms negotiations in speeches before the Council on Foreign Relations in New York in October 1981, and before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council in September 1982.

In the perspective of this hearing, I should comment that the Soviet position in both negotiations is one of determined defense of their growing advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles, and determined rejection of the principle of Soviet-American parity. In short, to translate the controversy to the political level, the Soviet Union is asking us formally and permanently to accept Soviet military dominance and Western neutrality—that is, a military relation which could permit them to establish a Pax Sovietica in world politics. What we are seeking, in contrast, is to achieve agreements that would reduce the nuclear arsenals on both sides to equal levels necessary for deterrence and defense. Such agreements would eliminate the nightmare threat of Soviet nuclear blackmail. And they would be compatible with the rules against aggression of the system of world public order posited by the

United Nations Charter—a system based on the equality and unassailable integrity of States. This is the course the United States has supported through thick and thin since 1945. It is the only course which could protect our national security in world politics, and the only course consistent with our character as a people and a civilization.

You ask how the United States should break the so-called deadlock in the Geneva arms negotiations. As I have said, the difference between the United States and the Soviet Union in these talks all stem from the fact that we are insisting on an agreement which permits deterrence and defense, while the Soviet Union is still trying to protect and enhance its capacity for blackmail based on the plausible threat of aggression. The Soviet Union has no right to seek such a capacity. Under international law, conventional forces become an act of force and an armed attack only when mobilized for war. It is the peculiar characteristic of certain nuclear weapons, if they exist in sufficient number, to constitute an act of force by reason of their very existence. This is the view of the problem the United States took in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

It follows that the deadlock in the Geneva talks will be broken only when the Soviet Union realizes that it cannot obtain an arms control agreement on the cheap, and that the United States will never accept a permanent and agreed position of nuclear inferiority. For the Soviet Union to agree to the principle and the fact of Soviet-American nuclear parity would be a long step toward Soviet compliance with the United Nations Charter provision against aggression. For the Soviet Union to take such a position would not be a concession to the United States, but an act of solidarity with the whole world communiy.

To my mind, this is the lesson of our experience in the Geneva negotiations so far, and especially in the INF talks, which are further advanced than the START talks. As you know, we made a strenuous effort last summer and fall in the INF talks to find a compromise compatible with the legitimate interests of both countries. I commented on the episode at pp. 13–15 of a speech called "Arms Control Fever," delivered in New York on April 17, 1983. It is before you. I might clarify one point about that episode. It is often said in the press that the Soviet Union did not reject the suggestion put forward by Ambassadors Nitze and Kvitsinsky until after the United States had done so. This is not correct.

We should know before long whether the Soviet Union is interested in a period of stability in its relationship with the West. If it concludes that its troubles in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and above all in Poland require such a period of true detente, it will be easy to reach nuclear arms agreements based on the principle of equality and deterrence.

I was asked to comment on the Snowcroft Commission Report. I am glad to respond. I congratulate the Chairman and members of that body on a distinguished state paper. There are a number of points on which I would qualify what appears in the Report, but I welcome and warmly support the main lines of what it says. Indeed, it would be churlish of me to do otherwise, since I have been preaching very much the same version of the gospel for a number of years.

Specifically, I am gratified by the position taken in the Report that the first principle of American foreign policy and "the essential dual task" of American statecraft must be to avoid "the threat of mass destruction" and to contain "the threat of aggressive totalitarianism." (pp. 1, 6) My only amendment for those passages of the Report, as I made clear earlier, would be that such a course on our part is required not only by our loyalty to the ideal of human liberty but by the deepest and most fundamental requirement of our national security—namely, the need to preserve the balance of power, and to oppose all hegemonial power.

Second, I welcome the Report's statement that in dealing with the Soviet Union we should make it clear "with calm persistence" that we offer the Soviet Union not only defense but true detente in accordance with NATO's Harmel Resolution of 1967—full cooperation as well as firm defense of our interests, recognizing that moral neutrality and indifference or acquiescense in Soviet aggression can only increase the risk of war (p. 2).

Third, I fully support the important emphasis in the Report (p. 2) that in order to eliminate the risk of nuclear war we must join with others in seeking to enforce the rules against conventional war. The Report points out that "conventional war between the world's major power blocks is the most likely way for nuclear war to develop. . . . Simply put, it is war that must concern us, not nuclear war alone."

Fourth, I find equally useful the thesis of the Report (pp. 2–3) that deterrence of war against our vital interests is the key task of our armed forces and diplomacy, working together, and that our diplomacy, our armed forces, and our arms control proposals should be "integrated and mutually reinforcing" in the interest of improving stablility. The first and most urgent goal of that effort should be to encourage the Soviet Union to move in directions which reduce or eliminate the Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missile warheads, an important source of the menacing instability of world politics today.

I am at a loss to understand how some commentators can conclude that the Report destroys the "myth" that we have allowed a "window of vulnerability" to develop in the nuclear balance. On the contrary, it seems to me clear that the central argument of the Report is the necessity for us to eliminate the Soviet Union's "one-sided strategic advantage" in ground-based ballistic missiles as quickly as possible (pp. 6, 13, 16). The report tells why: "The Soviets . . . now probably possess the necessary combination of ICBM numbers, reliability, accuracy and warhead yield to destroy almost all of the 1047 U.S. ICBM silos, using only a portion of their own ICBM force." (p. 4) If that isn't the "window of vulnerability" that many of us have pointed to in recent years, I don't for the life of me know what is.

I have no fundamental disagreement with the Commission's application of its precepts to the specific problems of our arms and arms control policies. I strongly support, for example, the Commission's view that any arms control agreement should encourage both sides to shift to smaller, retaliatory weapons in the interest of stability. In the debate over the new unit of account proposed in the INF and START talks, for example, I was much tempted to recommend exclusive reliance on throw-weight, but finally concluded, for reasons of prudence, that the new unit of account should be based both on the number of warheads and on throw-weight as an approximate measure of their destructive capacity. I thought then, back in 1981, and I still think that the number of launchers should have no place in the unit of account for the new treaty or treaties, and I opposed the last-minute attempt by some participants in the debate to subordinate throw-weight somewhat and to adopt a launcher sub-limit as a secondary element of our proposal.

A launcher limit drives the planners to propose larger and larger MIRVed weapons, while a throw-weight limit creates an incentive to build smaller weapons which could be confined to the function of retaliation. It serves the cause of stability to make targets less lucrative. I am not convinced, however, that it is necessary or desirable to abolish MIRVing altogether, as the Scowcroft Commission recommends.

The reasons advanced for adding a launcher limit to our START proposal were not convincing to me when they were offered, and they are less convincing to me now. And the effort to push the throw-weight issue to a second phase of the negotiation seems equally misguided. Failing to establish an equal throw-weight limit would work in the direction of larger missiles, not smaller ones. The possible harm of that approach is qualified by the important provision that for each side no more than half its ballistic missile warheads can be on ICBMs. That feature of our position should be considered indispensable.

The Commission had no practical alternative to relying on MX for the period of transition to smaller ground-based weapons. MX is the only new system of this type in the pipeline. It would have taken almost as long to revive production of Minuteman III as to produce MX. As for the deployment of MX in Minuteman silos, all one can say at this point is that the solution proposed by the Commission was designed to balance some military risk against political acceptability. I should have preferred a solution which left our Minuteman force intact. But on this critical issue the Commission's hands were tied by the fact that both we and the Soviet Union have agreed not to undercut the SALT II limits for the time being. Here, as in other areas, the negative effects of SALT II become manifest.

Given the confused and controversial history of the issue, one can only sympathize with General Scowcroft, and thank him for the agreement he achieved. But Congress is not bound by the Scowcroft Commission Report. I hope it will accelerate the development of the Midgetman program. I was disappointed by the projection in the Commission Report that it will take 10 years to develop the new small Midgetman missile. I can see no reason why it should take more than 4 or 5 years.

It would be useful, I believe, to go beyond the Scowcroft Commission Report somewhat in improving the survivability of our ICBM force. We should redeploy Minuteman III and MX in a multiple protective shelter mode, and undertake to defend them with anti-ballistic missiles, even if such a course required amendment of the ABM Treaty. Such a step would fall well within the basic principles on which the ABM Treaty rests. Most students agree that such a solution would be militarily preferable. It would also be preferable from the point of view of arms control.

The last question put to me asks for comment on the various freeze and build-down proposals before you.

The analysis I have presented here and in the package of speeches I have submitted makes my response to your question obvious.

The basic premise of the Administration's negotiating position and of the Scowcroft Commission Report is that the most serious problem we face is the Soviet lead in ground-based ballistic missiles—a lead we have allowed to develop in the last 10 years. That Soviet advantage is incompatible with deterrence and stability. And it is the source of the nuclear anxiety now transforming political attitudes throughout the West.

It follows as a matter of arithmetic that a freeze at current levels or a scheme involving equal reductions on each side cannot solve the problem. Such an approach would confirm and legitimize a position of strategic inferiority for the United States, and make real arms control impossible. Stability can be restored only by agreeing to parity for each side—that is, to equal levels, especially in the area of the most destabilizing classes of weapons. Of course an agreement should take all parts of the nuclear arsenal into account, on a weighted basis which reflects the destructive capacity of each category of weapons.

The freeze proposals fall into two groups. Some, like the drafts offered by Senators Jackson, Warner, and Dole, propose freezes at equal and lower levels of deterrent nuclear power. They would support the Administration's approach, and give it additional weight. Others—despite a good deal of ambiguity—seem to favor a freeze at current levels. They would eliminate any incentive the Soviets might have to negotiate at all. The Soviet negotiators are practical and experienced bargainers. They cannot be expected to give up their advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles unless the alternatives are unattractive.

Soviet spokesmen argue vehemently that in proposing a standard of equality between the Soviet Union and the United States we are asking them to make unequal concessions, indeed to disarm unilaterally. They offer instead the criterion of "equality and equal security," which would require us to accept their right to a force equal to the sum of the United States, British, French, and, ultimately, Chinese forces. This is not a claim for equality, but for dominion.

In the context of this analysis, the objection to build-down proposals is equally apparent. Equal reductions in the ballistic missile forces of the two sides could make the critical Soviet advantage even more significant than it now is.

The Soviet claim that our proposals would require them to disarm unilaterally. There is nothing inequitable about unequal reductions to reach equal ceilings. During the 1920's, the United States sank more naval tonnage than the other naval powers to reach the limits set in the Washington Treaty of 1922.

The United States should of course be alert to every possibility for a fair agreement, and flexible in its negotiating tactics. But it can never agree to the Soviet version of "equal security." Our guiding principle must be that of parity. Soviet-American nuclear parity would in itself be a major contribution to world political stability. Once that is achieved, multilateral agreement among all the nuclear powers should become more feasible.

PEACE AS A HUMAN RIGHT

(By Eugene V. Rostow [1])

Thank you for the honor of what you have said and done tonight. No compliment could have more meaning for me than the award of a medal for services to the cause of ethics in public life—a medal graced by the name of Earl Warren, and conferred by a pioneering and distinguished university in the tradition of Judaism. It has been said that praise does no harm if you don't inhale. I promise not to inhale. But I treasure your precious gift, and shall always do so.

I was brought up and have lived most of my life in New England, and particularly at Yale, a university founded by Congregational ministers to cherish learning and preserve the faith of the fathers. Despite their fewness, the Congregationalists and other Puritans have been critically important in shaping American civilization. That fact in turn constitutes an unique bond between Judaism and the culture of the United States, a linkage quite different from the relationship between Judaism and the culture of other Christian countries where Jews live, except perhaps for Scotland. Both Jews and the Yankee Puritans are nurtured on the Bible, worship without benefit of Bishops, and live in the yoke of a compact with the Almighty. Both are stiff-necked people, extreme individualists in the mold of the prophet Jeremiah, who thought it was perfectly proper for a free man to challenge the Lord to explain wherefore the wicked flourish. And above all, both the Yankees and the Jews are people of the law, who understand the centrality of law in the life of civilized societies, and are forever trying to regulate their lives with covenants, compacts, constitutions, and rules.

---

[1] Remarks on receiving the Earl Warren Medal for Ethics and Human Relations by the University of Judaism, Los Angeles, Calif., June 7, 1983.

It is therefore hardly remarkable that the United States has always been a leader among the nations in pursuing the ideal of the rule of law not only in our domestic governance but also in the governance of the society of nations. Many questions which are pragmatic issues of politics in other democracies are issues of law for us. Our written constitutions, coupled with the practice of judicial review, have become steadily more insistent pressures, helping to bring the law in fact, the law at the end of the policeman's stick, up to the standard of the law on the books, and to bring the law on the books up to the standard of our changing aspirations for the law. The Fourteenth Amendment was treated with malign neglect for fifty years or more. But it was a profound and pervasive influence on the law even when it was not enforced—a call to our conscience that could not be ignored forever. Now, in the name of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights as a whole, the Courts and Congress are reordering our society through a peaceful revolution we all know is right.

The flowering of the Bill of Rights during the last generation is simply the most dramatic instance of a process of law making which is touching every part of our public life, at home and abroad. For the government of the United States from its earliest days has played an active and productive part in seeking to bring international society under the rule of law. The infant republic had an influence entirely disproportionate to its population and military power in encouraging the reform and development of international law and its fulfillment through arbitration, adjudication, treaties, and the good offices of diplomacy. Grotius and Vattel had no followers more devoted than John Marshall, Joseph Story, and the early American Secretaries of State. And the American influence was of critical importance to the establishment of the International Court of Justice and its predecessors at the Hague, the League of Nations, and then the United Nations.

I wish tonight to concentrate on this dimension of the rule of law, its international dimension, that is, on international law as a component of our foreign policy. My argument is simple but radical in its implication, as we examine the small, turbulent and contracting nuclear world in which we have no choice but to live. It is that not only the deepest national interests of the United States but our nature as a people, a society, and a civilization require us to base our foreign policy firmly and unequivocally upon international law, and especially on the law of peace. We should regard peace not as an historical accident, or the casual gift of princes, but as a human right defined by law; we should accept the fact that peace is indivisible, as a Soviet Foreign Minister used to say during the thirties; and we should make it the first task of our diplomacy and security policy to help fulfill the world wide system of peace we have inherited.

As you know, I have just spent nearly two years as Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. But I daresay few of you realize that in the Arms Control and Disarment Act of 1961, proposed and passed on a bipartisan basis, Congress declared that it is "an ultimate goal of the United States" to subordinate the international use of force to the rule of law, and that the ultimate duty of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is to provide an impulse to this end in the development of our foreign policy. As Congress recognized in the statute, the quest for arms control treaties is meaningless except as part of a larger quest to bring international society under the control of a universal and effective system of international law. What the statute embodies is the judgment that on this contracting and interdependent planet, where modern science offers mankind both infinite promise and infinitely hideous danger, the course of the law is the most prudent and most promising foundation for the security of the United States. It is a cliché to say that the achievement of international peace is the supreme challenge of our time, but it is a cliché which must become a call to arms. The task has terror and immediacy that give it volcanic implications. It frames and pervades every other issue with which we deal; this will remain the case for the indefinite future.

What do we mean by the word "peace" and the phrase "system of peace"? International peace, like domestic tranquillity, is a condition achieved not by force alone, but by law and by the state of opinion which sustains law. Peace denotes much more than the absence of violence. There is no violence in the cemetery or in the streets of a city governed by a dictator. The states which constitute the society of nations differ widely in history, culture, and ideology. But they share or profess to share a code of values which reflect the nature of states and the necessities of their cooperation within the state system. That code reflects as well the contemporary aspirations of humanity both for peace and for economic, social, and political progress achieved in peace. The fullest statement of the code of values for the society of nations is the Charter of the United Nations—often honored in the breach, as we know, but as important to the future of international society as the Fourteenth Amendment has been for us at home. The rules of a legal system can be effective legal norms even when they are not perfectly enforced. But they cease to be norms, and become no more than Utopian dreams, if society loses its capacity to fulfill them, or abandons the task of trying to do so.

It is common in the United States and in England to confuse two quite different aspects of our foreign policy—our interest in peace, on the one hand, and our special interest in helping the democratic nations which share our culture and our values, on the other. We did not help Stalin against Hitler during the Second World War because we thought Stalin had become a democrat, nor are we helping Communist China today because we are under any illusions about the human quality of its regime. Our policies with respect to world public order have nothing to do with the degree of decency of the regimes we are aiding. We helped the Soviet Union a generation ago, and we are helping China now, because we share with those nations an equal interest in opposing aggression and hegemony, and achieving and maintaining a balance of power in the world—a distribution of power which could prevent a predatory nation from achieving dominion.

There is no way of avoiding this burden. America cannot be secure as an island of peace, isolated behind its oceans and its nuclear weapons in the world as it is. We were unable to escape what President Washington called "the general convulsions" of world politics even in the days before 1914, when we were protected by the Concert of Europe and the British fleet. We certainly cannot expect to do so now, when Britain and France are no longer the arbiters of world power, and only the United States can lead in the task of achieving and maintaining the balance of power. But the first panicky response of many Americans to the nuclear nightmare is to try to escape down the rabbit hole of history. The powerful memory of our isolationist past is gaining in strength. Its appeal is that of a treacherous mirage; we must put it aside as an illusion. There is not the slightest reason to doubt the capacity of the American people and their government to protect our interests in world politics by peaceful means—by deterrence and alliance diplomacy—and not by war. But success in such an effort will require of us the unblinking realism, energy and faith which have characterized American diplomacy at its most creative moments.

Secretary of State Acheson once said that it was characteristic of the impatient and restless American temperament to think of problems as headaches, transitory pains which could be made to go away if we took two aspirins. The problem of peace, he commented, is not like that at all. It is like the pain of making a living, and would never go away.

Today, we are all conscious of the unthinkable and unspeakable dangers of nuclear war, and resolved to do everything within our power to prevent it. But many of us turn with pathetic hope to the possibility of arms control agreements with the Soviet Union as a magic and aseptic way to achieve peace—a political equivalent of the aspirin tablets about which Acheson spoke. No belief could be more harmful to our national health. Arms control agreements can be useful tools of our foreign and security policies, and they are well worth pursuing. But they are not a substitute for having a foreign and security policy. And, if they are not conceived, negotiated, and carried out as integral parts of a policy of collective security designed to establish peace, they can do great and perhaps irreparable damage to our national security. Disarmament and collective security are twin policies. Disarmament is inconceivable as a practical matter unless the Western nations, necessarily led by the United States, succeed in restoring political stability based on general respect for rules of the United Nations Charter which purport to govern the international use of armed force.

You will note the focus of what I said—that the supreme problem of our time is the problem of achieving peace in the nuclear age—not arms control, or ending the arms race, or even the prevention of nuclear war, but peace itself. I framed the issue that way because the so-called arms race, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, is not the cause but the symptom of the breakdown of world public order which has become so palpable in recent years. The welfare of the United States will hardly be advanced if the nations succeed in outlawing nuclear war only to license conventional force aggression, or aggression through terrorism, subversion, and the international movement of guerrillas and armed bands. The state system is crumbling towards anarchy, as the Secretary General of the United Nations has rightly warned. In every part of the globe, states feel themselves to be in mortal peril.

Under these circumstances, states do not disarm. They arm. It is not an accident that the manufacture of arms is the leading growth industry in the world today.

When we think of international society, two visions jostle in our minds—the vision of the jungle, on the one hand, with the nations in a Hobbesian state of nature where clubs are trumps; and a vision of harmony and cooperation, on the other, with the relationships among the nations governed by the rules of international law. In fact, neither vision fully corresponds to reality, which encompasses them both. Modern history can be written as a counterpoint of these themes—that is, as a persistent and sustained effort to impose the rule of law on the diverse and unruly habits of the nations, especially with regard to the international use of force.

The modern state system emerged from the moral and intellectual climate of the enlightenment, and from the experience of the last two centuries with war. Its dominant idea is that the strongest states have a special responsibility for keeping the peace by preventing, confining, and limiting the practice of international war. The Congress of Vienna and its aftermath in the diplomacy of the Victorian age proved to be both creative and important in shaping the state system, and establishing its basic rules. But the Vienna system failed tragically in 1914. The men who met at Versailles in 1919 tried to recreate it through the League of Nations, but their effort lacked conviction and power, and it collapsed within a few years. After the Second World War, the yearning of humanity for peace expressed itself again, this time in San Francisco through the conference which adopted the United Nations Charter. In 1945, Western opinion was convinced that if only the great powers had enforced the rules of the League Covenant against aggression in Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain, and the Rhineland, the Second World War could never have taken place. Therefore Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter categorically condemns the international use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, except where justified by the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense. To enforce these rules is the chief function of the Security Council, which, on paper at least, has far more authority than any institution of the League. Its nominal power recalls that which Palmerston, Disraeli, and Bismarck exercised in fact during some of the diplomatic Congresses of the nineteenth century: the power to guide, direct, limit, cajole, conciliate, and, if necessary, to command and dispose of controversies which threatened the peace.

It would have been difficult to fulfill the hopes of the Charter even if the great powers had remained together after 1945. The old state system has tenacious habits of aggressive warfare, after all, and the end of West European imperialism has given those habits new opportunities. But the great powers did not remain together after 1945, and moments of concensus among them have been rare. Between the late Forties and the Seventies the Western nations helped to enforce the minimal rules of world public order quite effectively in their effort to contain Soviet expansion, but it has been obvious for the last ten years that the Charter of the United Nations is going the way of the Covenant of the League of Nations as an influence on the state system.

The root of the matter is that the Soviet Union has never accepted Article 2(4) of the Charter as applicable to it. From the beginning of the Charter era, the Soviet Union has claimed for itself—and only for itself—the privilege of using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states which are not governed by Socialist regimes, and indeed of using force even against Socialist states if they are under the control of Socialist heretics, revisionists, or schismatics, or if they show dangerous signs of backsliding to democracy.

This feature of the political landscape since 1945 is so familiar to us that we take it to be the order of nature, and assume that it has somehow been legitimized. But the special privilege of the Soviet Union to commit aggression at will cannot be legitimized under the Charter of the United Nations. These practices violate the most fundamental rule of the Charter system—the integrity of states.

When pressed, Soviet diplomats or scholars say that for the Motherland of Socialism to obey Article 2(4) would be to give up its nature as a society and a state. To this, the only answer an American can give is that the Soviet Union can preach the gospel of communism to its heart's content, but that in the nature of the state system, it cannot be allowed to propagate its faith with a sword.

The Soviet program of expansion, sedulously pursued since 1945, has gone too far. It threatens the most fundamental security interest of all other states, that in the world balance of power, and has therefore touched nerves of great sensitivity in countries as diverse as China, Japan, and Egypt, and NATO countries, and the small nations of South East Asia.

The United States and it allies in NATO Europe, Japan, and other Western countries have soberly and reluctantly begun to restore the military balance beween the

Soviet Union and the West. In the United States President Reagan has led a bipartisan coalition which supports larger defense budgets. But this giant step, indispensable as it is, is only half the job. President Reagan has not yet put forward a coherent vision of Western foreign policy—a vision to which our people and those of our allies and other friendly nations could really. Therefore we have not seriously begun to recover from the shock of the Vietnam experience in defining the ends and means of our foreign policy. Is it the policy of the United States in a nuclear world to defend only Fortress America? Influential defeatist voices tell us that the state of the nuclear balance requires us to accept such a posture, and the political impotence it implies. In this judgment, they are surely and fatally mistaken. Or should it be our policy to defend only the NATO allies, as others recommend? The NATO allies and Japan? Our interests in the Middle East, or other areas which become critical to the balance of power in the context of Soviet campaigns of expansion? Or can the national security interests of the United States be defended only by pressing for a policy of general compliance with the rules of the United Nations Charter against aggression and organizing regional coalitions to achieve it? Until these questions are clearly and firmly answered, by deeds and not only by words, there will be no general consensus in the West on what our armed forces are for—on when and how they should be used. Consequently, the influence of our armed forces in deterring aggression will be uncertain.

These great and pressing questions constitute the next great task of American leadership, and define the context of the arms control negotiations. The Charter rules against the international use of force cannot survive much longer as effective legal norms unless they are respected equally by both sides. Unless the Soviet Union decides in the near future to abide by those rules, they will cease to control the behavior of the United States and its allies. This is not an outcome the West desires. We know that the enforcement of the Charter rules is in the equal interest of every state. They are neutral principles—rules against international aggressive war—not rules in defense of capitalism or socialism, or rules which favor the status quo and prevent revolution. We know as well that conventional war may escalate to the nuclear level, given the stress and passion which are normal to the phenomenon of war, and that the same irrational forces could easily transform limited into unlimited nuclear war.

In short, the nightmare of nuclear war should persuade all the nations, including the Soviet Union, that peace really is indivisible, and that the nominal rules of international law against aggressive war should be reciprocally respected and generally enforced. This, I am convinced, is the only way to exercise the specter of nuclear war. And I am comforted that the recent statement of the American Catholic bishops on nuclear war, with which I disagree at a number of points, fully embraces this fundamental truth.

Is there a chance that the nations will adopt this course, as they recoil from the visible nightmare of anarchy and nuclear war?

It must be conceded at once that there is not sign as yet that the Soviet Union has taken this fateful step, despite Mr. Andropov's repeated assurances of his desire for better relations with the United States. In the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Afghanistan, and above all in Poland, Soviet policy remains expansionist, despite a number of setbacks, and continues to use armed force as an instrument of national policy.

Nor is there any progress in the nuclear arms negotiations in Geneva. In those talks, the Soviet Union is still tenaciously defending its capacity for nuclear blackmail. It is clinging to its lead of at least three to one in the most destructive and destabilizing class of nuclear weapons, the ground based ballistic missiles. And it is denouncing and rejecting the defensive principle of Soviet-American nuclear parity which is the basis of the American negotiating position. By insisting that British and French nuclear forces be counted with the American weapons in measuring equality, the Soviets are asking us to concede that they have a right to an arsenal equal to the sum of all other nuclear forces on earth. This is not a claim for equality, but for dominion.

If in the end we yield to the argument, we shall find that our nuclear guaranties have lost all credibility, our troops and fleets will be brought home from overseas bases, and we shall lose the capacity to carry out a foreign policy at all.

Nonetheless, I am an optimist on these matters, not because I believe that the Soviet Union is likely soon to see a blinding light on the road to Damascus, but because I am inclined to believe that man's instinct for self-preservation will in the end save mankind from suicide. The imperatives for survial in the nuclear age require the Western nations to adapt and modernize the foreign policy we have pursued since the time of Truman and Eisenhower and restore its effectiveness. It is the only possible foreign policy for the United States and its allies, given the geopolitical realities. The same imperatives decree the end of the Soviet Union's sour adventures in imperialism, and its acceptance, finally, of the rules of world public order which purport to govern every one else. The other nations of the world have discovered that imperialism and militarism are expensive, ineffective, and without moral justification. There is no obvious reason why the Soviet Union should remain forever blind to this truth.

Nearly a century ago, Alfred Nobel, the inventor of dynamite, thought that dynamite was so destructive that it would force mankind to accept peace. His prediction turned out to be wrong. But can we expect the horror of the nuclear weapon to fulfill Nobel's dream? If we are reasonable, and lucky, I believe we can. In any event, we have no alternative but to try.

The centerpiece of that effort should be a campaign to carry out the recommendation of the Secretary General of the United Nations to which I referred a few moments ago. In his report last year, Ambassador Perez de Cuellar warned that the state system is slipping into a state of anarchy, and called for a recommittal of the nations to the principles of the Charter, especially those governing the international use of force. The Secretary General's appeal followed proposals made by a representative of the United States at the United Nations, reiterated in President Reagan's speech to the General Assembly of July, 1982.

I started tonight by saying that the central task of world politics, and therefore the central task of United States foreign policy, is to establish peace; and that nuclear agreements and other arms control and disarmament proposals are simply aspects of the broader problem. Such agreements can be helpful only if they are compatible with the necessities of peace. The appeal of the Secretary General of the United Nations will be just another ritual exercise in handwringing and rhetoric unless it is backed by a major political effort in which the United States should play an active and constructive part. To have any chance of achieving that purpose, after the turbulence and drifting of the last decade, the goals of American foreign policy should be reformulated as a fresh, realistic, and coherent whole, firmly based on principle, and directed only to the achievement of peace. Fears and doubts have plagued American foreign policy since the tragedy of Vietnam. They cannot be dispelled by a series of fragmented action never effectively explained. An uncertain trumpet elicits an uncertain response.

As Lord Carrington said in a major speech a few weeks ago, there is no reason for the West to retreat in fear and trembling. The West has problems, of course, but they are altogether soluble. Our societies are stronger than ever—far stronger than those of the Soviet Union and its satellites. Only can our fears and sense of guilt stand in the way of a major effort to carry out the policy of peacemaking the Secretary General of the United Nations recommended last year. No lesser goal can offer humanity much hope of avoiding the nightmare of general war in a nuclear environment.

ARMS CONTROL FEVER

(An after-dinner speech at a private club by Eugene V. Rostow,[1] New York, N.Y., April 17, 1983)

In one of his recent homilies, our President spoke with pointed enthusiasm about a speaker at a monthly dinner who elicited "frequent laughter" from the company. I understand and sympathize with the lesson he was trying to preach, and accept it as an admonition. With rue, however, I confess that I cannot aspire to his standard tonight. I wish I could. But, as many of you know, I am a serious fellow, and besides, my subject is the nuclear weapon, hardly a matter for laughter, frequent or otherwise, save perhaps the laughter of the Gods.

Let me start by putting another aspect of my assignment to one side. As Ambassador Gross made clear in extending the Committee's invitation, there was considerable interest in the group about why I was sacked last January. Among journalists and others addicted to Washington gossip, interest in the question was intense, even prurient. I shall not comment on the episode, however, for a number of reasons, but particularly because I don't know what happened. Besides, the customary nine-day period has expired. Others are on the griddle now. All I can say is that my return to

---

[1] Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs, Yale University. Formerly Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (1966–69) and Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1981–83).

New Haven recalls the story about a newly appointed British Ambassador to Washington. The new Ambassador had never served in America and knew little about it. He asked his predecessor to recommend some books on Washington and American life more generally. After a moment's thought, the retiring Ambassador said, "Reggie, I suggest you start with the memoirs of Saint Simon." Ah well, Yale is not a worldly place, after all, and has never been known as a school for courtiers.

I do not mean to imply that I have any regrets about my adventures in Washington. The intellectual part of the job—trying to think about the nuclear weapon—turned out to be as demanding as any assignment I have ever had: full of myth, mathematics, and dreams, and utterly insoluble by the methods of reason alone. Surely a confirmed academic cannot ask for anything better, this side of Paradise. And I enjoyed the company of many fine colleagues and friends, new and old. The other dimension—the bureaucracy and the politics of it; the inevitable japery and knavery of Washington—struck me as more truly comic than any chapter of the Human Comedy I had witnessed before, more comic than faculty meetings, or even Washington during World War II, when forked tongues and stilletoes were in fashion, and sons of the wild jackass roamed the corridors freely.

Tonight I propose to put five simple propositions before you, as the main conclusions I draw from my recent experience.

1. The first is that we expect too much of arms control negotiations and arms control agreements. Arms control agreements can be useful instruments of foreign policy, and they are well worth pursuing. But they are not a substitute for foreign and defense policy, a wand we can wave to produce peace without tears. Many people throughout the West, however, seem to believe that a nuclear arms control agreement with the Soviet Union—good, bad, or indifferent—could guarantee the peace, or even that the process of negotiating such an agreement would somehow soothe the breasts of the Soviet leaders, and restrain their programs of expansion. The point is underlined by a remarkable bipartisan unanimity among the pundits who tell us that President Reagan will win easily next year if there is moderate economic recovery and an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.

I submit that the strength of this view, and its manifest dangers, justify the phrase "arms control fever" as the title for my talk. For the most significant aspect of the faith in arms control as peace magic is that it defies the visible lessons of experience. How such beliefs can be entertained after what happened in the 'Seventies—or for that matter, what happened during earlier periods when arms control fever raged—goes well beyond the limits of my understanding. Perhaps true faith is always immune to the evidence of the senses. The most important arms control agreements of this century—the Versailles Treaty and the naval agreements of the 'Twenties and 'Thirties—are hardly banners to which wise men can repair with confidence. In fact, the only truly successful arms control agreement I know about is the Rush-Bagot Treaty of 1817, which demilitarized the Great Lakes.

The record of our experience with arms control during the 'Seventies is all too plain. During the 'Seventies, you will recall, we made two nuclear arms agreements with the Soviet Union. They were ratified in 1972, and we spent the rest of the decade negotiating, signing, and debating the SALT II agreement. Throughout the West, people hailed the SALT process as the road to peace, and confidently assured us that when the Soviet Union had achieved nuclear parity, a place in the sun, and recognition as a great power, it would give up its policies of expansion, and live by the rules against aggression embodied in the United Nations Charter. Such condescending attitudes towards the serious men who govern the Soviet Union have always been exercises in wishful thinking. In 1983, they cannot be put forward at all. The Soviet Union did not do what it did during the last ten years in a fit of absence of mind; its foreign policy shows remarkable continuity and tenacity. The 'Seventies were a period of extraordinary Soviet expansion in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Caribbean, and of extraordinary—and continuing—growth in Soviet military power, and especially in the power of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. In each case, Soviet expansion was achieved by an aggressive use of force violating the rules of the United Nations Charter. And Soviet nuclear expansion went far beyond "parity", by any method of counting.

My first point, then, is simple but not easy. "Disarmament" and "arms control", on the one hand, and "collective security" against aggression, on the other, are twin policies. There can be no arms control or disarmament if world politics degenerates into a war of all against all.

2. Paradoxically, my second point may seem to challenge my first. It is that while every step on the road to our nuclear weapons dilemma was understandable in its context, the development of nuclear arsenals has become an insanity from which there can be no genuine escape save through Soviet-American agreement.

When the group of experts led by Einstein came to President Roosevelt and told him that Hitler was trying to make an atomic bomb, the President had no alternative but to go forward. So it has been ever since, with each Soviet breakthrough eliciting what we like to think is a deterrent response from us. Thus step by step the nuclear arms balance has become more complex and more bizarre. Vast sums are being spent on the development and manufacture of weapons whose function is to convince the other side that they *could* be used without quite risking the possibility that they *would* be used. And sizeable fractions of the most intelligent members of the work force of many countries are absorbed in making these weapons of intimidation; monitoring the activities of others in the field; and trying to calculate arms control formulae that might reduce the menace implicit in their existence.

Many metaphors have been used to describe the nuclear relation between the superpowers. A famous article some years ago described them as two scorpions in a bottle. President Reagan spoke the other day of two men on opposite sides of a table pointing loaded guns at each other. No one can disagree with President Reagan's comment that there ought to be a less barbarous way to keep the peace.

Perhaps new technologies of defense will make the nuclear weapon obsolete. Perhaps we can muddle through for another generation in something like the present pattern. But genuine deliverance from the nuclear nightmare can only be imagined through fundamental change in the foreign policy of expansion the Soviet Union has pursued so actively since 1945.

When I talk of Soviet-American understanding as indispensable to real progress in reducing the menace of nuclear weapons—not enough in itself, but indispensable nonetheless—I have in mind something much more comprehensive and fundamental than a technical nuclear weapons agreement confined to weapons quotas. Such agreements can do either good or harm, depending upon circumstance. Good arms control agreements can be useful catalysts, helping to encourage peace, and to reinforce peace once it has been established by other means. Bad arms control agreements can do a great deal of harm, if they prevent the West from doing what is necessary to deter aggression against our vital interests, and thus encourage war. You will understand why I used to say, when I was in ACDA, that while arms control agreements could not in themselves achieve peace, the Director of ACDA is in a position a little like that of Admiral Jellicoe during the First World War. Churchill said of Jellicoe that he was one of the few people on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon. In the event, of course, Jellicoe nearly did so at Jutland. And, so far as the nuclear balance is concerned, we nearly did the same thing in SALT I and SALT II.

3. The third point I want to emphasize is that the nuclear weapon is primarily a political, not a military force—a potent political force, generating currents of opinion which are transforming our world. No one can guarantee the absence of nuclear war, especially if nuclear weapons fall into the hands of irrational political leaders. Nonetheless, I believe the risk of nuclear war is far less today than the risk that the unity of the West will be destroyed and the West reduced to neutrality by psychological and political pressures emanting from the nuclear balance.

If we look back at the pattern of war and peace since 1945, we can see, I think, how calculations of the nuclear balance have influenced political and military decisions, from Berlin and Cuba to Korea, Vietnam, and the successive Middle East crises. When increasing numbers of serious people, including former President Nixon and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, tell us that the changes in the Soviet-American nuclear balance have made American nuclear guaranties incredible; when they say that great powers do not commit suicide for their allies, and that no American President could now do what President Kennedy did during the Cuban Missile Crisis twenty years ago, or what President Nixon did during the Middle Eastern crisis of October, 1973, it is time to stop, look, and listen.

By their existence, nuclear weapons generate fear. And, as Thucydides among others wisely emphasized, fear of the growing power of rivals has been an important cause of war throughout history. It has also been an important justification for surrender.

The Soviet Union achieved an advantage during the 'Seventies in ground-based ballistic missiles—the most accurate and destructive of nuclear weapons, and the ones most nearly immune to defenses. We never should have allowed that advantage to be attained, but we did. In 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union were approximately equal in the number of warheads on ground-based ballistic missiles of intercontinental range. During the last decade, the United States ICBM force remained stable, and we made no intermediate range missiles like those of the Soviet Union. By 1982, the Soviet Union had achieved a lead of three to one in ICBM warheads. If one adds the intermediate range Soviet missiles targetted on

Europe, China, the Middle East, and Japan to this figure,—now a force of some 1400 or 1500 warheads, growing at the rate of 3 a week,—the advantage becomes even more formidable. In other words, to recall an argument popular in the nuclear debate, the United States set a good example, but the Soviet Union didn't follow it.

Many of you remember Henry Kissinger's famous question, "What in Heaven's name can one do with nuclear superiority?"

The answer to Mr. Kissinger's question is now obvious. The Soviet advantage in ground-based missiles implies a theoretical first-strike capability, that is, a capacity to improve one's military position by undertaking a preemptive nuclear strike against the nuclear arsenal of one's adversary, and other military targets. If the Soviet Union could knock out our forces in that way with one-third or one-quarter of its ICBMs, the Soviet leaders could well believe that the remainder of their force would deter any response whatever on the part of the United States. Under these circumstances, there would be no credibility in an American threat to kill millions of Soviet citizens if the Soviet Union in response could kill many more million Americans.

When this dismal scenario is coupled with the Soviet monopoly in intermediate-range ground-based missiles, like the SS–20s, which threaten Western Europe, Japan, China, and the Middle East, the rationale behind the Soviet arms buildup becomes all too clear. It is the belief that Soviet numerical superiority in ground-based missiles creates a credible capacity for nuclear blackmail. The Soviet Union considers nuclear superiority as an ultimate and paralyzing reserve, permitting it to pursue its policy of indefinite expansion based on the use of conventional forces, terrorism, and subversion without fear of American retaliation. By such methods the Soviet Union can hope to gain the fruits of military victory without having to fight.

The state of the nuclear balance, as Helmut Schmidt has said, has a subliminal effect on the human mind. The Soviet advantage in ground-based missiles is the source of the nuclear anxiety which is having such a profound political influence throughout the Western world. The Soviet monopoly of modern intermediate range ballistic missiles constitutes a threat to Europe, China, and Japan at a time of growing doubt about the credibility of the nuclear umbrella provided by our intercontinental forces. The Soviet leaders believe that the whip-saw effect of this twin pressure, along with other Soviet activities and preparations on the periphery of Europe and Asia, will sap the foundations of the American alliance system. Throughout the non-Communist world, this twin pressure is strengthening movements for neutrality and unilateral disarmament, on the one hand, and for policies of isolationism, militarism, and ultranationalism, on the other—in short, for policies of self-deception, sauve-qui-peut, and the devil take the hindmost at both ends of the political spectrum.

If these political impulses are allowed to become full-blown panic, the structure of world politics would be transformed. Our troops would be withdrawn from forward bases and our alliances would be dissolved; nuclear weapons would proliferate; and we should be unable to protect our most fundamental national security interests against Soviet or Soviet-inspired aggression.

What is at stake in the nuclear arms talks, then, is, whether the United States can have a foreign policy at all, or whether the political tides generated by the Soviet nuclear advantage will force us to a policy of neutrality in Fortress America, as President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger suggest.

There is no objective justification for policies of withdrawal and surrender of this kind. A calm, steady, confident American foreign policy will continue indefinitely to deter the ultimate tragedy of nuclear war, and provide the foundation for successful programs of containment and collective security. As Professor Leslie Martin has said, the change in the nuclear balance may mean that the Emperor is naked. But he is still Emperor. There is no substitute for American nuclear deterrence. And it can continue to work. Foreign policy is influenced by many factors beyond computer print-outs defining the nuclear balance: by passion, fear, cowardice, stupidity, and accident; and by heroism, discipline, and faith, among others.

Our goal for the arms control talks in Geneva, therefore, is to confine nuclear weapons to the defensive purpose of deterring aggression. To facilitate this goal, we are concentrating in the first instance on the ground-based ballistic missiles, although we are of course fully prepared to negotiate about other nuclear weapons as well. The essence of our position in Geneva is to negotiate agreements which would make each side equal in nuclear deterrent power at radically reduced levels. Obiviously, the United States must eliminate the Soviet advantage in the most destabilizing class of nuclear weapons by agreement, by force modernization, or by a combination of the two. Equally clearly, we should infinitely prefer that advantage to be eliminated by agreement rather than by increasing our present nuclear arsenal.

The New York Times put the issue well in an editorial called "How Much is Enough?" on April 11, 1982. The task of arms control diplomacy, the Times said, is to allow the United States to maintain deterrence "which has kept the industrial world at peace for the longest stretch in history" and "to forbid the weapons which defy deterrence . . . That done, the arms race can subside. Until it is done, there never will be enough." If arms control agreements make it impossible for the Soviet Union to execute a preemptive first strike with less than 80%, rather than 25%, of its missile force, they should make a genuine contribution to political stability.

4. The fourth general comment I should make tonight is that thus far there is no sign of change in the Soviet position in the arms control negotiations or any other area of Soviet-American diplomacy.

The Soviet Union has not even accepted one of the proposals to neutralize Afghanistan, thus permitting a withdrawal of Soviet troops and a diminution of the Soviet threat to Iran and to Pakistan. Despite the stunning setback to Soviet plans in Lebanon, the Soviet Union has increase its own strength in Syria, threatening the air space of the South-Eastern corner of the Mediterranean. In Poland it continues to seek a restoration of order through repression, rejecting President Reagan's proposals for a progressive solution of the Polish crisis based on East-West cooperation. And in the Caribbean, in Asia, and in Africa it continues and indeed has increased its support for a sequence of armed attacks across a number of international frontiers.

Since the early 1950's, at least, the primary strategic goal of Soviet expansion has been to change the World balance of power by separating Western Europe from the United States and Canada. To achieve this goal, the Soviet Union has been following an old and familiar strategic doctrine. It has been seeking to outflank Europe from the north and south, thus bringing the entire Eurasian land mass under Soviet control, and on that basis, taking control of the Middle East and Africa. That done, the Soviet leaders believe, Japan and other nations of the Pacific basin would accept Soviet suzerainty as inevitable; the peoples of Europe would lose hope; and an isolated United States would have no choice but to acquiesce in Soviet dominion.

Mr. Andropov, the new Soviet leader, has defined the strategic goal of Soviet policy with refreshing candor in a speech he delivered on August 5, 1978, in Karelia, near Finland. The overriding task of foreign policy today, Mr. Andropov said, is to make detente irreversible. That task is indispensable in the name of humanity. And the outcome is made inevitable by what the Soviets like to call "the correlation of forces", and especially the balance of nuclear forces. Confronting these objective facts. Mr. Andropov says, the West has no alternative but to accept the Soviet conception of detente, which he defines in these terms:

"Here in Karelia, one must stress the significance attached to the lengthy experience of neighborly, genuinely equal and mutually advantageous co-operation between the Soviet Union and Finland. Soviet-Finnish relations today form an integral and stable system of equal cooperation in various spheres of political, economic and cultural life. This is detente embodied in daily contacts, detente which makes peace more lasting and people's lives better and more tranquil. In the last analysis this is the highly humane meaning of the foreign policy of socialism and the foreign policy activity of our party and the Soviet state."

Soviet conduct in the two nuclear arms control negotiations in Geneva, and in the active propaganda campaign accompanying those negotiations, is altogether compatible with Mr. Andropov's view. The main objectives of the Soviet Union in Geneva are to divide the United States from its allies, and to prevent the modernization of the American armed forces, and particularly the American nuclear forces. On that basis, Mr. Andropov seems to think, it will be easy to reduce the West to neutrality and the role of hewing wood and drawing water for the Soviet Empire.

In the INF talks the United States has proposed the abolition of the entire class of intermediate range ground based ballistic missiles on both sides. In response, the Soviet Union has repeatedly denounced and rejected the American zero-zero proposal, and offered in its place an ingenious plan which would permit the Soviet Union to keep, and perhaps even to enlarge its present SS-20 forces in and near Europe. Under the Soviet plan, the United States would not be permitted to deploy any comparable weapons in Europe. I do not know of any Western expert on the subject who regards the Soviet INF proposal as serious. The Soviet position is based not only on some athletic arithmetic about the weapons on each side which should be counted as intermediate range nuclear weapons, but on the proposition that the British and French nuclear weapons should be included in the agreement as American. This claim is entirely specious. The British and French weapons are not under American or NATO control. They exist for ultimate reasons of national survival, and do not constitute an aggressive threat to the Soviet Union in any possible sense, as Soviet officials freely admit. The argument is put forward as a bargaining device and a way of weakening European confidence in the American guaranty. Soviet-American parity is an important goal in itself. The Soviet claim of a right to a nuclear force equal to the sum of all other nuclear weapons in the world is a claim not to equality, but to hegemony.

Last July, the Soviet and American Ambassadors to INF, with my full support, suggested consideration of a compromise, which would involve low equal limits for both sides in and near Europe and in the Far East. That approach could make a major contribution towards the security of both countries, and of the world, by moving the nuclear arsenals towards a position of deterrence, and improving the credibility of United States nuclear guaranties for its allies and other vital interests. In March, 1983, President Reagan publicly announced our acceptance of the principle of the Ambassadors' compromise, which the Soviet Union had vehemently rejected last fall. We told the Soviet Union then that we did not take its rejection as final, and that while we had some difficulty with aspects of the plan, we were willing to keep the channel open. We should soon know whether the Soviets are willing to explore this possibility despite what Mr. Gromyko said at his press conference on April 2.

The situation in the START talks is comparable, but not yet so far advanced. The United States proposals would require a long step towards forces equal both in number and in destructive power—forces which would be capable of deterrence and retaliation, but not a preemptive first strike. The Soviet Union has thus far insisted on equal reductions, an approach which would preserve, perhaps even increase the destabilizing Soviet advantage.

The Soviet approach to the problem of these two related talks is hardly surprising. The Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles was not achieved by accident. It cost the Soviet Union a great deal of money, and years of effort on the part of the most advanced sectors of its economy. That advantage will not be given up unless the alternatives present unacceptable risks. The implications of the fact that a brilliant Soviet Ambassador, Yuri Kvitsinskiy, joined Ambassador Paul H. Nitze in sponsoring the Geneva trial balloon last July should be carefully and fully explored.

5. The fifth and final point I should like to put before you tonight follows, I believe, from the other four. It is that the so-called arms race, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, is not the cause but a symptom of the breakdown in world public order which has become palpable in recent years. The states system is crumbling towards anarchy, as the Secretary General of the United Nations has rightly warned. In every part of the globe, states feel themselves to be in mortal peril. Under these circumstances, I stress again, there can be no significant progress in arms control and disarmament without comparable progress in containment and collective security.

The modern state system has emerged from the moral and intellectual climate of the enlightenment, and from the experience of the last two centuries with war. Its dominant idea is that the strongest states have a special responsibility for keeping the peace. The Congress of Vienna and its aftermath in the diplomacy of the Victorian age proved to be both creative and important in shaping the state system, and establishing its basic rules. But the Vienna system failed tragically in 1914. The men who met at Versailles in 1919 tried to recreate it through the League of Nations, but their effort lacked conviction and power, and collapsed within a few years.

After the Second World War, the yearning of humanity for peace expressed itself again, this time in San Francisco through the conference which adopted the United Nations Charter. And again, as in 1919, the reconstruction of world public order was built upon the past, but also upon an appreciation of what had gone wrong. In 1945, Western opinion was convinced that if only the great powers had enforced the rules of the League Convenant against aggression in Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain, and the Rhineland, the Second World War could never have taken place. Therefore Article 2 (4) of the United Nations Charter categorically condemns the international use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, except where justified by the "inherent" right of individual or collective self-defense. To enforce these rules is the chief function of the Security Council, which, on paper at least, has far more authority than any institution of the League. Its nominal power recalls that which Palmerston, Disraeli, and Bismarck exercised in fact during some of the diplomatic Congresses of the nineteenth century: the power to guide, direct, limit, cajole, conciliate, and, if necessary, to command and dispose of controversies which threatened the peace.

It would have been difficult to fulfill the hopes of the Charter even if the great powers had remained together after 1945. The old state system has tenacious habits of aggressive warfare, after all, and the end of West European imperialism has given those habits new opportunities. But the great powers did not remain together after 1945, and moments of consensus among them have been rare. The root of the matter is that the Soviet Union has never accepted Article 2(4) of the Charter as applicable to it. From the beginning of the Charter era, the Soviet Union has claimed for itself—and only for itself—the privilege of using force against the territorial integrity or political independence of states which are not governed by Socialist regimes, and indeed of using force even against Socialist states if they are under the control of Socialist heretics, revisionists, or schismatics, or if they show dangerous signs of backsliding to democracy.

The Soviet Union has refused to recognize the right of its own peoples to self determination, on a most curious ground. Soviet writers solemnly declare that no people which has has a opportunity to belong to the Soviet Empire could conceivably elect to withdraw from it. Therefore, they conclude, any peoples in the Soviet Empire or under its protection who flirt with the notion of freedom are either mad or the victims of capitalist conspiracy or both, and have to be protected from themselves. This principle is being applied today in Poland, as it was applied yesterday in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, East Germany, and the Baltic States.

When pressed, Soviet diplomats or scholars say that for the Motherland of Socialism to obey Article 2(4) would be to give up its nature as a society and a state. To this, the only answer an American can give is that the Soviet Union can preach the gospel of communism to its heart's content, but that in the nature of the state system, it cannot be allowed to propagate its faith with a sword.

This, I believe, defines the context of the arms control negotiations, and constitutes their ultimate agenda. The Charter rules against the international use of force cannot survive much longer as effective norms unless they are respected equally by both sides. Unless the Soviet Union decides to abide by those rules, they will cease to control the behavior of the United States and its allies. This is not an outcome the West desires. We know that the enforcement of the Charter rules is in the equal interest of every state. They are neutral principles—rules against international aggressive war—not rules in defense of reaction or the status quo, or rules against revolution. They reflect the necessities of inter-state relations in a world which is becoming smaller, more interdependent, and more dangerous with every passing year. We know as well that conventional war may well escalate to the nuclear level, given the stress and passion which are normal to the phenomenon of war, and that the same irrational forces could easily transform limited into unlimited nuclear war.

In short, the nightmare of nuclear war should persuade all the nations, including the Soviet Union, that peace really is indivisible, in the phrase of a Soviet Foreign Minister forty years ago, and that the nominal rules of international law against conventional war should be reciprocally respected and generally enforced. This, I am convinced, is the only way to exercise the specter of nuclear war. And I am comforted that the draft statement of the American Catholic bishops on nuclear war, with which I disagree at a number of points, fully embraces this fundamental truth.

Is there a chance that the nations will take this course, as they recoil from the visible nightmare of anarchy and nuclear war?

I am an optimist on these matters, not because I believe that the Soviet Union is likely soon to undergo what Jonathan Edwards called a "great awakening", or see a blinding light on the road to Damascus, but because I am inclined to believe that man's instinct for self-preservation will in the end save us from suicide. The imperatives for survival in the nuclear age require the Western nations to restore the effectiveness of the policy of containment. The same imperatives decree the end of the Soviet Union's sour adventures in imperialism, and compel its acceptance, finally, of the rules of world public order which purport to govern every one else. Those rules correspond to the nature of states and the necessities of the state system, and constitute the only possible definition of the slippery word "detente".

Nearly a century ago, Alfred Nobel, the inventor of dynamite, thought that dynamite was so destructive that it would force mankind to accept peace. His prediction turned out to be wrong. But can we expect the horror of the nuclear weapon to fulfill Nobel's dream? If we are reasonable, and lucky, I believe we can. In any event, we have no alternative but to try.

Current
Policy No. 425

Nuclear Arms Control and the Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations

September 10, 1982

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is an address by Eugene V. Rostow, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, California, September 10, 1982.

My assignment is to contemplate the future of the Soviet-American relationship in the perspective of arms control—more particularly, in the perspective of our bilateral negotiations about nuclear weapons. To recall Dr. Johnson, nuclear arms control is one of those subjects which concentrate the mind. It is of special value in revealing the several realities of the Soviet-American relationship and the way in which they interact.

In attempting to carry out my assignment, I thought it would be useful to review the state of our nuclear arms negotiations with the Soviet Union—to report on where we are, and to peer through the glass darkly at the road ahead. As you know, two parallel Soviet-American negotiations are going on in Geneva. One deals primarily with Soviet intermediate-range nuclear weapons, those capable of being launched from the Soviet Union against targets in Western Europe, Japan, China, and the Middle East; the other deals with the intercontinental nuclear weapons on both sides. The talks on intermediate-range weapons, called the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] talks, began in November 1981, and are being conducted for us by Ambassador Paul H. Nitze. The START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] talks on nuclear weapons of intercontinental range began in June 1982 under Ambassador Edward L. Rowny.

We have agreed with the Soviet representatives that the details of the INF and START negotiations be kept confidential. But we have also made it clear to them that the Government of the United States has the duty to keep our people fully informed about the broad principles which govern our approach to the negotiations and the way in which they are developing. I have prepared my talk with full respect for these rules.

The INF and START talks are inextricably linked, for reasons both of security and of technology. The security reason for that linkage is so obvious that it is often taken to be self-evident and left unexplained. But the nuclear balance has been changing, and we can no longer take our traditional positions on these matters for granted. The political consequences of the changing nuclear balance should be faced head-on.

Looking back at the cycles of turbulence and stability since 1945, we have all come to realize, I think, that while the possibility of nuclear war can never be altogether excluded, especially in the case of countries governed by irrational political leaders, the principal significance of nuclear weapons is political. The political radiation of nuclear arsenals can be significant either for defense or for aggression—as a defensive deterrent, on the one hand, or as an aggressive instrument of political coercion, on the other. It is thus apparent that the INF and START talks involved the most fundamental issue of our foreign policy, the credibility of our security guaranties. Those guaranties all turn ultimately on the deterrent power of the American nuclear umbrella. The pressures of the Soviet race for nuclear supremacy during the last 10 years have intensified doubts about the continued effectiveness of the American nuclear deterrent—the rock on which the renaissance of the West since 1945 was built and the foundation for its security. Uncertainties on this basic point could lead to fatal miscalculations. A most important goal of our foreign policy as a whole, and thus of our arms control policy, is to restore full confidence in those guaranties on the part of friend and adversary alike.

The expansionist nature of Soviet foreign policy and the recent changes in the Soviet-American military balance—particularly with regard to nuclear weapons—directly challenge the major premise of modern American foreign policy. That premise is distilled from the harsh experience of two world wars which strong allied diplomacy could easily have prevented. It has been accepted by every President since 1945, and spelled out in long series of treaties, joint resolutions of the Congress, and other national commitments. Its essence is that the United States can no longer live in neutral isolation but must protect its interest in the world balance of power by preventing Soviet domination of Western Europe, Asia, or the Middle East at a minimum. The Concert of Europe which protected that American security interest for a century before 1914 does not exist. We can no longer take shelter behind the British fleet. If the job is to be done, we must take the lead in organizing the coalitions to do it. To recall the language of the North Atlantic Treaty under which NATO is established, and which is expressed in other security arrangements as well, an attack on these vital areas must also be considered an attack on the United States. In contemplating the future, every nation must take this permanent and immutable geopolitical interest of the United States fully into account.

Outside the government, Americans who write and speak about foreign policy may forget this ultimate truth and flirt nostalgically with the isolationist ideas of the 19th century. Occasionally the government of the day may do so for a time, under the pressure of events. But those who bear the responsibility of government cannot enjoy the luxury of escapism. The world should understand that the instincts for self-preservation of a politically mature people will always dominate American foreign policy in the end. As President Reagan has made clear, the United States will not retreat to "Fortress America" but will defend its alliances and interests throughout the world. What is at stake in the INF and START talks is nothing less than our capacity to carry out that policy through deterrence based on alliance solidarity: that is, through peaceful means and not by war.

The technical reason why the INF and START talks must be viewed together is equally simple. It is that intermediate- and intercontinental-range nuclear weapons do not constitute separate categories: Soviet weapons capable of hitting New York or Chicago could also be fired at London or Tokyo. There is, therefore, no way to evaluate the INF balance except in the START context. We cannot allow the whipsaw threat of Soviet INF and strategic forces to separate us from our allies and keep us from defending the security interests of the nation.

The United States is, therefore, closely coordinating the INF and START talks, which are based on the same analysis. Through these talks in tandem, we are trying to achieve the same goal—a radical reduction of the Soviet and American nuclear arsenals in a manner conducive to stability.

Review of Negotiating Efforts

Before we can consider how the INF and START talks are progressing, we must agree on the criteria to be applied in judging their utility. To that end, let me briefly recall the analysis from which our negotiating position is derived and the implications of the goal we are trying to achieve. President Reagan is determined to take full advantage of our arms control experience during the 1970s. That effort has required a reexamination of the role of nuclear weapons and the arms control doctrines of the United States and the Soviet Union.

How should we define what we are seeking through the INF and START talks? The place to begin, we concluded more than a year ago, is to take a fresh look at the nuclear weapon itself. We have been living with it since 1945. The early assumption that the nuclear weapon was a magic force for peace has long since faded away. Even when we had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, and then great nuclear superiority, we had to use conventional forces—and those alone—to counter a long cycle of aggression by the Soviets and their surrogates. Save in a few important situations of extreme tension, we found the doctrine of "massive retaliation" to be an empty threat.

Since the late 1950s, at least, the primary strategic goal of the Soviet program of expansion has been to achieve world dominance by separating Western Europe from the United States and Canada. To achieve this goal, the Soviet Union has been and is seeking to outflank Europe from the north and the south, thus bringing the entire Eurasian land mass under Soviet control and, on that basis, taking over Africa and the Middle East. That done, the Soviet leaders believe, Japan and the other nations of the Pacific basin would accept Soviet suzerainty as inevitable; the peoples of Europe would lose hope; and the United States would be isolated, with no choice but to aquiesce in Soviet hegemony. All our experience in our bilateral nuclear arms talks with the Soviet Union is consistent with this hypothesis. Soviet strategy in SALT I [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] and SALT II, seems to be dominated by two ideas: to divide the United States from its allies and to prevent the modernization of the American Armed Forces. These are the main Soviet themes in the negotiation as they are the main themes of Soviet arms control propaganda.

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States and its allies have never stopped trying to persuade the Soviet Union that this course was the classic road to disaster. Nor have they flagged in their efforts to convince the leaders of the Soviet Union that a constructive alternative was always available—the alternative of genuine East-West cooperation, based on respect by each side for the legitimate security interests of the other and for the rules of the U.N. Charter against aggression. To this end, with varying degrees of success, the allies sought to contain Soviet expansion and proposed a long series of agreements designed to induce the Soviet Union to pursue its ambitions in world politics only by peaceful means.

Among these proposals, those addressed to the nuclear menace have been of quite particular significance.

From the beginning of the nuclear age nearly 40 years ago, the American people and their government have been convinced—and rightly convinced—that nuclear weapons are revolutionizing both warfare and world politics and that extraordinary steps are required to protect civilization from the unthinkable disaster of nuclear war. Conventional war has profoundly damaged the fabric of civilization during this turbulent century. The consequences of nuclear war would be immeasurably worse.

The United States made its first proposal to eliminate the nuclear threat in 1946, when we had a monopoly of nuclear arms and nuclear technology. In the Baruch Plan we offered to put the whole of nuclear science under international control. Looking back, it is obvious that the Soviet refusal even to consider that offer was one of the most destructive turning points in the history of the cold war.

The offer of the Baruch Plan does not stand alone. During the 1950s, President Eisenhower proposed the "open skies" plan, which has had far-reaching influence even though it was not formally accepted. The first major step in the control of nuclear arms was achieved in 1963 in the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty followed in 1968.

Beyond these agreements, there are treaties barring weapons of mass destruction from the Antarctic and from outer space and the cycle of agreements which are our primary concern today—the Soviet-American SALT agreements and the INF and START negotiations. SALT I comprised two agreements, the Interim Agreement limiting offensive strategic weapons, which expired in 1977, and the ABM Treaty, which severely restricts systems for intercepting and destroying ballistic missiles. The ABM Treaty is of indefinite duration. SALT I and SALT II disappointed the claims made for them and the expectations they generated. Against the background of the Soviet nuclear build-up under the SALT I Interim Agreement, SALT II would have sanctioned continued increases in Soviet nuclear capabilities to threaten world stability.

What is the moral of this cycle of experience for the policies President Reagan has proposed in the INF and START talks? First, we are more convinced than ever that the efforts of the United States since 1946 to eliminate the possibility of nuclear war were wise and necessary. They should be intensified, not relaxed or abandoned. Second, it is obvious that no impregnable wall can be erected between nuclear and conventional war. A nuclear stalemate will not be worth having if it is treated simply as a license for conventional wars of all against all.

In order to eliminate nuclear war, the nations must also eliminate conventional war: that is, the struggle to save mankind from nuclear catastrophe must be conceived as part of a wider struggle to establish world public order itself. The issue is not colonialism, or capitalism, or communism, or democracy, or the so-called arms race. It is aggression. The motives for aggression are irrelevant. And the arms race is the symptom and consequence, not the cause, of the breakdown in world public order. We live in a small, interdependent, and dangerous world. In that world, our world with its ominous nuclear dimension, aggression should be inadmissible, and peace should be indivisible.

As President Reagan has said, we can no longer tolerate a "double standard" with regard to Soviet aggression or aggression by any other power. Both we and the Soviet Union must obey the same rules with regard to the international use of force—the rules to which we both agreed when we signed the U.N. Charter. Unless these neutral and universal principles are generally and impartially enforced, they will cease to have any influence on the behavior of states. In President Reagan's phrase, the nations must not merely condemn aggression; they must prevent it and enforce the rules against it.

Problems of INF and START Negotiations

I now turn to the specific problems of INF and START negotiations. A year ago a consensus emerged within the Administration on certain key propositions as the foundation for our negotiating approach in the two negotiations. The first and most important was that we should discard the premise that the United States and the Soviet Union shared the same view of nuclear weapons and the same goal for nuclear arms control negotiations. Ten years ago most Americans took that hypothesis for granted. Today it cannot be entertained at all. Officials used to assure us that the Soviet Union was only interested in equality, recognition as a great power, and a place in the sun and that when it achieved parity with the United States it would stop enlarging its armed forces. No one can say that after what happened during the 1970s.

For the United States, the only acceptable use for nuclear arms is in defense of our supreme national interests and those of our allies against the use of nuclear weapons and other forms of aggression. Our nuclear arsenal is defensive in character, and its mission is to deter aggression by presenting a visible and credible capacity to retaliate.

It is now obvious that the Soviet Union marches to a different drummer. While we in the West have been primarily concerned with deterring both conventional and nuclear attacks, Soviet doctrine and forces emphasize the ability to fight and win a nuclear war. Of course, the Soviet Government would prefer to have the fruits of military victory without having to wage war. To achieve that end, it believes, the nuclear superiority it is trying so hard to attain would be a political force of overpowering influence—the ultimate instrument of coercion and intimidation. The function of Soviet military superiority is to paralyze the American nuclear deterrent by threatening to overwhelm it, and thus make Soviet aggression with conventional forces possible. More than 75% of the Soviet strategic nuclear force consists of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—swift, accurate, and extremely destructive first-strike weapons which could destroy missiles deployed in hardened silos. Less than one-third of the American force consists of ICBMs. In addition, the Soviet Union has an intermediate-range ballistic missile force which, as yet, has no American counterpart. The Soviets currently have deployed at least 324 SS–20 launchers, 265 SS–4s, and 15 SS–5s. They have 1,232 warheads in all. With one refire missile per launcher, these intermediate-range missiles may have over 2,000 nuclear warheads, almost all of which can reach West European targets. The balance, all deployed on mobile SS-20 launchers, are now targeted from eastern Siberia. Given the transportability and range of the SS-20, all of these could be moved within reach of Europe. The United States has no weapons at all in this class. Partially to counter this threat, our Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missile and ground-based cruise missile are in development and are scheduled for modest deployment in Europe late in 1983.

The Soviet lead in ground-based intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles is one of the most serious foreign policy problems we face. This advantage gives the Soviet Union the potential to destroy all of Europe or Japan and many targets in other parts of the world at a time when a preemptive first strike with its intercontinental ballistic missiles could in theory also destroy all our ICBM force, that portion of our submarines that are in port, and those of our bombers that are at their bases.

The combination of these doomsday possibilities is a recipe for nuclear coercion that could split our alliances and leave us isolated in the Western Hemisphere. Henry Kissinger deepened Western anxiety about the nuclear imbalance a few years ago with his celebrated comment that great powers do not commit suicide on behalf of their allies. Former President Nixon has now made nuclear anxiety in this sense more acute. In an article in the *New York Times* on August 19, 1982, he says:

> The Soviet Union's achievement of superiority in land-based nuclear missiles has made our nuclear strength no longer a credible deterrent against Moscow's creeping expansionism, in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East. We will not again be able to use the threat of that power as President Kennedy did in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, when we had a 15-to-1 advantage, or even as I was able to do during the Arab-Israeli war in 1973, when our advantage was far less but still formidable. Even if we restore the balance of those nuclear forces, we will not fully restore their deterrent effect for such purposes. A threat of mutual suicide is simply not credible.

Political anxieties about the American nuclear umbrella would exist even if Dr. Kissinger and President Nixon had not spoken. They are what Chancellor Schmidt has called "subliminal" emanations of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and the state of the Soviet-American nuclear balance. They are there because we allowed the nuclear balance to deteriorate during the 1970s. We shall have to live with the consequences of that mistake until the balance is restored by some combination of American force modernization and arms control agreements.

The fears generated by the changing nuclear balance are manifest in many forms—in the antinuclear demonstrations and other movements for unilateral disarmament, isolationism, and accommodation, on the one hand, and for nuclear proliferation, on the other. If these movements prevail, here, in Europe, and in Asia, we shall wake up one day soon in a different world.

In the light of these considerations, President Reagan decided to make the removal of the destabilizing Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles the first goal of our nuclear arms control effort and the first aspect of the problem for us to take up with the Soviet Union. We were slightly ahead of the Soviet Union in the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs in 1972.

In 1982 the Soviets have a lead in this crucial area of approximately three to one. It follows that they have the theoretical capacity to execute a preemptive first strike by destroying our ICBMs and other nuclear forces with a fraction of their forces, holding the rest in an ominous reserve which could paralyze our remaining strategic forces. When the Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles are counted, the Soviet advantage in this category becomes even higher. Until this Soviet advantage in nuclear forces is eliminated, it will not be possible to achieve political stability.

The *New York Times* put the issue well in an editorial entitled "How Much Is Enough?" on April 11, 1982. The task of arms control diplomacy, the *Times* said, is to allow the United States to maintain deterrence "which has kept the industrial world at peace for the longest stretch in history" and "to forbid the weapons which defy deterrence . . . . That done, the arms race can subside. Unless it is done, there will never be enough."

U.S. Approach to INF Talks

This view of the matter is the basis for our approach to the INF and START talks. What we are seeking in these talks is to establish nuclear stability at equal and much lower levels of force—a posture on each side which would permit us to deter both nuclear war and other forms of aggression against our supreme interests. Such a policy would deny the Soviet Union the capacity for nuclear blackmail based on its present superiority in ground-based intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The U.S. position in these talks was explained by President Reagan in his speech of November 18, 1981. During the first round of the INF talks beginning in November 1981, the U.S. delegation laid out the broad priniciples underlying the U.S. approach, defined the elements of an agreement which would take into account the legitimate interests of the two sides, and in February 1982 presented the text of a draft treaty which would implement those elements. The Soviet side elaborated somewhat on the positions that had been set forth by Chairman Brezhnev before the negotiations had begun and offered its criticism of the U.S. position. Mr. Brezhnev's plan has two elements: A moratorium for the duration of the negotiations and a program of reductions based on the assumption that both sides are now equal in intermediate-range missiles. The Soviets have proposed a limit of 300 "systems" for each side by 1990.

During the second round, beginning in May, the Soviet delegation presented a draft text of an agreement which would embody the Soviet position. The United States offered its criticisms of the Soviet position and a full analysis of the issues between the sides.

As the third round of the INF negotiations is scheduled to begin at the end of this month, it is appropriate to review some of the major issues as they have emerged. You will remember that in 1976 the Soviet Union began the deployment of a new mobile and MIRVed [multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicle] intermediate-range missile system—the SS-20—as a replacement for the older fixed single-warhead systems on which it had relied for many years. The SS-20s are highly accurate; can strike all important targets in Europe, even from locations in the middle of Siberia; and have a short time of flight. They represent a threat different in kind, not just in degree, from the systems they have been replacing.

In 1979 the NATO nations unanimously agreed that it was necessary to counter this threat unless it was withdrawn. It was decided that the United States should move to deploy in Europe two somewhat comparable systems, the Pershing II ballistic missile and the BGM-109G ground-launched cruise missile and simultaneously seek negotiations with the Soviet Union for the limitation of comparable systems on both sides. On November 18, 1981, President Reagan proposed that both the United States and the U.S.S.R. entirely forego such systems—the zero/zero solution.

The Soviet Union has not yet gone beyond its position that the INF talks are exclusively concerned with stability in the European theater. The United States insists that the INF problem is global and that the cause of world peace would not be advanced by exporting the Soviet INF nuclear advantage to Asia.

The Soviet Union also continues to claim that the United States and the Soviet Union have approximately the same number of intermediate-range nuclear weapons in the European theater and, therefore, that the NATO decision to deploy 572 Pershing II and ground-based cruise missiles in Europe is "provocative" and "destabilizing." The Soviet claim rests on two untenable propositions—first, that the British and French nuclear forces must be counted with the American forces and, second, that American bombers, submarine-launched missiles, and cruise missiles should be treated as equivalent to the Soviet SS-20. The Soviet calculations go beyond even these errors. In order to demonstrate the supposed equality of the two INF forces in Europe, the Soviet Union must count all American weapons as relevant—including American dual-purpose aircraft, as well as FB-111s, all of which are located in the United States—and also exclude many categories of the Soviet arsenal.

The principal issue between the sides centers on the treatment to be accorded the SS-20s and comparable missiles on the Soviet side, and the Pershing II and BGM-109G on the United States side. Whereas the United States draft treaty would ban them on both sides, the Soviet treaty would eliminate them only on the U.S. side; the Soviet side would be permitted to have up to 300 launchers for such missiles in the European portion of the Soviet Union and an unlimited number in the far-eastern portion of the Soviet Union.

In addition to this wholly one-sided treatment proposed by the Soviets as to the central issues, their proposed treaty would have other unequal effects. The Warsaw Pact has some 7,000 nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe, of which some 2,500 are assigned to nuclear combat roles. NATO has approximately one-third of the latter number; almost all U.S. nuclear-capable planes located in Europe are dual capable. The U.S. contribution to the conventional defense of Europe is almost wholly dependent on such dual-capable planes. Yet, the Soviet draft treaty would have the effect of forcing the almost total withdrawal from Europe of such U.S. dual-capable aircraft, while not affecting most Soviet dual-capable aircraft.

This effect results in part from the Soviet proposal that U.K. and French nuclear-capable systems be included under the aggregate ceiling limiting U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range missiles and aircraft. This proposal is both technically flawed and inequitable in principle. First, most of these U.K. and French forces are not, in fact, intermediate-range (or what the Soviets call medium-range); they are SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missile] forces identical with Soviet and U.S. SLBM forces. Most of the remainder are nuclear-capable aircraft. The Soviet predominance in intermediate-range, nuclear-capable systems in Europe is so great that there would be no justification for compensation to the Soviet Union for British and French nuclear forces even if they were under NATO command.

Beyond this technical flaw, the claim of the Soviet Union for nuclear forces equal to or superior to those of all other nations combined would be unjustified. It is a demand for absolute security for one country, which is tantamount to absolute insecurity for all other countries. In short, it is a Soviet demand for hegemony. This will never be acceptable to the United States.

This Soviet demand is inappropriate in another way as well. The INF negotiations are bilateral negotiations between the United States and the U.S.S.R.; neither the United Kingdom nor France has authorized either the United States or the Soviet Union to negotiate on their behalf. On the contrary, they have stated their refusal to have their forces limited or compensated for in negotiations between us. From their standpoint, their nuclear forces are strategic; they represent their last line of defense in a potentially threatened position.

There are a number of other important issues separating the two sides. Much progress, however, has been achieved by the two delegations in sorting out what is important to each side and illuminating the way to possible solutions. A serious atmosphere has evolved in the INF talks. It is clear that a potentiality exists for accommodating the analytic concepts used by both sides. What is not yet clear is whether the Soviet Union is willing to accept agreement based exclusively on the principle of deterrence.

U.S. Position in START

The first 2-month round of the START negotiations has now been completed. They are, of course, at an earlier stage than the INF talks, but the atmosphere is correspondingly serious and businesslike.

The U.S. position was outlined in President Reagan's speech at Eureka College on May 9, 1982. Its essential idea is that of equal ceilings at much lower levels of force—ceilings that would strengthen deterrence and promote stability by significantly reducing the Soviet lead in ICBMs. Coupled with the dismantling of the Soviet intermediate-range ballistic missiles proposed in the INF talks, such a result would enable us to maintain an overall level of strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter conflict, safeguard our national security, and meet our commitments to allies and friends.

To achieve this goal, the President announced a practical, phased approach to the negotiation, like the procedure being used in the INF talks. It is based on the principle that the two arsenals should be equal both in the number of weapons and in their destructive capacity. "The focus of our efforts," the President said, "will be to reduce significantly the most destabilizing systems—ballistic missiles, the number of warheads they carry, and their overall destructive potential."

While no aspect of the problem is excluded from consideration and the United States will negotiate in good faith on any topics the Soviets wish to raise, the United States proposes that the first topic to be considered in the negotiations should be the reduction of ballistic missile warheads to equal levels at least one-third below current numbers. Both ground-based and submarine-launched ballistic missiles are included in this proposal. No more than half these warheads would be deployed on land-based missiles. This provision alone should achieve substantial reductions in missile throw-weight. Our proposal calls for these warhead reductions, as well as significant reductions in the number of deployed missiles, to be achieved as quickly as possible.

In a second phase, closely linked to the first, we will seek equal ceilings on other elements of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces, including equal limits on ballistic missile throw-weight at less than current U.S. levels.

In both START and INF, the United States has made it clear that verification measures capable of assuring compliance are indispensable. For those provisions that cannot be monitored effectively by national technical means of verification, we will be proposing cooperative measures, data exchanges, and collateral constraints that should provide the necessary confidence in compliance. The Soviet Union has indicated that it will be prepared where necessary to consider cooperative measures going beyond national technical means. This is an encouraging sign. Without satisfactory verification provisions, meaningful agreements will be impossible to achieve.

The Soviet Union has attacked our START proposals as unfair, on the ground that they call for unequal reductions—indeed, that they call for "unilateral Soviet disarmament." It is hardly obvious why this is the case. Each side now has approximately 7,500 ballistic missile warheads. Under the American proposal, each side would have to reduce to no more than 5,000, of which no more than 2,500 could be on ICBMs. True, the Soviet Union would have to dismantle more ICBM warheads than we would in order to comply with the ICBM sublimit, while we might have to dismantle more submarine-based missiles. But that is the point. There is nothing inequitable about an equal ceiling which strengthens deterrence and stability. It is discouraging that this feature of the American proposal was not mentioned in a recent article in the *Los Angeles Times* by General Starodubov, a senior member of the Soviet START delegation. By omitting any reference to SLBMs, General Starodubov gives the reader an incomplete version of the American position.

If the INF and START talks are successful, the huge Soviet advantage in ground-based ballistic missiles will be eliminated. These alone are the weapons which "defy deterrence." If the Soviet Union accepts nuclear arms control agreements based on the principle of "deterrence only," which is the heart of our negotiating position, a Soviet first strike would be impossible without expending most of the Soviet force. Given such a change in the balance of the two forces, we could hope to protect our ICBM force effectively. Then—but only then—nuclear tension would diminish.

There is another aspect of our START negotiating position which deserves emphasis. As President Reagan's speech at Eureka College makes clear, the American approach to START is directed in the first instance at the most destabilizing weapons and proposes a new unit of account as the basis for a treaty dealing with them and all other intercontinental nuclear weapons. That unit of account, replacing the "deployed launchers" used in SALT I and SALT II, would compare the Soviet and American forces both in the number of weapons on each side and their destructive capacity. The measure of destructive capacity we propose is that of throw-weight—the maximum weight of weapons a missile can propel. What we are seeking is an equal throw-weight limit for each side at levels below the present American level. This goal would require a greater reduction on the Soviet side than on the American side. But the Soviet Union can hardly claim a right to preserve an advantage which could only be used for intimidation or aggression. Nor is there anything inequitable in the idea of unequal reductions to achieve equality. The United States made larger reductions than any other power under the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922.

The Need for Real Nuclear Parity

If we yield in the end and wearily settle for INF and START agreements which allow the Soviet Union to preserve its overwhelming advantage in ballistic missiles, we should find ourselves confronting former President Nixon's bleak prognosis. Such an outcome would legitimize the superiority in intermediate-range and intercontinental ground-based ballistic missiles that the Soviet Union has achieved under SALT and authorize it to consolidate and improve that advantage. On that basis, the Soviet leaders would be justified in continuing to believe that they could translate their nuclear edge over the United States into political and diplomatic hegemony.

This would be a most dangerous illusion—the kind of illusion from which major wars have arisen in the past. President Reagan's approach to INF and START calls on the Soviet Union to join us in recognizing that the quest for hegemony is the greatest possible threat to the peace and that real nuclear parity between the Soviet Union and the United States—parity, that is, in deterrent capacity—is the most feasible foundation for a joint program to establish world political stability based on the rule of law.

The state of world politics does not justify the apocalyptic gloom of those who believe that resisting Soviet expansionism would be suicidal and, therefore, counsel an American retreat to isolation and submission. The Soviet drive for unlimited power faces insuperable obstacles. It confronts deep-seated economic and social problems at home and the ineradicable hostility of the nations it is seeking to rule abroad. It has suffered major defeats in peripheral campaigns, especially in the Middle East. And what Mr. Brezhnev has called "the crisis" in Poland is one of supreme importance to the future of the Soviet Union. Even the magnitude of its nuclear arsenal cannot protect the Soviet Union from the deeply rooted yearnings for freedom shared by people everywhere. Finally, and most important of all, the Soviet Union, like every other country, must accept the implacable logic of the nuclear weapon. As Khruschev once said, the nuclear weapon does not respect the difference between socialism and capitalism.

Foreign policy is not a mathematical exercise like chess. Like every other human enterprise, it must take account of the unforeseen. Chance, heroism, passion, and faith have greater influence in human affairs than the grim calculus of the nuclear equation.

The ultimate issue of Soviet-American relations since 1917 is defined in the nuclear arms talks with chilling clarity. It is whether the Soviet Union is a state like the others, willing to live as a member of the society of nations and to abide by its rules or, on the other hand, whether the Soviet Union will persist in the suicidal view that its mission is to lead a crusade to spread the "True Faith" by the sword. When the issue is raised with Soviet diplomats or professors, they say, "You are asking us to change a foreign policy rooted in the nature of our society and state." To that claim, the only possible answer is, "Not at all. So far as we are concerned, you can preach the gospel of communism as much as you like. But the rest of the world cannot tolerate the use of aggression to achieve it."

If the leaders of the Soviet Union are as rational and cautious as they are supposed to be, they should want a period of peace and stability in their relationship with the West. On the whole, I think they will. Like all his modern predecessors, President Reagan has made it clear to the Soviet leaders that he would welcome such a change and cooperate fully in making it a reality. ■

Published by the United States Department of State · Bureau of Public Affairs
Office of Public Communication · Editorial Division · Washington, D.C. · October 1982
Editor: Colleen Sussman · This material is in the public domain and may be reproduced without permission; citation of this source is appreciated.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you very much.

There being no objection, we will proceed under the 10 minute rule.

I have less than 10 minutes of questions, but I have a very basic question. It has been pointed out by Ambassador Smith and others about the bureaucratic and political situation of ACDA. People are wondering if an arms control agreement could be proposed, negotiated and then ratified. Yesterday it occurred to me to ask whether we have a timetable for a freeze, or do we have a timetable for the builddown? Yesterday, I asked Senators Nunn and Cohen what is the proposed timetable, let's say, under ideal conditions, for a builddown, and they both said that they had not thought about it.

And later in the day, in talking with them about a meeting we had at the White House about 2 weeks ago, it was estimated it would probably take about a year to get the specifications of a builddown. So if the President and the Congress decide to adopt a builddown, it will probably take a year to make a decision in the administration as to what the specifications and the tradeoffs of a builddown would be. It would probably take another year or two to negotiate it.

So optimistically, we are really talking about a 3-year delay. Or if a freeze is agreed to, how long would it take internally, bureaucratically, to decide what to propose and place on the table?

It just seems as though we are totally paralyzed, even if we were to agree on something here. As I listened to testimony this morning, I guess one of my questions—and I would start out with Ambassador Smith—why have we gotten into this position that we are so paralyzed?

Of course, you suggested putting the ACDA Director on the National Security Council, and you said in your statement that the Pentagon people, quite rightly so, take a different approach. They, too, have responsibilities. How quickly can we get action in arms control, and what do we have to do to make it happen?

Ambassador SMITH. Mr. Chairman, I do not think the organization of the American Government for arms control is at fault in the fact that we did not see any progress in the past 4 years. I think it would be well to try to improve the organization, but I would not like to see a conclusion that if only ACDA had been better, or better organized, things would have been better. I think basically the problem is one of political will on the part of the Chief Magistrate. If you do not have that, it seems to me you are looking at these long time periods where bureaucracy argues with itself.

I think, given the necessary political will, if we can win a war like World War II in 4 years, it should not take us 4 months to put together a proposal of the sort you are talking about.

Now, I am bound to say on the builddown proposal, it seems to me as long as we go ahead with building up the MX, adding 1,000 warheads to our force, I do not understand the arithmetic at all as to how you would get to a build-down proposition. Somebody told me, oh well, if you go to the bombers that we have mothballed out West, you can get the arithmetic to work out. But that strikes me as a phoney sort of proposal, that we would decommission bombers that are already decommissioned in order to make this 2-to-1 ratio that we have heard talked about.

Senator PRESSLER. General Seignious, do you have any comment on that?

General SEIGNIOUS. My comment is basically that each political candidate seems to try to diffuse the posture of the opposition by tackling defense and arms control matters even though it is not often proved to be correct once someone is elected.

In other words, I do not think we have found yet from a leader how to get a consensus, and a bipartisan consensus, on defense and arms control. The history in this country since World War II has been cyclical. We have gone from starvation to feast in our defense programs. We have had off-again, on-again defense programs. Arms control, either too much has been expected from it or it has not been integrated into policy formulation. And I did not infer, as Ambassador Smith did, that ACDA itself is at fault in the lack of progress in 10 years.

The structure of this Government in integrating arms control into national security is at fault, and the organization is a part of that, and it has got to come from a national desire for a central position, with the first question being asked by whether it be a Democrat or Republican, what is in the national interest, and sticking by it, and not create artificial bogies for political purpose.

Mr. ROSTOW. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest while I listened with great sympathy and support to my friends' and colleagues' suggestions about structural change for ACDA's role in the Government, I agree with some of them at least that that is not central.

I witnessed in the sixties a period of ACDA's very active and responsible role in the arms control process under the leadership of Bill Foster and Butch Fisher. And there the collaboration with the State Department and the Defense Department seemed to be close, continuous and effective under the leadership, as Mr. Smith says, of the Chief Magistrate.

So I do not think the structure is wrong, and indeed, I do support the recommendations of the Commission which led to the ACDA statute in 1961 that the Director of ACDA have direct access to the President and the White House and not be, in effect, an Under Secretary of State.

I think the much more important reason for delay in these proceedings is the Soviet position. We have a profound psychological and political resistance to accepting the reality that it is what it is. There is no use getting excited about it. But the Soviet Union is pursuing a serious policy of its own, and the dedicated and extremely able people who direct the affairs of that nation know what that policy is and what they are after.

For example, very few people realize that the Soviet position in the INF talks now, more than a year and a half after they began, is still, I think—at least it was when I was cast out of the Government in January, and I think it is still true—that the Soviet Union would keep in and near Europe its full force of SS-20's and perhaps add to it somewhat, and we would not be allowed to put any modern missiles at all into Europe.

This is achieved by a most ingenious and quite delightful arithmetical trick, but it is nontheless their position, and I do not know any serious advocate, any serious student of this question in Europe, America or Japan who thinks that the Soviet proposal is serious.

Now, this is the cause of delay, and I submit that until their basic policy position is changed, no amount of ingenuity, no amount of debating with ourselves and recasting these things, no amount of energy on the part of our negotiators is going to alter it.

What was proposed by both INF Ambassadors last summer, the trial balloon floated by Ambassadors Nitze and Kvitsinsky was, as I said in my New York speech last April, perfectly fair to both sides on the premise of parity. We said there were problems with it, but we wanted to go ahead and discuss it and keep the channel open. But the Soviets turned it down flat, with vehemence, and they turned it down flat because obviously it was a proposal for equality.

So I do not think that changes of this kind are going to alter the situation very much. I might add, regarding the remark of Ambassador Smith that our INF and START proposals were tailored in the Defense Department, that is not correct. I have no complaint whatever about full consideration of the suggestions and proposals made by ACDA in the period of my directorship. Our INF and START positions were not made in the Defense Department, they were made by the President after full discussion in which ACDA had full participation.

Senator **Pressler**. Senator Boschwitz has to preside at noon, and Senator Pell has graciously agreed to yield.

I would just say on this question that even adding up the most optimistic scenario, we are 4 or 5 years away from an arms control agreement. Even if the Russians and the U.S. leadership really decided to start to move, it will require a long time.

Senator Boschwitz.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I hope, Mr. Chairman, that assessment is incorrect.

I would like to read into the record a letter that the committee received from William Foster who thanked us for the invitation to appear but says that his state of health does not permit him to do so, and so he submits a brief letter.

You asked me how I thought we could achieve continuity in U.S. arms control policy, and what I saw as key priorities in arms control negotiations. To a large extent, I think there is one answer for both questions: It is a matter of how the U.S. Government is organized for arms control.

It has become increasingly apparent, to ever-greater numbers of people, that sound arms control policy is essential for the survival of our country. Traditional military or diplomatic solutions simply are no longer enough to assure our national security. Arms control—the safe design, configuration, limitation, and verification of weapons systems—is also an essential part of the picture. We have seen what happens when our people lack assurance that their Government is doing its best in arms control: There is an outpouring of concern by responsible-minded and deeply worried citizens' groups. We need such an arms control organization within our Government that responsible people need never again feel this lack of confidence.

I do not think the answer lies in having a huge arms control bureaucracy. Let me repeat that, Mr. Chairman. "I do not think the answer lies in having a huge arms control bureaucracy. It seems to me that a small but specialized organization like the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency [ACDA]—which I was privilege to direct from 1961 to 1969—can provide the necessary ideas and expertise, if it can draw on the resources of other Government agencies. [ACDA has taken quite a battering in more recent times, but I believe that enough remains of its records and specialized personnel to make a new beginning.] What has been lacking for arms control is stature within the Government. We must never again allow arms control to be smothered by other agencies or simply left in limbo.

Therefore, I propose that in the future the Director of ACDA should have cabinet rank and that he should be co-chairman with the Secretary of State, of an Arms Control Committee, the other members of which would be the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the CIA. All members of this committee would have direct access to the President. The President's special assistant for National Security Affairs could attend meetings of the committee as an observer. Arms control negotiations would be under the aegis of the Arms Control Director, instead of under the Secretary of State as they are now.

I believe that only through this drastic reorganization can we be sure that arms control will be given the priority, under this and succeeding administrations, which it clearly must have.

Respectfully,

WILLIAM C. FOSTER.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Rather than ask a question of our witnesses, I would rather ask them to respond to one another. The statements that they have made before us today certainly have been varied and have taken different viewpoints. I wonder if any of the witnesses would want some time to respond to the statements of any of the other witnesses.

Ambassador SMITH. Senator, I would prefer to have an opportunity to study what Mr. Rostow had to say. I have to say I presume that there was not very much difference in approach between myself and Paul Warnke or General Seignious. There clearly are differences of opinion between us and Mr. Rostow, but it seems to me the field is so broad that we could be here until breakfast tomorrow if we tried to answer all of those differences.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. I only have 10 minutes. [General laughter.]

Mr. Warnke, do you want to make any comment?

Mr. WARNKE. Yes, I would like to make a few comments.

First, it is obvious that my friend Gene Rostow and I see a very different kind of a world.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. That is true.

Mr. WARNKE. I do not see a world in which the United States is in a position of weakness. I do not think that the Soviet Union has acquired nuclear superiority. I think that we have the more survivable forces, and therefore, to that extent, the better forces. I think we can maintain that situation of parity. We can do it one of two ways. We can do it either by continuing a buildup on both sides or by measures of arms control.

It seems to me that we want to preserve strategic parity at the lowest level of risk, and the lowest level of risk means arms control rather than an arms buildup.

Now, I think what Professor Rostow ignores is the fact that we made a deliberate choice. We made a choice to diversify our nuclear forces and not to be largely dependent upon the more vulnerable land-based ICBM's.

As a consequence, we now have something like 52 percent of our strategic resources in the submarine-launched ballistic missiles. We have something like 25 percent in the ICBM force.

Now, if you compare their 75 percent or more, which they have in ICBM's, against our 25 percent, you wind up with a very gloomy picture. But I submit we ought to compare 100 percent with 100 percent. When we do that, it is very clear that we have an adequate retaliatory force.

I think that that is what the Scowcroft Commission report says. It does say, as Professor Rostow comments, that the Soviets do have this lead in land-based ICBM's; and it concedes the fact that that force would be theoretically vulnerable if that were the only force.

But what it concludes is that the existence of the Triad, our maintenance and modernization of submarine-launched ballistic missiles and our strategic bombers now being equipped with air-launched cruise missiles, means that the ICBM force is not vulnerable because of the fact that an attempt at a preemptive strike at 25 percent of our resources would not even succeed in destroying that 25 percent. So we would still be left with the overwhelming majority of our strategic retaliatory force.

Now that is the picture. We made the right decisions during the past 20 years. The Soviets, because of technological inferiority and because of the fact that geography does not permit them the degree of dependence on ballistic missile submarines, in my opinion have left themselves more vulnerable. I do not welcome that fact, but it is a fact.

I agree with the Joint Chiefs that we have rough equality in strategic nuclear power, and I think that that is the best that can be done. The question is how do you preserve that at the lowest level of risk?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Mr. Rostow, do you want to respond to that?

Mr. ROSTOW. I would like to comment about that. It is perfectly true that the Scowcroft Commission did not recommend that we quit and give up the attempt to protect our national interests and it did say that the synergism of the Triad would make a first strike unlikely for a few years more on certain assumptions about the prudence of Soviet behavior. I do not disagree with that. I do not suppose anybody would really.

But I would go back to a comment of Mr. Warnke that we made a deliberate choice to diversify. I fully support the notion of the Triad, because the uncertainties of science and technology make it highly desirable to stick to the concept of the Triad. But the decision to diversify and to have a Triad of approximate equality was not really based on strategic considerations but on interservice rivalries, as we all know.

The Soviets had a totally different view, and for a long time we have talked about this difference between the Soviet policy and our own as if it were a simple choice of taste: they prefer chocolate and we prefer vanilla. Well, it is now apparent that that is not the case, and the Soviet superiority in ground-based ballistic missiles, which I take it that even Mr. Warnke does not contest, exists for a real political purpose.

And he says over and over again that we have strategic parity, that there is strategic parity between the United States and the Soviet Union, although he does not include the significance of the intermediate range weapons in that calculation, intermediate range weapons designed to drive a wedge between us and the Europeans, the Japanese, and others who are threatened by those weapons.

That strategic parity, he says, means we do not have to worry about this disparity in the ground-based ballistic missile field. That is not what the Scowcroft Commission reported, and that is not what very serious political leaders like former President Nixon and former Secretary of State Kissinger say about it.

Last summer, former President Nixon wrote an article in the New York Times in which he said that the American nuclear deterrent has lost its credibility, and former Secretary of State Kissinger has been saying that now for some years. I do not believe that kind of defeatism is justified. I agree with a British writer on this subject, Professor Leslie Martin of London, who says, the changes in the nuclear balance may mean that the emperor is naked, but he is still emperor. There is no substitute for the American nuclear guarantee, and it has to retain its credibility, and it is. And I think if we adopt the recommendations of the Scowcroft Commission report, modify them somewhat as I have recommended this morning, we will be on the way to restoring the credibility of that guarantee.

But the point is that the nuclear forces are fundamentally political. They generate a political pressure and a political perception. I do not think that they are going to be used. I hope they are not. I do not believe there is any increase in the risk of their being used, at least so far as the industrial states are concerned.

Why should the Soviets be interested in a nuclear strike with all its uncertainties? They are doing extemely well as they are. If they can generate not only demonstrations in the streets here and in Europe, but far more significant, the kind of change in American political attitudes represented by President Nixon's article in the Times, or by a vote for pulling the troops out of Europe that we had in a Senate committee last year, or those nuclear freeze resolutions, one after another, proposing a plausible formula for moving ahead, why should the Soviets even dream about a nuclear attack?

So I disagree completely with my friend's anslysis there in an attempt to dispute what I said and what the Scowcroft Commission report said; and I call your attention to the quotation from Mr. Andropov of that speech to which I referred in New York, a very revealing picture of Mr. Andropov's policy and of Soviet policy.

Mr. Warnke says that he and I have a different perception of the world—perhaps we do, although we are both Yale graduates—but I commend to him that passage from the speech of Mr. Andropov. He certainly has a different perception of the world than either one of us.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I have to leave, Dr. Rostow. But you have left those speeches.

Mr. **Rostow**. I take it they are in the record.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Fine. Thank you very much.

Senator **Sarbanes**. Mr. Chairman, I am going to have to go shortly, too. I hope we do not lose an important advance that Senator Boschwitz made in his response. I think it would be very helpful, Ambassador Smith and the others, if we did receive from you written comments about the other testimony of members of the panel, to help define some of these differences. I mean we need to establish certain distinctions—for example, what is the definition of Soviet-American nuclear parity, a phrase which Professor Rostow uses but seems to break down into a category-by-category approach. And I understand that that is not the approach taken by others.

The sharp difference on the window of vulnerability in the Scowcroft report is perceived in two entirely different ways by members of the panel.

Mr. Chairman, I also wanted to ask, but perhaps this could be submitted for the record, what Mr. Rostow meant when he said the United States cannot afford another bad arms agreement. I would like to know which of the previous ones he regarded as bad, since he talked about another. Once we know that, I would like the other members of the panel to evaluate past arms agreements. If it is SALT II, then I would like to know whether he thinks we should be adhering to its terms, and if it is bad, what is the purpose of adhering to its terms.

The **Chairman**. Senator Pell, would you yield for just 1 second?

I would like to just tell my four distinguished friends how distressed I was that the scheduling today kept me on other matters this morning and will take me away again now. I very much deeply appreciate all of your appearances today. This will be an extraordinarily helpful panel, and we value your counsel and advice very much. The entire record will be read, and I will ask evey committee member to read the record, as I will, from beginning to end.

We do appreciate your time and your thought very much.

Senator Pell, will you at any point be asking a question about the letter from Director Adelman?

Senator **Pell**. I will.

The **Chairman**. If you would, please, I would appreciate it very much. I would like to hear their answers live on this, because I was discussing it with the Secretary this morning at breakfast, with Secretary Shultz, and also Kenneth Dam who will be coming up to testify tomorrow.

Senator **Pell**. Good. I am very glad that you have raised this, because I would also like to say how sorry I was not to be here for the whole hearing, but we had a markup in Labor and Human Resources going on simultaneously. I particularly value the friendship and admire all of you who are here. I am particularly glad to see

Ambassador Smith as I recall the load he carried, the yeoman's work he did with ABM and SALT I. I remember our first encounter, and he convinced me he was intent on arms control not only on the land but in the sea. It is very nice to have you all back here. And I congratulate Mr. Warnke on the work he did in SALT II, and deeply regret nonratification of it.

I would ask unanimous consent that my opening statement be inserted in the record at this point.

Senator **Pressler**. Without objection.

[Senator Pell's prepared statement follows:]

Prepared Statement of Hon. Claiborne Pell

I join the chariman in welcoming four distinguished former Directors of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I know that the first Director, William Foster, wishes very much to be with us today, and I regret very much that he is not able to join us.

You are appearing before us at a very propitious moment. I and other Senators have been very disappointed in the lack of progress in arms control during the last several years and the present bleak prospects for the next several years. I think it is fair to say that we have reached the crisis stage in arms control.

Prospects for the INF talks in Europe are dubious at best. The START talks show no sign of getting anywhere. At present all three of the most recent bilateral arms control agreements with the Soviet Union remain signed but not ratified and, there are no prospects for ratification in the immediate future.

I have a growing sense that, unless we act effectively and expeditiously, the opportunity for arms control in the foreseeable future may evaporate. The level of rhetoric has so escalated, the mutual distrust has so grown, and each side's dissatisfaction with the other has reached such proportions that we soon may be only able to regret lost opportunities—rather than seize new ones.

Fortunately, Senators and Congressmen of both parties are becoming increasingly aware of the dire straits in which we now find arms control. A succession of Senators and Congressmen made it clear to this committee yesterday that something is wrong and that something must be done soon to correct the situation.

This committee is now trying to determine the best advice to give the President to get arms control back on track. You four gentlemen can be crucially important in that effort. All four of you have distinguished records in the field of arms control. All four of you know of the problems inherent in achieving arms control, but you also understand the overriding importance of doing something now to curb the arms race and reduce the threat of nuclear war.

We welcome you.

Senator **Pell**. I would also ask to have inserted in the record a copy of a letter that Mr. Adelman sent to me in answer to a question I had asked, the question being: Under any circumstances would the United States be prepared to give up the MX program?

Senator **Pressler**. Without objection.

[The letter referred to follows:]

U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Washington, D.C., June 16, 1983.

Hon. Claiborne Pell,
U.S. Senate.

Dear Senator Pell: At yesterday's hearing you asked whether under any circumstances the U.S. would be prepared to give up the MX program?

The following is my answer for the record:

"The President has made clear that the scale of MX deployment will be influenced by Soviet strategic programs and arms reduction agreements. The MX is the U.S. response to a massive build-up of Soviet ICBMs over the last 10 years, and unless the Soviets are prepared to reverse this build-up and forego their heavy and medium ICBMs, the U.S. will go forward with MX."

Sincerely,

Kenneth L. Adelman,
Director.

Senator **Pell**. I would like to have copies of that letter given to the panel who are here. The answer said:

> The President has made clear that the scale of MX deployment will be influenced by Soviet strategic programs and arms reduction agreements. The MX is the U.S. response to a massive buildup of Soviet ICBM's over the last 10 years, and unless the Soviets are prepared to reverse this buildup and forego the heavy and medium ICBM's, the United States will go forward with MX.

Well, the key word is "forego," whether the Soviets will forego the heavy and medium ICBM's, which is virtually their total nuclear arsenal. I looked up in the Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary the definition of the word "forego," and it comes out as "relinquish." So that clarifies that portion of the letter.

Now, this is the question I would like to ask first of Mr. Rostow, and since my time is very limited, I would appreciate it if he could limit his reply to maybe a minute or so. When you left ACDA was it your understanding of American policy that the only way we would give up the MX would be if the Soviets relinquished the heavy and medium ICBM's?

I would add that this letter is in the public domain, because while the original session with Mr. Adelman was an executive session, the letter was sent unclassified.

Mr. **Rostow**. Senator Pell, I will confine my reply I hope to 1 minute.

I think this is a terrible way to negotiate with the Soviet Union, to have public letters of this kind indicating the potentialities of American positions. In my opinion, my recollection when I left ACDA in January no such point had been decided by the President. There had been some discussion of possible moves and countermoves in response to changes in the Soviet position if they were ever to emerge. And I believe this issue really as far as the decision was concerned was deferred until after any possible change in the Soviet position in INF.

Senator **Pell**. I would like to ask the other members of the panel if they have any thoughts in this regard or if they believe that—obviously this is a first negotiating position—that whether one could think that the Soviets would forego all their heavy and medium ICBM's, in order to get us to give up the MX?

Mr. **Warnke**. Well, I do not worry about this being made public because it is obviously not serious. [Laughter.]

In other words, it is not remotely a negotiating position or even a negotiating ploy. I would prefer that it be made on the record, because it really, I think, is going to arouse a certain amount of question as to whether or not we are serious about arms control.

As far as the proposal is concerned, what it asks the Soviet Union to do is virtually to disarm while we continue with our own programs.

Senator **Pell**. But we would give up MX, as I read it.

Mr. **Warnke**. We would give up MX, but we would retain, of course, our 10,000 strategic warheads. They would cut theirs down to probably something like 2,000. And as a consequence, it is not a negotiating possibility. It would leave them for the first time genuinely with a window of vulnerability.

It is even a little worse than the program that has been announced previously, because previously what we have said is that we are proposing in START that if they cut down to 210 MIRV'd ICBM's, then we will go ahead with 100 MX's, which would leave us with 1,000 super accurate warheads to destroy the remaining part of their MIRV'd ICBM force.

These are not serious proposals, Senator.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Smith.

Ambassador **Smith**. Senator Pell, I was struck by the first sentence which suggested to me an upward movement, over 100 MX's might be in order under certain circumstances so that the administration is not just foreshadowing the possibility of reductions but also of increases in the MX. You will recall we were talking about 200 MX's at one time, and now we are talking about 100.

I take it the last sentence is addressed to the questions that have been raised as to whether MX in any sense is a bargaining chip, would we be willing to concede it under any circumstances. And I think the administration wants to say, in effect, yes, we would. It is a bargaining chip. But certainly this contingency suggested here seems to be completely impractical.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you very much.

Mr. Seignious.

General **Seignious**. I put emphasis on the first sentence also, but I would say in fairness that the scale of U.S. deployment can be scaled up or down. And if the Soviets have an initiative that reduces their ICBM threat, then it could reduce our deployment of ICBM's. So, therefore, I do not think you can look at it just on one side of the scale.

Senator **Pell**. Right. Thank you.

Now, in the remaining time that I have I would like to bring up another subject, and that is to ask any of you on the panel whether you believe that a competition in space, space weapons, serves our interest. You are all undoubtedly familiar with the President's "Star Wars" speech of a few months ago. I would be interested in your reaction as to whether you feel it is feasible and in the interest of arms control to move ahead this way in space.

Again, starting with General Seignious.

General **Seignious**. I have not been associated with the Government for 2 years. When I was last time, I had no serious presentation to me of military fact that a space ballistic missile system in a defense mode would be successful in assuring a sanctuary to what was being protected on Earth, that is, cities or installations had a slim chance of having 100-percent invulnerability.

Second, I think that to project or attempt to project our Armed Forces in space leads to an unknown quantity that is a very risky, destabilizing proposition; and I would have to be convinced much beyond what I am now that there is, (a) any practical possibility of it; and (b) that it adds to the stability and security of the Nation. I doubt both.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Smith.

Ambassador **Smith**. Senator Pell, in my prepared statement I touched on this point.

Senator **Pell**. I am sorry.

Ambassador **Smith**. I said that it was an unfortunate suggestion that we should go for a major defensive system of this sort because it is impractical and also because it foreshadows a termination of the ABM Treaty. I think the stability of the arms race depends on keeping treaties, not on breaching them.

So I think that one evidence of the immediate prejudice that this sort of talk can do is that I relate the administration's reluctance to negotiate for antisatellite controls because of its appetite for going in the direction of a full defensive system. The technology I am told is very much the same, and so we are reluctant to see any controls on ASAT's, so-called, because of the impact it would have on Star Wars.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you.

Ambassador Warnke.

Mr. **Warnke**. As I understand it, Senator Pell, it is generally agreed that the idea of an ABM defense based in space would not be feasible for at least the next 30 years. So, therefore, I cannot really see it contributing much to my own personal survival. I think the real question is how we are going to survive during the next 30 years, and an ABM defense has no promise in that regard.

With regard to ASAT generally, the deployment of antisatellite weapons, as Ambassador Smith has pointed out, we have more to lose than the Soviets if both sides develop these antisatellite devices. We began talks to try and limit antisatellite weapons in June of 1978. It is, in my opinion, a tragedy that they were terminated.

Senator **Pell**. Ambassador Rostow.

Mr. **Rostow**. I testified on this subject before Senator Pressler's subcommittee late last year, and while I have not looked back at that testimony, I think that I still stand on it. And I spoke during the same period at a public meeting on many of the same questions in Washington.

I think the matter is under study. The results do not seem, as they were reported to me by the scientists and technicians, nearly so categorical as they were to Ambassador Warnke. I would be glad to find out why he thinks that there can be no progress in this area for the next 30 years, or why his interlocutor thinks so.

I think nobody can refuse to consider the possibility of the development of a defensive system or systems which can reduce the threat of ballistic missiles, and to rule out such a potentiality in advance—that is to say, that the offensive threat of these most menacing weapons, the source of nuclear anxiety throughout the world, it seems to me it is impossible to say no to until the scientific picture is much clearer.

Therefore, I support the policy of probing the field without any regard to what the Soviets are doing, but they are doing quite a lot.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you very much.

My time has expired.

Senator **Pressler**. Senator Percy.

The **Chairman**. Just one question that I would like to put to you. I discussed it with the Under Secretary of State for Great Britain this morning as to how he would feel, and how the foreign ministers of Europe would feel, about a freeze in Europe on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons there and the testing of them, what effect it would have if the Senate of the United States passed a resolution calling for a freeze in those three categories.

Could you comment on its effect on the strategic weapons and our direct relationships with the Soviet Union and then the impact that it might have in Europe if we were to call for a freeze across the board that would affect INF?

Mr. Rostow.

Mr. ROSTOW. I think it would have a disastrous effect in Europe because it would mean that there would be no potentiality for a successful outcome from the European and American point of view of the INF talks at all.

We must never forget that the Soviet Union refused flatly to discuss gray area weapons in the arms control negotiations until we decided on the two-track approach to handling the so-called gray area weapons, the intermediate range weapons. And if we had a freeze, that would mean that we would not produce the gray area weapons, and that would mean the Soviet Union would have no interest whatever in negotiating with us on the subject.

So it does not take much of a crystal ball and much experience in talking with the Europeans about it to say that they would be horrified by such a vote.

The CHAIRMAN. Paul Warnke.

Mr. WARNKE. Let me first correct the record. The Soviet Union was perfectly willing to discuss gray area systems when I began my stint as a SALT negotiator back in 1977. We refused to do it. We wanted to put it off for SALT III, which we then somewhat idealistically thought would take place by no later than 1979. But the Soviet Union wanted to discuss the forward-based systems and gray area forces generally, and we wanted to put that off.

Now, as far as the effect of a freeze is concerned, I think that the freeze resolution adopted by the House very correctly states that the discussions would have to take place to determine when and how to freeze. As I have said earlier, Senator Percy, I do not think you could freeze everything at once. And certainly the fact that you have an ongoing negotiation means that you would have to deal with that fact and that we would have to find at least some interim measure that would permit resolution on the INF problem on a temporary basis, after which we should fold it in, in my opinion, with the START talks which is the only way that any sort of a permanent resolution could be reached.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Ambassador SMITH. I have the same recollection that Paul Warnke has, that at least during SALT I the Soviets were very strong proponents of negotiating about forward-based systems, and we were the ones that said no, they were not strategic, and let us get that over first, and then we could go into other questions.

On the question of a freeze, I think one should distinguish between what I would call a negotiating freeze and a freeze as the target for the end of the negotiation. I think that if, as seems likely to me, the INF negotiations and the START negotiations are brought together at some point, then if there appeared to be a serious negotiation underway, I think some sort of a negotiating moratorium might be useful to us. But I do not feel that we should start in by saying the solution to our problem is to freeze everything and then perhaps talk about reductions.

The **Chairman**. General Seignious.

General **Seignious**. Mr. Chairman, good to see you again, sir.

The Atlantic Council just finished a year's study on the impact of certain nuclear policy decisions and what impact they would have in Europe. It was our consensus in the Atlantic Council that a continuance of our policy to deploy the INF is in the interest of solidarity and cohesiveness in the alliance, and a freeze that affected that deployment or affected the strategic umbrella that was accepted as the initial point of the negotiation was a mistake.

And I am saying practically the same thing that Ambassador Smith just said, that as a part of a negotiating process, a freeze is good only if you look at it on the end result of what you want and what is in the national security interest. To have it as the point of the negotiating process I think would be detrimental to the security interests of the United States.

The **Chairman**. Thank you very much.

I do have one other question I would like to put to you to get a response from you. I think there is a school of thought that certainly feels, and has a lot of people in it, that little progress is going to be possible with the START talks until we have an agreement in INF.

A staff committee report that you perhaps have copies of concluded in a sense that both sides lost an important opportunity for mutually beneficial INF agreements when they rejected the proposals that were made by Paul Nitze and his counterpart in the so-called walk in the woods.

Would you agree with that? And if so, do you think that there is any way, that we can get back to that posture?

Why do we not start with you, General Seignious, and work the other way?

General **Seignious**. Mr. Chairman, I think that that was a good initiative and one that should have been given more serious consideration, particularly because it leaves open the option of reducing the Pershing II so-called threat to the Soviet Union, but more importantly, a reduction in cruise missiles should be viewed very carefully. If you can avoid deploying cruise missiles on the continent, if you can deploy whatever level the Joint Chiefs and the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Congress agree to, but you can deploy them offshore, and therefore, verification does not become such a terrible problem. But once you deploy cruise missiles in proliferation on land-based and sea-based systems and on air systems on the continent of Europe itself, we are getting into a problem equally as destabilizing as the MIRV decision we made years ago.

So I do not think there is nearly enough emphasis on the sensitivity of the cruise missile issue.

Ambassador **Smith**. Senator Percy, I agree with General Seignious that we should be proceeding with the GLCM's and the Pershing deployment absent any Soviet change in tactics. I do not think that there is any prospect that until these two negotiations are melded together, as I mentioned before, that we are going to see an agreement.

I think that on INF—as the committee report suggested, if I recall it correctly, there are indications of interest in Europe in reviving the Nitze-Kvitsinsky bargain, and if those pressures are sufficiently responsible and strong, I would think we should respond to those wishes and somehow or another open up that channel again.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. WARNKE. Well, Senator Percy, in my opinion, any solution that is acceptable to our Western European allies ought to be acceptable to us. And they have indicated, of course, great receptivity to the idea of the Kvitsinsky-Nitze proposal.

I think we should recognize that we do not need another 572 warheads to blow up Soviet targets. We have some 10,000 strategic warheads already that can accomplish that. And accordingly, we are dealing basically with a political problem, and it will eventually require a political solution.

I would agree with Ambassador Smith that a permanent solution is not going to be feasible with INF as a separate negotiation. We ought to be able to find some way in which we can trade off deferral of deployment in exchange for reduction and destruction of more than 572 warheads by the Soviet Union. If that were acceptable to our European allies, I think we ought to grab it.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Dr. Rostow.

Mr. ROSTOW. Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the staff report. I saw a newspaper account of it, but I have not yet seen a copy, so I cannot comment on it. But if it said what you attribute to it, I do disagree.

I do not think we missed an opportunity. At that time an issue was raised, and there were responses. But as I said in my prepared statement—and I want to underscore that—we did not reject the approach at that time. We told the Soviet Union that we did not take its rejection as final, and its rejection was comprehensive and vehement.

Our position was that while we had—and I am reading from a speech I made in New York in April—while we had some difficulty with aspects of the plan, we were willing to keep the channel open and indeed actively sought to do so.

Now, President Reagan in March publicly announced our acceptance of the principle of the compromise approach put out by the two Ambassadors, and I have no doubt that that has been explored. I do not know that, but I have no doubt in terms of the nature of the people that it has been explored and will continue to be explored.

I think the difficulty is—and I reiterate it—the Soviet Union has not accepted the notion that in the INF talks in Geneva we are talking about anything but Euro missiles; that is, missiles within Europe or within range of Europe. They have refused to consider the fact that the Far Eastern missiles, the missiles in the eastern parts of Siberia have to be considered as well. And they have not in any way indicated that they are willing to consider the principle of equality and parity in this category between the United States and the Soviet Union any more than they are willing to make any concessions about the British and the French weapons systems.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Senator Pressler, I want to first thank you very much for chairing this meeting of the overall committee in my inability to do so today.

I would like to leave one question to be answered. I am hosting a working luncheon that I am late for, and they are waiting for me. I will have to get down there.

But I do recall that, Dr. Rostow, you mentioned that you had encountered a stone wall against progress on the ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaties—two treaties that I really felt should be ratified and the advice and the consent of the Senate should be gotten. It would be desirable to have a recommendation or favorable request from the administration on this.

I would very much appreciate your reaction as to whether or not that stone wall still does exist. We have had commitments, and further commitments that they are working on it. However, verification requests have been put forward that look to the Soviets like they want to reopen negotiations, and I understand the Soviets have refused to just reopen them. They said we have done those; we are ready to approve them and abide by them.

But is there any way we can break through, in your judgment? And would it be desirable for us to break through and for the Senate of the United States to give its advice and consent to ratification of those two treaties?

I will read the record then and catch up with you this afternoon, Senator Pressler.

Thank you very much again. We really appreciate your being here.

Mr. ROSTOW. I have not, Senator Pressler, been able to follow what has happened since I left the Government in this regard. I have read the newspaper stories which correspond to what Senator Percy has just said, namely that we have approached the Soviet Union and they have said no to whatever it was that we proposed.

I am afraid I would like to ask for the privilege of doing a little checking around before I write an answer to you, and I would be glad to write an answer for the record.

Senator PRESSLER. That is fine.

Ambassador Smith, I have a final question for you. You were the chief U.S. ABM Treaty negotiator. Do you believe that the ABM Treaty, which many regard as a major achievement of strategic arms control, provides lessons of how we should proceed in arms control today, and if so, how?

Ambassador SMITH. I think one of the lessons of the ABM Treaty is that it was largely, if not exclusively, negotiated in private.

Senator PRESSLER. It was largely negotiated in private?

Ambassador SMITH. There were a few leaks, but there were no trumpetings of our position in advance.

I think the second lesson is that a lot of time was wasted on one-sided proposals that we made, such as four sites for us against one for the Soviets. This is what we are looking at again in the offensive negotiations going on now.

We have a commodity that is in very short supply, I think, which is time, and we were killing time, and we have killed 2 years in this futile search for a one-sided solution.

Aside from that, I think that the result of the ABM Treaty was good. I think both sides have lived up to it. And I certainly hope that we do not cancel it. I have a feeling that these very airy suggestions that are made that oh, well, to get antiballistic missile defense of our ICBM's you just have to amend that treaty. I cannot conceive of an amendment to the treaty that the Soviets would agree to unless we paid a very high price, which I would not be willing to pay.

General **Seignious**. Mr. Chairman, may I repeat something that I feel very strongly? And that is, the end result of that and the approval of it, ratification of it by the Congress, represented a major national policy decision. It was the first time in the history of this country that we ever agreed to mutual vulnerability with a foreign power. And that is the kind of national policy that we have to arrive as an objective in seeking mutual survivability in our force structures.

And I reiterate that comparison is very important. It has been 11 years since that was ratified. It has been adhered to. It has provided us the best element of stability in our security planning, and if we could find a policy direction in which to head by our Government that would seek with the Soviet Union steps toward mutual survivability, I think we would have a breakthrough in stability under risk circumstances that would lessen the risk of war monumentally. And then we would not have to build forces and force structure on worst case planning but on a codified threat which is lessened remarkably if we know whether both sides have survivable forces.

Senator **Pressler**. The ABM Treaty banned an entire class of weapons before they were deployed, and some say that there is an analogy with respect to antisatellite weapons and other space weapons. Do you agree with that?

Ambassador Smith.

Ambassador **Smith**. In the ABM case there have been some deployments. The Soviets had a very primitive system around Moscow which I gather they are now dismantling. During the course of the negotiation we were building up two sites, so I would say we were a little more mature in ABM's than we are now in antisatellite systems.

Senator **Pressler**. That certainly stands as an example of when something was achieved through negotiations, so I congratulate you for that.

Senator Biden.

Senator **Biden**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I have three questions, time permitting.

The first is to followup on the second to last comment made about mutual survivability. Is there any merit to the notion that the United States adopt a negotiating posture that says we do not care what the configuration is of your arsenal, but that we will limit just the total number of warheads, we will limit and move down to 7,000 warheads from what we are now, which would be a bigger move for us than them. And we do not care whether you have them in SS-18's or SS-19's or new missiles or old missiles or submarines. And we will establish a regime over the next 15 years where every 2 or 3 years we move down to a lower number of total warheads.

Does that force each country to move to single warhead, more survivable mobile missiles and in turn accomplish the mutual survivability quotient, sir, that you are looking for; and does that or would that put either the United States or the Soviet Union, as we would read their situation, into jeopardy?

What about that notion, if you just speak to the notion? Anyone, starting with you.

General **Seignious**. Senator Biden, I do not take exception in principle to the freedom to mix on each side—in other words, choosing the systems that they have. But I do not think that conceptually goes far enough, although it may be a step-by-step proposition that adds to stability and in the long pull it may find an equilibrium and stability. But more importantly I think we should negotiate conceptually with the Soviet Union or discuss at least outside of the formal politicized negotiating process, find some forum that I mentioned earlier this morning that would open a dialog leading toward agreement on a concept of survivability.

We would like to see, I would think, for our own national survival that the Soviets move some of their forces to sea because we can verify it, and yet, it is not as threatening to us as the ICBM structure that they now have of 308 SS-18's, whereas if we concurrently look to survivable warheads and not matching warhead for warhead and aim toward substantial reductions on both sides, this will add to the stability of the strategic equation. And our forces can be remarkably reduced and so can the Soviet Union's forces be remarkably reduced and achieve the same deterrent posture.

Senator **Biden**. Would anyone else like to comment?

Mr. **Rostow**. Yes. I think if you use warheads alone as a unit of account in a nuclear arms treaty you give each side the incentive to have larger ones. And I think that is why we chose warheads plus throw-weight as an indispensable combination in devising a new and practical unit of account.

There I think freedom to mix would mean that you could have a limit that could last indefinitely and be reduced in stages through a combination of methods no matter what happens to the technology. But I would be very much against warheads alone without a throw-weight limit for that reason. You cannot equate horses and rabbits, after all, and the big ones are the source of a great deal of destabilizing concerns.

Mr. **Warnke**. I do not feel, Senator Biden, that size is anywhere near as important as accuracy. I think that the accuracy of the warheads is what really gives them a counterforce capability. If you are just dealing with size, it just determines how big the hole is where the high school used to be. It does not really have much to do with counterforce characteristics.

I would agree with Professor Rostow, however—and I am happy to be able to do it for the first time today—that the number count should not be the only criteria; that there ought to be some element of selectivity. Otherwise, you may end up with forces that are more vulnerable than they were before because of the fact that you have kept the counterforce weapons and reduced the number of targets, so I think you would have to watch that. Certainly as one measure of control, the warhead limit would be a very effective part of the total package.

Senator **Biden**. The second question I have is that when we had testimony from the Scowcroft Commission members, former Secretary Schlessinger told me that the START proposal was correct in seeking to trade our overwhelming superiority in submarine-launched missiles for a substantial cut in the ICBM's.

Obviously, Mr. Rostow agrees with that, having been involved in that decision, but do the rest of you share that concern about the heavy missiles in favor of trading away the submarine lead we have, or is it relevant at all?

General **Seignious**. I think as an opening negotiating position this is a satisfactory one, because as I said a minute ago, if you are going to drive the Soviets to SLBM's and reduce their ICBM capability, that adds to our stability and security, and that is a part of the negotiating position.

Mr. **Warnke**. I would say regrettably, Senator Biden, that the START proposal would not have that effect, and that is particularly true if the number of ballistic missiles is raised from 850 to something like 1,200, because under those circumstances if we deployed 100 MX's, we could keep 500 Minuteman III's and then deploy 600 submarine-launched ballistic missiles as compared to the present total which is something like 520.

So just looking at the mathematics, it does not have the effect that Secretary Schlessinger suggests that it has.

Ambassador **Smith**: I would think that anything that reduced the most survivable part of our force should be looked on with great doubt. And this notion of trading all of our submarines for a Soviet reduction in ICBM's is a worrisome proposition to me.

Senator **Biden**: Last question. Senator Pell, I am told, raised the question of the letter we received yesterday from Mr. Adelman indicating the United States might not build 100 MX missiles if the Russians agreed to scrap 308 SS-18's and 360 SS-19's. Not only would this deprive the Russians of what they obviously consider the most important of their strategic weapons, it would also involve an unbalanced trade.

I mean we are talking about 100 missiles for us with 1,000 warheads, and about 668 missiles for them with 5,240 warheads. In some places that is viewed as fair. But if you would consider bargaining away the MX, what price would you seek from the Soviet Union? Would you seek this kind of price?

Maybe we could start with you, Mr. Rostow. Do you think that is a reasonable and even starting position?

Mr. **Rostow**. As I said before in answer to one of these questions, I think it is a perfectly terrible way to negotiate with the Soviet Union, if we can bargain with each other about what we do.

I have always thought there was a great deal to Bill Hyland's original suggestion. I think he was the first to propose such an approach. I do not think you can answer it rationally, at least I cannot answer it rationally, unless I saw the entire context of the thing, manifestly a bargain, that would eliminate the anomaly of the interim agreement.

Because we said, after all, that our own unilateral interpretations of what that interim agreement meant would preclude the evolution of the SS-19 and so on. It may be in our interest to do it, but for how much would depend on what else was in the package.

Senator BIDEN. Well, let me ask it another way. Having been a negotiator, does this kind of proposal help you or hurt you when you walk to the table?

Mr. ROSTOW. Hurts it.

Senator BIDEN. OK. Anybody else want to comment on whether or not they would trade a couple of votes for the MX? I mean what do you have in mind? Anybody want to up the ante?

Mr. ROSTOW. Senator Biden, can I add one sentence to that?

Senator BIDEN. Sure.

Mr. ROSTOW. The Constitution makes a division between the functions of Congress, the functions of the Senate and the functions of the President in the formulation of foreign policy and the conduct of foreign relations. Nobody has ever been able to draw a very clear line about that, but it seems to me that backseat driving of this kind by particular proposals does really raise a serious question about the conduct of foreign relations on which everybody agrees the President is the main actor.

Senator BIDEN. Let me respond to that, because I think this is a very important and legitimate point to be made.

A predecessor of yours at the institution where you now teach once said that the conduct of foreign policy is defined in the Constitution—I am paraphasing—as merely an invitation to struggle. The Constitution is not very clear at all on that question.

But the fact of the matter is, the struggle is now taking place, in large part, I might say, because the President has been, in my view, less than forthcoming on demonstrating any clear desire to have arms control. This kind of malarkey, this kind of negotiating posture is one of the reasons why we are even having these meetings.

We cannot negotiate a treaty. We should not be negotiating a treaty. What really we are saying to you all—not to you but to the administration—is we do not think you are really trying to negotiate a treaty, and what we want to do is make it clear to you that we, Democrats and Republicans, goods folks, bad folks and in between, think you had better get about the business. I mean we would not even be here, we would not even be having build-downs and freezes and all the rest of these proposals if the President had come to the table in good faith and convinced even a portion of the American people that he really wanted an arms control agreement. And the reason why we are in this posture is not to define for the President what in fact should be the negotiating instrument to be used, but for God's sake, Mr. President, we are keenly concerned about whether or not you really want to negotiate.

Now, my Republican friends will say publicly no, that is not what they are doing. My Democratic friends will say you are being too harsh, Senator; you should be more circumspect when you say this. But when you cut it all away, that is what the freeze movement is about, that is what the build-down is about, that is what all of these proposals are about.

It is preposterous that we would attempt as a committee and the Senate as a whole to negotiate a SALT treaty or an arms control treaty. It is preposterous, and we are doing it. And the reason we are doing it is that we have a President who says well, I really want arms control; I will tell you what, I will trade the Russians 1,000 warheads for 5,240. I mean if they dismantle their whole force, you know, and we sit there and say now, Mr. President, I mean are you really serious about arms control.

This is turning into my little filibuster. I apologize. But I agree with you completely. If we had an administration that demonstrated a serious concern about negotiating an arms control agreement and had that as a priority, the activity of this committee and this Congress in the freeze movement and in every other movement out there in the public would dissipate tomorrow.

But what the President did when he came to office, with all due respect, professor, is he sent out a message; whether it was accurately perceived or not, it was perceived as follows: That he has dismantled the superstructure through which we have conducted discussions relating to the control of nuclear weapons. He dismantled it. That's the perception. And then every action he has taken after that lead people to believe, not only in this country but around the world, that he is not anxious to reconstruct another superstructure.

I am sincerely hopeful that he is, and that he really is doing it, but what really keeps us in the business we should not be in are letters like this. Now, maybe you could say we should never have asked the question and maybe so. Maybe the best thing to do is not ask it; therefore, we would not be frightened by his answer.

But it does not seem that there is an overwhelming desire. That is why, at least from this Senator's perspective, why we are in the business of going into such detail. This should be after the fact. The administration should be coming to us with an agreement that we then question. That is our legitimate role. But essentially what we are doing here is we are saying Mr. President, how about doing this, that, or the other thing. And it is the most incredible position to be in because we cannot do it well, because institutionally we are not designed to do that, nor should we be, and the only reason we are trying is out of desperation.

Mr. ROSTOW. I will not ask for equal time, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. I understand from the record you have had plenty today. I have only had those few minutes.

Senator PRESSLER. I think we will submit additional statements for the record. We are meeting again at 2 o'clock, so I am going to recess, and thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

The committee met, pursuant to recess, at 2:20 p.m., in room SD-419, Hon. Larry Pressler presiding.

Present: Senators Pressler, Boschwitz, Pell, Sarbanes, Glenn, and Cranston.

Senator PRESSLER. I apologize for being late, but there were two rollcall votes during the lunch hour, and they threw me off stride.

This afternoon we shall resume the committee's hearings on strategic arms control resolutions. The session will be devoted to testimony from public witnesses and from two former Government officials.

I am pleased to welcome the Nuclear Freeze Campaign to the committee, together with former CIA Director William Colby, Adm. Noel Gayler, and Dr. Irwin Redlener, representing Physicians for Social Responsibility.

Testimony from the public on arms control is extremely important to the deliberations of this committee and our colleagues in the Senate. Were it not for the concern of the public on arms control, there would be little prospect for a serious and determined effort by this Government in negotiations.

It is the public and the American taxpayer that has made arms control the central issue of the U.S. agenda. The public is right in focusing attention to this issue. You, the taxpayers of America, will have to pay the costs entailed in maintaining and building new weapons systems. Should war occur, it is the American public that will have to suffer the consequences. These consequences will be devastating in the case of a nuclear exchange. The realities of the nuclear age require that we realize that a nuclear war can only end with the total destruction of the world as we know it. The views our witnesses bring to the committee will receive the attention they truly deserve from this Senator and from my collegues on the committee.

May I say, this afternoon, we are going to move right along. We are going to have opening statements from my colleagues also, but this morning we got a little verbose, and this afternoon I am going to ask witnesses to summarize their statements, unless there are objections, and to place their statements in the record so we can move to questions, because we are under a time bind. There will be rollcall votes, and it will be a long afternoon unless we organize ourselves properly.

Senator Pell.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you. Also, there will be a coffee for the Prime Minister of Spain at half past 3, so some of us should be through by then.

I join the chairman in welcoming all of you here. We are all fellow passengers on this spaceship Earth, and I think that when we are dealing with these nuclear questions, we are finding that very few people trust their governments as much as they might or should, or rather, say, might, and that is very true in this case, and this is a democracy, thank God, and all of you who are coming forward today represent the people, not an administration, and not a government.

I think in many of these questions we would be well served if your views prevailed.

Senator **Pressler**. Senator Cranston.

Senator **Cranston**. I welcome all of you to this hearing. I would just like to say that in traveling throughout the United States in recent months, I have found in all parts of this country, North, South, East, West, far deeper apprehensions, far more widely held by people of all walks of life than most American political observers have yet recognized. There is a grave apprehension that we are undermining our economy through the cost of the arms race. There is an even graver apprehension that we are headed toward a nuclear war if we do not change our course. That is why there is so much support for the freeze, so much support for efforts to come to grips with this issue in a sensible way.

It is my conviction that those who are working on this are the most practical of all Americans, because they are working on the No. 1 problem of our time. All other issues relate to this issue. All other issues will pale into insignificance if we do not handle this issue properly. That is why this hearing, this effort to meld a consensus in the Congress, that will reflect a consensus developing in the country, is so very important.

I thank my colleagues, and each and everyone of you for your devotion to this effort.

Senator **Pressler.**Thank you very much.

At this point, we will hear testimony from a panel created by the Nuclear Freeze Campaign, led by Randall Kehler, who was here last year. Randall, do you have your group ready to go? Would you introduce them, and make your presentation?

STATEMENT OF RANDALL KEHLER, NATIONAL COORDINATOR, NUCLEAR WEAPONS FREEZE CAMPAIGN, ST. LOUIS, MO.

Mr. **Kehler.** Thank you very much, Senator Pressler. It is an honor and a privilege to be here. We will try to keep our testimony as short as possible, and invite you to ask questions of us when we conclude.

I would first like to introduce a man who has been a leader in the National Freeze Campaign, a pillar of support, particularly in the California effort, a successful effort to get the freeze passed by referendum last year, a retired businessman from California, Harold Willens.

STATEMENT OF HAROLD WILLENS, CALIFORNIA NUCLEAR FREEZE INITIATIVE, LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

Mr. **Willens.** Thank you, Randy. Thank you for the privilege. I am honored indeed to testify today as a businessman, as the leader of the California Bilateral Nuclear Weapons Campaign, as a delegate to the 1978 U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, and a strong supporter of the resolution before you.

To me, it seems the bottom line question before you is this. Will the Senate Foreign Relations Committee betray the right of the American people to have their elected representatives actually represent them? The people have made their position very clear and I cannot believe this committee would even consider rejecting what the American electorate so strongly favors. That would be a denial of democracy.

In the largest de facto referendum on a single issue in our history, 60 percent of approximately 20 million people voted last year for the freeze. This year, not many weeks ago, a Harris poll showed that by a 79 to 16 percent margin the American people want Congress to pass a freeze resolution.

Incidentally, Republicans in that poll favor the freeze by 72 to 23 percent. The evidence is unequivocal and undeniable. Regardless of party affiliation, the American people want a nuclear weapons freeze, and they want it now. The question is, will the Senate be accountable to the will and the wisdom of the people? As head of the California campaign, in which close to 4 million voters supported the freeze, I saw firsthand evidence of the deep concern felt by ordinary citizens in President Reagan's home State, citizens who realize the arms race reduces our national security and weakens our national economy.

I experienced the honor of a personal meeting with President Reagan to discuss the nuclear freeze. I regret to say that while he welcomed me graciously, it was clear that the commonsense case for a freeze had not been made clear by those around him. Mr. Reagan also seemed unaware of how strongly the American people feel that the way to stop the arms race is not to build more, but to end it now on both sides across the board.

Finally, as part of the U.S. delegation to the 1978 U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, I was actively involved in discussing different alternatives for arms control. The distinguished chairman of this committee also participated in that session. This is the first time since then that I have had the opportunity to express my respect publicly and directly to Senator Percy, to whom I hope these words will be brought, who took the time then to come to New York and participate very actively in our discussions.

I know how carefully he will listen and weigh the testimony and debate now underway before this committee, and based on the concern he expressed then, I believe that Senator Percy himself will decide to support the freeze. I hope so.

I do not believe that any member of this committee would want to tell the American people, despite the support millions of you gave to this issue at the ballot box and in subsequent opinion polls, I will not even vote to send the nuclear freeze resolution to the Senate floor. I do not believe any committee member would do that. You have a rare opportunity to do both what is popular and what is right. I urge you to join with the people you represent by supporting the Kennedy-Hatfield nuclear freeze and reduction resolution.

Thank you very much.

[Mr. Willens' prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HAROLD WILLENS

I am honored to testify today as a businessman, as the leader of the California bilateral nuclear weapons freeze campaign, as a delegate to the 1978 U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, and as a strong supporter of the Kennedy-Hatfield nuclear freeze and reductions resolution.

To me it seems the bottom line question before you is this: Will the Senate Foreign Relations Committee betray the right of the American people to have their elected representatives actually represent them? The people have made their position every clear. And I cannot believe this committee would even consider rejecting what the American electorate so strongly favors. That would be a denial of democracy.

In the largest de facto referendum on a single issue in our country's history, 60 percent of approximately 20 million Americans voted last year for a verifiable Soviet-American nuclear weapons freeze. This year—not many weeks ago—a Harris poll showed that by a 79 to 16 percent margin the American people want Congress to pass a resolution calling upon the United States to negotiate a nuclear freeze agreement with the Soviet Union. Republicans in that poll favor the freeze by a 72 to 23 percent margin. The evidence is unequivocal and undeniable: Regardless of party affiliation, the American people want a nuclear weapons freeze—and they want it now! The question is: Will Congress be accountable to the will—and wisdom—of the people?

As head of the California campaign, in which close to 4 million voters supported the freeze, I saw first-hand evidence of the deep concern felt by ordinary citizens in President Reagan's home State, citizens who realize the arms race reduces our national security and weakens our national economy.

I experienced the honor of a personal meeting with President Reagan to discuss the nuclear freeze. I regret to say that while he welcomed me graciously, it was clear that the commonsense case for a freeze had not been made clear by those around him. Mr. Reagan also seemed unaware of how strongly the American people feel that the way to stop the arms race is not to build more, but to end it now, on both sides, across the board.

As part of the U.S. delegation to the 1978 U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, I was actively involved in discussing different alternatives for arms control. The distinguished chairman of this committee also participated in the 1978 special session. This is the first time since then that I have had the opportunity to express my respect publicly and directly to Senator Percy, who took the time to come to New York and participate actively in our discussions. I know how carefully he will listen and weigh the testimony and debate now underway before this committee. And based on the concern he expressed, I hope that Senator Percy himself will decide to support the freeze.

I can personally testify to his real concern about the arms race—and as a leader on this issue, your chairman and your committee can open the path toward a business-like, conservative, risk-free way to stop spending precious resources in a race that won't be won by either side. Senate approval of the nuclear freeze can be an historic first step toward incremental reduction of Soviet and American arsenals that are far too great even now.

I do not believe that any member of this committee would want to tell the American people: Despite the support millions of you gave to this issue at the ballot box and in subsequent opinion polls, I will not even vote to send the nuclear freeze resolution to the Senate floor. You have a rare opportunity to do both what is popular and what is right. I urge you to join with the people you represent by supporting the Kennedy-Hatfield nuclear freeze and reduction resolution.

Mr. **Kehler**. Thank you, Harold.

I would next like to introduce Susan Catania, a former Illinois State Representative and chair of the Illinois Commission on the Status of Women.

STATEMENT OF SUSAN KMETTY CATANIA, ILLINOIS STATE REPRESENTATIVE, 1973-83; CHAIR, ILLINOIS COMMISSION ON THE STATUS ON WOMEN, 1974-83; AND FELLOW, INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, CHICAGO, ILL.

Ms. **Catania**. Thank you. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

When I was a child growing up in Chicago, we never thought much about national security. It was just there, like fresh air and sunshine. We had friendly neighbors on our borders and vast oceans on both sides. We were truly secure. But the atomic bomb and the intercontinental rocket changed all that, and as the forties and fifties gave way to the sixties and the seventies, those of us who were women and mothers sensed that true national security was rapidly slipping away from us. We began to understand that warriors were no longer going to march off to war while the women and children stayed safe at home.

In the nuclear wars of the future, the women and the children would die alongside the men, who would have nowhere to march. If we did not understand it before, we began to understand it very well after the Cuban missile crisis of 1963. Now the experts tell us that the United States and the Soviet Union have over 50,000 nuclear bombs between us, and I have a hard time getting my mind around a figure of that magnitude.

Why do we have so many? Because of "national security," that wonderful, all-purpose phrase that explains and justifies everything. But are we really more secure that we were a generation or two ago? Unfortunately not. Those of us who live in the Chicago area understand that in case of a full-scale war, a handful of modern, thermonuclear weapons could turn our entire city into a burned out radioactive shell. We also grasp the fact that a so-called limited war involving only attacks on the missile silos in the west could rapidly contaminate our vast fields of corn, grain, and soybeans.

The westerly winds that flow across the fertile Midwest could quickly make enormous radioactive wastelands out of the breadbasket of the workd.

I have seven beautiful daughters. How do I explain to them that we need 30,000 nuclear weapons and the Soviets need 20,000 nuclear weapons in order to feel secure? Will they really believe me if I say we do not plan to use them? How can I help to remove the cloud that blights both their future and mine? We are spending unimaginable amounts of money for weapons while our own citizens are suffering, being told there is not enough money for our senior citizens, for the education of our young people, for the handicapped, or even for basic scientific research.

We are told by our education commission that we are falling behind other nations. We are just barely hanging on. All through the range of social services, we see deep cuts, while at the same time we are pouring money into more and more weapons systems which often seem to become obsolete before they are very far off the drawing boards.

In last November's referendum, Chicago voters approved a bilateral freeze by a margin of 3 to 1. Suburban Cook County voters approved it by a vote of 2 to 1. I am proud to say that I endorsed and supported that freeze referendum. I believe those voters were sending a direct message to our two Illinois Senators. The message was simple and straightforward: End the arms race now, not later. Please end it completely, not partially, and end it on both sides, not just one side, but please end it before it ends us.

In the elections to come, women will be using our voting power to press home that point. The splitting of the atom and the development of the rocket have taken away forever the blessed feeling of security we once knew in this country, but an endless, mindless flood of death-dealing weapons will not restore it. More and more people understand that, and we are calling for a drastic change of policy.

A bilateral, verifiable freeze, we believe, would be the best embodiment of that change. I think we must take the initiative in calling on the Soviet Union to establish a nuclear weapons freeze. When our lives and the lives of our children are at stake, we cannot wait any longer to get as serious as we can about this issue. Posterity demands no less of us.

Thank you.

Mr. KEHLER. Thank you, Susan.

I would next like to introduce Terry Herndon, who until 2 weeks ago was the executive director of the National Education Association, and who is currently the president of Citizens Against Nuclear War, and I might add we are running short on time, so we need to be brief.

STATEMENT OF TERRY HERNDON, PRESIDENT, CITIZENS AGAINST NUCLEAR WAR, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. HERNDON. Thank you, Randy, and thank you, Senator Pressler.

As indicated, I can represent the National Education Association and/or the Citizens Against Nuclear War, which is an organization in which 51 prominent, esteemed, middle of the road organizations of American people have joined the NEA in an effort to cause the Congress and our Government to pursue a bilateral, negotiated, verifiable nuclear freeze.

I am here and that organization exists because of the popular mandate that has been described by my colleagues on this panel. Not only do we have the results of the referendum. Not only do we have the results of the various public opinion polls, but in the existence of Citizens Against Nuclear War, we see that the leaders of private organizations, membership organizations, are being required to address an issue that has little to do with the primary purpose that brought them into being, because the American citizens are utilizing these organizations to express the breadth and the depth and the fervor of their commitment in regard to a freeze.

Our coalition believes that the citizens of a democracy have a responsibility to participate in the debate on foreign policy, most particularly as it relates to arms, armaments, and more specifically nuclear arms and nuclear arsenals. We have intervened in this debate because of our desperate hope that the Congress will offer the leadership required to create the kind of government we would like to see.

In sum, we come with desperate hope that Thoreau spoke the truth when he said, let every man make known what kind of government would command his respect, and that wiii be one step toward obtaining it. Indeed, we would hope that our appearance here today will achieve a response from this committee, and that our Government will become known throughout the world as the champion of nuclear disarmament by seeking a nuclear freeze.

I thank you.

[Mr. Herndon's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TERRY HERNDON

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, the people that I represent feel that the Foreign Relations Committee has acted wisely in scheduling hearings into United States-Soviet relations in a nuclear era, and we are grateful for the opportunity to participate.

It is not hyperhole to say that this topic is the most important issue facing the Senate, citizens of our country, and the inhabitants of this planet.

This is why the past 2 years have witnessed an uncommon focus of public attention on arms policies, the nuclear arms race, and the security strategies of both nations. Popular literature, scholarly literature, political debate, and the mass media have all contributed to an uprecedented awareness and sensitivity within the electorate of our country.

It is in this context of awareness that public opinion polls find 81 percent support for a verifiable, comprehensive, bilateral freeze on nuclear weapons. It is in this context of awareness that 60 percent of those voting in statewide referenda voted in support of the Freeze. It is in this context of awareness that more than 100 national organizations have endorsed it. It is in this context that the House of Representatives overwhelmingly passed H.J. Res. 13 after an historic debate. It is in this context of awareness that the esteemed leaders of 52 prominent, national organizations formed Citizens Against Nuclear War.

The depth and breadth of the contemporary public debate and basic respect for the idea of self-government must lead one to conclude that we, the people, have a right to express ourselves regarding government policy in this area; and that, at this time, we express ourselves with a relatively sound knowledge of our alternative choices. The more the people learn about the rapid evolution of nuclear weapons technology, the more we fear the uncontrollable nature of the arms race. The more we learn about the awesome destructive power of the nations' arsenals, the less sanguine we are about survivability, civil defense, or any possibility of even pyrrhic victory. The more we consider the destabilizing quality of the next generation of American weapons (MX, Trident II, Pershings, cruise missiles, antisatellite weapons) and similar qualitative and quantitative expansion on the part of the Soviet Union, the less confident we are of the traditional notions of deterrence, balance of terror, and mutually assured destruction. The more we ponder the awesome economic burdens that the arms race imposes upon us, our children, and the other peoples of the world, the more fervently we cry, "Why?" and seek leaders who will deliver us.

We may dream of a world free of war-like tendencies, but clearly we will not see such a world in the short term. The only rational national security strategy is to minimize the possibility of armed struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Examining the number and type of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the superpowers leads to the conclusion that each of these arsenals goes way beyond the needs of simple deterrence. The arsenals have become tools for intimidation and coercion. They are tools for aggressive foreign policy, and therefore contrary to American values.

However, they are tools which can never be used without destroying their makers. They are not only dangerous but wasteful. The time has come to stop the buildup of these weapons, both quantitatively and qualitatively. We must apply a brake to the technological engine which delivers ever more accurate, speedy, and threatening weapons systems and then reverse course. We come to you with a message: freeze first, then reduce. We believe that S.J. Res. 2, the Kennedy-Hatfield Nuclear Weapons Freeze Resolution, introduced by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield and cosponsored by 32 other Senators, including seven members of this Committee, is the best vehicle for the Senate to use in responding to these feelings among citizens of these United States.

If this is a "government of the people, by the people, and for the people," then the people should be heard. We wish for our Government to lead the world into a more sane living environment; we want our Government to provide initiative toward a verifiable, comprehensive, bilateral freeze on the production, testing, and deployment of nuclear weapons. Inasmuch as our Predident has spurned this plea, we come to the Congress, the most direct representatives of the people, and ask that you express our view. We ask that you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, report out a resolution for an immediate, verifiable and bilateral nuclear weapons freeze. We ask that you demand a simple, swift, and sure end to the nuclear arms race.

There has been much attention given to a "guaranteed strategic builddown" as proposed by Senators Cohen and Nunn and other "less than a freeze" proposals. Numerical reduction of strategic arsenals is clearly desirable. However, replacing two obsolete and less threatening weapons with one new, more highly accurate and more threatening warhead, is not necessarily an improvement in global stability. At the heart of the arms race is the spur of technology, driving both countries to ever larger spending programs for nuclear weapons. This technological engine drives both our countries and the whole globe toward the nuclear precipice. We must put a brake on this engine. A verifiable, mutual freeze on the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons is the sanest step two superpowers can now take away from the precipice.

The members of CAN are not peace and disarmament organizations. We are organizations of American citizens who have come together with quite different primary purposes. We are as diverse as the NEA, the United Food and Commercial Workers

Union, the Solar Lobby, the National Black Caucus of State Legislators, the YWCA, the American Jewish Congress, and the Japanese-American Citizens League.

These organizations and 45 more are now together because their leaders and most of their members believe that:

The citizens of a democracy have a responsibility for foreign policy;

The United States must urgently seek international agreements to reduce the risk of war;

The existing arsenals and the nuclear arms race cannot provide effective security and indeed threaten the survival of civilization;

U.S. policy should not be based on an effort to win or survive a nuclear war; and

Civil defense cannot provide a "safety net" against nuclear war.

We support a verifiable bilateral freeze on the production, testing, and deployment of all nuclear weapons.

Our member organizations involve millions of American citizens. Many of them have appended their own letters to this testimony. I come on their behalf and say to you that the thoughts that I express today spring from millions of American hearts and minds.

We have not been duped, manipulated, or misled. We sincerely want the world freed of the nuclear arms race. We want a nuclear freeze which is followed by rapid reductions in the present arsenals. We want a government which champions this cause.

We come with desperate hope that Thoreau spoke the truth when he said:

"Let every man make known what kind of government would command his respect, and that will be one step toward obtaining it."

Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, we are grateful for your attention to our plea.

INTERNATIONAL CHEMICAL WORKERS UNION,
Akron, Ohio, June 20, 1983.

Hon. CHARLES PERCY,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: The International Chemical Workers Union, AFL-CIO supports S.J. Res. 2.

The ICWU is a national labor organization representing 65,000 workers in the United States chemical industry, We have contracts covering conditions of employment at some of the major corporations in the country, including duPont, Monsanto, Allied, and Union Carbide. We have members in several government owned-company operated military facilites and have some membership in various levels of the nuclear industries.

During our 29th Constitutional Convention held the week of October 17, 1982, delegates from 250 locals across the country were presented with a resolution in support of a nuclear arms freeze. During committee consideration, rank and file members proposed that the basic freeze language be amended by adding a prohibition on manufacturing, testing or using chemical or biological warfare. The resolution was overwhelmingly adopted on the floor. A copy of the resolution is enclosed.

On behalf of the members and families of the International Chemical Workers Union, AFL-CIO, we commend your committee for its consideration of this vital issue. We hope for an expeditious vote on the matter.

We consider S.J. Res. 2 to be the best alternative measure on this issue. We are confident that it will obtain a majority.

Sincerely yours,

FRANK D. MARTINO, *President.*

The International Chemical Workers Union convention held during October 17–22, 1982, has joined the ranks of 7 other International Unions favoring a Nuclear Freeze. Just under 300 delegates approved by acclamation a resolution dealing with the nuclear freeze, and calling for an end to the manufacture of chemical and biological weaponry. The sacrifice of social welfare in order to subsidize the massive military budget increase was also overwhelmingly condemned. The texts of the resolutions follows:

RESOLUTION No. 60

DISARMAMENT

Whereas: The United States Senate has not held a vote on the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT II), and

Wheareas: The Defense Department's 1982 annual report states: "The U.S. and the Soviet Union are roughly equal in strategic nuclear power," and

Whereas: The greatest challenge facing the earth is to prevent the occurrence of nuclear war by accident or design, and

Whereas: The Administration's current plans to produce and deploy a new generation of strategic nuclear submarines, bombers, missiles and warheads will destabilize the restraints on both sides increasing the problems of detection and verification and waste valuable resources desperately needed to alleviate poverty, hunger and disease, and

Whereas: We see no logic in the administration's policy which calls for arming in order to disarm, for spending billions more on nuclear weapons in order to end up with fewer nuclear weapons, and

Whereas: A freeze followed by reductions in nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems in needed to halt the nuclear arms race and to reduce the risk of nuclear war; therefore be it

Resolved: That this Convention call upon the U.S. Senate to ratify the SALT II Treaty; and be it further

Resolved: That we call upon all nations to:

(a) Pursue a complete halt to the nuclear arms race.

(b) Decide when and how to achieve a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems.

(c) Give special attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve.

(d) Proceed from this freeze to a mutual, verifiable reduction of existing nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems; and

(e) Totally reject the manufacturing, testing and/or use of chemical and/or biological warfare.

RESOLUTION No. 61

MILITARY BUDGET

Whereas: The national security of the United States is a primary concern of the International Chemical Work, and

Whereas: The security of the Nation requires domestic stability including an employed workforce, and

Whereas: The social programs developed over the 50 years to protect people from the devastating effects of poverty, poor training or physical handicaps have been drastically reduced in order to increase military spending; now therefore be it

Resolved: That the International Chemical Workers Union reaffirms its support for military spending necessary to assure national security; and be it further

Resolved: That the International Chemical Workers Union refuses to accept the notion that national security can be subsidized by taxing under-employed workers or by reducing benefits to the under privileged; and be it further

Resolved: That research funds should be allocated for discovering means of establishing full employment, instead of weapons of destruction.

ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION,
Washington, D.C., June 17, 1983.

Hon. CHARLES PERCY,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: Environmental Action urges you, as the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to support Senate Joint Resolution 2 (S.J. Res. 2). This resolution calls for negotiations to begin in an attempt to reach a "mutual and verifiable freeze and reduction in nuclear weapons" in order to reduce the accelerating risk of nuclear war. We fail to understand how any elected officials could possible vote against a resolution which advocates merely the beginnings of negotiations.

As environmentalists, we increasingly view nuclear war as the ultimate threat to the environment. Like the majority of the American people, we feel compelled to speak out firmly against the nuclear arms race.

Negotiation of a bilateral freeze for all future testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weaponry would be the most effective measure possible for reducing the chance of nuclear war. As proposed in S.J. Res. 2 the nuclear weapons freeze is verifiable, and more significantly, it can end the nuclear arms race.

In addition to requesting your support for S.J. Res. 2, we ask that you oppose the Cohen-Nunn Strategic Builddown proposal (S. Res. 57). The Cohen-Nunn proposal would allow qualitatively more dangerous nuclear weapons to be devised and produced. Merely reducing the numbers of weapons would not decrease the threat of nuclear war.

We have passed the point at which we can afford to allow the arms race to continue. As an elected representative, you can end the nuclear arms race—protecting the environment and all of the people of our planet—by voting in favor of Senate Joint Resolution 2.

Sincerely,

ELIZABETH A. DAVENPORT,
Coordinator.

[From the OWL Observer, June 1983]

NUCLEAR FREEZE RESOLUTION MOVING ALONG

Last month the U.S. House of Representatives voted by a margin of almost two to one in favor of a mutual verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons by the United States and the Soviet Union. The resolution now goes to the U.S. Senate, where supporters hope the Foreign Relations Committee will soon hold hearings on it.

Last year, in referendums across the country, citizens made it clear there should be an end to the nuclear arms race now. When Citizens Against Nuclear War (CAN) was formed, OWL joined approximately 40 national organizations in support of their goals—to work for peace and the reduction of nuclear arms.

Karen Mulhauser, Executive Director of CAN (and an OWL member), sends word on actions she hopes OWL members will take to help passage of the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution (S.J. Res. 2) by the Senate. Write your Senators and urge support if they are not already among the 34 co-sponsors of the resolution.

Letters of appreciation should also go to those who led the successful fight in the House: Rep. Ed Markey (D. Mass.), who was the initiator of the freeze in the form of the Markey-Conte resolution (H.J. Res. 2); Rep. Clement Zablocki (D-Wis.), Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman and House floor leader on the debate. CAN reports that Zablocki "during the long debate leaned on other Democratic representatives and Republican Jim Leach of Iowa for help in beating back several amendments which would have weakened the resolution." Other members who had leading roles in support of the freeze were: Les AuCoin (D-Ore.), Stephen Solarz (D-NY), Les Aspin (D-Wis.), Norman Dicks (D-Wash.), Dante Fascell (D-Fla.), Nicholas Mavroules (D-Mass.) and Dan Glockman (D-Kan.).

THE AMERICAN ART THERAPY ASSOCIATION, INC.,
Falls Church, Va., June 8, 1983.

Chairman CHARLES H. PERCY,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR CHAIRMAN PERCY: The 2,500 members of the American Art Therapy Association whole heartedly join with other members of the Coalition Against Nuclear War to urge members of the Senate to vote in favor of S.J. Res. 2 which calls for a mutual and verifiable freeze and reduction in nuclar weapons.

As human service professionals directly involved in both creativity and human potential, we find the current path of the nuclear arms race both horrific and irrational. The ghastly destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons are well-documented and difficult to refute. The direct casualties from a 20 Negation thermonuclear bomb on a city like Washington, D.C. would include 50 percent dead and 40 percent seriously injured. These direct casualties would overwhelm our medical care system, without beginning to care for the thousands of indirect and delayed casualties. Yet in spite of the obvious destructive potential of nuclear weapons and, moreover, the unsuccessfull attempt of the nuclear arms race to either lessen international tensions or strengthen international peace, the race continues to escalate.

If the world has so far escaped a nuclear disaster, it has been due more to our luck, than to our wisdom. We of the American Art Therapy Association feel that the time to end this dangerous gamble with destruction is long overdue. As citizens, we entreat our representatives to lead our nation forward to a peaceful future for our country and our planet and vote for S.J. Res. 2.

Sincerely,

GEORGIANA JUNGELS, ATR,
President, American Art Therapy Association.

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY WOMEN,
Washington, D.C., June 20, 1983.

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: The American Association of University Women, a national organization of 190,000 college-educated women, strongly urges your support and leadership in seeking passage of a bilateral, mutual and verifiable nuclear freeze.

Since our beginnings in 1881, AAUW has worked for arms control. Through many wars and conflicts the Association has eagerly sought an end to development of weapons which destabilize global military balances. No clearer example of such a destabilizing condition exists than in the continued deployment of bigger, more accurate nuclear weapons. From our perspective, we believe that only through a freeze of weapons testing and development can we even begin the process of a sane arms control policy.

AAUW supports the Kennedy-Hatfield freeze resolution as well as a comprehensive test ban treaty. On these issues our grassroots have spoken loud and clear.

During the hearings your committee conducts in the next few weeks, we hope that our voice is made clear. We want arms control measures now that will prevent nuclear war and promote more cooperative relations between our nation and the Soviet Union.

This June our membership will once again reaffirm our national commitment to arms control and to a nuclear freeze, in particular. Our members voices cannot be ignored. Please help us bring our nation back on the path to successful arms control measures which strengthen rather than weaken our global leadership.

Sincerely,

MARY PURCELL,
President.

KAPPIE SPENCER,
Legislative Chair.

LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS,
Washington, D.C., June 20, 1983.

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: On behalf of the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), this country's oldest and largest Hispanic organization, I would like to express our great concern about the continuing nuclear weapons race. LULAC has confirmed its concern through a resolution which was passed at our Executive board meeting in October of last year. We believe that the present arms race and the mind-set which defends that race contribute to creating a climate which would allow a nuclear war.

Our concern with the United States' position in the nuclear weapons race is many-fold. We believe that by intending to deploy first strike weapons, such as the MX missile and the Pershing II, or weapons which cannot be detected or verified such as the cruise missile, we are undermining the possibility of a nuclear arms agreement. Our concern is also one of economic priorities. Hispanics have had to disproportionately bear the brunt of the present recession and defense, versus-domestic programs, spending. Studies show that defense spending creates less jobs per dollar spent than civilian alternatives, and also, that as weapons sophistication increases, defense industries create fewer jobs per dollar spent. At a time when our community faces 15 percent unemployment, we find this situation unacceptable.

We urge you, Senator, to recognize the need to immediately curtail the development and deployment of nuclear first strike and unverifiable weapons, to support a resolution aimed at freezing the development and deployment of nuclear arms, and to use that opportunity for the purpose of more substantive negotiations calling for a reasonable and permanent arms control arrangement. Thanking you for your attention to this matter, I remain,

Respectfully,

ARNOLDO S. TORRES,
National Executive Director.

NATIONAL WOMEN'S HEALTH NETWORK,
Washington, D.C., June 20, 1983.

Hon. CHARLES PERCY,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: The National Women's Health Network is an advocacy organization devoted to improved health care services for women in the United States. The Network believes that women's health care can be improved only when women's health concerns and other human needs become a federal budget priority. The Network believes the current emphasis on nuclear arms development is one of the greatest detriments to the improvement of women's health. The money now being funneled into the spiraling nuclear weapons buildup can better serve the many health needs of women.

The National Women's Health Network believes the use of nuclear weapons is an unconscionable and unacceptable method of resolving international disputes. The development and stockpiling of nuclear arms brings humanity to the brink of destruction. There is no winning in the use of this kind of ultimate force. It is unbelievable that economic viability and psychological well-being can be restored and that the human race as we know it can survive the long-term effects of widespread genetic damage. The arms race carried to its inevitable conclusion—nuclear war—could only result in destroyed biological and social systems, a world in which the survivors may well envy the dead.

The National Women's Health Network decries the consideration of the nuclear alternative by some political and military officials as an option and urges the United States to pursue a policy aimed at stopping nuclear arms escalation and reduction of these stockpiles. The United States and the Soviet Union, the two recognized world leaders in nuclear arms technology, are currently roughly equal in overall strategic nuclear strength. This parity offers a rare opportunity for both countries to negotiate a meaningful mutual arms reduction which will serve their own interests as well as the interests of all humanity.

The National Women's Health Network adds its voice to the many thousands of organizations and individuals in the United States who support a meaningful worldwide arms reduction program. The National Women's Health Network supports public initiatives which ask the U.S. Government to propose to the Government of the Soviet Union that both countries immediately agree to a mutual halt of all further testing, production, and deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and delivery systems as a first step toward balanced reductions. Therefore, The Network urges you to support S.J. 2, the nuclear freeze resolution.

Sincerely,

SYBIL SHAINWALD,
Chair of the Board.

[Western Union Mailgram]

AMALGAMATED CLOTHING AND TEXTILE WORKERS UNION,
New York, N.Y., June 30, 1983.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: We urge you to report S.J. Resolution 2 out of committee. The General Executive Board of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union has joined with an increasing number of unions in endorsing a nuclear weapons freeze as the surest method to stop the arms race which is greatly damaging our economy and increasing the risk of war.

DAVID DYSON.

NATIONAL UNION OF HOSPITAL AND HEALTH CARE EMPLOYEES,
New York, N.Y., June 21, 1983.

Senator CHARLES PERCY,
Chairman, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: On behalf of 143,000 members of the National Hospital Union I urge you and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to support S.J. Res. 2, the nuclear weapons freeze, as initially introduced.

We also ask that you do everything in your power to bring the measure to a vote on the Senate floor at the earliest possible date.

Sincerely,

HENRY NICHOLAS, *President.*

ORGANIZATION OF PAN ASIAN AMERICAN WOMEN, INC.,
Washington, D.C., July 17, 1983.

Honorable CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: The Organization of Pan Asian American Women (Pan-Asia) urges you to support legislation for a mutual bilateral verifiable freeze on nuclear weapons.

Pan-Asia is a national organization dedicated to ensuring the full participation of Asian-American women in all aspects of American society.

We are particularly concerned about this issue because the first target of a nuclear attack took place in the Pacific basin. Many Americans of Japanese descent were victims of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki holocaust. Today, these survivors continue to suffer the consequences.

As Americans of Asian descent, we are interested in American foreign policy which could affect the Asian countries. As human beings, we are concerned with the threat a nuclear attack would have on posterity.

Sincerely yours,

WENDY LIM, *President.*

AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION,
Washington, D.C., June 20, 1983.

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: At its 1981 Annual Meeting the American Public Health Association adopted a resolution entitled, "Nuclear War and Weapons." A copy of the resolution is enclosed.

Our membership vigorously opposed the development and deployment of the neutron bomb and the cruise and Pershing missiles. We believe that escalation in nuclear weapons development and production increases the potential for nuclear war. We further feel that it is not possible for nuclear war to be "limited" geographically, or to be won or survived.

The American Public Health Association strongly supports a multilateral thermonuclear arms freeze and urges our government to initiate multilateral talks directed at limitation of nuclear armaments. We are pleased to support S.J. Res. 2 which endorses a Comprehensive Test Ban treaty and a "build-down" of nuclear weapons.

Very truly yours,

ANTHONY ROBBINS, MD, MPA,
President.

[American Public Health Association Resolution Adopted November 1981]

NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The American Public Health Association,

Noting the announcement on August 6, 1981, Hiroshima Day, to add the neutron bomb to our military nuclear arsenal, and the deployment in Western Europe of the Cruise and Pershing missiles, and

Believing that escalation in nuclear weapons development and production increases the potential for nuclear war, and

Knowing that there are already over 50,000 nuclear warheads in the world, of which 30,000 belong to the USA, and that this represents an accumulated explosive power equal to 3 tons of TNT per person alive on earth, a quantity sufficient to destroy any country at least 20 times over, and

Recognizing that there is abundant evidence that it is not possible for nuclear war to be "limited" geographically, or to be won or survived and

Acknowledging that protests have been registered in Europe against this deployment of nuclear weapons, therefore

1. Vigorously opposes the development and deployment of these nuclear weapons by the United States,
2. Strongly supports a multilateral thermonuclear arms freeze and strongly encourage the government to initiate multilateral talks directed at limitation of nuclear armaments,
3. Notifies the United States President and Congress of this position.

Notifies the public via the media of this position.

THE NEWSPAPER GUILD,
Washington, D.C., June 14, 1983.

Senator CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: On behalf of The Newspaper Guild's 32,000 members, I wish to convey to you our deep concern over the threat to our very survival posed by the continued proliferation and stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

Acting on that concern, delegates to the Guild's 1982 Convention last June called for an "immediate bilateral freeze on the production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons." Such a freeze should be "the first step toward a reduction and elimination of the world's nuclear arsenals," the delegates said.

To further that aim, the Guild joined with other national organizations in the founding of the Citizens Against Nuclear War.

Now, we call on your committee and the Senate to set in motion the apparatus for achieving a verifiable and bilateral nuclear freeze by approving S.J. Resolution 2. This issue demands the highest priority. All of our futures are at stake.

Sincerely,

CHARLES A. PERLIK, JR.,
President.

WOMEN FOR RACIAL AND ECONOMIC EQUALITY,
New York, N.Y., June 17, 1983.

Chairman CHARLES H. PERCY,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: Women for Racial and Economic Equality supports S.J. Res. 2, the Kennedy-Hatfield Nuclear Freeze resolution.

We feel that the first line of defense in our country must be found in guaranteeing our basic rights to jobs, quality public education, housing, health and child care. Study after study has convinced us that money spent on the arms race generates many fewer jobs than money spent on basic human needs.

We, our children, and our families, want to live secure in the knowledge that our elected representatives will work for our right to live in a world at peace, rather than at the brink of nuclear holocaust. Support for S.J. Res. 2 is but one, but at this stage the best, way to reflect that commitment to us. We urge its passage.

Sincerely,

CHERYL CRAIG,
National President.

United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America,
Washington, D.C., June 17, 1983.

Charles H. Percy,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Chairman Percy: The nuclear weapons freeze resolution demanding an immediate and verifiable U.S./USSR agreement to freeze the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons systems is the most important issue faced by this Congress.

The passage of S.J. Res. 2 would do much to relieve the economic crisis in the world and the constant fear of all civilization being wiped out.

The funds sought by President Reagan and his administration to support the program for the military are intolerable and can no longer be borne by the working people of this country. Hundreds of billions in projected expenditures for the military is unreasonable when you consider we cannot find means to create jobs for the millions of American walking the streets.

To negotiate a freeze on nuclear weapons as outlined in S.J. Res. 2 would be the single biggest contribution this country and the Soviet Union could make to all mankind. Money needed to feed, clothe, and house our poor, unemployed and older people; to establish a national health care program, to develop an efficient public transportation system; to improve education and hospitals, would be available from our tax payments instead of building weapons of fear and destruction.

We urge you to do everything in your power to report S.J. Res. 2 favorably and to work for its passage by the full Senate.

Thank you for considering our views.

Very truly yours,

James Kane,
General President.

The United Prebyterian Church in the U.S.A.,
Washington, D.C., June 17, 1983.

Hon. Charles H. Percy,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Senator Percy: The Presbyterian Church, U.S.A. has made a strong commitment to the bilateral nuclear weapons freeze. The 193rd General Assembly (1981) and the 194th General Assembly (1982) endorsed the freeze.

However, in a very unusual action, the General Assembly asked the synods and presbyteries (regional bodies of the church) and congregations to study the freeze and to take their own action.

The response to this request has been unprecedented with the Presbyterian Church, U.S.A. Seventeen regional synods have endorsed. One hundred and forty-one presbyteries have endorsed, while one has voted against it. One thousand six hundred and fifty congregations have voted to endorse, and ninety-two have taken some other action supportive of the freeze.

We believe the arms race has to end in order to protect God's Earth. The freeze is a very important step to assure that future generations are not threatened by nuclear annihilation.

We urge the members of the Foreign Relations Committee to vote favorably on Senate Joint Resolution 2.

Sincerely,

Richard L. Killmer, *(Rev.),*
Director, Peacemaking Project.
Mary Jane Patterson,
Director, Washington Office, Presbyteran Church, U.S.A.

NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION,
Washington, D.C., June 21, 1983.

Hon. CHARLES H. PERCY,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: The National Education Association (NEA), our nation's largest organization of teachers and other education employees, believes that a complete halt in the nuclear arms race should be implemented immediately. This should include a mutual and verifiable cessation of testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear delivery systems and other destabilizing weapons. A copy of our policy Resolution on a nuclear freeze is enclosed for your information.

NEA further believes that as an immediate arms control objective, the United States and the Soviet Union should—

1. Pursue an immediate and complete halt to the nuclear arms race;
2. Decide when and how to achieve a mutual verifiable freeze on testing, production, and further deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles, and other delivery systems; and
3. Give special attention to destabilizing weapons whose deployment would make such a freeze more difficult to achieve.

The delegates to the NEA Representative Assembly clearly identified a nuclear arms freeze which meets the above criteria to be a major priority.

Sincerely,

LINDA TARR-WHELAN,
Director of Government Relations.

H-27. NUCLEAR FREEZE

The National Education Association believes that peoples of the world—in their concern for the survival of the planet and humankind—are evolving toward greater and greater collective consciousness and unity in their recognition that nuclear war is the common enemy of all nations and peoples and is not survivable.

The Association calls for a halt to the arms race in order to create a world without nuclear weapons. As a critical first step toward lessening the risk of nuclear war and reducing nuclear arsenals, the Association urges the United States and all other nations to adopt a freeze on the testing, development, production, emplacement of nuclear weapons and all systems designed to deliver nuclear weapons.

WASHINGTON ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY
ORGANIZATIONS FOR REFORM NOW,
Washington, D.C., June 21, 1983.

Chairman CHARLES H. PERCY,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: The 60,000 low and moderate income families in 27 states who are members of the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) wish to express to you and your fellow committee members our wholehearted support for passage of a freeze on nuclear weapons.

We advocate the adoption of S.J. Res. 2 and urge you to reject any weakening amendments. We are convinced that an immediate freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons is an essential first step toward the arms reduction that is vital to our future security and survival. We are further convinced that our nation's true security lies in an economy predicated on justice and that this goal is incompatible with the spiralling costs of the arms race.

Your committee has a pivotal role to play and we urge you to take the lead in supporting the nuclear freeze.

Sincerely,

MADELEINE ADAMSON,
National Representative.

[Western Union Mailgram]

THE CONGRESS OF ITALIAN AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS,
Brooklyn, N.Y., June 16, 1983.

Senator CLAIBORNE PELL,
Capitol One, D.C.

The members of the Board of Directors of the Congress of Italian American Organizations support a freeze on all nuclear weapons

MARY SANSONE,
Executive Director.

Mr. KEHLER. Thank you, Terry.

In the interest of time, let me simply make a few brief remarks. As the national coordinator of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign, I primarily want to let this committee know that the National Freeze Campaign strongly urges your support for an immediate, verifiable United States-Soviet freeze, and we very much hope you will support Senate Joint Resolution No. 2, sponsored by Senators Kennedy and Hatfield.

We also want to let you know that the freeze campaign is unalterably opposed to the so-called builddown proposal, which you have before you, as a proposal which is dangerously simplistic, and which ignores the qualitative aspect of the nuclear arms race and which would allow every conceivable type of new and dangerous destabilizing weapon on both sides to go forward under the name of builddown, when in fact we would simply be building up qualitatively.

I would like to simply enter the rest of my testimony in the record, and conclude by trying to give you a brief flavor of what the work of the National Freeze Campaign is like. All over the country, thousands of freeze supporters are working to try to educate themselves and their friends and neighbors as to the unimaginable danger posed by nuclear weapons. And this is precisely the point. The danger posed by nuclear weapons is in fact unimaginable.

With the assistance of Senator Pell, who has agreed to help me in this regard, I would like to share with you a very simple teaching technique developed by physics professors to help people understand orders of magnitude, in this case, to help us all understand the incredible destructive power of today's nuclear arsenals.

If I may come forward a minute, if I can ask you, Senator, to hold this container, I am going to drop a single metal BB into this container, and I would like you to imagine that the sound it makes falling into this metal container represents all of the explosive power, all of the megatonnage used in all of World War II, including the bombings of London, Dresden, Tokyo, all the fighting on the western and eastern fronts in North Africa, and Pacific, even including the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, represented by the sound of this one little metal ball falling into this container.

I do not know if this could be heard in the back of the room. Let us do it one more time. It helps sometimes to close your eyes while you listen to the sound [indicating].

Now, perhaps, keeping your eyes closed, I would like you to listen to another sound, which is the sound the equivalent of the entire destructive power of today's nuclear arsenals. As you listen to this sound, try to remember the sound that you just heard of World War II [indicating].

[Mr. Kehler's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANDALL KEHLER

Good afternoon. My name is Randall Kehler and I am the National Coordinator of the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign. I am here representing the nationwide organization responsible for coordinating the widespread support among the American people for an immediate, mutual, verifiable freeze between the United States and the Soviet Union, a bilateral freeze regarded as the essential first step which must be taken before we can ever achieve genuine and substantial reductions on both sides, a goal shared by all of us here today.

I think it is an undisputed fact that the majority of American people want our government to support this immediate, mutual, verifiable freeze. The evidence is well known. The closest thing to a national referendum in the history of American democracy took place last fall when more than one-third of the entire U.S. voting population had an opportunity to vote yes or no on the Freeze. Eleven and one-half million voters, or more than sixty percent, said, "Yes, we think our government should propose a mutual freeze to the Soviet Union."

In addition, 350 city councils around the nation have publicly endorsed the Freeze. This list includes almost all of our major cities, including New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, as well as hundreds of smaller ones from Tuskegee, Alabama, to St. Paul, Minnesota. Furthermore, freeze resolutions have now been passed by one or both houses of the state legislature in 24 states, most recently Maryland, Washington State, West Virginia, Missouri, North Carolina, Ohio, and New Mexico.

Religious support for the Freeze is probably well known to you. Almost every major religious denomination in the country, including, most recently, the United States Conference of Roman Catholic Bishops, has endorsed the Freeze. Eighteen national and international labor unions have also endorsed the Freeze, including many of the largest unions in the country such as the International Association of Machinists; the United Food and Commercial Workers; the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees; and the National Education Association.

As I am sure you are aware, the United States House of Representatives is also on record in favor of an immediate, mutual, verifiable freeze, followed by mutual reductions. With the nearly two-to-one pro-Freeze vote of May 4, 1983, Members of the House agreed that such a freeze is a prerequisite to genuine, mutual reductions.

I would like to make several points in order to clarify the position of the National Freeze Campaign. First, this campaign is a non-partisan effort. The public support for the Freeze which I have mentioned above comes from Republicans and Democrats alike, conservatives as well as liberals. In fact, national opinion polls show that nearly as many people who voted for President Reagan in 1980 support the Freeze as do those who voted for former President Carter. It is essential that the issue of stopping and reversing the nuclear arms race, the issue of preserving life on this planet, transcend normal partisan politics.

Second, and by the same token, this is not an "anti-Reagan" campaign. Naturally, most Freeze supporters are adamantly opposed to the nuclear buildup policies of the Reagan Administration, but we are also acutely aware of the bipartisan history of America's role in the nuclear arms race. Every president for the past 30 years, Republican as well as Democrat, has declared the necessity of stopping the nuclear arms race, and yet every one of them has supported or initiated policies that have perpetuated it. While the nuclear war-fighting rhetoric of the Reagan Administration has been unprecedented, we will not settle for reassuring rhetoric and a return to the days of "managed escalation," or arms-control-as-usual.

Third, the Freeze for us is not just one of many different arms control proposals. Yes, it is certainly a specific arms control proposal, but it also represents one of two mutually-exclusive approaches to the problem. And there are only two approaches. One is to stop and reverse; the other is to keep going. This Administration, while promoting nuclear superiority under the guise of "catching up," seems unalterably committed to the "keep going" approach. The Freeze, on the other hand, is the only option you have before you which rejects the "keep going" approach in favor of the "stop and reverse" approach.

In this regard, we wish to state that we are categorically opposed to the so-called "build-down" proposal. This is a dangerously deceptive and simplistic approach which completely ignores the qualitative aspects of the current nuclear arms race. The "build-down" proposal would allow every new weapon on both sides, no matter how dangerous or destabilizing, to go forward, with the only cost being the necessity of discarding older weapons which in many cases are becoming obsolete anyway.

Because of our insistence that the arms race must be stopped before it can reversed, we urge you to give your strong support to S.J. Res. 2, co-sponsored by Senators Kennedy, Hatfield, and 32 others. At the same time, you should know that the National Freeze Campaign also supports H.J. Res. 13, the Freeze Resolution approved by the House last month. If this committee or the full Senate finds the House version of the freeze resolution more acceptable than S.J. Res. 2, the Freeze Campaign would have no objection to your adopting that version. Both versions clearly call for an immediate, mutual, verifiable freeze followed by mutual reductions. And that is the essential point.

Fourth, it is urgent that such a freeze, at least in the form of a mutual "'negotiators' pause," be implemented right now. We cannot afford to wait for two reasons. The first is that there is a very real danger that must be addressed right now—the danger posed by a new generation of first-strike, war-fighting weapons, some of which will be extremely hard to verify, which both the United States and the Soviet Union are now testing, producing and deploying. The second reason is because we have an extraordinary opportunity right now, in the form of unprecedented public support, for a U.S. initiative to conclude a mutual freeze with the Soviet Union. Stopping the nuclear arms race will not be accomplished without the kind of enormous public support that exists today. Now is our chance.

Fifth, you should know that thousands of Freeze supporters all over the country, more and more frustrated by continued support for arms-racing policies on the part of their elected representatives in Washington, are beginning to set their sights on the 1984 elections. I mention this not as a threat, but merely as a statement of fact. What other recourse do the American people have when there is such an obvious discrepancy between the will of the majority of the American people and the will of their elected leaders?

How does one explain this discrepancy, particularly in a country in which we pride ourselves upon having a government "of the people, by the people, and for the people"?

I realize that some of you here today do indeed support an immediate, mutual, verifiable freeze. But the majority of U.S. Senators, not to mention our leaders in the White House, as yet do not. I would ask those who do not:

Is it because you think that the Freeze is simply a slogan? Have you not read the founding document of the Freeze Campaign, entitled "Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race," in which the Freeze as an arms control proposal is clearly spelled out? Or have you not seen the full description of the Freeze presented in the House earlier this year by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Clement Zablocki, in which it is clearly explained what the proposed Freeze would include, exclude, and leave up to the negotiators?

Do you really believe that the obstacles to a mutual freeze are technical, as opposed to political? Do you really believe that there are any significant technical problems—for example, having to do with verification—which could not be worked out if there were sufficient political will?

Is it your belief that the risk that may be associated with stopping the nuclear arms race are actually greater than the increasing risks of continuing it?

Do you really think, given the enormous overkill on both sides and the current invulnerability of major portions of both sides' arsenals, that a mutual halt now would leave the United States vulnerable to a Soviet nuclear attack? Or, for that matter, leave the Soviet Union vulnerable to a U.S. nuclear attack?

Are you really convinced that just one more weapon, or perhaps two, or just one more "modernization" program, will be enough? Are you convinced that one or two more on our side will not lead to one or two more on the Soviet side, which in turn will lead to one or two more on our side, and on and on and on?

Or is it your belief that because we haven't had a nuclear war yet there's no hurry in stopping and reversing the nuclear arms race? No hurry, despite the fact that there have already been innumerable close calls due to human and technological error? No hurry, despite the fact that our own country, according to public records, has seriously considered on a number of occasions during the past 30 years using nuclear weapons in various conflicts around the world (and presumably the Soviets have too)? No hurry, despite the spread of nuclear bomb-making technology to more and more nations and to particularly volatile regions of the world?

And is it your belief that the nuclear arms race is not costing us anything in the meantime? That the billions and billions spent on sophisticated nuclear technology could not be spent, in the public or private sector, to improve the quality of life for all Americans? That the specter of nuclear holocaust is not taking a terrible psychological toll on our people in general, and especially the young people who, according to numerous studies, feel that they cannot take the future for granted?

If these are not your beliefs, then what is it that prevents you from giving your full, wholehearted support to a mutual, verifiable freeze?

You who are Members of the Senate have an extraordinary opportunity to use your great authority, influence, and prestige not only to support a strong freeze resolution in the Senate, but also to actually exercise real leadership toward stopping and reversing the nuclear arms race. I am convinced that you could not devote your lives and your fortunes to a more noble cause. If you should choose to do this, the American people will support you.

Senator **Pell**. Very good.

I would add here how glad I am that in my State I helped take the lead in the freeze campaign in the last election. We had it on the ballot. I regret that throughout the country the same step was not taken, and I also frankly regret the fact that we got only 60 or 65 percent of the vote. I believe that with more educational work, we would have gotten 90 or 95 percent.

I think this demonstration today was very vivid. The contrast was dramatic. The pellets were all dumped in the end, but if you kept up the initial pace, it would have gone on for another 5 minutes.

Senator **Pressler**. We will have some questions and comments, but as I say, we must move along, because of some of the commitments that some of the members have this afternoon. Let me say that Senator Cranston and I held hearings last year on this subject, but I am wondering if one of the representatives could say whether you support the House-passed version of the nuclear freeze resolution?

Mr. **Kehler**. I would be happy to speak to that question. We feel very comfortable with the Zablocki freeze resolution, House Joint Resolution 13, which was passed by the House. We would prefer that you support the Kennedy-Hatfield, Senate Joint Resolution 2, only because we think it is simpler and less redundant, but if you should decide that the House version is more acceptable, that would be acceptable to us as well.

The essential point for us is the point that the freeze must come first if we are ever to have genuine mutual reductions, and it was that question of sequence, the freeze first, followed by reductions, which was preserved intact in the House freeze resolution.

Senator **Pressler**. Mr. Willens, I would be very interested to learn more about the poll that was taken, the number and the sample, but maybe you can just send that to my office because I want to save time here.

Mr. **Willens**. I would be glad to do that.

Senator **Pressler**. If you have some polling that has been done in the Midwest, I would like to see that, if you have breakouts.

Mr. **Willens**. Thank you.

Senator **Pressler**. Yes, Rudy, would you like to go?

Senator **Boschwitz**. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry that I was first early and then I was late. I was trying to read the testimony of Mr. Kehler. Has anybody else testified? Have these folks testified?

Senator **Pressler**. Yes, they have all testified. So perhaps Senator Pell can ask his questions.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Fine.

Senator **Pell**. There is one question which comes up every so often, and that is whether the freeze resolution is in any way contradictory to moving ahead with the INF negotiations. My own view is that it is not, because I think if we conclude a treaty in Geneva in the INF negotiations, it would be a step forward. That would be at least one building block on which we can build. If agreement came first, we could freeze at the reduced level. If the freeze is in place, we should be able to reduce from that level. What are your reactions to the criticism that is sometimes raised against us that it runs counter to the INF negotiations?

Mr. **Kehler**. Let me say that the idea of having a mutual comprehensive freeze was never meant to preclude any reductions which could be achieved in the meantime if they were available to us. In the case of the INF negotiations, obviously, the freeze campaign favors a negotiated settlement which would preclude any further deployment by any side. We are certainly not against that kind of outcome, and as I said, whether it is INF or the START negotiations, we would like to see reductions wherever they can be achieved, but we are frankly discouraged by the prospect of reductions if there is not a comprehensive freeze first.

Senator **Pell**. I have always been struck by the analogy that perhaps is an oversimplification, but I thought a valid one, that Senator Hatfield drew, that before a rising elevator can start coming down, it must stop and freeze first, and this is really what we are proposing at this time.

Do you think that the nuclear freeze in any way undermines the Soviet will to negotiate? Do any of you have a view on that?

Mr. **Kehler**. Harold, would you like to speak?

Mr. **Willens**. I think it does just the opposite. In my experience, I have never negotiated in the international arena; however, I have negotiated labor management complexities and others, and I have always found that only when both sides are relatively equal in influence, power, whatever, can you get a negotiation to succeed in which neither side gets everything it wants, but both come out with something better than they started with.

So, I believe that because the Soviets have achieved a rough kind of parity with us—we can both destroy each other many times over—there is for the first time a real chance to negotiate to get a freeze on both sides, and a freeze is no more, really, than a truce used to be in prenuclear wars, and before you could sign a treaty, you would have to stop shooting, and that is what a truce was all about. We have to stop building so that the negotiations can go forward, whether it is INF or START or whatever.

A freeze will accelerate, expedite, strengthen rather than weaken the position.

Senator **Pell**. Mr. Willens, in connection with you conversation with President Reagan, is there anything you could tell us about it or enlighten us as to his thoughts?

Mr. **Willens**. Yes. As I said in my remarks, he was very warm and very gracious. I told him I was representing close to 4 million people from his own State, voters from his own State, and he said, well, those people just do not seem to understand, Mr. Willens, that the Soviets are ahead. And I said, no, I think they understand very well that they are not ahead.

I personally have been involved in this issue, although I am a businessman. It has caught my attention, and I have been in it for over 20 years. I have met with almost every science adviser to every President in those 20 years. Not one of them thinks that we are behind. In fact, they think we are ahead, but every one of them thinks that the words "ahead" and "behind" do not mean anything.

Senator PELL. What was the President's thought?

Mr. WILLENS. He just said, well, they just do not know what I know, and so on.

I might mention this: It was as though he had rehearsed some lines. Forgive me. I do not mean to be disrespectful to a gentleman who is now President of our country, but it is we who own the country. It belongs to us. We are the shareholders in the American enterprise, and it is as though he was not hearing what I was saying, he had just memorized a few lines, and that was it.

The only time I got a real response out of him, I should say, is this. I said, as a marine intelligence officer, I have been in Hiroshima and Nagasaki not long after the dawn of the atomic age, and I said, I have always felt that someone like you, Mr. President, ought to offer to your counterpart from the Soviet Union a meeting which would not be a formal summit meeting, because that takes a long time, but an informal summit meeting, because the symbolism of the two of you meeting in Hiroshima can be enormously powerful.

Senator PELL. What I am interested in is what he said, not what you said.

Mr. WILLENS. On that point, he said, that is a very interesting suggestion, and I would like to think about it. On the other, we just expressed our positions to each other. I did not convince him, nor did he convince me.

Senator PELL. Right. Thank you.

Now, one other thought here. It bothers me. I can be a member of our Government, and taken a active role in the freeze movement. Yet you or I do not suffer for it. We do not get harassed. We do not go to jail, or anything of that sort. If we were doing this in the countries behind the curtain, we would be suffering.

I wrote a letter to both Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Andropov, asking each one if he could not move a little bit in the direction of letting the freeze and antinuclear movements play a role in their country. Needless to say, I did not get a reply to either letter, which were sent via Ambassador Dobrynin, and I was just curious as to whether you feel you have any contact with similarly thinking people wanting peace on the Earth, where we are all fellow passengers, and do not want to be incinerated, with movements on the other side of the curtain? Because it is not going to be any good to have a freeze on this side and no freeze on that side.

Mr. WILLENS. It would do a lot of good, because we are blessed with democracy. We are therefore responsible and capable of doing something about this on a mutual basis. So it is up to us, because we have this freedom, and the voice of the people can be heard, it is up to us to make a sane offer and see if they respond.

Senator PELL. But what is the condition—if any of you can enlighten me on this—of the antinuclear movement behind the Iron Curtain? Is there any spontaneity to it whatsoever?

Mr. **Willens**. I know nothing about it. I have kept away from it. I care about my country and its leadership role, and I do not know. I cannot speak to that.

Mr. **Herndon**. One the difficulties, Senator, is, while we may question the veracity of their position, it is at least the superficial position of the Soviet Government that the freeze is a good idea. Now, the pursuit of government policy, contrary to the official disposition of the government, does indeed bring repression, and there is not a dissident movement of great size and magnitude in the Soviet Union.

I have thought a good bit about the question you raise and related questions, and I am impressed by the fact that there are many in the United States who are concerned about the status of Soviet Jewry because of the repressive government, and indeed a Russian Government of one kind or another has been repressing Jews for a century, and yet the greatest threat to the very existence of Russian Jews today is the American nuclear arsenal.

There are people who worry about the status of the Evangelical Christians in the Soviet Union, but the greatest threat to their very existence is the American arsenal.

Senator **Pell**. I think you had something up front here, Mr. Kehler?

Mr. **Kehler**. I simply wanted to reiterate what Terry said, in that, No. 1, there is no equivalent freeze movement in the Soviet Union because of the nature of their system; and second, to say that in fact the Soviet Government for the first time officially indicated that they would support a mutual bilateral freeze when they voted in favor of that proposition in the General Assembly of the United Nations this past December.

Contrary to President Reagan's assertion that this idea came from the Soviet Government, that is completely untrue, the Soviets resisted the idea on every occasion that they got, but did in fact sign on to the freeze agreement in the United Nations last December.

But the essential point to remember is that the purpose of the freeze campaign is simply to get our own Government to propose a freeze to the Soviet Union and test their sincerity, put them to the test, challenge them. And so our work is here in this country, to bring our Government to that point.

Senator **Pell**. I thank you very much, and I would add that I would hope that there is a Tass reporter here and that he would write a story and it would be printed. I would very much doubt that this interplay would be.

My time has expired. If the chairman would permit——

Ms. **Catania**. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to make an observation in response to Senator Pell's question. This morning in the newspaper it says that the Soviet Union is granting some rights to laborers in decisionmaking—clearly, an American idea that has somehow managed to surface at that level in the Soviet Union.

We have been seeing demonstrations in Poland during the visit of John Paul II in support of a labor union, a concept that thrives more in the United States than anywhere else. So ideas that gain strong support here do surface behind the Iron Curtain in spite of massive suppression efforts, and I think it is simply commonsense to assume that people in the Soviet Union do not want to be destroyed any more than people in the United States want to be destroyed.

Senator **Pell.** Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator **Pressler.** Thank you very much.

Senator Boschwitz, and then I think that we all must remember, after Senator Boschwitz' questions and Senator Cranston, we must move along with our witnesses. We have a long session this afternoon.

Senator **Boschwitz.** Mr. Chairman, I would like to, in that case—hear Admiral Gayler and Mr. Colby. I have a lot of questions, but I will defer them to a later date. Also I have a 3:30 appointment with the Prime Minister of Spain.

Senator **Pressler.** Senator Cranston.

Senator **Cranston.** Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to say that if you have to leave I would be glad to chair, because I think these witnesses, who are here on a very important matter, should be given whatever time is needed. I know we have another panel coming up.

Senator **Boschwitz.** In that case, Senator, perhaps we can hear the other three witnesses and ask them questions.

Senator **Cranston.** Fine, whatever you wish. I do have a few questions.

Senator **Pressler.** Do you have more than 10 minutes of questions?

Senator **Cranston.** No, I can do mine in 10 questions.

Senator **Pressler.** Then why do we not go ahead and do them and then submit it for the record.

Senator **Cranston.** Mr. Kehler, I would like to ask you about the builddown. You said you do not support it. You did not explain why; if you could briefly explain why I would appreciate it.

Mr. **Kehler.** I think the build-down at first glance appeals to a lot of people and probably a lot of people who support the freeze, because it would appear that we are going to end up with fewer and fewer weapons as we give up two for every one we build and deploy.

I think the problem is that we not only have a quantitative arms race and a problem, which these BB's I dropped represent, of megatonnage piled upon megatonnage, but we also have increasingly a qualitative arms race, where ever more accurate weapons, ever more destabilizing hair trigger weapons, in some cases weapons that are hard to verify, for example cruise missiles, are going forward on both sides.

It is not just a U.S. problem; it is a United States and Soviet problem. And there is nothing in the builddown as I read it which would limit in any way that new generation of dangerous, destabilizing, highly accurate, hard to verify weapons from going forward. So really, we would just be masking the continuation of the arms race while all these new weapons make us increasingly more insecure and make the risks of nuclear war greater.

Senator **Cranston.** What in your view would be required to verify a freeze?

Mr. **Kehler**. In my view, and I am not an expert on these matters, but I try to listen hard to expert testimony—we will be hearing some of that in just a few moments—there is adequate technical means of verification in the possession of both sides. In fact, both sides are not watching each other without a freeze agreement, and I think with relatively high reliability.

But I am also convinced, as we have heard from expert witnesses, that there is no such thing as perfect reliability in the area of verification and that verification is very much a political matter. That is to say, when the political will is present both sides will figure out ways to verify each other.

I am convinced that there is adequate verification for a freeze and that our national security would be enhanced by it.

Senator **Cranston**. Yes, sir?

Mr. **Willens**. Senator Cranston, may I just add that in business I learned a long time ago that life is all about choices, risks, and gains. Now, the imperfect verifiability, which is almost perfect from what I have read and learned, but let us call it imperfect verifiability, of a freeze is no risk at all when you compare it to the risk of continuing to do what we have done the last 37 years, which is to build the two arsenals higher and higher.

A 69-cent computer chip can bring about the end of two countries. Now, if you continue that way, there is where the risk lies, and the partial risk, the slight risk of the possibility that the Soviets would be stupid enough to cheat so they can get another 1,000 devices—what does that mean to them? They have enough to destroy us many times over already, and if they get caught redhanded they will look like idiots in the eyes of the world.

Well, straight commonsense argues that anybody with an IQ of over 5 is not going to do that. So it is comparative risk that ought to be talked about when we discuss verifiability, even though we are going to hear from some real experts on that issue.

Senator **Cranston**. Mr. Willens, skeptics have said that those who voted on the issues on the ballot in California, Rhode Island, and elsewhere had not really thought it through and were not well informed and therefore did not really register anything of great significance. Would you comment on that?

Mr. **Willens**. Yes, I surely would. California was the State in which this administration decided to destroy the freeze, and it made a very intelligent judgment from its political perspective: If the California freeze initiative were defeated, then very little impact would have been achieved elsewhere.

Because of that, President Reagan himself on three separate occasions attacked the freeze very strongly. Defense Secretary Weinberger made two or three major speeches. Four or five people from the administration at top levels, including the National Security Adviser, Judge Clark, all made major speeches, and they really attacked the freeze very strongly, laying before the people, always with full media coverage, naturally, laying before the people their arguments against it.

Despite that, despite that incredibly strong attack from the President and all the President's men, the people in the State of California voted for the freeze. So believe me, there was nothing soft-headed about it, there was nothing easy about it. The attack was ferocious, and still the commonsense of the people overcame these attacks.

Mr. **Herndon**. Senator, may I suggest that in my relatively short lifetime there have been few if any occasions when the electronic media, the political debate, scholarly literature, and popular literature have so concentrated on a question. Now, one may be able to argue that there is a substantial portion of the American populace that has not exposed itself to those various media or have not seriously considered the material put forth through those media.

But if one concludes that the American public is not competent or qualified to render a judgment on this question at this point in our history, I believe they have concluded that there is no way that the people can be competent to render a judgment on any question, because rarely is a question of public policy so thoroughly exposed and so thoroughly argued from all perspectives as has this one been in the last 2½ years.

Senator **Cranston**. I agree with your answers, which are very eloquent, very forceful, and very persuasive.

Let me ask this question of whomever wishes to respond.

The President recently, in relation to the MX missile, agreed to do something about arms control. We are in some form of negotiation with the Soviets in Europe on arms control and there have recently been various statements by the President, the Secretary of State and others on the subject.

Do you think that those moves have diminished the support for the freeze in the country at the present time?

Mr. **Willens**. Let me just give a quick answer. I have to leave. The people who voted for the freeze in 1982 represented 60 percent of those who had the right to vote or had the opportunity, 60 percent. So it was 60–40. Every poll taken since then has gone higher and higher until the one I mentioned earlier, 79–16; this despite a highly accelerated attack on the freeze by the administration.

So it is astonishing. It is what one national pollster called a political miracle, where the commonsense of the American people has suddenly burst forth and is resisting all kinds of double talk and so on, and the sense of it is broadening and deepening.

Senator **Cranston**. Do you think that a summit conference that did not lead to concrete results in terms of a freeze or an agreement for significant reductions would have any impact on the public opinion that clearly supports a freeze at the present time?

Mr. **Kehler**. I think that a summit meeting, or for that matter any number of initiatives in the arms control arena, would be seen as credible and believable by the American people and as useful only in the context of a clear commitment to stop and reverse the nuclear arms race. And that clear commitment I think has never been made.

One way that I would hope that it will be made ultimately is in the form of some kind of negotiated pause or moratorium in which both sides agree to stop the testing, production and deployment while these meetings and negotiations are going on, so that we do not make the situation worse while we are trying to make it better.

Senator **Cranston**. Thank you very much

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you very much.

We will now call the panel of Admiral Gayler, William Colby, Irwin Redlener, forward. I will first call on Admiral Gayler.

Can we have order in the room.

May I ask each of you to summarize your statements. We will place them in the record in full and we would very much appreciate being able to move to questions after brief presentations from each person.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Mr. Chairman, respectfully, the statements do not seem terribly long and it makes it a little easier for me to follow.

Senator **Pressler**. Would you like to ask your questions right now?

Senator **Boschwitz**. I do not want to ask questions. I would just hope that the witnesses not be too brief.

Senator **Pressler**. OK. I was trying to accommodate my good friend——

Senator **Boschwitz**. Yes, yes.

Senator **Pressler** [continuing]. As I see the hour of 3:30 approaching for him.

Admiral Gayler.

STATEMENT OF ADM. NOEL GAYLER, U.S. NAVY (RETIRED), ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN COMMITTEE ON EAST-WEST ACCORD, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Admiral **Gayler**. What I will do, Mr. Chairman, then, is to tick off the principal points, but in the order in which they appear in my statement.

The first is, we have to have arms control in order to improve the security of the United States, as well as to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Second, we can define that security as freedom from war or threat or war on military action.

Third, that we have to reduce the risk of nuclear war to the vanishing point. It is entirely possible to do that, given the political will to do so.

The first point, as George Kennan has said, is that there is no issue at stake in our relations with the Soviet Union which is worth a nuclear war. This is not a doctrine of "Red or dead." We do not have to be either one. In my judgment, by the proper support of competent sea, land, and air forces, we can defend ourselves and our allies and our interests without resort to nuclear weapons or the threat of nuclear weapons.

There are measures that we can take, anyone of which is good, all of which together will in my judgment reduce the risk of nuclear war practically to zero. One is that we knock off this insulting and pointless rhetoric between the two countries principally involved, the United States and Russia.

The second is that we renounce once and for all all nuclear war-fighting and counterforce doctrines, and this will force profound changes in the physical world, in our weapons programs and deployments.

Third, that we stop attempting to injure each other. It is simply not true that what injures the Soviet Union helps the United

States and vice versa. There are many things which are helpful to both of us, and an end to this nuclear arms race is the prime such thing.

The fourth measure is that we should redeploy shorter range weapons out of range of each other, in order to mitigate the hair-trigger situation that exists, for example, in Europe.

Fifth, that we should adopt a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. This of course would be a reciprocal policy to that of the Soviet Union, and I want to point out that it would result in real differences in weapons supplied, in the deployment and position of those weapons, in the doctrines, the training, the exercises. In effect, it would have results in the real world, not be merely a paper declaration.

Sixth, that we should—and I am choosing my words carefully now, in light of the freeze testimony—declare a moratorium on the development, testing, and deployment of new nuclear weapons, so long as the other side exhibits similar restraints. A moratorium, of course, need not be negotiated, can be simply declared and observed along the lines of the moratorium on open air testing that President Kennedy and Chairman Khruschev had many years ago.

Finally and most important, that we accomplish deep and continuing cuts in the nuclear stockpiles by the actual and verified destruction of the weapons and their fissionable material.

Now, the American Committee on East-West Accord, for which I am appearing here, has developed, with the help of nuclear scientists, with the help of industrialists, particularly with the help of political scientists and under the leadership of George Kennan, a proposal that the United States and the U.S.S.R. turn in to a depot large numbers of nuclear weapons, verify, weigh, extract the fissionable material, dilute that to powerplant material, burn it up irrevocably in electric powerplants, the military elements of the weapons ground up beyond reverse engineering and disposed of.

That each side choose the weapons that it turns in. Now, this has the advantage that it accomplishes actual destruction of weapons, it is verifiable—you see this thing happening, and that these agonizing questions of definition are done away with. Particularly the question of equity as between the two powers is taken care of by the fact that each continuously chooses its own strategy as it goes along in turning in these weapons.

We think that the proposal is equitable and practical and verifiable, and we have some reason to believe that it may well be negotiable. The point there is that it can support any other arms reduction measure or it can stand on its own.

To that, add a complete stop on the production of weapons-grade fissionable material and inspection to international standards of electrical powerplants against diversion of material from them.

Now, are the Soviets ready for an agreement of this kind or any similar agreement which reduces nuclear weapons? You have just had testimony from probably the most astute and experienced observer of the Soviet scene living in America, Averell Harriman, who has just talked to the Chairman, Mr. Andropov. And what Governor Harriman reports as the Chairman's statement is:

"Today the Soviet people and the American people have a common foe—the threat of a war incomparable with the horrors we went through previously."

Governor Harriman's comment on that statement is that, while he does not believe that Chairman Andropov will pursue Soviet goals and objectives with any less vigor, that he, Andropov, realizes that the avoidance of mutual destruction is the foremost Soviet objective.

We and the Soviet Union have two very important interests in common: One is that we not be blown up; and the other is that we not see nuclear weapons proliferated around the world in the hands of irresponsible governments or even terrorist groups.

On these two powerful common interests we can build agreement, but only if we separate nuclear weapons control from all other issues between us. We cannot expect the Soviets to shape up by our standards on every difference that we have. We can reasonably expect that we can reach agreement on these two matters of such overwhelming importance to us both.

Let me end, Mr. Chairman, by expressing my conviction that real nuclear arms reductions require only political will to succeed. There is no technical obstacle, no security problem, no military consideration that cannot be handled safely, given the will to do so.

[Admiral Gayler's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ADM. NOEL GAYLER

The primary goals of nuclear arms control must be to improve the security of the United States and the West by reducing the risk of nuclear war.

Our security can be defined as freedom from war and from threat. We must not be coerced by war or by the threat of war, whether here at home or in Europe or Asia or wherever our interests and commitments may lie.

And we must reduce the risk or nuclear war to the vanishing point, for nuclear war would be more terrible by far than anything which has yet happened on earth.

As George Kennan has said:

"* * * there is no issue at stake in our political relations with the Soviet Union—no hope, no fear, nothing to which we aspire, nothing we would like to avoid—which could conceivably be worth a nuclear war, which could conceivably justify the resort to nuclear weaponry. And the second is that there is no way in which nuclear weapons could conceivably be employed in combat that would not involve the possibility—and indeed the prohibitively high probability—of escalation into a general nuclear disaster."

This is not a doctrine of "better red than dead". We need be neither. We can assure our security against conventional attack, together with our Allies, by sustaining modern, well-equipped, and well-led forces on land, sea and air. Military reform will be required, at home and in Europe, but this is a small price to pay to end the transparent but dangerous bluff that we would use nuclear weapons first.

We can protect our interest and our commitments conventionally. And we can come close to ending the danger of nuclear war. How? By measures like the following:

Stop exchanging insulting and pointless rhetoric between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Arms control is at least a two-handed game, and we cannot move easily toward a rational agreement while vilifying each other.

Renounce once and for all nuclear war-fighting and counterforce doctrines. This will force profound changes for weapons programs and deployments.

Stop attempting to injure each other. Embargoes against the Soviets on the one hand or Soviet fishing in the troubled waters of Central America on the other cannot coerce either superpower. It can only make them angry. It is simply not true that whatever injures the Soviets helps the United States, and vice versa.

Redeploy shorter range weapons out of range of each other, to reduce hair-trigger readiness requirements.

Adopt a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons.

Declare a moratorium on development, testing and deployment of new nuclear weapons so long as the other side exhibits similar restraint. And use this time to hold while serious arms reductions are negotiated.

Finally, and most important, accomplish deep and continuing cuts in nuclear weapons stockpiles by the actual and verified destruction of weapons and their fissionable material.

Major reductions in nuclear weapons are an avowed policy goal of the United States and U.S.S.R., but success in negotiations appears remote. Both sides agree that negotiated reductions must be equitable and verifiable, and that agreements must be concrete and precise. But definitions of these criteria are far apart and both sides continue to differ over the focus and extent of reductions.

The American Committee on East-West Accord has a well developed proposal that meets these demanding criteria while avoiding the pitfalls that have plagued earlier negotiations.

Our proposal says:

United States and U.S.S.R. turn in nuclear warheads containing fissionable material, and convert that material to nuclear fuel for burning in power plants.

United States and U.S.S.R. cease production of weapons-grade material.

United States and U.S.S.R. agree to full-scope safeguards on nuclear power plants.

Nuclear warheads have a number of components. We propose that both sides turn in warheads but hand over only the core of the warhead—the explosive nuclear fission device—whose fissionable material would then be converted to power-plant fuel. The other components of the warhead would be mechanically destroyed.

The scheme for weapons conversion can be summarized as follows:

Each country hands over progressively large numbers of explosive nuclear fission devices to a single conversion facility, built explicitly for this purpose at a neutral site.

Under supervision, the devices are dismantled and their fissionable material converted to power-plant fuel for generation of electricity. Swords into plowshares.

At any given time, each side chooses the devices it hands over. Any device qualifies, without regard to the type of warhead or nuclear weapon from which it is taken. Results are measured by the weight of fissionable material contained in the devices. (We avoid endless debates over classification and equity.)

Soviet and American Teams, with perhaps a third party as referee, identify and count each device, and weigh the fissionable material turned in. All are positively identifiable, by scientific means. (That's verification, without intrusive inspection in either country.)

The proposal is equitable, practicable and verifiable.

This Deep Cuts proposal must be accompanied by a negotiated full stop to production of weapons-grade material. (A halt in production is much easier to verify than reduced production.) The production plants in use are well known, and clandestine production of significant amounts would present a number of observables. New production plants would also be difficult to conceal.

Newer methods of producing fissionable material, for example by centrifuges or laser-isotope separation, promise smaller physical plant requirements, but there is reason to believe that useful observables will exist in the event of significant clandestine production.

This Deep Cuts proposal should also be accompanied by full-scope safeguards against diversion to weapons use of commercial powerplant fuel. It is true that for the United States and U.S.S.R., already possessing thousands of weapons, safeguards are less critical than they are for the non-nuclear powers who might, through diversion, acquire their first nuclear weapons. Nevertheless it is politically important that both superpowers accept international safeguards against diversion, or agree to joint inspections of commercial power facilities, or both.

This Deep Cuts proposal of the American Committee has several uniquely attractive features, aside from avoiding many of the problems of equity, verification, and classification that have plagued earlier negotiations:

It can stand alone, or it can provide a means to carry out reductions achieved through alternative formulas. This approach can fit into the framework of SALT, START, builddown or any other approach.

As a stand-alone proposal, it is the only one that assures real weapons reduction.

It builds in clear visibility that inventory reductions are taking place.

It promotes dramatic, immediate, and continuing reductions in nuclear weapons.

It is simple enough to be understood and sophisticated enough to work.

Are the Soviets ready for an agreement of this kind, or any similar agreement which really reduces nuclear weapons? The most astute and experienced observer of the Soviet Union, Governor Averell Harriman has reported the statement of General Secretary Andropov in their very recent meeting:

"Today the Soviet people and the American people have a common foe—the threat of a war incomparable with the horrors we went through previously. The war may perhaps not occur through evil intent, but could happen through miscalculation. Then nothing could save mankind."

Governor Harriman commented:

"I wish to stress that this sense of concern does not in my mind imply that he will pursue Soviet goals and Soviet objectives with any less vigor—only that he realizes that the avoidance of mutual destruction is the foremost Soviet objective and that he is deeply concerned that events today are propelling both superpowers in a direction neither can afford."

We and the Soviet Union have two very important interests in common:

That we not be blown up;

That we not see nuclear weapons proliferated world wide, perhaps even in the hands of terrorists.

On these powerful common interests we can build agreement, but only if we separate nuclear weapons control from all other issues between us. We cannot expect that the Soviets will shape up, by our standards, on all the issues between us. But we can reasonably expect that we can reach agreement on these two matters of such overwhelming importance to us both.

Let me end by expressing my conviction that real nuclear arms reductions require only political will to succeed. No technical obstacle, no security problem, no military consideration exists that cannot be handled safely given the will to do so.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you very much. We have had you before our subcommittee before and we thank you very much.

Next, I will call on William Colby, former Director of Central Intelligence, with the Committee for National Security.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM E. COLBY, FORMER DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ON BEHALF OF THE COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. **Colby**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On behalf of the Committee for National Security, I would like to urge that this committee report out favorably the Kennedy-Hatfield resolution and that we proceed to a mutual and verifiable freeze on the production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons.

I think it is my particular contribution to this effort to assure you that it is a practical step and that any such agreement can be verified adequately to protect the security of our country. That requires a couple of summary points.

First, we are going to be following the development of Soviet weaponry whether there is an agreement between us or not, because we have to to protect our country. The Defense Department's recent booklet on Soviet military power shows the comprehensive nature of our knowledge of their weapons systems, including many weapons which are in essence nonverifiable: the numbers of tanks, the numbers of pieces of artillery and all that sort of thing.

Now, any of those can be hidden under barns, developed in factories in the Urals, and yet we have perfectly adequate estimates of the total numbers of those weapons. Now, as I say, we are going to be doing that whether there is an agreement between us or not.

If there is an agreement, the process becomes easier, not harder, because these agreements in recent years have all contained provisions which make it easier to monitor the matters limited by the treaties. This includes restrictions on concealment, noninterference, with the other side's collection capabilities, declarations of forces, notification of tests.

There are even in some of these treaties provisions for the exchange of geological information, for the implantation of black boxes or sensors, and in one of them the inspection team, which caused the failure of our first nuclear freeze proposal in 1946, when Stalin rejected it as a form of American espionage.

The fact is that the Soviets in recent years have been forced by the development of technology and by the development of communications, transportation and so forth, toward greater visibility of their affairs. In these treaties they have shown a willingness to take steps that will help this process when a treaty is in their interest. They are never going to have an open society, I do not think, and there is never going to be a Moscow edition of Aviation Week.

But nonetheless, we are going to know the size and development of their forces sufficiently to protect our country, whether there is an agreement between us or not, and it will be easier with one.

The third point is that a freeze makes this process easier. The more comprehensive a restriction, the easier it is to monitor it. If you get into these complex numerical numbers games, then you require a lot of cross-checking, a lot of examination of all different elements in order to see whether the totals come out right.

With a freeze which says stop, you merely look to see if there is any activity in violation of the freeze. Therefore, a freeze by definition is easier to monitor than one of these complex reduction arrangements and formulae.

Fourth, with a freeze treaty, there is an additional feature to our benefit, the opportunity for communication about ambiguous Soviet behavior. If we see some activity going on in the Urals today and we wonder what it is and we go over and ask the Soviets to help us resolve that bit of ambiguity, they tell us it is none of our business, and it is not because they have not agreed to any supervision.

But the SALT I experience indicates that when we see ambiguous activity, we have raised it with the Soviets and we have been able to ascertain what that activity is, either that it is not in violation of the treaty, as some of them turned out, or that actions were taken which were apparently leading to violations of the treaty, and the effect of it was to stop that action.

In other words, an agreement between us allows us not only to know more about the Soviet activity, but to influence their behavior in a positive manner and in that way to protect our security.

Now, the fifth major point is that an agreement between us is a better form of protecting our security than continuing the arms race. We protect our country better by causing the Soviets not to develop additional weapons than by developing the weapons on our side to shoot them down if they are launched against us.

What we are interested in is the protection of our country, not legal evidence for a court of law in a breach of contract suit. We are collecting this information, and will be under a freeze agreement, to protect our country.

When you consider the reality of these weapons systems, you must realize that any violation which would give a substantial strategic advantage would have to be of a size and a complexity which would make it literally impossible to be done on a hidden basis. There could be marginal violations, let us admit it, although the evidence, as I say, in the Defense Department's booklet does not indicate that they are going to be very large and that our coverage is indeed comprehensive.

But if we do reach an agreement, then it is plain that any marginal agreement cannot threaten our country as much as the development of additional weapons systems, and that the marginal violation will undoubtedly be caught long before it becomes a strategic threat to us.

These are the key points. There is one additional fact. If we reach a freeze agreement with the Soviets it will be touted on both sides as a great contribution to the safety of our countries and of the world. If the Soviets decide to launch some program of treachery in violation of that agreement, they would have to have literally thousands of Soviet citizens involved in the project.

I think one can say that among those thousands there would be at least a few who would be so repelled by that kind of treachery that they would do what Col. Oleg Penkovsky did in the late 1950's—make contact with American intelligence to alert us. He paid with his life for doing that, but he contributed to the safety of the world in the Cuban missile crisis, and I think you will find other brave Soviet citizens would also undertake that kind of action if they saw any substantial program of violation by the Soviet Union.

For these reasons, then, Mr. Chairman, let me urge that you not be paralyzed by the problem of verification. Let me urge you not be stopped by those who would take an absolutist view toward it. Let us move toward protecting our country by a freeze agreement better than we can by continuing to build arms.

Thank you.

[Mr. Colby's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WILLIAM E. COLBY

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Committee for National Security, let me assure you that verification should not be a obstacle to conclusion of an arms control agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. This is true of an agreement for a mutual and verifiable freeze on the testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems or several other possible agreements to arrest the arms race and lessen the nuclear terror presently threatening the world. This conclusion comes in part from the marvels of our present intelligence systems but especially from a clear understanding of the nature of verification and its true function in our relationships with the Soviet Union.

It is essential first to recognize that the United States will be monitoring the development of Soviet military forces and weaponry whether there is an agreement between our two countries or not. Our intelligence services are responsible for keeping us informed of potential dangers to our country. It is plain from such examples as the recent Defense Department booklet, "Soviet Military Power," that our coverage of Soviet forces and weaponry is comprehensive. This booklet discusses and gives numerical counts of a vast variety of Soviet forces and weapons.

Many of these are of a physical nature that makes them plainly concealable and yet we have reliable estimates of their total production and numbers. This comes from the nature of central intelligence, gathering all the relevant facts of factory production rates, operational testing, depot stores, and unit allocations. The preface to this booklet shows that kind of comprehensive coverage which our intelligence services provided during the mere year and one half between the first and second editions of this publicaton. It is plain that these cover a number of weapons which are far from identifiable down to the last individual item.

The verification of an arms control agreement will be subjected to this kind of comprehensive attention by our intelligence services, focussed on the elements of such an agreement. In general, the more comprehensive the restraint, the easier rather than more difficult it is to identify whether the Soviets comply or attempt to violate the restraints. Complex numerical limitations must be cross-checked and verified whereas a flat prohibition can merely be the subject of attention to see whether there is any activity in violation.

The second important aspect of the verification procedure is to realize that monitoring Soviet forces and weaponry is easier under a negotiated arrangement such as a freeze than it is without one. Recent arms control treaties negotiated with the Soviets contain a number of provisions designed to ease the process of monitoring the forces and weapons covered by those agreements. Agreements on non-concealment and non-interference, specific numerical limitations, test notification rules, declaration of forces—all ease the problem of monitoring Soviet forces. In recent treaties awaiting ratification by the Senate, the Soviets have accepted such additional steps for monitoring such as the exchange of geologic data, the implantation of censors or black boxes and even that supposed ultimate—the inspection team.

I am not a believer in the absolute value of an inspection team, Mr. Chairman, because it was, after all, the Russians that invented the Potemkin village. I am sure that their ability to obfuscate and pull the wool over the eyes of an inspector is as good today as it was some centuries ago. But, the combination of all of these provisions certainly exposes the Soviet Union to a far greater degree than they have been willing to accept in the past. The Soviets are never going to have the kind of open society that we have, nor will there be a Moscow edition of Aviation Week, but the Soviets have not only already accepted substantial exposure of their affairs, they have indicated willingness to consider additional specific arrangements which would be essential to obtain a verifiable agreement which is in the interest of both nations.

The third aspect of verification which is essential to consider is the additional communication which would be opened with the Soviet Union under an arms control agreement. If we see some ambiguous activity in the Urals today, Mr. Chairman, we are going to be very attentive to it, and try to define its true nature. If we approach the Soviets with a request for assistance in clarifying this activity for us, we would be met by flat rejection in that warm and sympathetic manner in which the Soviet handle intrusions into their paranoiac secrecy. With an arms control agreement, however, as we had seen with SALT I, a special communications channel is established specifically for the discussion of ambiguities or challenge of possible violations. The history of SALT I shows that this has been used on some occasions to clarify that suspected violations were in fact not violations, to obtain suspension of certain behavior by the Soviets which would be in violation and on at least one occasion to achieve cessation of a suspected activity despite a Soviet claim that it did not happen. None of these is available in the absence of an arms control treaty, so that one extends not only our knowledge of Soviet activites but our influence upon them.

The final point to consider in a discussion of verification is its purpose. This is the protection of the security of the United States, not the assembly of evidence for a breach of contract suit in a court of law. The purpose of verification is to prevent our being surprised by some violation of an accord between us to the extent that we could be placed at a strategic disadvantage. This, of course, is the same purpose as that of our current monitoring of ongoing Soviet weapons and force developments. Thus, the question is not whether some individual action takes place which is technically at variance with obligations assumed by the Soviet Union; the important question is whether there could be a build up of Soviet strength in violation of a treaty which could threaten the safety of the United States.

Plainly, by the nature and numbers of these nuclear forces, a marginal variation in the numbers would have no strategic significance beyond indicating a possible intent to move ahead to a strategic advantage. Any action which would have the potential of a strategic advantage would by definition have to be of a size and scope to become visible to our monitoring systems, even if they were not able to pick up each individual action. Again, the experience under SALT I, declassified for public knowledge, plainly indicates this, as we picked up specific and individual violations long before they could have had any strategic significance.

Thus, it is not essential to insist that verification must absolutely identify any single action by the Soviet Union in violation of its commitments. Rather, the safety of the United States can be better obtained through an arms control agreement prohibiting the further growth of Soviet strategic forces. The safety of our country can better be protected by convincing the Soviets not to develop new weapons systems than by developing the weapons necessary to shoot them down if they are launched at us.

One can raise a theoretical possibility that nuclear weaponry may be so limited eventually that even one or two marginal ones might provide a strategic advantage. But we are so far from that situation at this time, and we are so much in need of moves to reverse the steady increase in these weapons that we can count on this future problem being alleviated by the degree of openness and mutual confidence a substantial history of reducing these threats to each other could produce.

One supplementary point, Mr. Chairman. If the Soviet Union and the United States were to agree on a comprehensive freeze or equally sweeping arms control agreement, it would be presented by each government to its people as an achievement for the protection of its people from the terrible nuclear danger. If the Soviet Union thereafter should attempt to develop a secret program to acquire a strategic advantage in violation of such commitments, a large number of Soviet citizens would have to be involved in the project if it were of sufficient scale to achieve its objectives. Among those Soviet citizens, the Soviet leadership would have to assume that at least some would be so repelled by such treachery and such danger to the Soviet Union itself and the world that they would raise the alarm that such a violation was underway. Colonel Oleg Penkovsky contacted the intelligence services of the west for precisely that reason—revulsion at the irresponsibility of the leadership of Khrushchev and his team in the late 1950's. This kind of a tip would enable our intelligence services to focus on such a program, and it would certainly provide the basis for vigorous communication with the Soviet government to achieve a cessation of such treachery. We cannot rely solely upon such a potential tip for the security of our country, but is certainly reasonable to include it as one element of the panoply of intelligence sources upon which our monitoring and verification can rest.

In summary, the Soviet Union has been forced over the years to drop some of its draconian controls against revelation of information about itself, and the trend of the future is clearly further in the same direction. It will not develop into an open society, but the march of technology is forcing it to greater exposure.

In its consideration of the different proposals for arms control, and particularly that of the nuclear freeze, let me urge this committee to stress the importance of verification and the need to include steps to facilitate it in any treaty with the Soviet Union. At the same time, let me urge that the Committee not be paralyzed by a demand for absolute verification of every last detail. Verification is certainly possible, through the kind of arrangements the Soviet Union has accepted, to the degree necessary to protect our country. We should not be estopped from further steps to protect it through arms control against the further growth of Soviet forces and weaponry by an absolutist, unrealistic and unnecessary demand for total exposure of every last detail.

Senator **Pell**. Mr. Chairman, if you will permit me, I have to go over and help cohost a meeting with the Prime Minister of Spain. Let me just say how sorry I am not to be here for the questions and answers, more to the point, and my old friend and classmate, Bill Colby, and Admiral Gayler, whom I greatly admire, and Mr. Redlener. I present my apologies and I am sure that my colleagues will ask my questions by asking them more succinctly and better.

Senator **Cranston**. If I may say one thing, those two statements that we have just had, given the background that each of you bring to the witness table, are absolutely outstanding and are of tremendous help and I thank you for them very much.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I join my colleague from Rhode Island. I have to leave and go with him.

Senator **Pressler**. Dr. Redlener.

STATEMENT OF IRWIN REDLENER, M.D., CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, PHYSICIANS FOR SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, CAMBRIDGE, MASS.

Dr. **Redlener**. Thank you.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you, and I do so as the chairman of the national executive committee of Physicians for

Social Responsibility. PSR is a national professional organization consisting of approximately 30,000 doctors and supporters committed to public education regarding the consequences of nuclear arms and the nuclear arms race. Over 180 chapters in all 50 States participate in highly active and highly visible programs of public and professional education. These programs are designed to promote a view that: nuclear world war becomes likely with each new step in the arms race; that nuclear war is not winnable or survivable; and, that the historical and professional imperative of physicians compels us to participate in the process of eliminating the nuclear threat.

All of us in PSR realize that we are not alone in the pursuit of this process—quite the contrary. We are certain that every responsible member of our Government, in the administration and in the Congress, would want to do whatever is necessary to prevent nuclear war. And, more importantly, it is abundantly clear that the American people, themselves, have entered this process to a very substantial degree.

The most recent Lou Harris poll on the subject conducted in March of this year indicated that 79 percent of the American people support a bilateral, verifiable nuclear weapons freeze.

In fact, all key public groups including 78 percent of those who voted for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 72 percent of all Republicans now favor such legislation.

But besides the formal polls, let me share with you the collective experience of thousands of physicians who have been to every corner of the Nation; to the cities and the smallest towns, to the universities and the Rotary Clubs, to the schools and the medical centers, to public symposia and town meetings.

For 4 years we have taught the consequences of nuclear war and have listened to the concerns of your constituents. People have developed an acute awareness of the danger we face and they ask the same question you grapple with today: How do we reduce the threat of nuclear war?

Unfortunately, the answer from Washington does not yet match the overwhelming and clearly expressed will of the American people to desist from perpetuating the nuclear arms race.

It is to span this gap between public concern and governmental action that physicians have come to Washington. We are determined to translate your decisions on nuclear arms development into terms related to the consequences of these actions. Terms applicable to the liklihood of nuclear war and the possibility of human survival should this nightmare become a reality.

There are those who advocate a position calling for more nuclear weapons to reduce the likelihood of actually using them. Their argument is based on a premise that the Soviets are, or soon will be, in position of nuclear strategic superiority. They are anxious to close any gaps with the Soviets and, if possible, maintain an edge in strategic nuclear forces.

How can we place any stock in this argument? Even the recent Scowcroft Commission report laid the so-called window of vulnerability to rest. But even more significant is the fiscal year 1984 report from the Pentagon's Richard D. DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense.

According to DeLauer, in 20 areas of basic military technology, the United States leads the U.S.S.R. in 15 categories, is equal in 4 and behind the Soviets in 1 single area: conventional warheads. In the comparison charts of actually deployed military systems, including strategic forces, equally dramatic conclusions are drawn. In 32 key areas, the United States leads in 14, the 2 countries are equivalent in 13, and Soviets superior in only 5.

One final note of irony—in light of recent pronouncements by the administration: These fiscal year 1984 data are more favorable to the United States than similar comparisons developed a year ago.

Those who propose more nuclear weapons as the route to national security make two additional and particularly disturbing assumptions. First, that nuclear weapons are effective "bargaining chips" at the negotiating table. Second, that the Soviets will, say for economic reasons, be intimidated to retreat from the competitive spiral of attempting to match or surpass us.

Unfortunately, history and experience teaches us that these assumptions do not reflect reality. Yesterday's bargaining chips are today's deployments and become tomorrow's impediments to real arms control. And, furthermore, no one could disprove the contention that the Soviets are perfectly willing to make whatever sacrifices they think are necessary to match perceived threats from U.S. strategic forces.

So, back to our original question: How do we reduce the threat of nuclear war?

The public opinion surveys, the recent vote in the House of Representatives and some interesting straw poll results in the embryonic Democratic Presidential campaign suggest a simple, but powerful answer to this vital question.

We can reduce the threat of nuclear war by stopping the production, storage and use of all nuclear weapons. We negotiate this halt with the other nuclear superpower in the form of a bilateral verifiable treaty. And, we follow this freeze with rapid, substantial reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers.

This, Senators, is what the people of this country want. The freeze is the moral backbone of our mutual commitment to end the nuclear threat. When you vote to negotiate a mutual and verifiable freeze with the Soviets you demonstrate first, real comprehension of the dangers inherent in continuing the arms race and, second, consistency with the fervent wishes of the vast majority of Americans.

What incredible ironies have emerged as civilization contemplates our nuclear dilemma. Consider these:

One, nuclear weapons are militarily useless. Deployment in war would certainly destroy the adversary, but at the same time unleash a devastating retaliation resulting in no winner.

Two, nuclear weapons are politically useless. Possession of them has not deterred Soviet aggression in Afghanistan or Eastern Europe, American intervention in Southeast Asia, bloody conflicts in the Middle East and Central America, or armed conflict on the Falkland Islands.

Three, nuclear weapons can be increased or modernized often at the expense of increasing destabilization and decreasing societal security.

Four, nuclear weapons are morally unacceptable. Their possession and the suggestion of their use implies an intent or threat to engage in widespread omnicide. Given all this, it is fair to ask, why not freeze? We are peering into a unique window of opportunity. An opportunity to have meaningful arms control among the nuclear superpowers.

Until very recently, public indifference to the issue of nuclear weapons and significant perceptions of inequalities of strategic arsenals have precluded real progress in arms control. But now, the public is awake and aroused and the strategic arsenals are as balanced as they will ever be. Never before, and perhaps never again, will such an opportunity present itself.

The time is now and the place is the U.S. Senate. An end to the nuclear arms race is the most compelling issue you will ever face. It is bipartisan, it is international, and it is a desperate plea of civilization confronting its own survival in hard, realistic terms.

As physicians we are, if not comfortable, certainly familiar with complex critical decisionmaking. The intricacies of metabolic and physiologic dysfunctions of a patient in intensive care parallel the complexities of international relationships and defense strategies.

We go out to the waiting room and say: the patient is doing poorly. He is in heart failure, his kidneys and liver are malfunctioning, and the digitalis we were depending upon to save his heart is already pushed to the limits of safety.

The family say: but if his heart is failing, why not give him more digitalis anyway:

We explain: because the digitalis will kill him. More is not better. And so it is with nuclear weapons. We all agree the arms race is dangerous; our society's status is as precarious as the dying patient.

And now, it is up to you to face hard reality. More nuclear weapons won't save us. We already have far too many: The people want real security from the nuclear threat, not illusions of survivability proposed by proponents of civil defense programs; the people want genuine arms control, not new and more threatening weapons systems bringing us closer to the brink of nuclear war; and the people want a halt to the development and deployment of nuclear weapons. They want to tell you enough is enough. Don't fail them now. It may be our last chance.

Senator **Pressler**. Thank you very much.

I might ask Mr. Colby, based on his experience with our European allies, we are told that the European allies are concerned about a freeze because it would leave them in the theater at a lesser advantage and Senator Percy has said that the European allies are very much afraid of a freeze because of that.

What is your assessment? How, if we had a freeze, would we reassure our European allies?

Mr. **Colby**. I think at the moment you have to say that the existence of an SS-20 does give an apparent advantage to the Soviets in that theater. However, I think at the same time you have to say that any use of those SS-20's would be more than adequately retaliated for by the forces in the theater—both the American forces in the theater, the British and French forces, which would obviously be available, and by our strategic backup. A freeze would not eliminate any of those, and, therefore, the retaliation would be complete and absolute.

If we focus on the real strategic balance between us, Mr. Chairman, it is obvious that these weapons are not usable and that they are dangerous. If we focus on bean-counting, the numbers-counting, we can go into the same kind of arrangements that have led us astray the last 35 years of building more and more of these in the hope that somehow the next particular level will make us safe, and it does not.

Senator PRESSLER. I would ask any of you to contrast the freeze and the so-called builddown. I noted that a lot of the supporters of the freeze in the Senate also support the builddown. Do you see that as inconsistent?

Mr. COLBY. I do, yes, Mr. Chairman, because I think the freeze is deliberately a simple program. It says stop. Now all of these arms treaties that we have negotiated up to now have always contained within them the ability to build new weapons, and the builddown also contains that possibility—to build new weapons.

What the freeze movement is trying to say is that these weapons should be stopped, and the only way to stop them is to freeze, not to just build new ones under the guise of builddown or exemptions or maintenance or modernization or whatever—just stop.

Senator PRESSLER. Thank you.

Senator Cranston.

Senator CRANSTON. I pose this question to either Admiral Gayler or Mr. Colby. Critics have charged that a nuclear freeze would preserve nuclear instability and perpetuate Soviet advantages. What is your comment on that?

Admiral GAYLER. I do not think the Soviets have an advantage of any kind and if there were in fact a discrepancy between the nuclear forces at this level it would not make any difference anyway. I think it has no political utility. It has no military utility.

I think a freeze which actually stopped the weapons growth on both sides would simply be to the advantage of both sides.

Senator CRANSTON. It is also argued that a freeze might undermine the administration's efforts in START. What comment do you have on that?

Admiral GAYLER. A freeze is a way of maintaining the status quo while making serious efforts in arms negotiations to make cuts. These are not exclusive ideas. It is only the commonsense idea that we do not add to weapons while we are negotiating cuts in them. So my reaction is it would not mitigate against serious arms reduction proposals.

Mr. COLBY. Quite the contrary. Senator, I believe a freeze would assist the process of reduction because without a freeze then the momentum of development of new weapons, of testing of new weapons—in our case the MX, in the Soviet case a new intercontinental weapon—will complicate any attempt to work our reductions, and a freeze would stop it so that you could work out a sensible system of reductions.

Senator **Cranston**. Critics in the administration argue that a freeze would undercut whatever Soviet incentives there are to negotiate arms control and arms reduction agreements. What is your comment on that?

Mr. **Colby**. The Soviets have the same incentive after a freeze as right now without one. Their incentive is to lessen the danger of nuclear war to themselves, aside from to us, and I think that would continue. A freeze would actually lessen that danger because of the restriction it would place on the development of the new more destabilizing weapons, the higher accuracies and the other features of the newer weapons that are making them more dangerous rather than less.

Senator **Cranston**. Mr. Colby, do you see any risks in a freeze and do any of them exceed the risks that are inherent in the arms race itself?

Mr. **Colby**. I see the risk of a minor marginal violation in a freeze. There are certain elements that might be a little more difficult to verify than others, but the major danger is the continued growth of these weapons, and I cannot see the possibility of a strategic advantage to either side in the result of a freeze.

Senator **Cranston**. I thought your statement on verifiability at the outset was very helpful. What problems are we likely to face in verification if the arms race continues? What problems specifically do we face with regard to cruise missile verification?

Mr. **Colby**. There is a problem on how you distinguish a nuclear-armed cruise missile from a conventionally armed cruise missile, but we have that same problem with respect to bombers and we work our way through that by various indicators in the bombers, by the support structure for nuclear weapons as against conventional weapons that surround the airfields from which they fly—that sort of control that you look at to determine whether they are nuclear-armed or not.

We are going to be doing that whether there is a treaty between us or not. A freeze would make that process easier.

Admiral **Gayler**. I think I would add to that, sir, if I might, that the growth of a very large cruise missile component on either side would make verification of reduction agreements very much more difficult.

Senator **Cranston**. Admiral, do you have any suggestions as to ways to improve the concept of the freeze?

Admiral **Gayler**. I think that as a practical matter that to treat it perhaps as a moratorium, a restraint by mutual informal agreement would avoid the otherwise necessity for a long negotiating period, and that might be a good thing to do. I think that would improve it without changing its thrust.

Senator **Cranston**. What about incremental approaches?

Admiral **Gayler**. There are some elements of the freeze proposition, such as a comprehensive test ban, which are highly understandable, highly negotiable, highly verifiable, and I think you could proceed with those incrementally in a formal way. But I would advocate an overall moratorium on new things at the same time.

Senator Cranston. What do you say to those who say, "well, how can we safely cut back on any of the weapons we have after a freeze?"

Admiral Gayler. I think we can safely cut our arsenals on both sides to a minimum invulnerable deterrent against nuclear attack, a nuclear deterrent against nuclear attack, and if we design our weapon systems on either side for that purpose they would not in any way resemble what we have now. They might be a tenth or less, of a special invulnerable kind.

And if that were to take place through mutual agreement, the world would be a much safer place and this country would be a much safer place.

Senator Cranston. What do you say to those who say one cannot trust the Russians?

Admiral Gayler. I say that you can trust the Russians to act in the Russian interest and that we have a long record under SALT I of Russian adherence to agreements which are in their interest and which are written in specific and concrete terms. You do this; we will do that—not vague expressions of good will or the spirit of Camp David or something, but simple, concrete agreements the Russians will live up to because it is in their interest.

Mr. Colby. I would like to add to that, Senator, that I do not trust the Russians. I do not think you have to. You can watch them and you can catch them long before they can do anything that would be of substantial danger to us.

Senator Cranston. Do you feel that nuclear weapons are really militarily usable under any circumstances?

Admiral Gayler. No, sir, I do not. I have looked for many years at the possibility of the useful military employment of nuclear weapons—at sea, in the Pacific theater for which I used to be responsible, in the Middle East, and in the defense of Europe. I cannot see any way in which we could use them that would not result in shooting ourselves in the foot and their boomeranging against us, as well as taking the terrible risk of escalation to total war.

Senator Cranston. You spoke in your opening testimony about no-first use and your advocacy of American adoption of that policy. Some people question whether it really serves any significant purpose since neither side is really apt to believe that the other side under all circumstances would stick to a no-first-use policy.

How do you respond to that question,

Admiral Gayler. A no-first-use policy over a period of some time will result in concrete physical changes in the weapons that are made available—because some will be inappropriate except for first-use against a conventional attack—in the deployment of all nuclear weapons, in the doctrines and training for the employment of forces on land and at sea and in the air, in the exercises that we observe and in many other ways.

So it would not be a mere paper declaration which could be overturned but would actually result in a change in the forces involved, which could not be overturned overnight.

Senator Cranston. The Soviets have made a no-first-use declaration. I presume they have not made any noticeable changes as a consequence of that up to now. It not, why not? Is that because we have not reciprocated?

Admiral **Gayler**. Certain Soviet spokesmen have said that they are in fact making such changes and that if we keep our eyes open we will see them. I think we should adopt a wait-and-see attitude on that.

Senator **Cranston**. Do you believe that that is the case at present?

Admiral **Gayler**. I think it is plausible. As I say, I think we should adopt a wait-and-see attitude, and if they do in fact make these changes in doctrine, weapons deployment and everything else, we will see them.

Senator **Cranston**. I want to be clear we were talking about a "no-first-use" policy.

Admiral **Gayler**. Yes.

Senator **Pressler**. Senator Glenn. We can have another round if you want to.

Senator **Glenn**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have followed this question of verification for a long time. It has given me a lot of problems. I have been over to Geneva in times past, gotten every intelligence briefing there is, and read about everything there is, and it still interests and concerns me very much.

We are getting into more complexity instead of less. When SALT II was under consideration in the Senate, as you know, we were blind pretty much—well, we were blind from satellites at that time. We could not say much about it then. We had also lost our tracking sites in Iran at that time. After we regained that capability we can monitor launchers OK, under SALT II.

We are getting into a whole different level of complexity here that really bothers me and I, too, Mr. Colby, do not trust the Soviets. I think that any agreement we make will have to be a verifiable agreement. I have been for a nuclear freeze with those qualifying words ahead of it—mutual and verifiable. Verifiable adds a whole level of complexity to it that still disturbs me.

Dr. Redlener mentioned that 79 percent of the American people want a freeze. But also, when you ask but do you trust the Soviets to operate in good faith under a freeze, it is just about the same figure that says no, we do not fully trust the Soviets to do that.

So you come out with some mixed emotions here, and I have those same mixed emotions that I think most of the American people feel. When we talk about numbers of warheads per missile and a 2-for-1 scaledown and things like that I am just at a loss as to how we verify things like that.

I know you gentlemen have expressed great confidence here today that we can verify adequately. How will we do that? I just do not understand how we will do this because we are into a whole level of complexity on numbers of warheads per missile and we are down to a point where even the numbers of tests required any more are too few to really give you a pretty good feeling of what you can do with that missile.

Concerning the shuttle program, in fact, this is not directly analogous, but we built a brandnew missile, a brandnew vehicle, completely engineered from startup, a whole new concept, solid rockets on this thing, and put men aboard it the first time out. That is the kind of confidence we had in our ability; that the new system would do what it was supposed to do. We did not do extensive testing. We put men aboard it and they went.

And we are getting now to where instead of requiring the 40 or 50 flights that we used to require on missiles, we now have a reasonable confidence level after 5 or 6. We run a longer testing program, of course, but I do not think we would hesitate to deploy with very few tests. And so the Soviets, given the same capability, perhaps could deploy whole new systems with very few tests, without our being adequately able to really verify what they are doing.

I am making a statement more than a question, but that whole area just bothers me a great deal. And I think any agreement we make is going to have to be verifiable to be acceptable to the Congress and to the American people.

Mr. **Colby**. May I respond, Senator?

Senator **Glenn**. Either both or all of you.

Mr. **Colby**. Well, let me say, Senator in the first place the freeze is deliberately not complex. In fact, it has the benefit of eliminating a lot of the problems that you cite because it just says stop testing, which is the easiest thing to locate, production, which is a little harder, and deployment, which is very simple.

So it just says stop and you look to see whether anything of that nature is taking place, not whether there are 10 tests or 5 tests. It is whether any are taking place. So the complexity thing just disappears in the freeze situation.

Senator **Glenn**. I do not know which one of the three of you indicated—I noted it down here. You said you thought we could verify that no weapons grade material was being made. Do you really think we can do that to an adequate extent; that we could verify they were not making perhaps thousands of additional warheads?

Mr. **Colby**. I think we can verify that they are not making thousands. I think we could not verify that they are not making another 50 or 20, which would not make any difference since they have 20,000 of them. But if they made another 1,000, yes, I think we would pick up the activities of that particular factory and we would be curious about it and we would have an ability to communicate about it and ask what was going on there and to raise it through a communications channel with the Soviets that we do not have without an agreement.

Admiral **Gayler**. I think that is the key point, Senator. The question of verification depends on what it is that you have to verify and to what extent you have to verify it, and when you go the grim necessary calculations of how many people get killed in an exchange between the Soviets and ourselves it turns out it is not very sensitive to the numbers of weapons.

It is sensitive to whether you target cities or not. It is sensitive to whether you fuse on the ground, getting fallout. It is even sensitive to which way the wind blows. But in the calculation you can hardly find 1,000 missiles one way or another, so that while you cannot with certainty say that they cannot cheat at the micro level, you can say with a good deal of certainty that they cannot cheat at a level which would make any difference in the outcome.

Senator **Glenn**. Do you think we are going to have onsite? I do not really know how we do onsite inspection because for numbers of warheads and things like that even if we were on site you would have to dismantle missiles and take nose cones off, and it would be just such a complex job.

Mr. **Colby**. Two things. First, I do not think onsite inspection is a be-all and end-all. That is one of those absolutist positions that I think is as much as anything going to torpedo any kind of agreement. I think that the Russians invented the Potemkin village, and their ability to put a false front forward is no worse now than it was a couple of centuries ago under Catherine.

The fact is that we are going to be able to see any substantial activity. The inspection teams can help, but the whole concept of central intelligence is to put the material together from every source, so that you do get a cross check on it and evidence that raises only a slight suspicion on this side, then suddenly looks to have a totally new dimension when you look at it from that side.

If you add to that communication about it, you are doing pretty well.

Dr. **Redlener**. I just wanted to observe that I think this discussion is very far ahead of where we need to be right now. We are not really talking about the applicability or reliability of particular verification systems. We are talking about asking our Government to negotiate a mutual, a verifiable, bilateral freeze. Implicit in that request is that the terms of verification, the terms that will satisfy you and everyone else will be worked out, but that we have the will and we have the impetus to begin those critical negotiations.

But I think what is clear is that we are really not asking for acceptance of a particular kind or set of verification principles. We are asking you to have the will and desire to look for those verification mechanisms by agreeing to seek a mutual bilateral treaty with the Soviets.

Senator **Glenn**. In your statement a moment ago you said you felt it was morally wrong to have weapons like this in our possession, which I believe was your statement. Do you think we should destroy all of ours unilaterally?

Dr. **Redlener**. I do. I think that civilization on the planet should totally destroy its nuclear arsenal. I think that would be—ideally, where I stand on this. What I do not think is appropriate is to try to direct this to one side or the other, doing it first or completely or unilaterally, because no one is really asking that.

What we are asking for is a negotiated agreement with the other guys that have a lot of nuclear weapons to reduce the threat as much as possible so that we do not have a nuclear war. I do not think anyone that I know representing the freeze or certainly any one in the physicians' group is even talking about unilateral measures to disarm or make the United States insecure in any way. I think this has been a problem. As much as we say we are talking about bilateral, mutual agreements, people continue to respond: do you really want unilateral disarmament? I really think that is not where any of us stand.

Senator **Glenn**. No. Well, from the statement you made, I just wanted to clarify that and make sure that was not what you had in mind.

My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral **Gayler**. Senator, as a colonel of Marines, it will not have escaped your attention that this command preoccupation, as well as money devoted to weapons system, which are essentially unusable, does divert from very real military needs, some of which we are not meeting even now, at these budget levels.

Senator **Glenn**. I agree, there is a tremendous amount diverted into this. I do not know how we get out of this immediately, though. I do not think we can just unilaterally withdraw support for these programs and say that we will not keep up. I do not think we want to encourage a perception of imbalance that might encourage any stupid activities on the other side. That is the problem.

And as we try to scale these things down, I want to scale these things down in the worst way, but as we do that, how we verify it still is a very major problem to me. I am not an absolutist, as you put it a while ago, who thinks that we have to have every single one counted. There are going to be certain counting errors in here, I realize that, but we cannot let it get to the huge imbalance point that might let anyone make a mistake, and have the mistaken notion that they really could make a first strike and get away with it.

I disagreed with the MX missile entirely. I led the fight on the Senate floor against the MX 3 years ago, and I lost that one, had a grand total of nine votes in support of my position over here in the middle of the night. I thought it perpetuated a geographic point vulnerability that was ridiculous. To build a 192,000-pound monster that cannot do anything but squat in the same old holes again, and be an even more attractive target, did not make any sense. I felt that we got a better shot at real deterrence by going with a smaller mobile, which is what gives the Soviets pause against the Pershing in Europe, and gives us pause against the SS-20.

Admiral **Gayler**. I think our bottom line is that you would surely see any cheating that made any difference.

Senator **Glenn**. Well, that is the area I am following very closely, and again, I do not quite share your confidence but I am following it very closely and hope I can be convinced that we can pick up anything that is done.

Mr. **Colby**. May I suggest, Senator, that it is pretty clear in that booklet that the Defense Department put out. It just covers a whole lot of things, and if you read the preface of it, it shows you what the Soviets have done in the last year and a half since the first edition of that booklet, and if that is not verification, I do not know what is.

Senator **Glenn**. A lot of them are estimates, and estimating the numbers of tanks and so on is a little different ball games. If we are off by 20 percent there, it is maybe not as cataclysmic in its potential as if we were of 20 percent on the estimates of nuclear weaponry.

Mr. **Colby**. I respectfully wish to differ on that, Senator. If we are talking about more than enough of these weapons on both sides to destroy the world many times over, a 20-percent error, which I say is not a reasonable percentage, that we can come much closer than that on these weapons. A 20-percent error is a great deal safer for our country than to continue to build more and better of these weapons.

Senator **Glenn**. Thank you.

Senator **Pressler**. Senator Cranston?

Senator **Cranston**. The thrust of your testimony seems to be that the risks of verification failure are really far outweighed by the risks of the arms race. With regard to onsite inspection, if the two powers continue with modernization and more and more complicated weapons systems are developed, do you believe we will come to a time when onsite inspection will be imperative, or is it more likely that we will always be able to verify safely by other means?

Mr. **Colby**. I think that onsite inspection can assist the process of verification. I do not think it can provide it alone. And I do not think without it the process of verification is impossible. It is one of those additional sources of information that can help you.

Senator **Cranston**. Is it not true that with regard to onsite inspection, the United States is probably just as unwilling to have Communists running around our defense plants as the Soviets are to have capitalists running around their defense plants?

Mr. **Colby**. I am not sure that Lockheed would particularly like to see Soviet colonels walking through their secret skunk works.

Senator **Cranston**. Can either of you conceive of a rational, deliberate, calculated decision by either side to launch a first strike?

Admiral **Gayler**. I cannot.

Mr. **Colby**. I cannot. The retaliation is absolute on both sides.

Senator **Cranston**. I would like to hear both of you briefly comment on the builddown.

Mr. **Colby**. I object to the builddown, Senator, because the builddown includes the building of new weapons. The achilles heel of the arms control process for the last 25 years has been the steady development of new weapons. It is time we stopped developing such new weapons.

Admiral **Gayler**. Senator, I think that anything which resulted in a net reduction in the number of nuclear weapons as the original two for one builddown does is not bad. It is not my preferred way to do it. My preferred way I have testified to, which is simply to get rid of nuclear weapons at the choice and election of each country involved. If the builddown, however, becomes modified by such things as variable ratios and so forth and so on, then it can indeed be a cover for unjustified improvements or modernization of the forces.

Senator **Cranston**. Doctor, I would like to ask you, do the Physicians for Social Responsibility feel that there is any serious medical response to nuclear war?

Dr. **Redlener**. Physicians for Social Responsibility categorically states that we see no possible way of mounting any sort of effective medical response in the aftermath of nuclear war. Dependence upon the possibility of salvaging what would be left of society after nuclear war is really illusory. This is exactly why we have gotten so deeply involved in preventive measures in dealing with nuclear war.

Senator **Cranston**. Has your organization done medical, scientific studies in this area?

Dr. **Redlener**. PSR's members and its leadership have done an extensive amount of work analyzing all sorts of potential recovery systems or civil defense systems that have been proposed with regard to salvaging people after nuclear war. We have looked at the crisis relocation plans, sheltering, predicted radiation levels, expected incidences of all sorts of infectious diseases, trauma and burn injuries, and other problems just about as extensively as can be done.

We have attempted to prospectively look at this issue, and have concluded as a result of this data and our studies that there would not be any chance for reasonable human survival after nuclear war.

Senator **Cranston**. Is it your understanding that the Soviet medical experts who have looked at this matter have come to the same conclusion? If so, how widespread, as far as you know, is that information in the Soviet Union among the medical people?

Dr. **Redlener**. Soviet medicine has mounted a campaign, attempting to explain to the Soviet people about the dangers and consequences of nuclear war, similar to what is happening in the United States. The exposure of the Soviet population to the physicians' concerns has been incredibly extensive. All of the major Russian media outlets, television, printed media, et cetera, have covered this repeatedly. There is no question that the Soviet people, at least in this narrow regard, have similar information as the American people in terms of the medical consequences.

In fact, as we speak, an American delegation of physicians is returning from the Netherlands, where a meeting was held with physicians from the Soviet Union and other nuclear powers to talk about the international medical concerns with regards to nuclear weapons and war.

Senator **Cranston**. That chart of DeLauer's from DOD is very useful. Could you provide that to the committee in an 8 by 11 form so we can reproduce it? That would be very helpful.

Dr. **Redlener**. Certainly.

Senator **Cranston** [presiding]. I have no other questions, and I guess there are no others here with questions. I hope that we are going to proceed to markup next Tuesday. I believe we are. I thank you all very much for your attendance. Your testimony has been very helpful. I think we have developed a very strong record, with the help of you and the other witnesses. I thank you very much. The hearing now stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 10 a.m., Thursday, June 23, 1983.]

UNITED STATES-SOVIET RELATIONS

THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 1983

United States Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles McC. Mathias presiding.

Present: Senators Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Murkowski, Pell, Biden, and Tsongas.

Senator **Mathias**. The committee will come to order.

The committee is privileged to have before it this morning the Under Secretary of State, Kenneth Dam. Before we call on the Secretary for his opening statement, I have a short statement of my own.

Because, Mr. Secretary, you come before this committee at a critical time in the evolution of opinion in Congress and around the country on the subject of arms control, I think it is fair to say that in voting on the 25th of May for the MX missile or, more specifically, for the continued testing of the MX missile, that a number of Members of the Senate agreed to give the administration one last chance to prove that it is really serious in its negotiating efforts.

The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Kenneth Adelman, sent us a letter which was released the day before yesterday that, together with the testimony he gave in closed session to this committee last week, bring into serious question the basis on which at least some of us cast our vote in May. Both the letter and his testimony lend support to the contention of those who argue that the adminsitration has made impossible demands on the Soviet Union in the START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks] proposals, demands that the Soviets will not accept, will not consider seriously, and which in fact threaten the continuation of the arms control process.

I realize that some in the administration maintain that there is a realistic prospect of success in Geneva based on the administration's proposals, just, I might say, as some in the freeze community argue that a total freeze on nuclear weapons testing and production and deployment is a feasible policy goal.

But one of the things we ought to consider together this morning is: What happens if they are both wrong? What if, by setting standards that cannot be met, we have doomed ourselves to continuing the escalation of nuclear weaponry and perhaps worse?

I for one have concluded that, as worthy as some of the goals that we have established for ourselves may be, they are not achievable within a reasonable period of time, and the result is a threat to the stability of the nuclear arms balance.

The Soviet Union is obviously not going to destroy several hundred of its heavy and medium ICBM's just for the privilege of letting us deploy 1,000 MX warheads and thousands of sea-launched cruise missiles. But we do need, I think, to retain the START goals and to continue the START process.

At the same time, we must initiate a new negotiating track which seeks interim restraints pending some more comprehensive solutions to our strategic arms problems. We need to negotiate a confidence-building package with the Soviets which enhances stability, which reduces the risks of war, and which points toward a more far-reaching agreement.

We should consider certain ICBM-SLBM test limitations. We should consider restraints on new and destabilizing systems, such as sea-launched cruise missiles, and expanded verification procedures.

I have to conclude—and I say this with a great deal of concern—that the American people have lost faith in the official arms control process, and they have good reason for coming to that conclusion as the process has lost control of the arms race. It hardly requires a reminder that over a decade has passed since we ratified the last major United States-Soviet arms control agreement.

Stability is at risk and with it our national security becomes at risk. Thee are interim measures that should be explored with the Soviets, measures which can enhance our mutual security while we seek comprehensive solutions to our strategic arms problems.

I would hope that today we could explore this subject in your testimony and in the colloquy that will follow.

Senator Pell, do you have an opening statement?

Senator **Pell**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, yes.

I am particularly interested in this letter and what it says, because it was in answer to a question of mine that Mr. Adelman wrote me, with copies to other members of the committee. It was very decent of him, I think, to make it an unclassified letter, since the session itself was classified. But it seems to me, having made it an unclassified letter, it really then is in the realm of public policy.

The question really is very much as Senator Mathias has said: Is the MX on the bargaining table at Geneva or not? It has been sold to us as being useful in the bargaining process. If it is not on the bargaining table, do we really mean what we say? Is this an opening position, that we would require the Soviets to give up 650 ICBM's and not build up any more in return for our giving up our 100 MX's? In other words, they would give up all of their medium and heavy land-based intercontinental missiles, which are already in place, and we would give up the MX system, which is only in the process of being tested.

Is that really our position? If it is not our position, what is our actual position?

Senator **Mathias**. Mr. Secretary.

STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH W. DAM, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE

Mr. **Dam**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Pell.

I would like to address the specific question of the letter in connection with the questions and answers, if I may, because I would like in the course of my testimony to try to set forth our general position. Then we can get into details as you think appropriate.

Senator **Mathias**. I think you will have that opportunity.

Mr. **Dam**. With the understanding that you are going to give me that privilege, I would like to proceed to the formal testimony. Actually, I have a rather short testimony, because Secretary Shultz was already before you fairly recently setting forth not only our arms control policy but our general position in United States-U.S.S.R. relations. You have that testimony.

It is, as he said, his position, the administration's position, and the President's position, because the President went over that testimony very carefully. And in fact, in order to get to the questions that I know are on your mind, I am going to present an even shorter version than my already relatively short testimony.

Senator **Mathias**. Would you like the full statement inserted in the record?

Mr. **Dam**. I would appreciate it.

Senator **Mathias**. Without objection, so ordered.

Mr. **Dam**. Thank you.

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this committee as you review the relationship of arms control to our national security and the current status of our arms control efforts.

The issues before us are among the most important issues we face, because of the dangers inherent in nuclear weapons and because of the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable peace.

President Reagan is committeed to the process of arms control, and has been pursuing significant arms reductions since the first days of this administration. Both deterrence and arms control are key components of our national security policy. Our efforts, we believe, are beginning to pay dividends.

In 1981, the President undertook, with the bipartisan support of the Congress, a vigorous program to restore the strength and credibility of our military forces. At the same time, the President set in motion a major review of arms control policies and issues, which produced a series of arms control policies and issues, which produce a series of arms control proposals for negotiation with the Soviets.

Specifically, in 1981 the President wrote to President Brezhnev outlining a four-point agenda for arms control. Those points are: Negotiation on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe; the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks; negotiations to achieve lower, equal and verifiable levels of conventional forces in Europe; and finally, negotiations on what have become known as confidence-building measures—measures to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.

Since then we have introduced arms control proposals in the areas of chemical weapons, improvements to the Threshold Test

Ban [TTB] Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions [PNE] Treaty, and nuclear nonproliferation.

Secretary Shultz addressed each of our negotiations in detail before this committee last week. In addition, we have described them in the publication which I would like to make a little pitch for here. It is a U.S. Department of State publication called "Security and Arms Control: The Search for a More Stable Peace," available from the State Department, which sets out this history and sets out our general position on each of these negotiations.

I believe, for several reasons, that we are now in a very strong position to achieve progress in arms control.

Senator **Mathias**. Mr. Secretary, the majority leader is holding for me on the telephone. Would you mind suspending your testimony for just 10 seconds?

Mr. **Dam**. Of course.

[Recess.]

Senator **Mathias**. Mr. Secretary, I apologize for that brief interruption.

Mr. **Dam**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I believe for several reasons that we are now in a very strong position to achieve progress in arms control.

First, by modernizing our conventional and nuclear forces, America has demonstrated its commitment to maintain a stable nuclear balance, even in the face of a massive Soviet military buildup.

Second, we have continued to demonstrate by our flexibility, our seriousness about reaching mutually beneficial arms control agreements. While we believe our proposals are sound and fair, the President has given his START negotiators new flexibility to explore all appropriate avenues for acheiving reductions.

Third is the emerging bipartisan consensus. As a result of the Scowcroft Commission report and extensive consultations with the Congress, there has been a rethinking of our national strategic policy and adjustments have been made in our arms control approach. The President has endorsed the findings of the Scowcroft Commission and has pledged his support for adopting its specific proposals. We are also giving serious attention to the Cohen-Nunn builddown proposal, the objectives of which are congruent with our own.

Fourth is the renewed unity of our allies. At Williamsburg and at the recent NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris, our allies clearly endorsed our basic arms control approach and reaffirmed and dual tract Alliance policy on INF.

In sum, I believe that conditions now exist for progress, but progress requires a serious effort on both sides. The Soviet Union thus far has not been forthcoming—in either START or the INF negotiations. If progress is to be made, the Soviet Union too will have to show seriousness and flexibility.

In pursuing all arms control agreements, our guiding principle has been that they should result in militarily significant reductions to equal and verifiable levels. I believe that despite our disparate views on the strategic balance, these criteria can form the basis of arms control agreements acceptable to the Soviet Union as well.

The Soviets have already shown some movement in the direction of accepting the concept of reductions in the START talks. While we have proposed deeper cuts than they, we are now talking the same language—the language of reductions. Much more negotiating will have to take place before any agreement becomes possible in START, but it is not an impossible task from where we stand today. We are negotiating in good faith. It is up to the Soviets to respond in kind.

In the INF negotiations, our objective has been and remains the complete elimination of longer-range land-based INF missiles, wherever they may be deployed. The Soviet position continues to call, in effect, for a Soviet monopoly of such weapons. We have made clear our readiness to agree to reductions to any equal verifiable level. Here again, we look to the Soviets to negotiate in good faith.

Mr. Chairman, the current situation holds much promise, but the next few months will be critical. Above all else, we must work to maintain a bipartisan consensus on the U.S. approach to arms control. To the extent the Soviets believe they can exploit divisions in this country and within our Government, arms control agreements will be delayed. To the extent that the U.S. positions put forward in the negotiations have the solid backing of the U.S. Congress and the American people, the Soviets will recognize that they are faced with positions that they cannot ignore.

The U.S. positions in all of the ongoing arms control negotiations are sound, they are equitable, and with your help they are achievable.

Mr. Chairman, I stand ready to answer any questions the committee may have on the administration's arms control policies and the various arms control resolutions now before the Congress.

Thank you.

[Mr. Dam's prepared statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH W. DAM

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before this Committee as you review the relationship of arms control to our national security, and the current status of our arms control efforts.

These are among the most important issues we face as a nation, not only because of the dangers inherent in nuclear weapons, but also because of the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable peace.

President Reagan is committed to the process of arms control and to producing meaningful results. He has been pursuing significant arms reductions since the first days of his Administration. Both deterrence and arms control are key components of our national security policy. Our efforts, we believe, are beginning to pay dividends.

EARLY EFFORTS

In 1981, the President undertook, with the bipartisan support of the Congress, a vigorous program to restore the strength and credibility of our military forces. At the same time, the President set into motion a major review of arms control policies and issues, which produced a series of arms control proposals for negotiation with the Soviet Union. Specifically, in November 1981, President Reagan proposed in a letter to President Brezhnev a four-point agenda for arms control. That agenda included negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe; the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks; negotiations to achieve lower, equal, and verifiable levels of conventional forces in Europe; and finally, negotiations on what have become known as confidence-building measures—measures to reduce the risk of war by accident or miscalculation.

Since then, the United States has also introduced a far-reaching proposal for a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons in the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament. We have also proposed to the Soviets discussions needed to improve the verifiability of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Finally, we are conducting an active dialogue with the Soviets on the issue of nuclear non-proliferation.

We are now vigorously pursuing each element of this important and comprehensive agenda. Moreover, Mr. Chairman, useful progress has been made. I won't go through the status of each negotiation at this point, since Secretary Shultz addressed each of our negotiations in detail before this Committee just last week.

PROSPECTS FOR ARMS CONTROL

I believe that we as a nation are now in a very strong position to achieve progress in arms control. A number of factors are coming together now that lead me to this conclusion.

First, and most importantly, America has now demonstrated its resolve in maintaining a stable nuclear balance. Strategic arms control cannot be divorced from its context—the strategic balance. The Congress and the President together have taken essential steps to modernize our military forces, nuclear as well as conventional, and thereby to help ensure a stable balance, even in the face of a massive Soviet military buildup.

A second important element is our continued demonstration that we are serious about reaching mutually beneficial arms control agreements. This determination is reflected in the flexibility we have shown. While we believe our proposals to be sound and fair, we are willing to consider alternative approaches. For example, 2 weeks ago the President stated that "there may be more than one way to achieve our objectives of greater stability at reduced levels of arms." He thus instructed Ambassador Rowny to make clear to the Soviets that we are willing to explore alternative means of achieving those objectives.

A third and crucial element is the new bipartisan consensus on modernization and arms control that has emerged in recent months. As a result of the Scowcroft Commission report and extensive consultations with the Congress, there has been a rethinking of our national strategic policy, and adjustments have been made in our arms control approach. While the Scowcroft Commission expressed support for the basic approach of this administration, it did call for some changes—most notably movement toward smaller, single-warhead ICBMs as a means of creating a more stable strategic balance in the future. President Reagan has endorsed the findings of the Scowcroft Commission, which he praised for the "wisdom of its counsel," and has pledged his support for adopting its specific proposals.

We are also giving serious attention to the mutual guaranteed build-down proposal sponsored by Senators Cohen and Nunn. We see their objectives as congruent with our own: to achieve substantial reductions, while at the same time allowing necessary modernization.

A fourth element which has helped to improve chances for achieving meaningful arms control is the renewed unity of our allies. At Williamsburg and at the recent NATO Ministerial meeting in Paris, our Allies clearly endorsed our basic arms control approach and reaffirmed the dual-track policy on INF. This has put the Soviet Union on notice that its hopes of dividing the Allies will not work and that serious negotiation is the only realistic course open to them.

In sum, I believe that conditions now exist for progress. But it is important to realized that progress requires a serious effort on both sides. The Soviet Union thus far has not been forthcoming—in either the START or the INF negotiations. For example, despite recent Soviet statements on INF, the Soviets continue to insist on a monopoly of INF missiles in Europe. If progress is to be made, the Soviet Union too will have to show seriousness and flexibility. At present, our positions in START and INF are still far apart. We can begin to narrow that gap if the Soviet side takes a constructive approach.

We recognize that the Soviet Union may view the strategic balance differently than we, but we believe that there are some fundamentals that both sides can agree upon. In pursuing all arms control agreements, our guiding principle has been that they should result in militarily significant reductions to equal and verifiable levels. I believe that these criteria can form the basis of arms control agreements acceptable to the Soviet Union as well.

Indeed, the Soviets have already shown some movement in the direction of accepting the concept of reductions. For example, in START, the Soviet Union has proposed a reduction to 1,800 in the level of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and have offered to limit the actual number of nuclear warheads to some unspecified number. While the United States has proposed deeper cuts, we are now at least talking the same language—the language of reductions.

Much more negotiating will have to take place before any agreement becomes possible in START, but it is not an impossible task from where we stand today. The United States is negotiating seriously. The President recently announced his willingness to raise the ceiling on deployed missiles, in accordance with the Scowcroft recommendations. It is now up to the Soviet Union to respond with similar flexibility.

In the INF negotiations, our objective has been and remains the complete elimination of longer-range land-based INF missiles, wherever they may be deployed. The Soviet Union has resisted this stabilizing and moral solution. Mr. Andropov's proposal of last December would still give the Soviet Union a monopoly in longer-range INF missiles. Despite a few rhetorical flourishes, the Soviet position remains essentially unchanged since the outset of the negotiations.

In our effort to break the stalemate, we have proposed an interim agreement under which we would reduce our planned deployments in Europe if the Soviets will reduce their number of warheads currently deployed to an equal level. In short, we have made clear our readiness to agree to reductions to *any* equal verifiable level. Here again, we look to the Soviets to negotiate in good faith.

Thus, the current situation holds some promise, but the next few months will be critical. Above all else, we must work to maintain a bipartisan consensus on the U.S. approach to arms control. To the extent that the Soviets believe they can exploit divisions in this country and within our government, agreements on arms reductions will be delayed. To the extent that the U.S. positions put forward in the negotiations have the solid backing of the United States Congress and the American people, the Soviets will recognize that they are faced with positions they cannot ignore.

The U.S. positions in all of the ongoing arms control negotiations are sound, they are equitable, and with your help, they are achievable.

Mr. Chairman, I stand ready to answer any questions the Committee may have on the Administration's arms control policies and the various arms control resolutions now before the Congress.

Senator MATHIAS. I suppose we should start with the Adelman letter, and since Senator Pell raised that question initially I want to give him an opportunity to discuss it with you. But as we raise it, it seems to me you have to recall that great leaders, military leaders, in writing their memoirs describe how they sat in their tent the night before the battle and visualized what the other side was thinking; and that we have to sit in our tents and visualize what the other side is thinking.

What can the other side be thinking in the light of the Adelman letter, which suggests that they have to dismantle most of their land-based ICBM force, the heart of their deterrent, with no corresponding reduction in American land-based ICBM's? What are we thinking in our tent,

Senator Pell, did you want to pursue the Adelman letter?

Senator PELL. Thank you very much indeed. You are very nice to give me this opportunity, because the letter is of interest, I know, equally to all of us.

You are familiar, Mr. Dam, I know, with the letter.

Mr. DAM. Yes, I am.

Senator MATHIAS. If not, we have a copy. [Laughter.]

Senator PELL. I want us to be clear what it is saying. Would you agree with me that "forego" is the same as "relinquish"? In other words, that the letter says the Soviets should forego their heavy and medium ICBM's?

Mr. DAM. That is right.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Now, in your view is the administration talking about all of the SS-19's and SS-18's, for a total of about 650 missiles?

Mr. **Dam**. Could I answer that question in a more general way first, because I think it is important to put this letter into perspective?

Senator **Pell**. Certainly.

Mr. **Dam**. I must say that, sitting in their tent, the Soviets undoubtedly will have problems visualizing what we are thinking, because they hear so much of it.

I think we have to remember that we are talking very specifically to the Soviets about our proposals in Geneva. They are very clear, they are on the table, and they are very specific. This letter is not our proposal to the Soviet Union. We have made our proposals clear to them at Geneva. We have also had other discussions with them on START matters. So I do not think they have any doubt about what our position is.

Let me say this with respect to the Adelman letter. First of all, I would like to say that the Secretary of State addressed that letter yesterday afternoon in his press conference. If you do not have the transcript of the relevant portion of that press conference I would be pleased to make it available to the committee, because he answered several questions on that subject.

Senator **Mathias**. I think it might be appropriate, if there is no objection, to make it a part of the record, at least that portion of the transcript.

Mr. **Dam**. We would be pleased to provide it for that purpose.

[The material referred to follows:]

Press Briefing by Hon. George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, Loy Henderson Conference Room, June 22, 1983

Secretary **Shultz**. Any questions?

Greg Nokes (AP). Yes, Mr. Secretary. Are U.S. efforts to obtain a withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon at an impasse? If not, what is our next step, and do you or Ambassador Habib or Deputy Secretary Dam plan to meet with Syrian officials in the near future?

Secretary **Shultz**. We have been meeting with the Israelis and with the Lebanese. We have been consulting with the Saudi Arabians and other friends in the region. We have had contact with the Syrians.

We continue to be fully engaged in this very important issue. I recall to you the President's objectives of the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon, of the emergence of Lebanon as a sovereign country able to rule itself and develop, and to provide measures that ensure the security of Israel's northern frontier. We continue to work for those objectives.

Ambassadors Habib and Draper will be returning to the area probably the day after tomorrow, and we will continue to be fully engaged and work on it.

Question. Mr. Secretary, what if the Israelis redeploy their forces to the south? Would that be a setback in terms of a total withdrawal of all foreign forces, and is there any deadline inherent in that?

Secretary **Shultz**. There are no particular deadlines although obviously the sooner a withdrawal process can start, the better. I'm speaking of a full withdrawal process. That is what we want. I say the sooner the better because it's a very tense area. When you have tension, I think the sooner you relieve it the more you reduce the risks.

One would hope that if there is any move in the direction of withdrawal it would be part of an overall program. In any case, whatever happens I'm sure there will be intensive discussion between the parties most directly concerned.

Question. But if there were a partial redeployment of the Israelis, would that be a setback in terms of the full withdrawal?

Secretary **Shultz**. That depends upon the conditions under which it takes place. I think there is, of course, inherently a sense that when one of the foreign forces there withdraws, that is part of the territory of Lebanon that they can take control over.

Nevertheless, I think we have to come back and judge anything that happens according to these major objectives, not only of the President but of the others that we have been working with in the area.

QUESTION. Mr. Secretary, the situation in Lebanon itself, with the Syrians apparently trying to take control of the PLO in the Bekaa Valley and with the Syrians also attempting to set up local autonomous rule in parts of the Bekaa Valley, doesn't lend itself to much optimism in terms of a Syrian withdrawal at any time soon.

Is there any reason to believe—do you have any reason to believe that ultimately the United States may be successful in getting the Syrians to withdraw?

Secretary SHULTZ. We certainly are going to continue to work on that problem. As you point out, I think quite correctly, there are obvious indications that the problems are real. Nevertheless, I think there is great importance throughout the world, and the Arab world, on the emergence of Lebanon again as a country that is free of foreign forces, and great support for that idea. I think and hope in the end we'll have success, and the Lebanese will succeed.

QUESTION. A debate is raging in the press about the central message that you meant to convey in your statement on Soviet-American relations to the Foreign Relations Committee last week. Would you care to join and maybe settle that debate?

Secretary SHULTZ. I've been asked that question a lot. I have, after trying a variety of answers, settled on this one. My advice is: read the statement and draw your own conclusions. Don't depend on somebody else.

QUESTION. Mr. Secretary, can you give us any details on the deaths of the two American journalists today in Central America, and have you determined as yet where the fire came from that hit their car?

Secretary SHULTZ. I understand that the fire came from Nicaragua, and it hit their car. They were in a zone which was known to be a dangerous zone and they had been warned, as I understand it, before they went there. But the fire did come from Nicaragua, and I want to take the occasion to express my sorrow and my condolences to their families.

QUESTION. Mr. Secretary, I would like to give you another chance on Dan Shorr's question.

Secretary SHULTZ. I thought that might come back. There is a fundamental point when people complain about news stories of one kind or another, that they should read something and then figure it out for themselves and not depend on the opinion of someone else.

QUESTION. In the carpentry of that particular speech, clearly, there must have been an emphasis in your mind of some sort of signal you wanted to get to the Kremlin, and we have in fact had mixed interpretations.

We would like a little background guidance from you.

Secretary SHULTZ. I think there are two signals, if you want to use that terminology: strength and diplomacy.

We want to make it clear that we are determined to be strong, to be able to defend our interests. We have strong allies. We're working effectively with them; there is cohesion, and we are determined. At the same time, we and our allies both would prefer a more constructive dialogue and set of arrangements with the Soviet Union than we now have.

In the statement I say that we are prepared to engage in that kind of discussion. I think it's a question of both sides of the coin. They're both there.

QUESTION. If I may follow up, sir. Since you made that statement, and given the statements made by Foreign Minister Gromyko, do you sense in what the Soviets have been saying any indication of a Soviet response to the diplomatic side of your two-signal approach?

Secretary SHULTZ. You can take a statement like the full text which I read of Mr. Gromyko's speech a few days ago and, for the most part, it is, I would say, a very tough and categorical kind of speech and set of statements. However, it is interlarded with comments about the desire for—I think his term was, at least, as translated—smoother relations, and so you find that intermixture.

I think it's fair to say that this sort of a combination of strength and diplomacy has been present in statements made by a variety of people, including General Secretary, or now President Andropov and President Reagan. The question is, will there be a development in terms of substance?

There are a wide variety of places in which discussions are going on between ourselves and the Soviet Union and our allies in the Soviet Union.

There are many fora where substantive issues can be explored. And in those fora, we are prepared with reasonable positions and a spirit of give-and-take. So we'll see whether or not we have a kind of response that can allow the diplomatic side of this to develop.

QUESTION. Mr. Secretary, have you decided yet whether or not the United States will engage in a direct dialogue with repesentatives of the left in El Salvador, and whether that dialogue will be conducted with Ambassador Stone here, there, under what conditions?

Secretary SHULTZ. The basic dialogue that has been put forward has been put forward by the Peace Commission in El Salvador which has stated its willingness to discuss with the left conditions under which they might enter the electoral process.

I think that is the right body to conduct those discussions, and the right way for it to go. If we can facilitate that, and I think if that is to happen, it would undoubtedly be through Ambassador (Senator) Stone's efforts. If we can facilitate that, we're glad to do so, but fundamentally I think the responsibility rests with the people of El Salvador, and they have designated the Peace Commission as the body to engage in that discussion.

QUESTION. Mr. Secretary, there seems to be some confusion about the meaning of the terms under which the MX missile might be abandoned.

Is this meant as a serious negotiating offer, or is it meant to simply convey the idea that it would be very, very difficult to talk us out of the MX?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think this blow-up today about that subject is puzzling because I don't think that there's anything particularly new to be said on the subject.

Let me just review where we are. The first point to remember is that the Peacekeeper, or MX, as it is deployed, will be a very important modernization of the land-based leg of our triad deterrent force. That's the fundamental reason why the President is recommending it, the Scowcroft Commission recommended it, and why it's being funded and put there.

At the same time, we are in the process of a wide-ranging discussion with the Soviet Union aiming at reductions in strategic arms. That's including the whole variety of arms that fall under that category. So all of these things are under discussion.

But I don't think there is anything particular to recommend, picking out a particular element in that bargaining and trying to place it against some other element in that bargaining. If we are able to reach a result, which I hope very much that we are, there will be a package of things that will be worked out between the parties, and that's always the way it is in any complicated bargain, not an equation of any one thing.

QUESTION. Mr. Secretary, on that point a number of people in Congress have said that they believe the MX was essentially put forth as a bargaining chip. But General Scowcroft himself has said that is not the case, that there are no conditions under which it would not be deployed.

Was it meant to be a bargaining chip?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think I've just answered that question, but I'll try it again. The reason for the proposed deployment and eventually the deployment of the MX or Peacekeeper Missile is that it constitutes a key ingredient in the land-based leg of the triad of deterrent forces. That is the basic sum and substance of it.

We are engaged in a bargaining process, and the bargaining process is about strategic forces, so it's something that has to be taken account of in those discussions. It's basically as simple as that.

QUESTION. Mr. Secretary, if I can come back to the dialogue with the Soviet Union, could you give us some of the flavor of the talks? I don't mean—what I mean is aside from the arms control forums, which we all know about. Now, you've been, I gather, talking to Ambassador Dobrynin, and presumably Ambassador Hartman had some talks in Moscow.

Are these more in the way of each side reading its own brief, or are there actually any proposals put on the table, or is it a kind of a sterile discussion? We don't get any sense of any give and take here.

Secretary SHULTZ. I can't point to results that show that somehow we're making genuine progress from the variety of talks we're involved in, and I think by and large you know them well. There are the INF talks in Geneva, there are the START talks in Geneva, there are the chemical warfare talks in Geneva, there are the MBFR talks in Vienna, there are Max Kampelman's discussions in Madrid, there are the ambassadorial discussions that you mentioned, there are a wide variety of international agencies in which both countries are represented and which our representatives sometimes get together in the venue of those talks. So there are a wide variety of things, and there are some areas where there has been some progress made.

Of course, we have positions that we express, and they do too. At the same time there are occasions—and I've been involved in some myself—in which there is a kind of a personal give and take to it. But, barring substantive results that we can point to that are significant, I don't think that you can say the process is leading us somewhere.

In other words, I say you really have to judge it by results. There's a lot of input, there's a lot of activity, but we have to keep looking at the substance and asking ourselves in those terms whether or not we're getting anywhere, and so far we aren't.

But we will keep at it, and I hope that we will get somewhere.

Question. Can I ask you a question I've asked you sometimes in the past. Do you see any value in a meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko to try to get some of these issues at a higher level in advance of when you'd see him normally at the U.N.?

Secretary Shultz. If it turns out, if there is a judgment that it is desirable to do that—when Foreign Minister Gromyko and I came to the end of our meeting in New York, we agreed that if it appeared to be desirable to us, we would arrange a meeting. So far it hasn't seemed worthwhile, but that doesn't mean that it couldn't be arranged. But as of now there is no plan for such a meeting.

There's nothing to bar it, however, and the possibility of it is always present, of course.

Question. Mr. Secretary, (inaudible) that a meeting will or might take place in Damascus between you and President Assad at the end of your upcoming trip to the region since you said that you are in contact with the Syrians and consultations with (inaudible)?

Secretary Shultz. We're in contact in the sense that we have exchanged cables. Our Ambassador has met with them. They have said they are ready for and want to see a dialogue with us. We feel the same way about it, and we hope that such will be arranged. But I don't have any plan or any schedule to stop in the Middle East on my way back from Pakistan.

Question. Sir, in your talks and discussions with the Saudi Arabians and their intercession, have you felt that the Syrians perhaps would be more amenable to a withdrawal from Lebanon now since they are involved—since the Saudis may be involved in some of those talks?

Secretary Shultz. Since the what? I couldn't hear.

Question. The Saudi Arabians—since you are in consultation with them, and since they have been interceding in some of those talks, have you sensed that perhaps the Syrians would be more amenable to a withdrawal from Lebanon now from your discussions with the Saudis?

Also, sir, you mentioned that Ambassador Habib will be going out to the region. Is he welcome in Damascus? Will he be stopping over in Damascus?

Secretary Shultz. First we observe, I think, a very constructive effort on the part of Saudi Arabia, and what precisely will come out of that remains to be seen. Other countries also have expressed themselves and are being helpful. Beyond that, I don't have any comment to make on the Saudi effort.

As far as Ambassador Habib in Damascus is concerned, they have stated that they don't want to receive him there, so he won't go, and we will find other people who we hope will be acceptable to them and be able to carry on a discussion with them.

Question. Mr. Secretary, I would like to take you back to the Honduran-Nicaraguan border where some of our colleagues were killed yesterday. That area has been heating up in recent months with military action around that border.

Recently, General Alvarez, who is the head of the Honduran military, was in Washington, and he said he would like assuance from the United States that if there were a major attack into Honduras, the United States would come to the aid of Honduras.

Can you tell us what is the United States attitude about that, and how likely do you thnk such a thing might be?

Secretary Shultz. We consider the situation in Central America to be of great importance to the people there and to ourselves. And because of that, we are extending great efforts there. I think the very large-scale shipment of arms into Nicaragua from the Soviet Union, sometimes directly and through Cuba, is not appreciated by us. It's a very unfriendly thing to do. So we would take a major outbreak of war there very seriously. Beyond that, I don't want to make a comment.

Question. Mr. Secretary, do you have the impression yet that the Soviets want to negotiate a way to get their troops out of Afghanistan? And what would you hope to accomplish on that front and on the Cambodian problem during your trip?

Secretary Shultz. The United Nations has been conducting for some time now negotiations with the Soviet Union on the Afghanistan matter. Just how much progress they've made is a little difficult to interpret. The Pakistanis have been involved, and of course, taking a part there. I've had the opportunity to discuss that with Foreign Minister Yaqub Kahn, and I look forward to talking with him again. But I don't really have anything to point to that that says genuine progress has been made. There is a large contingent—over 100,000, we understand—of Soviet troops in Afghanistan.

For there to be a genuine resolution of that problem, which we very much favor, it would have to include the removal of those troops; it would have to include the emergence of a non-aligned government of Afghanistan; it would have to provide for the creation of a government that is responsive to the people of Afghanistan, and in some way the refugees would have to come back with honor and without prejudice.

So these are the things, I think, that are pretty well agreed that we need to work for. And there is a lot of effort going on, but it's hard to identify progress.

So far as Kampuchea is concerned, we have been supporting the efforts of the ASEAN countries. I will be very interested to be talking with them in a few days in Bangkok. Again I think what we would like to see—the ASEAN countries would like to see, the Chinese would like to see—is the removal of the Vietnam forces, Soviet proxy forces, from Kampuchea, and a chance for that country to revive itself.

There are a lot of interim things being talked about. Of course, the Thais are very close to that situation, so their views have to get some special weight. That is, again, something that I'll be discussing.

Question. Also, on that general region, does your trip to Asia signal an increased American commitment to the Pacific and Asian region, both in terms of defense and trade?

Secretary Shultz. It is a fact that our trade with the nations of Asia has been increasing rapidly over quite a period of time. And if you look at the patterns of economic development, population, and so forth, I don't see how you can expect anything else but a continuation of that trend into the future. So it's a very important area for us from the standpoint of the economics of it, and of course, it has great strategic and security importance as well. So when we say we should be global in our outlook, it certainly means that we should be paying attention to developments in Asia, and I have been very conscious of that personally, both before being in this job and since being in the job.

Question. Mr. Secretary, what do you make of the current struggle within the PLO? How do you interpret the Syrian involvement in that? And if Yasser Arafat were to be overthrown, would that necessarily be a bad thing?

Secretary Shultz. We don't have a lot of contacts with the PLO, so our intelligence is all second-hand and third-hand. I shouldn't say we don't have a lot: we don't have any direct contacts with the PLO. That always leaves you a little less well informed than you might otherwise be.

But there is, clearly, a struggle going on, and it has probably some elements of policy. There may be some elements of the results of indecisiveness involved and control over funds and bureaucracy—I don't know. The basic issue, I think is how can it be brought about that more attention is paid to the problems of the human beings called Palestinians, who live there, and whose lot is a poor one and whose prospects, not just taking it from year to year, but almost from generation to generation, are not that great.

It seems to me that we do have to pay attention, not just us but the PLO and everybody, to the legitimate rights and aspirations of these human beings, and see if we can't do better by them. I think it must be so that one of the reasons why there has been such difficulty with conflict in the Middle East is the fact that we, as an international group of countries, have not been able to come to "grips" satisfactorily with the human condition of the Palestinian people, and we really have to be down on it. It's a very difficult problem, I know, That's the reason it hasn't been solved. But I think that is at the heart of the matter more than sort of internal PLO politics.

Question. But would Arafat's coming or going bode ill or well for your ultimate objectives, do you think?

Secretary Shultz. It's a question of the degree of unity in the PLO and the extent to which there are factions and what orientation of the PLO might have, and whether or not in the end, whatever happens might make it more possible for King Hussen to have a non-PLO, legitimate Palestinian delegation that was endorsed with him in entering the peace process. That's what we have been trying to achieve.

The extent to which Syria comes to dominate the organization, which may be happening—you read that a lot—I think makes it questionable, whether or not these developments would ease that problem. So we have to look elsewhere for our method; or perhaps in our discussions with the Syrians we might find some answers.

Mr. HUGHES. The last question.

Secretary SHULTZ. "The last question," the boss says. You pick the last questioner.

Mr. HUGHES. What about Mr. Schorr?

Secretary SHULTZ. OK.

QUESTION. Mr. Secretary, do you know of any material of American origin or American license being used by one side or the other in the war between Iraq and Iran? And if that were to happen, what would be your attitude towards it?

Secretary SHULTZ. We have had an attitude of neutrality in that war, and we haven't made sales directly ourselves. We have also prevented sales of American-licensed or American parts flowing through in somebody else's equipment.

In saying that I don't say that nothing could possibly have slipped through our efforts—and maybe you have an example in your mind or something. But that has been our policy, and we have tried to follow through on it and with considerable amount of argument with some of the countries that have wanted to make those sales.

QUESTION. Thank you, Mr Secretary.

(The press conference concluded at 3:35 p.m.)

Mr. DAM. First of all, he emphasized that the MX is important to the national security of the United States, that it is an important part of the strategic Triad, and that we need it. The Scowcroft Commission thought we needed it. The Congress has thought we needed it. We have proceeded with the flight testing of it. That is the first point: It is a part of our national security.

Second, we do have this process in Geneva that I have talked about. Now, at Geneva we have a position and the Soviets have a position. But overriding everything is the President's statement that everything is on the table. We are prepared to discuss any reasonable proposals from the Soviet Union.

But we do not think that in talking about our position, particularly publicly, it is useful to pull out one element of what is a comprehensive position and try to link it up with one element of what the Soviet position is. These are packages. They reflect balance, and attempting to draw lines between one point in their position and one point in our position does violence to the concept of comprehensive strategic negotiations.

Now, the question that was the basis for the Adelman letter was an extremely hypothetical question.

Senator PELL. Let me interrupt there, since it was my question. I would disagree with your use of the word "hypothetical." The question was very simply, what would be the price if we did not go ahead with the MX.

Mr. DAM. May I explain what I mean by hypothetical?

Senator PELL. Please.

Mr. DAM. Hypothetical in the context of the Geneva negotiations. It is the United States which has proposed substantial reductions. As I said in my statement, the Soviets have begun for the first time to talk the language of reductions. Remember that the earlier SALT agreements, on the whole, simply ratified the existing level of armaments. They did not involve substantial reductions.

To talk about the elimination of one entire U.S. weapons system would go far beyond anything the Soviets have shown any interest in discussing. We are the ones who are discussing substantial reductions, not the Soviet Union. So in that sense, we are somewhere on the far end of anything the Soviets would even allow us to say at the table, much less discuss seriously.

In that sense I think it is a hypothetical question. It does not connect with anything the Soviets are willing to talk about, and so I would characterize the letter as a hypothetical answer to a hypothetical question.

I do believe that it is important, in talking about what kinds of packages could be worked out with the Soviet Union, to be in the position where we negotiate through our negotiators at the negotiating table. I think we complicate their jobs if we try to talk about packages that might be negotiated with the Soviet Union.

I want to reiterate that we have a position on the table. The Adelman letter is not a new offer. We have a position on the table and they have a position. We have said we are prepared to talk to them about anything they want to talk about, and so I think that is the way in which we will be handling this matter.

Senator PELL. But my understanding was you were going to give us a general reply to my question and then a more specific one.

Mr. DAM. Right.

Senator PELL. What would be your more specific reply?

Mr. DAM. Well, your question, as I take it, had to do with what is meant by forgoing medium and heavy ICBM's.

Senator PELL. Yes, SS-19's and SS-18's.

Mr. DAM. SS-18's and SS-19's, but not all of the Soviet land-based missiles. But the SS-18's and SS-19's are what I take that to refer to. It does not say all, but all might be a reasonable interpretation.

The point is, obviously if we are going to have to give up something then the Soviets are going to have to give up something equally important. That is all the letter intends to say, as I read it. It does not say 600 or so, or whatever the correct arithmetic is.

Senator PELL. But it does say to forego the heavy and medium ICBM's. Presumably it is an all-inclusive phrase. In your view would that include also the SS-17?

Mr. DAM. I did not read it in that way, because in the normal vocabulary that we have been using it would not.

Senator PELL. Then in your view the heavy and medium missiles would be simply SS-19's and SS-18's?

Mr. DAM. That is my view of what that letter means. But again, we have emphasized to the Soviet Union that one of the areas of equality that we should be driving for, working on, is the area of destructive potential. We have told the Soviets, as the President said in his Rose Garden press conference, that the Soviets can tell us exactly how they would like to do it, but work on that we must.

So what this letter is saying is, all right, if the Soviets want us to forego MX deployment then they have to be prepared to make major steps in the area that is the most dangerous, which is their very heavy and medium—and their mediums are all quite heavy by the standards of the United States—missiles, and they have to make major efforts there.

So in that sense, it is congruent with our START position, but it is not meant to be some clarification of it, some new proposal or some new offer, et cetera.

Senator PELL. Would you expect, if we moved ahead in agreement along these lines, that the Soviets would take other steps, too, to reverse their buildup? What would be your view of other steps the Soviets could take?

Mr. **Dam**. Well, we have put on the table a proposal which includes a reduction in the number of missiles, with particular emphasis on a reduction in the number of warheads and a reduction in destructive potential, which feeds back to this question of their heavy and medium ICBM's. We also proposed other kinds of things in the area of confidence-building measures.

Senator **Pell**. Does the quid pro quo in that offer involve the reduction of or not moving ahead with the MX's, or would we move ahead with MX through hell and high water?

Mr. **Dam**. We have a proposal on the table with regard to the number of missiles and the number of warheads. The Soviets do not want to come down that far. Now, we are prepared to talk to them not only about numbers, but also about composition. So in that sense the MX is available for negotiation.

But it is not a bargaining chip in the sense that we are not saying that we are just deploying this for the purpose of negotiation. The point is, it is a vital aspect of our national security.

Senator **Pell**. Thank you very much. I thank the Senator from Maryland for this opportunity.

Senator **Mathias**. Mr. Secretary, I would like to come back to other interim proposals. If START turns out to be not negotiable, and the freeze turns out to be not negotiable, what else can we do?

But answering this, I would like to take one more look at the START program as it has been outlined by Ambassador Adelman. If I were a Soviet leader sitting in my tent—and I am not confining this now to the Adelman letter—I might look at the options that seem to be available, and those do not look terribly attractive when you consider the cuts that the United States would have to take would be in the least vulnerable of American systems.

Mr. **Dam**. I beg your pardon? I do not quite understand what you are asking.

Senator **Mathias**. Well, it does not seem to be very attractive from their point of view for us to offer to make cuts which from their point of view are in weapons systems that are not the most threatening to them. And of course, part of what concerns me is not just how the Russian leader sitting in his tent is going to view it, but how is the rest of the world going to view it? How are our allies in Europe going to view it? How, for that matter, is the American public going to view it?

We have to have a policy which is credible from the point of view of public perception.

Mr. **Dam**. Well, Senator, we would be required to take reductions by our proposal.

Senator **Mathias**. But in what systems?

Mr. **Dam**. And in fact, everyone has been telling us that we had too low a number, not too high a number, with regard to the number of missiles in our proposal.

Are you suggesting that we really ought to suggest lower levels?

Senator **Mathias**. I am suggesting that the particular systems that we have suggested as being available for our cuts may be ones that are less attractive than they need to be in order to keep the negotiating process moving.

Mr. **Dam**. Well, we have not suggested particular systems in that sense. What we have done is to set forth a position based on number of warheads, number of deployed missiles, and destructive potential, and we would be taking reductions.

Now, if they want to propose a particular system, well, we have said we are willing to talk about any reasonable proposal. We are not excluding negotiating about particular systems. Our proposal is phrased in more general terms, and indeed, we are of the impression that that is how the Soviet Union rather prefers to negotiate, because they have put a good deal of emphasis on their designing their system and our designing our system.

Senator **Mathias**. Now, while each side is sulking in their tents, what else can we do?

Last March a number of Members of the Senate sent the President a letter which pointed to the need to overhaul and modernize the NATO short-range nuclear force posture. Specifically, we proposed a sizable net reduction in the NATO tactical nuclear forces. This adjustment has been supported by the NATO military leaders.

We have had no response from the administration to that suggestion. I wonder where that lies. Again, I address myself not only to the substance of the proposal, which I believe to be sound, but to the perception which this would create in Europe and in the United States, which is extremely important to the political stability of the Atlantic Alliance.

Mr. **Dam**. There are two aspects to that. With regard to shorter-range INF systems, those are under negotiation at the INF talks in Geneva.

Senator **Mathias**. We are talking about battlefield tactical weapons, of which there are a large number deployed at the moment.

Mr. **Dam**. With regard to weapons that would not fit into that category, we are very actively working on that subject. We are working on it with our allies. We have a very serious review under way with them conducted at a high policy level. We would expect that that would come to a conclusion some time this autumn.

Senator **Mathias**. Of course, there has already been a NATO review and a NATO report on this subject which advocates that these tactical weapons be withdrawn.

Mr. **Dam**. My impression is that all of the allies agree that that has to be given flesh and it has to be worked out. So, the work now is going on to make that a reality.

Senator **Mathias**. Could you advise us as to the status of those negotiations?

Mr. **Dam**. Yes. I would prefer to think of them as a cooperative study and set of conclusions rather than negotiations with our allies, because they really are not in the nature of negotiations. I do expect them to be concluded this autumn. I cannot give you a specific date, but definitely this autumn.

Senator **Mathias**. It looks to me like this is a promising interim step that would create a sense of confidence about the arms control process.

Mr. **Dam**. Yes. I do want to point out to you that in the period 1979–80, we took about 1,000 such weapons out of Europe unilaterally. I also want to point out that to a large extent, the INF deployments will be on a one-for-one basis, so that other weapons will be coming out. So this is not an area where there has been any kind of buildup in number of weapons. Rather, the trend has been already and for some time in the opposite direction.

Senator **Mathias**. The NATO report was very specific, and the letter that we sent to the President was very specific on this. I have to be disappointed that we have not been able to make more progress, but let me move on to another subject.

On the question of START, the administration has apparently decided to defer consideration of SLCM's, the sea-launched cruise missiles, until a unspecified later point in these talks, although the United States enjoys a clear edge in cruise technology, I think that major deployments of sea-launched cruise missiles may occur before these systems are considered, before we reach that unspecified point in the negotiations, so that we will not be negotiating about weapons still to be deployed, but that will actually be on submarines and maybe other surface vessels.

Senator Pell and I had a conversation on this subject, speculating on his sitting on the rocks in Newport, Rhode Island, drinking his morning coffee and wondering whether the trawler he sees out on the horizon is carrying a SLCM. This is not just a hypothetical, fanciful possibility, because 75 percent of the American people live within range of Soviet SLCM's while only 10 percent of the Soviet population live within the range of U.S. SLCM's.

So, this administration ought to have very great concern about the deployment of SLCM's. Just because we seem to be ahead in that art at the moment is no guarantee that Senator Pell's coffee cup may not be shattered some morning. We thought we were way ahead in MIRV technology and it did not take the Soviet Union very long to catch up in MIRV's, and they can catch up in SLCM's too.

Would it not be in our own best interest to move forward with negotiating with the Soviet Union for strict limits on SLCM deployments before they also achieve a capability which can put them to sea in every trawler and every fishing boat up and down the Atlantic Coast?

Mr. **Dam**. Well, I certainly agree with you that the Soviets have demonstrated a technological ability which leads me to agree that they do have a capability in this area, and that they will have more.

I think the problems with regard to SLCM's is a little different, however. First of all, this is an area that raises several problems. One is verifiability

Senator **Mathias**. I agree. That is the nightmare of SLCM's.

Mr. **Dam**. They are extremely difficult to verify, so one has to work very hard on that problem. I think the other area is that one has to be concerned about compomising conventional capabilities, because in the long run, cruise missiles afford possibilities for reducing the nuclear threshold, or rather reducing the dependence on nuclear weapons. In many ways, they are the most promising thing technology has to offer us by way of finding some way out of the nuclear dilemma. So, we do not want to shut off our ability to develop our conventional capacities. So, there are some very serious dilemmas in this area.

In the meantime, the Soviet Union has shown no interest at all in negotiating. They say they want to ban them. Well, I do not think that is a negotiating posture that permits serious discussion of these very difficult problems that I have just mentioned.

Senator **Mathias**. Now, in order to restore the proper rotation, I will recognize the Senator from Kansas next.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would only say regarding your comment about the generals sitting in their tents deciding what to do that we also today have a large section of the American population that sits in front of their television sets and become generals in regard to their own thinking about what we should do with regard to arms control and every other issue.

Also, I think that these hearings are serving a very important function, but I would also caution those of us who feel that we are not pushing the administration enough to deal with the Congress as well as the Soviets on arms control. I think that there is a fine line to be struck there on what, indeed, has to remain on the bargaining table and what can be thrashed out in public debate.

Secretary Shultz, when he testified last week on United States-Soviet relationships, Mr. Dam, said at that time that we would hope to not be involved in endless confrontation with the Soviet Union. I think this is what concerns us all as we analyze that relationship, and it is a wearing one that can push us sometimes to want to try for new efforts, and sometimes ones that become unrealistic and too demanding.

I think that the questions that we have attempted to ask in a discussion of the various arms control resolutions before us in the Senate is the broader spectrum of what efforts can be made to put together, as Senator Mathias has said, an interim package.

I have thought that there were various proposals, including one of which I am a co-sponsor, that would help us in an interim period that would in no way jeopardize the ongoing negotiations as I would see it, and allow us to continue to be flexible as President Reagan, I think, is attempting to be in these efforts.

It is a two-way street. We can only just try so many times and, I think, have to be trying realistically, but so far we have certainly been met with an inflexible position from the Soviets. I would like your thoughts on the Levin-Kassebaum proposal of which Senator Mathias and Senator Pell are cosponsors, as are nine other Senators.

The thrust of that is a moratorium on MIRV'd ICBM flight testing. We would continue to test the MX up to the start of the moratorium. We would also continue with production up to that point. But we would offer a moratorium on testing to the Soviet Union of all MIRV'd ICBM's that have been in development since May 1979.

This would catch the modified SS-18's and SS-19's, as well as the new SS-X-24 the Soviets are developing. That is the solid fuel missile on which they have conducted some tests. As I see it, verification would not be a problem, and this is one of the aspects of it that I think is important. Verification of land-based missile tests is relatively simple. It would not require lengthy negotiations. It would be a breathing space while other, more significant negotitions such as modified START would be ongoing.

I think that one thing that has to always be taken into account is the balance, and a realistic one, as Chairman Mathias has pointed out. It seems to me that both sides have to give up something if a worthy compromise is going to be struck, and the success depends on a negotiator not giving up too much. I think in this proposal the net goes fairly wide, as far as what we would be asking of the Soviets, particularly in the solid fuel development, if they would agree on halting those and some other tests.

One key, I think, and it is an important one, would be the timing. Obviously, if negotiations would continue on to a point in a moratorium that is reached after they have already conducted a significant amount of their tests, it would be pointless, but of course I think that is something that would have to be determined.

I would like your thoughts about whether you believe this could be a viable proposal that would help us in a continuing search for some interim measure or initiative on arms control efforts.

Mr. **Dam**. First of all, let me say we very much appreciate the thoughtfulness behind this proposal. I do think that there is one rather overriding consideration that leads us to conclude that in the end it is not a good idea. You might disagree on that particular aspect of it, so I also want, then, to go on and talk about a problem basically in the verification or, if you like, in the drafting area that in any event one would really have to face up to.

On the more general proposition, I think the fundamental question here, as you recognize, is basically that the Soviets would only really be giving up the SS-X-24 where we would be giving up, in effect, the MX, because that would be the effect of it if they agreed to it, and I suspect they would snap it up, because what we are talking about is a situation in which the United States frankly has been very slow in modernizing its land-based forces.

As I recall, the MX development in the sense of original conception dates from 1966. The United States has been very slow in, first, getting it to the development stage, and I am using development there in the technical sense, and then in working it through the whole deployment question, which we all know has been facing several administrations and a number of Congresses.

So, in the meantime, the Soviets have been able to develop, deploy, and then build variants of the SS-17, the SS-18, and the SS-19. Those are in place. Meanwhile, we have not gone to the point where we have something comparable in the MX, and what this proposal would essentially do would be to lock in the Soviet advantage.

Now, you may disagree on that proposition, but that is the general proposition. There are more specific concerns that I would like to point to, and it really, I guess, is best thought of under verification, although verification relates back to the problem of negotiation.

I think the PL-5 case, which I take it you are familiar with, shows that there is a real problem in verifying the difference between an existing type, a modification variant, if you like, and a new type. I know you have attempted to deal with this problem in section 3 of the resolution, because it prohibits the flight testing of a variant, a new variant presumably of the SS-17, SS-18, and SS-

19, but it would not probibit the flight testing of an existing type of SS-17, SS-18, or SS-19.

Now, we have already had three pre-1979 variants of the SS-17, four of the SS-18, and three of the SS-19, so when we get a new test, the immediate question is where does it fit? Is it prohibited or is it not prohibited? You know that from the encryption aspect it is very difficult to know, so it is not so clear to me that the Soviets would really be precluded from further upgrading their SS-17's, SS-18's, and SS-19's under this rule, but if they agreed, we surely would be precluded from getting to the point where we would be in a position to deploy any MX's.

So, those are my two problems.

Senator **KASSEBAUM**. But if there were a significant modification, this woud be easily detected, and that is, of course, what we would want to get at. As I say, the larger consideration, I think, would be the importance of halting the new SS-X-24.

Mr. **DAM**. But is that enough a justification to lock in the Soviets' advantage which the Congress faced in the MX debate?

Senator **KASSEBAUM**. Well, we can still continue testing the Minuteman III.

Mr. **DAM**. But not, presumably, a significant—I think that was your word—improvement to the Minuteman III.

Senator **KASSEBAUM**. Well, if it is a problem for us, what they do, I think it would be a problem for them, what we do. As I say, there has to be a balance struck, and it is something that one has to carefully figure out. But we cannot, it seems to me, hope to achieve any breakthrough, and maybe this is what none of us want to face, in which we believe that we cannot give up anything. It is finding some constructive mechanism there by which we are both going to have to give up something, realizing, as I said earlier, that it is not so much as to endanger our strategic security.

There will be many who think giving up anything would be wrong, but then that would put arms control negotiations absolutely out of the picture. There is a certain amount of purpose to be served in just talking. But that builds up an atmosphere that is not particularly conducive to any real productive efforts after a time. What I think is important is to continue searching for some crack that can be used to continue to push the negotiations forward.

If the administration finds some other avenue along these lines that it would feel might answer those problems, I am sure all of us here would be very supportive of those efforts. I hope that some good thinking might go into using something like this as a vehicle for an interim strategy.

Thank you.

Senator **MATHIAS**. Thank you.

The Senator from Massachusetts is recognized.

Senator **TSONGAS**. Mr. Secretary, let me pursue the issue of what is on the bargaining table. Since you were not the one to raise it, I feel somewhat inhibited, since you are basically trying to square statements made by other people. I have here the transcript of the testimony that Director Adelman gave to us last week.

Mr. **DAM**. I am glad you have it, because I have not had an opportunity to obtain it.

Senator TSONGAS. One of your staff can take care of that. I would just refer you to particular pages. One is page 24, where Chairman Percy indicated what he thought the ground rules were vis-a-vis what was on the table and how that related to his view of the MX. I would refer you to pages 26 and 27, and discussions between Mr. Adelman and Senator Boschwitz on what in fact ACDA has looked at, and page 44 and 45, discussions with me on that same question.

And then, I think, most particularly on the question of numbers, page 35 onward, the discussion between Mr. Adelman and myself on numbers, and on page 32, discussions between Senator Boschwitz and Mr. Adelman on what would be deployed.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Was that a top secret briefing, Senator, to which you are referring?

Senator TSONGAS. I am just referring to the pages and the subject matter, and not to details—what would be deployed. I think if you read that, and it is now available, you will see why we are concerned, because the impression that has been given publicly by Secretary Shultz and what has been stated to us in that testimony plus the letter does not seem to coincide.

So, what we want to know is whether indeed the MX is a bargaining chip, and let me ask you some specific questions. The letter to Senator Pell says that, "The scale of MX deployment will be influenced by Soviet strategic programs." Now, does that mean that the number of MX's that would be deployed would be a function of how many Soviet ICBM's are in place?

Mr. DAM. Senator, the deployment of the MX is one thing. The negotiations are another. So we would proceed with the deployment of the MX under the plans that have been testified to at extraordinary length by the people most directly concerned with the development and deployment of the MX. At the same time, we would be trying to reach agreement at Geneva with the Soviets.

Now, we have put on the table proposals which call for reductions, reductions by both sides, very substantial reductions. Clearly, we would have to reduce missiles, deployed missiles. We would have to reduce warheads, and the composition would be something undoubtedly that the Soviets would want to talk about, and I am sure that in that connection it would be something that we would negotiate actively about, what exactly the composition would be.

Actually, the Soviets have not been anxious to talk about composition of forces, but have been more on the side of saying that they want to talk about numbers only, in the aggregate.

So, I do not see how under those circumstances one can talk about what the outcome of those negotiations will be. Obviously, people have preferences, but deployment of the MX is the deployment that has been testified to in open session and that we planned, subject to whatever agreement we are able to arrive at in Geneva.

Senator TSONGAS. OK. Let me pursue that. The optimal agreement in Geneva would be the President's proposal, by definition, which would take us down to 5,000 warheads. I am sure you would agree with that.

Mr. DAM. [Nods affirmatively.]

Senator TSONGAS. Now, at 5,000 warheads, I think most people around here assumed that at that level, in essence, having Soviet acquiescence to the American proposal, that you would not have full deployment of the MX, that not all 100 MX's would be deployed, and that either none or substantially less than that would be deployed. Is that a fair understanding?

Mr. Dam. I think that obviously it would be possible to fit the MX warheads within the 5,000 total, if that is what you are asking.

Senator Tsongas. Would it also be fair to say that it is not only possible, but it is probable?

Mr. Dam. I think that depends on what the Soviets want to negotiate about.

Senator Tsongas. Well, the difficulty I have is this. Having sat through the previous testimony, and knowing what is in this transcript, well, how can we get at this thing?

Mr. Dam. I would be glad to talk about this in a classified session if you would like.

Senator Mathias. We can request the chairman of the full committee to call a further classified session. I do not think we can go any deeper into the transcript than we have gone this morning.

Senator Tsongas. Well, I would like to have a closed session, because I think we have to know one way or the other what in fact we are dealing with, and I would hope that we could allow the Secretary to read the transcript and either in writing or personally—he need not come himself—would he just tell us where that transcript is in error, if it is in error. If it is not in error, I think we have a right to know that.

I am not sure what is gained by pursuing this, because I cannot ask questions in any depth here without making reference to classified testimony. I do not want to and cannot do that. But I want to request that at some juncture in the future, perhaps next week, that we might have a closed session at which the Secretary could testify.

Senator Mathias. I will transmit that request.

Senator Tsongas. I will not pursue this matter, because if I do so any further, I would begin to walk a very thin line, and I would not do that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator Mathias. Thank you, Senator Tsongas.

Before we call on the next questioner, let me say that I have to leave the hearing. I have two further questions that I did not have an opportunity to ask, and I am wondering, Mr. Secretary, if you would mind responding to them in writing for the record.

Mr. Dam. I would be delighted.

Senator Boschwitz. I would be pleased to yield to you.

Senator Mathias. Well, I fear it would take more time than you would be pleased to yield, and I do not want to trespass on your time. But I thank you, and I will ask Senator Kassebaum if she would assume the Chair.

The Senator from Minnesota is recognized.

Senator Boschwitz. Mr. Secretary, Senator Mathias as a matter of fact asked you a question about why we have not negotiated early on with the Russians about cruise missile technology, where we apparently have the lead. And I do not know the answer to the question myself, but what kind of success have we had in the past in dealing with the Russians where we have a technology that they do not?

Mr. DAM. That is an interesting historical question. Offhand, I would be reluctant to try to sound too profound on that subject. I think that it is certainly true that we have shown not only that we have technology but also determination. We have been able to accomplish things, and I think of the ABM Treaty, for example, where at first the Soviets were not willing to talk, but when we showed that we not only had the technology, but we also had the will, we got our agreement fairly promptly.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Hopefully that will be repeated, though I quite agree with the administration's position that trying to get a treaty for the sake of getting a treaty is not a particularly good aim. We yesterday, in the afternoon, had a number of witnesses with respect to the nuclear freeze, and one, Mr. Colby, formerly the head of the CIA, I thought, was a particularly competent witness.

I wonder if you would just review with me and review with the committee the position of the administration with respect to the freeze. I understand the opposition, and I believe I understand its reasons also, but I wonder if you would review them once again for the sake of the committee.

Mr. DAM. Yes. We do recognize two virtues of the freeze proposal. One is that it appears to be simple, and the other one is that it obviously has an attraction. But we think that there are many, many disadvantages that overweigh those apparent advantages. In fact, we consider the freeze, particularly in the form of the resolution now before the committee, positively disadvantageous to the national interest.

For example, basically, it precludes modernization of our forces. We believe that a policy of strength and diplomacy, to which the Secretary testified, really could not work with the freeze. Just think of some of the consequences. It would unilaterally prevent us from deploying the INF missiles if we coud not reach agreement in Geneva this fall. That is the very hallmark at present of the solidarity of the NATO alliance, and it would just cause that whole solidarity to collapse, because we would be pulling the rug out from under the entire NATO dual track decision.

We all know about the impact on the MX, and generally across the board it would not be possible to modernize our forces. At the same time, as I have indicated, the Soviets would have their advantages locked in. I think this just gives you a slight flavor of some of the complexities of the issues.

Many people respond by saying, oh, well, we do not want to interfere with the INF, and we do not want to interfere with that, and yes, we do believe in modernization, but could we not just have a freeze? Well, that is really inconsistent as I think is illustrated by the debates in the House. I think the debates in the House really reflect the fact that a simple freeze along the line of the proposal before you is just unworkable. But, in any event, let us move away from that. Let us assume that we could get together and somehow or other try to make consistent that which in itself is inconsistent, that is to say, a freeze and modernization, and could arrive at some language.

The fact of the matter is, we are well beyond a freeze in the START negotiations. It would be very difficult to negotiate a freeze with the Soviet Union. It raises all of the verification problems, and then some, that we have facing us in START, and then some, because insofar as production is frozen, that is the one thing that is really impossible to verify, because you cannot look in a factory that has no windows. You cannot tell what is being actually produced. You can only tell what is being tested. You can only tell what is being deployed. You cannot tell what is being produced.

So, now that we have gotten the Soviets themselves to put on the table a proposal which involves some reductions, why would we want to go back, drop that negotiation, and start negotiating at a higher level of nuclear armaments? It just does not make sense.

So, that, in short, is the administration view.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. You referred in your testimony to, "We are also giving serious attention to the mutual guaranteed builddown proposal sponsored by Senators Cohen and Nunn. Their objectives are congruent with our own, to achieve substantial reductions, while at the same time allowing necessary modernization."

Can you expand on the attitudes that you have developed with respect to the Cohen-Nunn builddown?

Mr. DAM. Yes. Let me just reiterate what you just said. It has the enormous virtue, compared especially to the freeze proposal, of recognizing the necessity of modernization. That is very important. We must modernize. We must reduce. Those are the twin planks if you like, of the President's arms control position, and that is the essence also of Cohen-Nunn.

Now, the President himself has in a variety of ways endorsed this concept. The question now is really one of implementation. How do you build that really brilliant insight into a START proposal? How do you make it consistent with our START proposal? That is something we are working very hard on. There is a process within the administration that is working on those problems. It gets relatively complex, because there are many things to be concerned with. But we would expect within a few weeks, I would say 3 to 5 weeks, to have an administration position not on the concept but on the specific implementation and how to build it into our START position.

Senator BOSCHWITZ. Thank you, Madame Chairman.

Seantor KASSEBAUM [presiding]. Thank you.

Senator Pell, do you have any questions?

Senator PELL. Thank you, Madame Chairman.

I was just thinking, as we were going back to this letter for a second, that I guess we accept the fact that it is a pretty outrageous quid pro quo the administration is demanding from the Soviet viewpoint. On the other hand, if you are going to buy a house, you initially offer about a fraction of what you know you eventually will have to pay; so I can see why the administration would not want to spell out specifically the quid pro quo, because that would give away the bargaining poisition in advance.

I guess the thing that bothers me is that, in securing approval of the MX, and I was not one of those who approved of it, the argument was advanced that it really was a bargaining chip. But, as we explored it further, we found that the bargaining chip is so impossibly large that it is not really a very serious bargaining chip.

I think this is what is causing the problem here. Maybe the administration would have been better off from the beginning in not being responsive at all. I do not know. Do you have any thoughts here on this whole subject?

Mr. DAM. Well, I think that the phrase "bargaining chip" is a very treacherous one. I do not know when it was invented, but it is a little bit of a substitute for thought, I believe. What I said when I testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee was not that the MX was a bargaining chip, but that there was no reason for the Soviet Union to come to the table and bargain seriously if all they had to do was sit back and see all of our plans for modernization collapse in the internal debate in the United States, and that resolve and determination were extremely important.

As I just testified, we demonstrate resolve in connection with the ABM deployments, and we got an ABM Treaty in 1972. It is in that sense that I think the MX has to be viewed. It is not saying that we did not put it on the table. As the President said, everything is on the table. It gets into this very complex kind of dialog that we attempted to have on the open record with Senator Tsongas as to how exactly that would play itself out.

But fundamental to the Scowcroft Commission report, which got wide bipartisan support, was that the MX was needed, was needed on its merits as a national security investment, that it contributed in and of itself to the arms control aspect of the Scowcroft Commission report, that they were a package, and that one had to view the whole thing together.

That was the concept of the Scowcroft Commission report. It was the thrust behind the President's endorsement of it, and as I understood it, it was what was the attractive part of it in the bipartisan support that it received and in the debates that surrounded the congressional decision.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

I guess what is at the bottom of this is that some of us, and I certainly am one, are not convinced truly of the seriousness of the administration in wanting to achieve arms control. We are skirting around the issue, but that is the basic problem. I, for one, need to be more convinced of the seriousness of the commitment of the administration in this regard. I hope I will be convinced, although so far I am not.

To leave this subject and go on to the question of the summit meeting, what is wrong with the idea of a summit meeting with no agenda, just so that the two men can get each other's measure and make sure that the other fellow does not have horns and a tail, to more or less see it from the other man's viewpoint?

We were talking about tents earlier and the way you see things. I like the old admonition that for every 60 minutes you spend negotiating, you should spend 10 minutes in the skin of your adversary, and neither of these men have any idea of the other. I do not believe Mr. Andropov has ever been to our Nation, and I do not think Mr. Reagan has been to the Soviet Union, but I may be wrong in that. Neither one sees it from the other person's viewpoint. Would it not be a really reasonable idea for the two men to spend a couple of days together?

Mr. **Dam**. Well, that is certainly an argument that one hears a great deal, and this general question has been debated for decades. The President has thought long and deeply about this, and he has come to the conclusion that it is not a good idea, and I think that view is very widely shared in the administration.

First of all, just to be sure we are clear as to what the position is what would be required? We would have to have a well-prepared summit, and we would have to have confidence that something substantial would come out of the summit. Both of those terms are subject to definition, and no attempt has been made to give them greater content, because we are not quite at that point yet, although we are trying with the Soviets in a variety of fora, as I think Secretary Shultz made clear in his responses to questions and in his prepared testimony.

I think one of the principal reasons is the expectations that get built around things, say, like econimic summit conferences of allies. The expectations that would be built would be very great. You could say, well, now, we are just going to get together and have a chat, and have a few meals together, and so forth. But the expectations would inevitably grow, particularly in this country, and in any place where there is a free press and free debate. Just think what might come out of it.

Well, nothing would come out of it to which anyone could point other than the fact that they had met and had had a pleasant time or an unpleasant time, as the case may be. But I think the President has felt, and many of us have felt that that would not contribute to a better spirit in the world, to more confidence in the world, to a relaxation of tensions. In fact, it could very well play out just the other way.

Senator **Pell**. My understanding is that there is the possibility of a summit meeting next year at about this time or a little bit earlier, in an election year. I would hope that you would move ahead with it sooner rather than later. Do you have any knowledge of any plan for such a summit meeting coming up?

Mr. **Dam**. I have no knowledge of any plans, and I am confident that there are no plans. We simply have not gotten to the position where we have made enough progress toward the preparation of such a meeting to make planning for it feasible under the guidance that we have from the President.

Senator **Pell**. My own view is that it would be helpful simply in having the two men have an understanding of each other's viewpoint. I have never had the opportunity to hear Mr. Andropov talk, but we have had many opportunities to hear the President express himself. When he speaks, he speaks from a particular viewpoint without, I think, cranking into it the viewpoint of his adversaries, and this is very important in any negotiation.

On a separate subject, the other day, I think it was in answer to a question that I asked Secretary Shultz about regarding a reduction in the chance of war by accident and miscalculation. He mentioned that the Soviets had been responsive when it came to discussing adding a high-speed facsimile capability to the hotline and an agreement for allowing consultations in the event of terrorists seeking a nuclear weapon, but had not been responsive when it came to upgrading the existing diplomatic communications channels and estabishing a direct link between the United States and Soviet military command centers along the lines of the present incidents at sea arrangement.

What are your own views of the Soviet reluctance to engage in these latter two discussions?

Mr. **Dam**. I really feel very uncomfortable trying to speculate about what went into the Soviet decisionmaking process. They have not excluded absolutely those possibilities, but they do not think they are useful or desirable measures. On that basis we have not had the opportunity to discuss those measures with them sufficiently to get a better feel for their reasoning.

Senator **Pell**. So the door is not completely closed, then, to discussions in those two areas? They have not said "Nyet?"

Mr. **Dam**. Oh, they have said no, but let us put it this way: They have closed the door, but they have not locked it.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Senator Boschwitz, do you have any more questions?

Senator **Boschwitz**. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, Senator Cohen has stated that many administration officials appear to be hostile to the builddown, not so much in the State Department, apparently, as at Defense, and these opponents are trying to undermine the President's commitment to adopt it or they are trying to note all of the ramifications and difficulties with it, and thereby kind of sink it in the morass of saying that it is a marvelous idea, but, but, but, but, all these but's, and at the end they have worked and pulled a no out of a yes.

We on the Hill do not want to be unrealistic with respect to the idea of the builddown, and any approach in the area of arms control and disarmament is undoubtedly strewn with complications and risks and so forth. From your conversations, does it appear that proper consideration of the builddown is being impeded? I am not totally wedded to the builddown, but I think it is good, and from all I have heard, the pluses seem to outweigh the many difficulties and complications.

Does it appear to you that in the councils of the administration the builddown is getting a fair hearing? I wonder if you would comment on what.

Mr. **Dam**. Well, as you know, you can get almost any opinion on matters like this within the very large national security apparatus of the United States Government, which involves a number of agencies and departments. But I think that there is general support for this concept, and in any event, we have gotten our marching orders from the President, who has given them to us publicly.

There is a group which is meeting intensively on this subject. Studies are being done. Computer runs are available on what it means, and so forth. But there are some conceptual problems, too, that involve putting it together with our START position, and making it a working proposal, as opposed to a basic concept.

I know that Senator Cohen and Senator Nunn are quite willing to talk about these problems and, as I understand it, have made some changes, although they do not appear in the text of the resolution that I have. We would not want to get ourselves in a position where we would be giving up on a couple of basic propositions.

For example, we would not want to say that if the Soviet Union decides to stick with the weapons they have now and not modernize, that they would not have to reduce, whereas if we modernize, we would have to reduce. We do not think that would be in the national interest. We would not want to get ourselves in a position where we gave up on the notion of equality.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Pardon me, Mr. Secretary. I have asked Senator Cohen the question that since we have such a large number of weapons that are elderly, whether it be B-52's or Titans, or Minuteman II's, or even submarines, and that since the Soviets—I have heard 80-85 percent of their forces are less than 5 years old—could it not be true that the builddown would be destabilizing. We would be building down faster than the Russians.

He, however, responds that despite the fact that they have so many new weapons, they are apparently producing very many more, and as you said in your statement, they have a very active arms buildup, which certainly is continuing. So, it seems improbable that either side will stand still in the whole business of strategic arms. That is a part of the problem of the freeze, that if you create a static situation, we come into that situation with a whole bunch of weapons that will have to be replaced, but they apparently are replacing theirs or adding to theirs, and so the builddown, he felt, would be equally effective against them.

Mr. **Dam**. Well, I do agree that they seem to be going on, no matter what, building new weapons, and in larger and larger numbers, but I still think that in fleshing out the resolution we have to give serious attention to the question of the relative incentive and need for modernization. We do not want to get ourselves in a position where they are in a position to maintain larger numbers simply because they have less need for modernization.

If they have some sort of sociological or political factor in the Soviet Union that means that they will not take advantage of their superior position, that is one thing, but we have to know what we are doing, and that is what we are working on. There have been many conversations along these lines, I know, with Senator Cohen, and so that is what these few weeks are being spent on.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Scott Martin, my staff person, very properly reminds me that Senator Cohen also has agreed to the concept of plateaus. That is, if one side builds down to a specific level and gets ahead of the other side, the side which has built down more could then halt for awhile and wait for the other power to catch up.

Mr. **Dam**. That is right.

Senator **Boschwitz**. I think that would be a useful element in the proposal. I would also ask, do you see the builddown as a possible interim proposal which might be agreed to prior to an overall START treaty?

Mr. **Dam**. Well, that is a complicated question, and we certainly do not have an administration position on that question. I know that has been discussed in many circles. It is somewhat related to another question that is often asked, do you have to negotiate the whole START agreement, or could you envision some kind of an interim START agreement? So it all gets very complicated, and I would not exclude the possibility of it being some sort of an interim step. But, I would say that it has to be very closely worked into our START position, because it would in some sense be like an interim START agreement.

In other words, whatever you do with Cohen-Nunn, you do to our START position, because we are talking about the same weapons. We are talking about the same modernization. And so it has to be congruent, and so I think the question of whether it could be an interim step is really a second question, once you decide what you want your posture to be. So we have not worked out all these questions. I think it is premature to address that question.

Formally, our position is, of course, that we have a START position on the table. We would expect to negotiate all of it.

Senator **Boschwitz**. Well, once again, I think that there are many Senators who are of my mind. We have a great regard for both Senators Cohen and Nunn. Not all of us, including myself, are by any means as expert in the field of arms and arms control as they, and while we will rely upon the administration, we will also rely on one another. So I say that the builddown is an important element in our thoughts and our continued support of administration policies, and we hope that you will give very careful consideration to this.

Mr. **Dam**. We certainly will, and we think that Senator Cohen and Senator Nunn have made a great contribution in developing this concept, and we are delighted to continue to work with them in giving detail to the central concept.

Senator **Boschwitz**. It is a fairly flexible proposal, since the two to one does not have to apply to all weapons. It can even be one to one in some weapons, but from our discussions at the White House and at other places, it seems to be a proposal very worthy of consideration, and going back to my original statement, I trust that it is not being in some way undermined by people in the bureaucracy.

Mr. **Dam**. Well, thank you. I am aware, of course, of the letters that you and Senator Kassebaum, too, wrote on this subject, and I think your point about flexibility is important. I think you address the question of variable ratios in your letter also, and that is important, but determining what those ratios should be obviously requires some work.

Senator **Kassebaum**. Mr. Secretary, I am reminded in listening to these arms control debates of the sequence in "Alice in Wonderland" in which Alice becomes lost and asks the Cheshire cat which way she should go. The Cheshire cat said to her, "well, it depends on where you wish to get to." I sometimes think that this is something that is frustrating to us all, where do we wish to get to?

Senator Biden?

Senator **Biden**. Thank you very much, Madame Chairman. I think that is a great way for me to open my questions.

The only reason why we are going into such detail, Mr. Secretary, in my opinion, is that we are not sure where you all want to get to. When I say you, I am using "you" in a collective sense, and it is no secret that there is skepticism in varying degrees in both political parties, both here and abroad, as to the desire—or as to whether or not the administration wishes to get to an arms control agreement that anybody thinks is practicably negotiable.

I assume you would disclaim that characterization, but I honestly believe that if you in private seek our views, as you have, because you are held in high regard here—my colleagues on this committee and my colleagues in the Senate at large, you will find that although they may differ in degree with my assessment, it is only in degree, not in substance, as to—we are wondering where you want to get to.

Now, to that end, I have become somewhat frustrated, as I am sure you have, for different reasons, about freezes, and build-downs, and flight test moratoria, all of which are good ideas, I might add, but I find us up here discussing with the administration details of negotiating positions. That is somewhat unusual for us to be doing, and the notes my staff was kind enough to take for me on your opening statement and your responses to questions were as follows:

> The Adelman letter is not a proposal to the Russians. They know what we are proposing. Overriding these formal positions is Reagan's statement, "Everything is on the table." It is bad to pull out one element for public discussion. Negotiations are a package. The issue is hypothetical. The U.S. is seeking deeper cuts," et cetera.

Mr. **Dam**. Good notes.

Senator **Biden**. He takes good notes, does he not? [General laughter.]

And he is very bright, too. But beyond that, the fact of the matter is—and the reason why the rest of the staff is chuckling, I very seldom say anything nice about my staff, in part because they very seldom say anything nice about me. [General laughter.]

But all kidding aside, the frustration is obvious. There is a frustration expressed in your very diplomatic answers. In effect, you are saying to us, look, let us negotiate. that is really what you would like to have happen. Let us negotiate. And we are up here saying, well, we do not really trust your desire to negotiate, so we want to provide every kind of push and prod we can. I do not mean you, sir, in particular. I am using you again in terms of the administration.

Now, with that little bit of background, at least where I am coming from, in order to find out where you are going, or where you want to go, to paraphrase Senator Kassebaum, I would like to talk about the negotiating structure within the administration. Who is in charge? Is it Mr. Rowny? Who has the President's ear? Who is the person the President most listens to on arms control? Mr. Rowny? Mr. Clark? Mr. Adelman? You? The Secretary of State? And I am not being facetious. Who? Could you tell us that? Who is the most influential person with the President on this issue?

Mr. **Dam**. I can answer the first part of the question, which I understand is not what you are trying to get at, when you ask, who is in charge? There is no question about the fact the President is in charge.

Senator **Biden**. Who after the President?

Mr. **Dam**. I do want to emphasize that, because I have to say that having attended that very well publicized NSC meeting, there is no question about the fact that in the discussion of the START position, the President was very much on top of the issues, and very much in charge, and understands the issues. It was an excellent meeting.

Now, that being said, there is an NSC structure which provides for interagency work coming together in NSC meetings. Now, the——

Senator BIDEN. Now, who heads that? I am going to ask questions that are obvious on their face, but I would like them answered. Who heads those NSC meetings? Who carries the substantive issues in the NSC meetings on arms control? Who chairs those?

Mr. DAM. The President chairs it. I am not going to get into details of specific NSC meetings, but——

Senator BIDEN. No, I do not want to know——

Mr. DAM. They are chaired by the President. The job of the National Security Advisor is essentially to construct agendas. The normal person who speaks first, and in some sense is looked to for overall direction is the Secretary of State, and certainly the Secretary of State has been spending a lot of time on this question. He has gotten very deeply into the issues. In my judgment, he understands it extremely well. Not only has he mastered the technical details, but he also—and this should not be surprising for people who know him—understands very well the psychology of the negotiations, and how they have developed, and how they should be expected to develop.

Now, there obvioulsy is a very important role for the Department of Defense, and that includes the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because they obviously have the greatest knowledge of the weapons systems. There is obviously a role for the Central Intelligence Agency. There is an important role for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Senator BIDEN. Who prepares the ultimate negotiating—I do not want to know it, but who prepares the document that is the recommended negotiation position as they change? Who hands that to the President? Who prepares it, and who hands it to the President, understanding the President may discard it, change it, know so much about it he writes it all by himself, but who presents—who is in charge of preparing that paper?

Mr. DAM. There is an interagency group.

Senator BIDEN. I know that, but one person heads that. Who does that?

Mr. DAM. I believe that in the START case the principal actor is Admiral Howe.

Senator BIDEN. And for whom does he work?

Mr. DAM. Admiral Howe is in the State Department. He is in charge of our Political Military Bureau. He has the advantage that he not only is within the State Department and has been for some time, and has good knowledge of all of the diplomatic aspects of it, but he also is a military officer.

Senator BIDEN. So it goes from Howe to the President?

Mr. DAM. Well, the purpose of the NSC structure is to be the President's White House staff. The staff is the President's staff, and they structure the meetings essentially, under the statute. Obviously the handing out of things and the construction of the agenda are a job for the President's staff. But there are no surprises here. One does not go to a meeting and find that there is some other agenda than what we have been preparing for all the time.

Senator **Biden**. No, I am not talking about the agenda. For example, let me be more specific. Let us assume that, and since we have established for the record that the Adelman letter was not a proposal, let us assume, since that is not the case, and everybody knows that now, let us assume that was the proposal that Mr. Rowny was going to be instructed to table.

Now, as knowledgeable as the President may be on this issue, unless he is unlike any other President, including ones who were known for their great knowledge of this issue, like President Nixon, unless—even he, because he was such a busy man, and all Presidents are, there is one last person that talks to the President, and by the way, you have been in the bureaucracy long enough. If I have to have a job working for a President, I do not care what the title is, I want to be the last guy to talk to him, no matter what. I think we both agree that that is a strategic position to be in. No matter what the title. No matter how important. I want to be the last guy other than the doorman, you know——

Mr. **Dam**. I was going to mention the doorman.

Senator **Biden**. The doorman in this administration's case may have influence. I do not know. [General laughter.]

But I should not be so facetious. I should not have said that. I am sorry. But I could not resist that, and it is not really true. [General laughter.]

Anyway, I want to get back on the point. So, I was being a wise guy then, but I am not being a wise guy now, when I try to identify who is the person that finally hands the President that position and says, we will trade—if it were a position, 100 MX's or 1,000 MX warheads for 5,300 or whatever it was SS-18's and SS-19's. Who would be the guy to hand that to the President to get the President to sign off?

Mr. **Dam**. Well, let us retrace the process a little bit. You have this interagency group which meets. It meets under the chairmanship of an officer of the Department of State.

Senator **Biden**. And who would that be?

Mr. **Dam**. That is Admiral Jon Howe. Normally, the State Department would prepare the options papers, but everybody will read them. It is all cleared on an interagency basis, so it is an agreed paper. It is transmitted to the President through the National Security Council staff.

Senator **Biden**. And who is that? That is Clark?

Mr. **Dam**. Judge Clark. Mr. McFarlane. There are other people over there. Mr. Lehman, who is an expert on arms control. They are all there. Who actually hands it to him I do not happen to know. I do happen to know that other people speak to the President privately about these matters, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense. I am sure that on occasion the Chiefs have met with the President of the United States.

I do not put as much importance on that question, perhaps, as you do, though I obviously understand that it is of some importance. Let me remind you that the staff of the President has been chosen by the President because he has confidence in his staff, and so they do what he wants them to do.

Senator **Biden**. I understand that dilemma. Though you may not view it as a dilemma, I view it as a dilemma. My concern is this. For example, this committee would be considerably less active on this issue, in my view, if we thought the relationship on arms control questions, and I know my time is up—Senator Boschwitz, do you mind if I keep going?

Senator **Boschwitz** [presiding]. I know that we have a vote on, Senator, and I would like to say a word or two to the Secretary privately before he leaves.

Senator **Biden**. OK. Well, if in fact we knew that the relationship on arms control issues between the Secretary of State and the President was like it was with Ford and Kissinger, or like it was with Kissinger and Nixon, you would find concern up at this end of the Hill being dissipated a great deal.

Our concern, to be very blunt, is that the people the President has reposed his confidence in do not have a lot of knowledge about arms control on the one hand, or have a long track record of believing that arms control is counterproductive. Judge Clark came to the job—maybe he is such a quick learner, but he came to the job with as much knowledge about arms control as I did when I was an undergraudate at the University of Delaware in 1960, and I believe I probably knew more then than he.

Now, you know my views about Judge Clark. I think he is a fine guy, but his promise to us when he was confirmed was, do not worry, I will not be making policy. I am paraphrasing what he said in the record. It was, do not worry, I am not going to be making policy. That was reassuring to 99 percent of us.

Our concern now is that he is playing a big role in making policy. So that is why I have pursued this with such detail. I am not sure even if your answer were different from what you gave me, I am not sure you could sit there and say, well, it is true, the most influential man on arms control with the President is Judge Clark, or the Secretary of State.

Do you believe the Secretary of State to be the most influential man with the President on arms control? Do you believe that man to be the Secretary of State? And I will not ask you who it is if it is not him.

Mr. **Dam**. Well, I do believe so, and I believe so particularly because I believe that arms control is part of our overall relationship with the Soviet Union, and I do believe that the Secretary of State is certainly the dominant figure in developing that policy. Let me say this. I am a great admirer of Judge Clark, but I do not think it makes any difference. I think you ought to judge by what you think of the positions.

Now, let us look at what has happened over the last few months. The question is, Did you think that the interim proposal on INF was a good idea or a bad idea? Do you think the endorsement of the Scowcroft Commission was a good idea or a bad idea? Do you think that giving the flexibility to Ambassador Rowny was a good idea or a bad idea?

Those are the three major events in the past few months.

Senator Biden. Let me answer your question, and then ask you one. The answer is "Yes, I do think it was." Let me ask you. Do you think they would have ever occurred had the Congress not been so vocal and on the back of the President of the United States and on the back of everyone in the administration? If you honestly believe had we remained silent in the U.S. Congress on this issue, were there not a freeze movement out there that was real and deep, and the polls showing 75 percent of the people supported it, do you honestly believe those changes would have occurred?

Mr. Dam. Well, it is possible the Scowcroft Commission would not have existed, but let me say this. I have no doubt, for example, just to take an illustration, that the INF interim position would have occurred because it was very carefully worked out in consultation with our allies, and debated to a great extent face to face in talks with Chancellor Kohl.

Senator Biden. And afterwards, Chancellor Kohl said, hey, fellows, you have to get me off the zero option. I am in trouble, even me, your supporter. Kohl is the guy who said to you guys, I need to change, and you guys are not going to make it unless you change. Your good right-wing friend.

Mr. Dam. I think that is a vast, vast oversimplification. I think the question in negotiations is often timing, and I think there is agreement among the allies that the timing was just right.

Senator Biden. Well, let me conclude by saying—I sincerely mean this—I have great respect for you, and I have an inordinate amount of respect for the Secretary of State, and I would say for the record again he would be a great Cabinet member in anybody's Cabinet. He is a class act.

My concern is that he is so busy—I just think he is the only high ranking informed official on foreign policy that is in this administration, and I am afraid he cannot do it all. I hope he is still talking to the President about El Salvador. I hope you guys at the State Department still have an input on El Salvador, instead of Judge Clark, who is reported to have that influence. I hope Secretary Shultz still has the influence in the Middle East that he did. I do not want Secretary Weinberger making policy there. I hope he has influence on policy regarding arms control.

My problem is, I am not sure that his plate may be too full. But speaking of timing, my timing is way up, and I thank Senator Boschwitz for allowing me the extra time.

Thank you for being here. Please do not quit, Mr. Dam.

Senator Boschwitz. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. This hearing is adjourned.

[Additional questions and answers follow:]

State Department's Responses to Additional Questions Submitted by Senator Mathias

Question 1. Yesterday four former ACDA Directors, including Eugene Rostow, were questioned about the so-called "walk in the woods" taken by INF negotiator Nitze and his Soviet counterpart last July. All four former Directors endorsed the conclusions reached by Messrs. Nitze and Kvitsinsky as the basis for a formal INF agreement.

(a) What is the Administration's current position on the principles enumerated during that Nitze-Kvitsinsky dialogue?

(b) What are the prospects for an eventual INF agreement based on those principles?

(c) Do you see some Pershing II and cruise missile deployments as inevitable?

Answer. (a) The "walk in the woods" reflected ideas worked out on an informal, exploratory basis between Ambassador Nitze and his Soviet counterpart last July. Although we ourselves had several problems with the proposal as it stood, we were interested in keeping this informal channel open. The Soviet reaction, on the other hand, was completely negative.

(b) We remain convinced that the proposals we have on the table in Geneva—the interim solution and the "zero/zero" proposals—offer the best basis for an equitable agreement, and we are actively negotiating for an agreement on this basis. We also remain willing to consider any serious Soviet proposal on the basis of the five criteria set out by President Reagan: United States-Soviet equality, non-consideration of third-country systems, global limits, no adverse effect on NATO's conventional defense and deterrent capability, and effective verification.

(c) Deployment of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles would not be necessary if the Soviets were to accept our preferred INF solution; that is, total elimination of land-based, longer-range INF systems on both sides. The Soviets have so far been unwilling to accept this solution, however, so the United States has proposed an interim solution for equal warheads on INF missiles on both sides. An agreement on a basis other than zero/zero would of course require U.S. deployments of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles to provide a deterrent to the residual Soviet missiles in accordance with the 1979 NATO dual track decision.

Question 2. Would not now be a propitious time to begin negotiations on banning ASAT weapons, before either side has too much of a technological lead and billions of dollars have been invested?

Answer. In 1978-1979 the United States conducted bilateral negotiations with the Soviets on antisatellite arms control. These sessions made it clear that there are substantive problems for which no solutions have yet been found.

For example, we have been unable to find a satisfactory way to verify that the Soviets would have given up their own operational ASAT system under such a treaty. The Soviet ASAT is a relatively small system which is fitted to a space booster. We do not know how many ASAT systems have been manufactured and it would be difficult to preclude a covert supply of ASAT systems for use in a crisis.

There are also problems in defining such broad terms as space "weapons." For example, there are a number of earth-based weapons which could have some residual ASAT capability. The Soviet ABM system is an example of this.

The Administration is carefully analyzing these and other complex arms control problems. Until at least some of these problems are resolved, we believe that it is inadvisable to enter into specific negotiations on "weapons in space."

Question 3. Has the United States prepared any sort of a response to the Soviet draft treaty on outer space tabled nearly two years ago?

Answer. In his speech on national space policy on July 4, 1982, President Reagan declared that the United States will continue to study further space arms control options, and will consider verifiable and equitable arms control measures that would ban or otherwise limit testing and deployment of specific weapon systems, should these measures be compatible with United States national security.

We are addressing problems, such as verification, which must be resolved before we can address the question of negotiations.

Question 4. Given that the United States is much more dependent on space for communication, weather prediction, and military-related matters than is the U.S.S.R., would it not be wise to end the space arms race before it begins?

Answer. It is not at all clear that the United States is more dependent on space assets than the U.S.S.R. Dependencies differ from satellite type to type.

The Soviet Union possesses the world's only ASAT system. Failure to respond to the threat caused by this system would jeopardize U.S. national security. Current U.S. R&D efforts to develop an operational ASAT weapon are in response to that threat.

To date we have been unable to find a satisfactory way to verify that the Soviets would give up their own operational ASAT system under a treaty than bans ASATs. Since satellites which serve U.S. national security—while relatively few in number (compared to strategic systems)—are in many cases vital, Soviet cheating even on a relatively small scale could prove to be catastrophic.

Until at least some of these problems are resolved, we believe that it is inadvisable to enter into specific negotiations on weapons in space.

APPENDIX

FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION,
Washington, D.C., June 23, 1983.

Re: Nuclear Freeze Resolution.

Senator CHARLES PERCY,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
United States Senate,
Washington, D.C.

DEAR SENATOR PERCY: We are writing to urge the Foreign Relations Committee to include the language of S.J. Res. 2 as the centerpiece of any nuclear freeze resolution the Foreign Relations Committee reports to the Senate floor.

We believe the case has been convincingly made that each side has enough nuclear weapons to obliterate the other many times over and that further testing, production and deployment of nuclear warheads, missiles and other delivery systems should be stopped on a mutual and verifiable basis. Deep reductions should accompany or follow such a freeze.

We categorically reject the idea that the way to achieve arms reductions is to enter into a huge new armament program. The theory is that this will induce the other side to negotiate and make concessions. But history shows it is most likely to increase fear, mistrust and insecurity and to promote a counter build-up.

The way to make progress, in our opinion, is to make negotiable proposals which take into account the security interests of both sides, to conduct foreign relations in an atmosphere of civility and equality, and to undertake simultaneous measures to increase constructive communication and expand exchange of persons and trade in peaceful goods.

In our view the nuclear freeze proposal embodied in S.J. Res. 2 is a negotiable proposal which meets the basic security interests of each side, and therefore should be endorsed by your Committee.

As an integral part of any effort to achieve arms reductions, we urge the Committee also to support expanded U.S.-Soviet exchange programs, as in H.R. 3500, and to encourage increased trade in agricultural and other peaceful goods with the Soviet Union.

We oppose the "2 for 1 build-down" as an alternative to a nuclear freeze. While this concept is a definite improvement over the Reagan Administration's START proposal, and would be a useful adjunct to the SALT II limitations, it is inadequate compared to the nuclear freeze. Both sides have huge surplus stockpiles of nuclear warheads. The United States, for example, could reduce its strategic warheads by 90% and still have enough to destroy the Soviet Union as a functioning society. The build-down proposal would, therefore, make insignificant reductions in the numbers of nuclear warheads while providing a license to carry on the technological modernization race to produce more dangerous and provocative weaponry. It would not stop the continued testing, development and deployment of new Soviet nuclear weapons, as the nuclear freeze would.

We would appreciate you inclusion of this letter in the hearing record.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD F. SNYDER,
Executive Secretary.

[Whereupon, at 11:55 a.m., the committee adjourned, subject to call of the Chair.]

○